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




JAMES VI  
OF SCOTLAND  
and the  
THRONE OF ENGLAND



THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION



*JAMES VI*  
*OF SCOTLAND*  
and the  
THRONE OF ENGLAND

BY  
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To My Mother and Father and Sister





## *PREFACE*

The subject matter of this book was originally presented to Bryn Mawr College to meet one of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Its preparation has been aided by many friends. I am deeply indebted to Dr. Conyers Read, of the University of Pennsylvania, who inspired the study and gave constant advice and help throughout the work; to Dr. Howard L. Gray, of Bryn Mawr College, who read the manuscript with care and made many valuable suggestions; to Dr. Caroline Robbins and Dr. C. W. David, of Bryn Mawr College, for their helpful guidance; and to Dr. Frederick J. Manning and Dr. Mary Albertson, of Swarthmore College, for their interest and encouragement. The seminar in Tudor history at the Institute of Historical Research in London, directed by Professor J. E. Neale, has been helpful. I wish to acknowledge the courtesy of the officials of the British Museum and the Public Record Office in London and of the National Library of Scotland and the General Register House in Edinburgh. Dr. Annie I. Cameron of the General Register House has been most kind. Finally, I thank the Trustees and Faculties of Bryn Mawr College and Swarthmore College for generous grants which made possible this investigation.

The financial responsibility for the publication of the book has been assumed by the American Historical Association through its Committee which administers the Carnegie Revolving Fund. I am very grateful to the Committee. I am indebted to Miss Marjorie D. Marsh and to Miss Jean MacLachlan, of D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., for valuable editorial work.

In quoting from contemporary sources, I have modernized the spelling, except in the few Latin and French documents, where I have retained the original spelling. The punctuation is my own. I have tried to insert only such as seemed necessary for clarity. Quotations from printed sources, of course, I have attempted to reproduce to the letter. In the text I used the spelling "Stewart" rather than "Stuart" because the former is the native Scottish form.

The dating of correspondence is as in the original manuscripts. This means that letters in the State Papers, Scotland, are dated according to the Old Style, while the French and Roman transcripts are of the New Style. The fact that Scotland adopted the New Style calendar in 1600 has not complicated the scheme, since most of the letters after 1600 are those of English agents, who still used the Old Style.

HELEN G. STAFFORD

Lancaster, Pennsylvania

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## CHAPTER I

### EARLY CRISES

In the year 1586 England was facing a European situation as serious as any that had confronted the nation earlier in the reign of Elizabeth. Until then the Queen had skilfully kept up the appearance of peace with Spain, in spite of Drake's career as gentleman pirate and in spite of the quiet enlistment of many Englishmen in the armies of the Protestant Dutch rebels. After the assassination of William the Silent in 1584, she had reluctantly commissioned Leicester to lead an expedition to the United Provinces. Although no open declaration of war was ever made between England and Spain during her reign, futile pretences were at length abandoned. The last Tudor monarch appeared in her armor. In the eyes of some she was defending the cause of Protestantism; to others she was the champion of freedom of trade; many saw her most important mission to be the protection of England from the threatening power of other nations. Thousands of her subjects made no attempt to differentiate these missions but thought of them as fused into one.

The war, thus tacitly waged, was one aspect of the broader movements of sixteenth century European history, the conflict of religions, and the rise of centralized national states. In France the religious wars had been resumed. This time the Catholic League, led by the Duke of Guise and strengthened by Spanish gold, was making a determined effort to prevent the Huguenot, Henry of Navarre, from succeeding the Valois weakling, Henry III. Even closer to English interests were the fortunes of Mary Stewart. Since her entrance into England in 1568, the Scottish Queen had

been a serious menace to England's peace. Her claim to be Elizabeth's heir, her fidelity to the Roman Catholic faith, and her relationship to the Guises made men fear lest civil war and foreign invasion be undertaken in her name.

The rôle of Scotland and of her King in this European drama was of great importance. For centuries, France had been the "Auld Ally" of Scotland and England the "Auld Enemy." There was between Englishmen and Scotsmen a deep-seated antipathy, inflamed by memories of Bannockburn, Flodden, and Solway Moss. Scotsmen had not forgotten Somerset's militant matchmaking in 1547, when he tried to woo the infant Queen of Scots for Edward VI by devastating her patrimony. But times were changing. The work of John Knox was not only to rouse his countrymen against Catholic beliefs; his mission in the political world was to lay the foundations of a friendship between England and Scotland, based on Protestantism. The government of Mary of Lorraine, Regent in Scotland during part of her daughter's minority, had made French influence in the country hated. Scottish lords turned to England for aid, and Elizabeth used the opportunity to strengthen "the postern."

James VI, the son of Mary Stewart by Henry Darnley, in whose name the government of Scotland had been carried on since his mother's deposition, was a curious product of the circumstances of his youth. One reads of almost no intimate childhood companions, no pranks or escapades. Much of his time was spent in Stirling, in the keeping of the Earl of Mar. "My Lady Mar was wise and sharp, and held the King in great awe; and so did Mr. George Buchanan," one of his tutors.<sup>1</sup> Buchanan, famous as historian and political writer, was a staunch advocate of the Reformation and a bitter opponent of Mary. His political creed was based on the assumption that government rested upon a system of mutual obligations between monarch and subjects, but he

<sup>1</sup> *The Memoires of Sir James Melvil of Halhill*, George Scott, ed. (London, 1683), p. 125.

emphasized the duties of the former and approved of tyrannicide to get rid of wicked rulers. These ideas, if he discussed them before the King, encouraged quite different opinions in the boy's mind; the scenes James witnessed from day to day showed all too vividly the evils of weak royal authority and encouraged him to stress the duties of subjects.

After Mary's flight to England, Moray, Lennox, Mar, and Morton tried successively to rule Scotland more or less in the Protestant interest and more or less with English help. Then, in 1579, there came to Scotland Esmé Stewart, Sieur d'Aubigny, a French kinsman of James in whom the boy delighted but whom Elizabeth mistrusted. D'Aubigny's influence was undermined by a group of Protestant lords who, led by Gowry, seized the King in the "raid of Ruthven." By this time, however, James was no longer the weak child who had been the pawn of so many regents. In short order Gowry's party was ousted with the King's connivance, Gowry was executed, and his companions, Angus, Mar, and the Master of Glamis, fled to England. In this way murders, swift changes, and what amounted to kidnappings (the polite phrase was "to obtain possession of the King's person") were commonplace occurrences during James's youth. He grew up fully aware that a powerful and factious nobility was incompatible with royal power.

This son of Mary Stewart had not inherited his mother's personal charm. Rather awkward and ugly in appearance, he had in compensation no grace of manner or nobility of character. While he displayed little control over his emotions and often lost his temper, these qualities were coupled with a faculty for deception. Lies, secret diplomacy, and equivocal promises readily given and as readily ignored were characteristic of him. In spite of his extravagant idea of a king's authority, he was incapable of developing any true sense of the dignity of his position. Courtiers who possessed the qualities he lacked—handsome features and a

pleasing personality—attracted him; during his reign many enjoyed the position of favorite, as, for example, d'Aubigny, Huntly, and d'Aubigny's son, the Duke of Lennox. To them all he was generous and at times seems to have permitted state policies to be swayed by his regard for them. They were, however, often his tools for the accomplishment of a cherished purpose. In spite of the absurdities in his personality, James Stewart had a certain ability and tenacity that made him a force to be reckoned with in the history of the years 1587–1603.

The King's position in Scotland in 1586 was, from his point of view, not satisfactory. Although he exerted much influence on the Scottish Parliament through the Lords of the Articles, a committee that practically determined what legislation should be enacted, and although the Privy Council was an apt instrument of the royal will, the power of the great nobles and the poverty of the crown made the King's authority a myth. No efficient system of local government responsible to the crown existed. Royal officers were hampered by old feudal jurisdictions. Bitter feuds among the nobles created grave problems of law and order and made impossible the administration of justice. Forfeited lands of rebels often had to be assigned to some great lord to insure the execution of the penalties of forfeiture, a system that deprived the crown of a profitable source of income and at the same time encouraged vendettas. The frequent recurrence of long minorities in the Stewart line during the past two centuries of Scottish history had accustomed the nobles to independence and lawlessness.

On the borders and in the highlands and western isles lived restless clansmen, another serious problem for the government. The clan system, built on ties of blood and fosterage and personal loyalty to a chief, encouraged feuds. Chiefs often played a dual or triple rôle as heads of clans, feudal lords, and prominent councillors or officers of state. Too frequently, land was occupied by a clan without clear



title; the land itself was poor and unproductive; and Edinburgh, the seat of what little forceful government existed in Scotland, was far distant.

Lack of money was another element in the situation. The poverty of the crown reflected the general poverty of the country. Although agriculture was the chief occupation, the soil was not fertile. There were few towns and, with the exception of Edinburgh, none of any considerable size. Trade was beginning to absorb the interests of some of the burghers, but its volume was not great. Even the wealth of the Church, the usual source of revenue for impecunious monarchs of the sixteenth century, afforded the crown little profit, since the nobles had acquired many of the church lands. Moreover, the nobles had often appealed with success to the generosity of their king and had received grants of crown lands. James, when he came of age, was driven to manipulate the coinage and to beg abroad to relieve his necessities.<sup>2</sup>

The state of religion in the country contributed to the weakness of the royal power. No accurate estimate of the numbers of Roman Catholics and of Protestants has been made or can be made from records now available. Certain areas, particularly in the north, near Aberdeen and Inverness, and in the southwest, near Dumfries and Wigtown, were known to be centers of "the Romish superstition."<sup>3</sup> In the absence of figures, it can only be said that the Presbyterian kirk was desperately afraid of the strength of the Catholics in Scotland, that certain Catholic nobles, such as the Earl of Huntly, were favorites of the King, and that James, although probably Protestant at heart, saw in the Catholic faction an instrument for curbing the pretensions of his noisy, troublesome ministers. He hated the demo-

<sup>2</sup> For books on conditions in Scotland in the sixteenth century, see Bibliographical Note, pp. 304-306.

<sup>3</sup> P. Hume Brown, in his *History of Scotland* (3 vols., Cambridge, 1899-1909), II, opp. p. 208, has prepared a map suggesting the relative strengths of the two religions.



cratic tendencies of the kirk organization, saw quickly that the cry for "parity of ministers" was aimed not only at bishops but at the royal authority exercised over the kirk by means of bishops, and in consequence took measures to safeguard his prerogative.<sup>4</sup>

Chief among the noble families of Scotland who, while protesting loyalty to the King, did their best to belittle royal authority, were the Hamiltons, who claimed to be the nearest heirs to James. Lord John, head of the family, was, on the whole, friendly to English interests. His brother, Lord Claud, vacillated. In 1586 he was assuring Mary of his loyalty to her. The Stewarts, bitter enemies of the Hamiltons, claimed from their own members an heir apparent in the person of Ludovic Stewart, son of d'Aubigny, Duke of Lennox.<sup>5</sup> The hereditary feud had been intensified by the political turmoil of the past decades. For their part in the murder of the Stewart Regents, Moray and Lennox, the Hamiltons had been proscribed in 1579. Captain James Stewart, Earl of Arran, the man who had arranged Morton's fall and had gained ascendancy over the King as d'Aubigny retired, had used the opportunity to appropriate for himself some Hamilton lands. Other prominent Stewarts were the Earl of Atholl, inveterate enemy of the Gordon Earl of Huntly; the Earl of Moray, James Stewart, whose wife was a daughter of the Regent Moray; and Francis Stewart Hepburn, Earl of Bothwell, whose mother was a sister of the infamous Bothwell of Mary's stormy career. The Earl of Angus, a sturdy Protestant, headed the Douglas family; but the earldom of Morton, which had belonged to the Douglasses, passed for a time after the fall of the Regent Morton to Lord Maxwell, a powerful border noble of Catholic sympathies. Other prominent Protestant houses were those of Erskine, led by the Earl of Mar; of Ruthven, led by the Earl of Gowry; and of Lyon, whose head was

<sup>4</sup> For the kirk, see Bibliographical Note, pp. 305, 313-314.

<sup>5</sup> See Genealogical Table I, pp. 28-29.

Thomas, Master of Glamis. In the northern highlands the Gordons, under the Catholic Earl of Huntly, were very powerful, while in the west the Protestant Earl of Argyll, a Campbell, was the outstanding figure. Among the officers of state of lower birth, Sir John Maitland of Thirlestane, Secretary and soon to be made Chancellor, younger brother of Sir William Maitland of Lethington, towered above all others in ability and influence.<sup>6</sup>

Several circumstances complicated James's relations with England. He was poor; Elizabeth, in comparison, was wealthy and able to buy his friendship, so necessary to her security. Mary's captivity in England must have been agreeable to him, since it left him free in Scotland. A contemporary phrased his attitude well.

And though hee seemeth not to have lost all affection to his Mother, notwithstanding those foul parts, yet (as they abowt him will speak) hee had rather have hir as shee is, then him self to give hir place . . . .<sup>7</sup>

He was influenced most of all by the hope he had of succeeding Elizabeth. Although the King could bargain sharply for an alliance and demand a round sum as annual pension, hinting that, unless it were forthcoming, the Catholic faction backed by foreign gold might gain control of Scotland, Elizabeth was in a position to modify his price. The detention of Mary Stewart and the lure of the English succession were certain to keep his demands within reason.

The question of the succession was one on which Elizabeth had, throughout her reign, steadfastly refused to commit herself. The candidates were of various nationalities, English, Scottish, Spanish, Portuguese, and Italian; they

<sup>6</sup> See Bibliographical Note, p. 306.

<sup>7</sup> *Original Letters of Mr John Colville, 1582-1603*, David Laing, ed. (Bannatyne Club, Edinburgh, 1858), p. 315.

represented both Catholic and Protestant interests; and in individual ability they varied greatly. The most important were Mary Stewart and her son James; Arbella Stewart, daughter of Charles Stewart, who was the brother of Henry, Lord Darnley; Edward Seymour, styled by courtesy Lord Beauchamp, representative of the Suffolk claim; Henry Stanley, Earl of Derby, another descendant of the Suffolk line; Henry Hastings, Earl of Huntingdon, who could trace his lineage from the Duke of Clarence, brother of Edward IV; and Philip II of Spain and his daughter, the Infanta Isabella Clara Eugenia, descendants of John of Gaunt.<sup>8</sup>

Elizabeth, remembering from her sister Mary's reign what discomfiture could result from the presence of a "sun rising," never granted the request of her people when they begged her to settle the succession. The uncertainty was a check on the behavior of eager claimants, each of whom might hope to gain his end by courting the Queen's good will. Moreover, as long as affairs in Europe were in such a critical condition, Elizabeth was never inclined to force an issue or to take a definite step. Parliament in 1571 had made it treason to deny that the common laws of the realm ought to direct the succession or that the Queen with the authority of Parliament could regulate it; and severe penalties were prescribed for publishing or "uttering" any book or writing in support of any candidate for the succession before the question was settled by act of Parliament.<sup>9</sup> With this Elizabeth let the matter rest.

In the summer of 1586, Elizabeth could view with satisfaction her relations with Scotland. In the previous autumn she had permitted the Protestant lords, Angus, Mar, and the Master of Glamis, exiled in England since Arran came to power, to escape over the borders into Scotland, where

<sup>8</sup> For details see note and Genealogical Tables in Appendix I to this chapter.

<sup>9</sup> *Statutes of the Realm*, IV, Pt. I (1819), 527.

they appeared before Stirling castle with sufficient forces to overawe James. Arran took to his heels. He never returned to power, although fear of him and of his "Black Acts" troubled the kirk more than once. With the Protestant lords in power, Elizabeth could hope to establish a league with Scotland. Thomas Randolph, the English ambassador sent north early in 1586 to negotiate it, found little difficulty in getting James to agree in general to a treaty; but the King, perhaps prompted by his Secretary, Sir John Maitland, was inclined to drive a hard bargain. He insisted that Elizabeth insert in it a provision granting extensive commercial privileges to Scots in England, an article promising that his claim to succeed her should not be prejudiced by any act of the Queen's without just cause given, and a third clause conferring on him "some special name of honor and dignity . . . with her Majesty's benevolence. . . ." <sup>10</sup> Randolph negotiated with skill and, although the amount of the pension he offered the King was reduced by Elizabeth, <sup>11</sup> James, after some hesitation, accepted four thousand pounds sent to him in May. <sup>12</sup> At Berwick, in July, commissioners from both countries completed the treaty, which provided for a defensive and offensive league to protect religion and definite assistance in case either

<sup>10</sup> Public Record Office, State Papers, Scotland (hereafter cited as S. P. Scotland), XXXIX, No. 30, Randolph to Walsingham, Mar. 14, 1586. These State Papers, Scotland, are in manuscript form, arranged chronologically, and bound in volumes for convenience in reference work. The "name of honor and dignity" probably referred to the King's claim to the Lennox lands in England, once the property of his grandparents, Matthew Stewart, Earl of Lennox, and Margaret Douglas, niece of Henry VIII. See Appendix II to this chapter.

<sup>11</sup> Conyers Read, *Mr Secretary Walsingham and the Policy of Queen Elizabeth* (3 vols., Oxford, 1925), II, 253; *Calendar of the State Papers Relating to Scotland and Mary, Queen of Scots, 1585-1586*, W. K. Boyd, ed. (Edinburgh, 1914), p. 254, Walsingham to Randolph, Mar. 19, 1586. Walsingham said £5000 had been promised but Elizabeth reduced it to £4000.

<sup>12</sup> British Museum, Lansdowne MSS., liii, f. 1, memorandum by Randolph, Oct. 8, 1587; B. M., Additional MSS., 33531, f. 288, list of payments; S. P. Scotland, LIII, No. 13, list of payments; *Cal. Scottish*, 1585-1586, pp. 372-373, 377-379.



country should be invaded.<sup>13</sup> Although the treaty contained no mention of a pension or of James's claim to be Elizabeth's heir, the Queen gave him an "instrument" under her privy seal, signed by herself, assuring him of her financial aid as long as he remained friendly and promising not to prejudice his title without just cause.<sup>14</sup> It is significant that she mentioned no specific sum at the time, but expressed hope that the amount could be increased rather than decreased. Actually the sums paid varied somewhat, increasing at critical moments, as in the year of the Armada, at the time of the King's marriage, and in 1593 and 1594 when he had to cope with rebellion in Scotland. The Queen seems to have considered three thousand pounds her normal yearly obligation.<sup>15</sup>

Mary Stewart's fate was the first important question to be settled after the conclusion of the treaty. Walsingham brought his careful investigation of the Babington plot to a climax in August, one month after its signature. Had James sold his mother's life for a pension and the English alliance? Many of his contemporaries suspected him of such inhuman bargaining but there is no evidence that the issue was clear cut when he agreed to the league in 1586. Randolph, the English ambassador, once wrote to Walsingham that Mary's name had not been mentioned in the negotiations, a significant silence.<sup>16</sup> The *status quo* must have suited the King well. He was drawing money from England, and Mary's imprisonment there prevented her from interfering in Scotland. Further indication that her destiny was not settled absolutely at the time of the com-

<sup>13</sup> Thomas Rymer and Robert Sanderson, eds., *Foedera, Conventiones, Litterae* . . . , VI, Part IV (The Hague, 1741), 185-186.

<sup>14</sup> S. P. Scotland, XL, Nos. 1, 2, 3, copies, Elizabeth to James, June 2, 1586; *Register of the Privy Council of Scotland*, David Masson, ed. (vols. IV-VI, Edinburgh, 1881-1884), V, 324, 325 and n.

<sup>15</sup> See lists of payments to the Scottish King, S. P. Scotland, L, Nos. 82, 90; *ibid.*, LIV, No. 79; *ibid.*, LXII, No. 26; *ibid.*, LXVI, No. 12; *Border Papers*, Joseph Bain, ed. (2 vols., Edinburgh, 1894-1896), I, 550.

<sup>16</sup> *Cal. Scottish*, 1585-1586, p. 330.



pletion of the treaty lies in the fact that, during the months when the Babington conspirators were being tried, Elizabeth was not at all sure that her "deere brother" of Scotland would remain friendly if his mother should be executed. James had probably not yet made such a decision.

Throughout her captivity, Mary was a potential rival to her son for the English throne. Her power to harm him depended on the support she could command in England and in France, Spain, and Rome. Elizabeth's government watched carefully the Catholics at home. Abroad, Rome was helpless without one of the great powers. Conditions in France made it doubtful whether Mary could obtain any aid there; and, while recourse to Spain seemed more promising, Spanish action was slow and Philip's sincerity toward Mary was vitiated by a hope of conquering England for his own dynasty.<sup>17</sup>

In another way Mary might have involved James in difficulties. Moved by a frenzy of fear for Elizabeth's life, the English Parliament had passed in 1584 the Act of Association, which provided for the speedy trial of any person pretending a claim to the throne who should be charged with an act of invasion or of rebellion or with an attempt against the Queen; such a person, if found guilty, was to be excluded from any claim to the throne. The Act also provided that

. . . if any such detestable Act shall bee executed against her Highnesse most Royall Person whereby her Majesties Life shall bee taken away, (which God of his great Mercie forbid,) That then everie such person by or for whome any such Act shall be executed, and their Issues being any wise assenting or previe to the same, shall by vertue of this Acte be excluded and dis-

<sup>17</sup> J. D. Mackie, "Scotland and the Spanish Armada," *Scottish Historical Review*, XII (1914-1915), 10; *Calendar of Letters and State Papers Relating to English Affairs Preserved in, or originally belonging to, the Archives of Simancas*, M. A. S. Hume, ed. (vols. III, IV, London, 1896-1899), III (1580-1586), 562-569; *ibid.*, IV (1587-1603), 41-43.

habled for ever to have or claime, or to pretend to have or claime, the saide Crowne of this Realme or of any other her Highnes Dominions; Any former Lawe or Statute whatsoever to the contrary in any wise notwithstanding. . . .<sup>18</sup>

If the Protestants in England were strong enough to enforce this law, it was essential for James to keep himself free from any implication in a Catholic plot. The law read, "their Issues being any wise assenting or previe." But what if the Catholics should succeed in a plot? What if the Spaniards should invade?

James's actions in the face of the dilemma confronting him in the winter of 1586-1587, when Mary faced trial and execution for her share in the Babington plot, foreshadowed his conduct during the next sixteen years. If he should sanction Mary's execution, he would have grave problems to face not only in his relations with Spain, France, and Rome, but within his own kingdom, where the Catholics were strong and where Scotsmen, whatever their religion, were proud of their name and might consider Mary's treatment an insult to the nation. If he should threaten to make his mother's death a cause of war, what chance would the weak northern kingdom have against the strength of England? How far could Scotland count on foreign aid? How disinterested would that aid be? Would Philip pour out Spanish blood and gold to conquer England for another? James found it impossible to answer these questions to his satisfaction. He therefore strove to avoid a decision and tried to throw responsibility on Elizabeth.

He sent one ambassador after another to intercede for Mary's life. He suggested a return to the long accepted state of affairs, close imprisonment for his mother with the understanding that, if she should plot again, she would be punished regardless of her estate. Once he proposed her deliverance on guarantee by hostages from various princes

<sup>18</sup> *Statutes of the Realm*, IV, Pt. I, 704-705.

that she would not attempt anything against Elizabeth. Yet he coupled these errands with instructions to see that his title, i. e., his claim to the English throne, was in no way prejudiced by the legal proceedings against Mary. He ventured no criticism of the evidence used against her. In fact, he openly condemned her actions.<sup>19</sup>

Recent investigation has brought to light a secret negotiation through Mr. Archibald Douglas, James's agent in London. In it the King's skill in evasion is apparent. Douglas, on returning from court one day, rode with Leicester in the latter's coach and discussed the situation with him. When Leicester asked him point-blank whether James would break the league in case of Mary's execution, Douglas replied that he thought James would keep the league "notwithstanding onye report, if the fault shuld nocht be founde in thame selffis that shuld mowe your Majestie [James] to the doing thairof."<sup>20</sup> Leicester answered that, if James proved steadfast in religion and willing to follow advice, he would be well used by Elizabeth and assured of his title. The Earl even suggested that Huntingdon might make public renunciation of his claim to the throne in James's favor if the matter did not offend the Queen. James received Douglas' account of this interview on the fourteenth of December and replied next day. He wrote to Leicester, referring him to the Master of Gray for a full answer to Douglas' communication. The King denied that he had been in touch with Mary since the Master of Gray was last in England or had preferred her claim to the English throne to his own, and added, ". . . how fonde and inconstant I were if I shulde preferre my mother to the title let all men judge." It has been pointed out that in all

<sup>19</sup> *King James's Secret*, Sir Robert S. Rait and Dr. Annie I. Cameron, eds. (London, 1927), *passim*; *Letters and Papers Relating to Patrick Master of Gray, Afterwards Seventh Lord Gray*, Thos. Thomson, ed. (Bannatyne Club, Edinburgh, 1835), pp. 106-107; *Cal. Scottish*, 1586-1588, W. K. Boyd, ed. (Glasgow, 1915), pp. 164-165.

<sup>20</sup> *King James's Secret*, p. 80; *Warrender Papers*, Dr. Annie I. Cameron, ed. (2 vols., Scottish History Society, Edinburgh, 1931-1932), I, 242-243.

fairness to James this sentence must be read in conjunction with the preceding one dealing with Mary's title to England and that it seems to mean that James would be foolish to prefer his mother's claim to his own.<sup>21</sup> Nevertheless, the words were ambiguous and the King must have been aware that he was writing a most important letter.

The editors of *King James's Secret*, the book in which this confused correspondence is printed at length, have argued as follows against the King. On reading Douglas' letter, James must have known that it was necessary to decide whether to do something for Mary or not. Douglas had given the impression that his master would keep the peace. If James did not repudiate his agent's statement, Mary would almost certainly die. Other letters from London suggested that, if the King should threaten war in revenge for her death, it would be disastrous to his claim to England. Consequently, James, in writing his momentous letter to Leicester, failed to utter that threat, failed to remove the impression Douglas had given, and thus silently acquiesced in his mother's death. The instructions prepared for Gray, who was to depart for London, likewise contained no outspoken threat. Reports in London said that letters from Scotland substantiated the belief that James would "digest" Mary's execution. After learning of these reports, James wrote to Elizabeth on January twenty-sixth, denying their truth and almost uttering a threat; but he took away its force by a qualifying word and thus again failed to repudiate the impression Douglas had given.<sup>22</sup>

Honoure vaire [were] it to you to spaire quhen it is least lookid for, honoure vaire it to you—quhiche is not onlie my freindlie advyce but my earnist suite—to take me and all other princes in Europe eternally beholdin unto you in granting this my so

<sup>21</sup> *King James's Secret*, pp. 97–102; *Warr. Papers*, I, 248–249.

<sup>22</sup> *King James's Secret*, Intro., pp. vi–viii, pp. 107–117, 156–157, 175–182.



reasonable request, and not—appardon I pray you my free speaking—to putt princes to straittis of honoure quhair through youre generall reputatione and the universall—allmost—mislyking of you may daingerouslie perrell both in honour and utilitie youre persoune and estate.<sup>23</sup>

This exposé of James's silent concurrence in Mary's death is the result of recent investigation. A tradition of long standing has charged the Master of Gray with treachery to Mary while he was on this errand, professedly to plead for her life.<sup>24</sup> The evidence does not prove the accusation beyond doubt. It is true that Gray had betrayed her years before, when in 1584 he came on an embassy to England; thereafter, by his own confession he had no interest in saving her life, once writing to Douglas, ". . . if maiters nicht stand well betwene y<sup>e</sup> Q.' Ma<sup>tie</sup> thair and our Sovereaine, I cair not althocht sche wer out of y<sup>e</sup> way."<sup>25</sup> Yet in January, 1587, when sent to London, he seems to have done his best to save Mary. Though James referred Leicester to him for an answer to the latter's message, there is no evidence that the Master carried any verbal communication to the Earl differing from his written instructions, which were designed to save Mary's life. In London he worked faithfully to this end and his conduct was highly commended by Sir Robert Melville, his fellow ambassador. Gray even advised James that his best course lay not in friendship with England and warned the King that other servants of his, namely, Archibald Douglas and Sir Alexander Stewart, were vitiating the work of himself and Melville.<sup>26</sup> Although he was disgraced in Scotland the following May when he was tried

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 180–181.

<sup>24</sup> William Camden, *The History of the Most Renowned and Victorious Princess Elizabeth* . . . (London, 1688), pp. 379–380.

<sup>25</sup> *Illustrations of British History* . . . , Edmund Lodge, ed. (3 vols., London, 1791), II, 331.

<sup>26</sup> *King James's Secret*, pp. 107–182, *passim*; *Warr. Papers*, I, 252–264, *passim*.



on a number of charges, one of which concerned Mary, the evidence brought forward at the trial related to the period previous to the embassy of 1586–1587.<sup>27</sup> It is probably connected with the letters sent to Scotland by Leicester to secure his disgrace.<sup>28</sup> He cannot be wholly cleared of the charge of double dealing in January, 1587, in view of his past career of perfidy. Nevertheless, his presence in London is of less significance than the presence of two who definitely proved to be traitors to Mary.

The indubitable villains among James's messengers to Elizabeth were Archibald Douglas and Sir Alexander Stewart. Douglas' part has already been noted. Stewart appears to have assured Elizabeth that James would "with tyme digest the worst." The King disavowed this assurance when he wrote to Elizabeth on January 26th and seemed very angry with Stewart, but the presumptuous knight suffered no punishment.<sup>29</sup> Even Archibald Douglas was employed by the King after Mary's death, although the position of that impecunious gentleman in London became very precarious as time passed.

Thus, James in this crisis in the early period of his personal rule displayed the qualities that were to carry him fairly successfully through subsequent years. Since he did

<sup>27</sup> *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, IV, 166–168 and notes; *Ancient Criminal Trials in Scotland*, Robert Pitcairn, ed. (3 vols., Bannatyne Club, Edinburgh, 1833), I, 157–158.

<sup>28</sup> *King James's Secret*, pp. 92, 153–155 and n.; Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Most Hon. The Marquis of Salisbury . . . Preserved at Hatfield House, Hertfordshire* (vols. III–XV, London, Dublin, and Hereford, 1889–1930), hereafter cited as *Hat. Cal.*, III, 254; *Cal. Scottish*, 1586–1588, pp. 327–328. The editors of *King James's Secret* suggest that Gray was sincere in his animosity toward England at this time because of his cool reception there. Leicester, to ruin Gray, sent incriminating letters to James by means of Sir Alexander Stewart. These letters have not been found. They were probably like the one quoted above, which was written *before* this embassy, showing Gray's opinion that it would be better if Mary were dead.

<sup>29</sup> *King James's Secret*, Intro., pp. vii–viii, pp. 158, 173–178; *Cal. Scottish*, 1586–1588, p. 275; *Extracts from the Despatches of M. Courcelles, French Ambassador at the Court of Scotland MDLXXXVI–MDLXXXVII* (Bannatyne Club, Edinburgh, 1828), p. 37.

not know whether Protestant or Roman Catholic would eventually win in the great conflict, he was determined not to alienate himself from either party. His career, as outlined in the following pages, shows that he rarely pronounced definitely for or against either. If he seemed to favor one, almost invariably new favors to the other followed. His aims were to establish real authority for himself in Scotland and to make sure of the English succession. Though the religious problem complicated both issues, James was to prove adept in using it to solve his difficulties. In Mary's case his judicious silence appeared to throw responsibility on Elizabeth. Mary Stewart was executed at Fotheringhay Castle on February 8, 1587. Only the events of the next years could reveal the success of her son's equivocal policy.

Accounts about James's reception of the news of his mother's death vary. One contemporary said that he "moved never his countenance at the rehearsal of his mother's execution, nor leaves not his pastime and hunting more than of before."<sup>30</sup> According to Moysie, he refused to believe the first reports received but, when on February twenty-fourth certain word from Carey came, he "wes in great displeasour, and went to bed without supper: lykas on the morne he past solitarlie to Dalkeithe, desyring to be solitar."<sup>31</sup> He donned a "dule weid of purple," a gesture which called down Bothwell's scorn. That hot-headed Earl said that he would wear no "dule wede" until he had avenged the indignity done to Scotland.<sup>32</sup>

There was tension on the borders for several months,<sup>33</sup> and James refused to receive Sir Robert Carey, Elizabeth's

<sup>30</sup> *Hat. Cal.*, XIII, 334.

<sup>31</sup> David Moysie, *Memoirs of the Affairs of Scotland* (Bannatyne Club, Edinburgh, 1830), pp. 59-60.

<sup>32</sup> *The Historie and Life of King James the Sext . . .* (Bannatyne Club, Edinburgh, 1825), p. 225; *Cal. Scottish*, 1586-1588, pp. 324, 331.

<sup>33</sup> *Cal. Scottish*, 1586-1588, p. 300; *Border Papers*, I, 245, 247, 254-255.

messenger sent with a letter deploring "that miserable accident."<sup>34</sup> The King sent letters to Henry III, Catherine de Medici, and the Guises to sound them out as to possible aid and commissioned as his ambassador in France Mary's representative, James Beaton, Archbishop of Glasgow. The commission was neither signed nor dated, two features which detracted from its validity. Guise did not reply until October, 1587; Henry III and Catherine not until January, 1588. Clearly, James could get only pious good wishes from France, although Henry's prompt acknowledgment of him as the true heir to the crown of England must have pleased him.<sup>35</sup> Philip of Spain sent messages of condolence and offers of help against England, but he seems to have found intrigues with the Scottish nobility a more promising way of annoying Elizabeth than an alliance with the King.<sup>36</sup>

It is significant that even while he was communicating with Henry III, the Duke of Guise, and Philip II, James was on terms of cordial friendship with Henry of Navarre. He permitted Sir James Colville of Easter Wemyss, his subject, to lead a company of men in Navarre's service, and he entertained in Scotland the Huguenot poet, Du Bartas. Obviously, he had no intention of severing his Protestant connections while waiting for news of possible Catholic support.<sup>37</sup>

Whatever his outward show of displeasure toward England, James in little more than a month after Mary's death was furtively trying to get Elizabeth to offer compensation. The intermediary was Archibald Douglas, who was instructed to deal "very secretly, and with great discretion and consideration." Douglas obediently wrote to Lord Burghley that "the King my maister hath taken resolution

<sup>34</sup> *Warr. Papers*, II, 11 and n.; *Cal. Scottish*, 1586-1588, p. 333; *Memoirs of Robert Cary, Earl of Monmouth* . . . (Edinburgh, 1808), p. 13.

<sup>35</sup> *Warr. Papers*, II, 55-68; Courcelles, *Despatches*, pp. 48, 53-54, 60; *Cal. Scottish*, 1586-1588, pp. 340-341.

<sup>36</sup> *Cal. Spanish*, 1587-1603, pp. 57-58, 144-146, 159.

<sup>37</sup> *Warr. Papers*, II, 54-55 and n.; 62 and n.

to conteyn himself wythin the compasse of ressonable freyndschippe wyth her majeste onto such tym as he shalbe perfytly informed of hir majesteis inclination towardis him, whiche he hath beyn comited to ressave from me notwythstanding of all the persuationis that hath beyn used to move him in the contrarye.”<sup>38</sup>

Although James assumed a pose of dignity and for a time refused to indicate what would satisfy him, in July he drew up an outline of points for which Douglas was to work in England. They were: 1. a declaration that he was the lawful successor to Elizabeth; 2. a grant of lands in England and the title of duke; 3. a promise that Arbella Stewart should not be given in marriage without his consent; and 4. reparations for losses suffered by Scottish merchants.<sup>39</sup> Elizabeth was slow to take the hint, but in the meantime James carefully cultivated other friends in England.

The attitude of Elizabeth's councillors toward the succession question is not clear. The Queen's dislike of discussion, the statutory limitations, and the numerous issues involved made men chary of acknowledging a preference for any claimant. Her great Lord Treasurer, Burghley, with his habitual caution, preserved a mask of silence. He was thought to have favored the Suffolk claim early in Elizabeth's reign. Later he was considered rather friendly to Mary Stewart. At times he seconded Walsingham's efforts to conciliate James. Walsingham suspected him in 1584 of looking to that “sun rising.”<sup>40</sup> Toward the end of his life

<sup>38</sup> *Hat. Cal.*, XIII, 335–339; *ibid.*, III, 239–240; *Cal. Scottish*, 1586–1588, pp. 341–343.

<sup>39</sup> *Hat. Cal.*, III, 267–268, 295–296; *Cal. Scottish*, 1586–1588, pp. 496–502. Cf. *Hat. Cal.*, III, 261–262. A. Douglas had apparently made similar proposals to Elizabeth in April, shortly after receiving James's orders to deal secretly for offers of compensation (*Cal. Scottish*, 1586–1588, pp. 400–401; *Hat. Cal.*, III, 243).

<sup>40</sup> Lansdowne MSS., cii, ff. 89, 93, Burghley to Sir Thomas Smith, Apr. 27, May 1, 1564; *Dictionary of National Biography* article on John Hales; *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, Addenda (Eliz. and James I—1580–1625)*, Mary Anne Everett Green, ed. (London, 1872), pp. 406–409; *Correspondance Diplomatique de . . . La Mothe-Fénelon (1568–*



Walsingham, who had once been considered a partisan of Huntingdon, seems to have been on extremely friendly terms with James.<sup>41</sup> Leicester looked here and there to insure the future. Huntingdon was his brother-in-law; at one time he was suspected of trying to arrange a marriage between his infant son and Arbella Stewart; later there was a rumor of a match between his stepdaughter and James.<sup>42</sup> Certainly, in the summer of 1586 just before the crisis of Babington's plot, he had entered into very friendly relations with the Scottish King and had suggested some way of nullifying Huntingdon's claim.<sup>43</sup> In December he discussed that as the price of James's consent to his mother's death. After the execution Leicester continued to use Archibald Douglas as a medium of communication with James, and James received his messages affably, even to the extent of uttering the obvious falsehood that "he knew his lordship [Leicester] not to have been upon the Council of his mother her death, nor no principal cause thereof, and therefore he would the more esteem of his lordship."<sup>44</sup> Leicester had a hand in the disgrace of the Master of Gray, perhaps to find a scapegoat in Scotland for the odium of Mary's death.<sup>45</sup>

James welcomed the advances made by others of Elizabeth's circle. There is a reference to four of the Queen's councillors who had testified their good will to him through Archibald Douglas. In addition to Leicester and Walsing-

1575) (7 vols., Paris and London, 1838-1840), II, 123; Conyers Read, "Walsingham and Burghley in Queen Elizabeth's Privy Council," *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, XXVIII (1913), 48-49; Read, *Walsingham*, II, 231.

<sup>41</sup> *Cal. Spanish*, 1580-1586, pp. 264, 400; *Cal. Scottish*, 1586-1588, p. 650; *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, XXVIII (1913), 48; Read, *Walsingham*, III, 340.

<sup>42</sup> *Cal. Spanish*, 1580-1586, p. 264; Read, *Walsingham*, II, 195-196, 232.

<sup>43</sup> *Hat. Cal.*, XIII, 305-306.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, III, 256. Since Leicester was in Flanders, he did not sit on the Commission that tried Mary in October, 1586. He returned to England at the end of November and certainly used his influence to bring about her execution. (*King James's Secret*, pp. 51, 75, 79-80, 97-102, 171-173.)

<sup>45</sup> *King James's Secret*, pp. 91-92, 154n.; *Hat. Cal.*, III, 254; *Cal. Scottish*, 1586-1588, pp. 327-328. See above, p. 16, n. 28.



ham, possibly Sir Christopher Hatton and Ambrose Dudley, Earl of Warwick, Leicester's brother, were the cordial gentlemen. James expressed satisfaction at Hatton's appointment as Chancellor and he must have been pleased when Archibald Douglas assured him of the new Chancellor's support of his claim to the English crown. Warwick showed cordiality by sending the King a gift of crossbows and dogs, for which he was duly thanked.<sup>46</sup>

In spite of such reciprocal courtesies, the prospect for "the amitie" in the summer of 1587 was not bright. Walsingham was worried.<sup>47</sup> The Master of Gray, though his support was of a doubtful nature, was no longer in Scotland. In a Parliament held in midsummer the lords, moved by a speech of Chancellor Maitland, vowed vengeance for Mary's blood.<sup>48</sup> Public opinion, which James had found so difficult to control before Mary's death, was outraged by the judicial murder of a Scottish Queen.<sup>49</sup> There was unrest on the borders<sup>50</sup> and the Catholic lords were active. Robert Bruce, their agent on the continent, with the Duke of Guise, Philip II, Mendoza (Philip's ambassador in Paris), and the Duke of Parma (Philip's general in Flanders) had arranged a plot to hire ships in Scotland, send them to Danzig for grain, bring the grain to Parma at Dunkirk, and there take on troops to be carried to Scotland. For some reason Bruce did not reach Scotland until the end of August, 1587, by which time it was too late to get the necessary vessels. The project was dropped for the time. The havoc created by Drake when he "singd the King of

<sup>46</sup> *Hat. Cal.*, III, 168, 255-259, 261-262, 271-273; *Hist. MSS. Comm., Report on the Laing Manuscripts Preserved in the University of Edinburgh* (London, 1914), I, 66.

<sup>47</sup> *Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series, 1586-1588* (vol. XXI, in 4 parts), Mrs. Sophie Crawford Lomas and A. B. Hinds, eds. (London, 1927-1931), Pt. I, 318-320.

<sup>48</sup> *Cal. Scottish*, 1586-1588, pp. 475-477.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 169-170; *Warr. Papers*, I, 248; B. M., Harleian MSS., 292, f. 62, copy, Justice Clerk in Scotland to A. Douglas, Oct. 24, 1587, calendared in *Cal. Scottish*, 1586-1588, pp. 491-494.

<sup>50</sup> *Cal. Scottish*, 1586-1588, pp. 478-479.

Spain's beard" at Cadiz may have contributed to the general failure of the plan.<sup>51</sup>

In the following winter the English government was kept informed of further plots between the King of Spain and the Catholic party in Scotland.<sup>52</sup> The English began to doubt James's fidelity to the league. Lord Burghley confessed, "It is to be considered whether her Majesty may do the King of Scots more harm, or he her."<sup>53</sup> Alarmed, the English Council took measures to reinforce the borders.<sup>54</sup>

At this time, nevertheless, James hinted that the suggestions which Archibald Douglas had conveyed from him were not yet answered. Though "honor" forbade him to appear too eager to open a correspondence with Elizabeth, he tried in December, 1587, to get in touch with her through Lord Hunsdon, her cousin on the borders.<sup>55</sup> The Queen's answer was frosty. In negotiations with Douglas, possibly as early as April, 1587, she had intimated that the King should be convinced of her innocence of Mary's death. She had then refused to do anything about the Lennox lands, to which, she hinted, Arbella had some claim. She had pointed to the fact that commissioners were already named to handle mercantile disputes, and had offered a statement under the hands of Mary's judges that the process against her had not in any way been prejudicial

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 485-486; *Hat. Cal.*, III, 280; *Cal. Spanish*, 1580-1586, pp. 580-581, 589-590, 595-596, 603-608, 635-638, 665-666, 681-688; *ibid.*, 1587-1603, pp. 57-58, 68-69, 75-76, 89-92, 144-146, 160-161; J. D. Mackie, "Scotland and the Spanish Armada," *Scot. Hist. Rev.*, XII (1914-1915), 17-19.

<sup>52</sup> E. g., *Cal. Foreign*, 1586-1588, Pt. I, pp. 416, 454, 489, 507.

<sup>53</sup> Read, *Walsingham*, III, 189n.; *Cal. Domestic*, 1581-1590, Robert Lemon, ed. (London, 1865), p. 437.

<sup>54</sup> *Border Papers*, I, 270, 289; *Acts of the Privy Council of England*, J. R. Dasent, ed. (new series, XIV-XXXII, 1897-1907), XV, 252-254, 273, 390-391; *Hat. Cal.*, III, 292-293; *Cal. Scottish*, 1586-1588, pp. 533-534.

<sup>55</sup> *Border Papers*, I, 294-322, *passim*; *Cal. Scottish*, 1586-1588, pp. 541-542, 547-550. James's instructions for Carmichael, his agent, printed in *Cal. Scottish*, 1586-1588, pp. 331-332, under date Mar. 10, 1587, are practically identical with the document printed under date Mar. 10, 1588 (*ibid.*, pp. 549-550); 1588 is the correct year.

to her son.<sup>56</sup> Apparently the Queen's attitude had not changed since April, although in December she offered the King four thousand pounds a year, which Hunsdon thought would scarcely please him since Wotton had formerly promised five thousand.<sup>57</sup> The negotiations were pursued in tiresome fashion. In May or June, 1588, Robert Carey, Hunsdon's son, crossed the border to confer with the King, apparently at the Queen's orders. He was received by James with the consent of the Scottish Council, an action which implied the resumption of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries.<sup>58</sup>

Probably the internal crisis in Scotland hastened Elizabeth's decision to come to a better understanding with the King. In January, Huntly, Lord Claud Hamilton, Glencairn, Montrose, other Catholic lords, and possibly Lord John Hamilton met at Linlithgow, while forces under Herries and Johnston advanced toward Edinburgh. The attempt was premature. A show of firmness on the part of James and the quick action of Edinburgh in arming and guarding the town soon removed the immediate danger. Although the advance had been prompted by personal motives, such as hatred of Chancellor Maitland and a private feud between Huntly and Marshall, the testimony of Robert Bruce, the Catholic agent, shows that it was also part of a general plan of the Catholic lords to divert suspicion from themselves by joining with Protestant lords and pretending to aim at civil reform, thus gaining time until Spain could send them help.<sup>59</sup> In April another at-

<sup>56</sup> *Cal. Scottish*, 1586-1588, pp. 400-401; *Hat. Cal.*, III, 243.

<sup>57</sup> *Border Papers*, I, 310-311; *Cal. Scottish*, 1586-1588, pp. 553-555. Burghley's letters to Hunsdon and to his son Robert Carey, printed in *Cal. Scottish*, 1586-1588, pp. 393-396, 398-400, under dates Apr. 3, Apr. 6, 1587, apparently belong to 1588.

<sup>58</sup> *Border Papers*, I, 320-322, 324; *Cal. Scottish*, 1586-1588, pp. 558-560; *Hat. Cal.*, XIII, 372-374; Carey, *Memoirs*, pp. 16-17. Carey assigned this journey to 1587, but it is certainly that of 1588.

<sup>59</sup> *Hat. Cal.*, III, 306-308; *Border Papers*, I, 308-310, 311-312, 317-318; *Cal. Scottish*, 1586-1588, pp. 531-533; *Cal. Spanish*, 1587-1603, pp. 224-225.

tempt to oust Maitland failed.<sup>60</sup> James showed some vigor in an expedition against the Maxwell Earl of Morton, who had returned from Spain and was lurking in the Southwest. Maxwell, one of the most dangerous Catholic lords, was captured and imprisoned.<sup>61</sup>

These were the critical months before the Armada. After Carey's return to her court, Elizabeth and her Council decided to send two thousand pounds to the King, which sum was paid to James's agents in July.<sup>62</sup> As the threat of Spanish invasion loomed close at hand, she sent an ambassador, one Mr. William Ashby, to Scotland. The story of his negotiations is well known. Alarmed at the approach of the Spanish fleet, he exceeded his instructions and, to win James to complete concurrence with England, offered him a dukedom with a reasonable revenue attached, an annual pension of five thousand pounds, and a personal guard of fifty gentlemen, together with a force of one hundred foot and horse with which to keep the peace on the borders, both forces to be maintained at the Queen's expense. This Ashby deemed necessary to outbid Spanish offers. The ambassador was well aware that he had gone further than he had warrant.<sup>63</sup> Whether these golden offers prevailed with the King or whether other considerations influenced him, James cast his lot for England and made active preparations to withstand the Spaniards.<sup>64</sup> The few of the enemy's forces who landed at Leith to consult Colonel Sempill, a notorious Scottish "practiser," were imprisoned.<sup>65</sup>

After the success against the Armada, Elizabeth lost little time in repudiating Ashby's promises. Though she forwarded three thousand pounds to the King and sent

<sup>60</sup> *Border Papers*, I, 322-323; *Hat. Cal.*, III, 317-319.

<sup>61</sup> Carey, *Memoirs*, pp. 16-17; *Cal. Scottish*, 1586-1588, p. 586.

<sup>62</sup> *Cal. Scottish*, 1586-1588, pp. 575-576, 620.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 589-592.

<sup>64</sup> *Reg. F. C. Scot.*, IV, 306-308.

<sup>65</sup> *Border Papers*, I, 328.



Sir Robert Sidney to Edinburgh to thank him for his good intentions and to warn him against the designs of Spain and of his Catholic nobility, Sidney had little more to offer.<sup>66</sup> Elizabeth's letter of October 8, addressed to James, stated her position quite clearly.

And if any shall (to increase your good favour towards them) instil in your ears to demand such unfit and unreasonable demands at my hands as may not be fitly granted for some weighty reasons, and yet suppose that, for fear you fall to other course, I may be induced to yield thereto, let me use you in this as right amity requireth. . . . Right dear brother, be assured that you cannot nor ever will more readily demand things honorable and secure than my entire good affection shall ever be most ready to correspond you. But if any shall be required that my present estate shall not permit as sure for me, then abuse not your judgement with so contrarious thoughts: for never shall dread of any man's behaviour cause me to do ought that may "esbrandil" the seat that so well is settled. . . .<sup>67</sup>

Other discouraging events occurred. Leicester's death just after the victory over the Armada deprived James of the man on whose support he had counted most in England. The King had planned to use Sidney as an intermediary with Leicester, "hoping surely at the backgoing of this gentleman [Sidney] that greater matters by the said lord's procurement should have been performed unto him nor any yet promised." Now the laborious process had to be repeated with others. It is significant that Archibald Douglas was requested to give the King advice as to what person was likely to succeed to Leicester's influence and with whom the King should deal in place of him. Walsingham was to be assured of James's favor and commenda-

<sup>66</sup> *Cal. Scottish*, 1586-1588, pp. 604-606, 620.

<sup>67</sup> *Hat. Cal.*, XIII, 384.



tions were to be delivered to Essex.<sup>68</sup> Early in September James was writing to that Earl.<sup>69</sup> Already the man who was to be the central figure in the next decade had secured the attention of the Scottish King.

On the whole, these early crises show in the King a lively appreciation that in friendship with Elizabeth lay his best course. The league, Mary's fate, and the Armada had successively raised the issue, and in each case he had hesitatingly favored Elizabeth. In doing so he had as far as possible avoided a complete surrender to the dictates of the Queen. He meant to sit more firmly on the throne in Scotland and to occupy the English throne after her. He was not sure that he could achieve these ends by endorsing whole-heartedly the Protestant cause. Had he been able to decide altogether in favor of the Protestants, he was in no position as yet to force his will on his country. Therefore he temporized. The story of the years from 1587 to 1603 is one of variations on this theme. It is a tale of shiftiness and cunning, of bitter disputes and, at times, of incidents that bordered on downright hostilities between England and Scotland.

## APPENDIX I

### THE RIVAL CANDIDATES FOR THE ENGLISH THRONE

Mary and James were nearest in blood to Elizabeth, but Henry VIII's will had passed over his eldest sister Margaret's descendants.<sup>70</sup> Arbella's claim was much weaker than James's, since she was descended from Margaret Tudor by a second marriage to the Earl of Lennox. The Suffolk claim, transmitted from Mary Tudor, Henry's younger sister, rested in Edward

<sup>68</sup> *Hat. Cal.*, III, 359-361.

<sup>69</sup> *Border Papers*, I, 333-334.

<sup>70</sup> Genealogical Table II, pp. 30-31. For a discussion of Henry VIII's will and of the various claimants, see *Correspondence of King James VI. of Scotland with Sir Robert Cecil and Others* . . . , John Bruce, ed. (Camden Society, London, 1861), Intro., pp. vi-xii.

Seymour, styled by courtesy Lord Beauchamp. Its validity was marred by the fact that Elizabeth steadfastly refused to recognize the marriage of Seymour's parents, the Lady Catherine Gray and Sir Edward Seymour, Earl of Hertford.<sup>71</sup> Beauchamp displayed little ability. Henry Stanley, fourth Earl of Derby, also claimed descent from Mary Tudor. His father was a Catholic but Derby seemed to be vigorous against recusants. Although the Catholics entertained fond hopes of his son Ferdinando, fifth Earl, the latter appeared not to encourage them. Little is known about the second son, William, who succeeded to the title in 1594.<sup>72</sup>

Henry Hastings, Earl of Huntingdon, a representative of the house of York, was a prominent Puritan, active in state affairs. He held office as Lord Lieutenant in various counties and was for twenty years Lord President of the Council of the North.<sup>73</sup> His marriage to Catherine Dudley, sister of the Earl of Leicester, strengthened his position in the Puritan party. His brother George, who succeeded him in 1595, took no prominent part in public affairs.

Philip II and the Infanta were descended from John of Gaunt. The Infanta had an even more obscure claim through her French mother, a descendant of the Dukes of Brittany, who could trace their ancestry to William the Conqueror, Henry II, and Henry III.<sup>74</sup> Attention should also be called to the Farnese claim, likewise derived from John of Gaunt. Parma probably never seriously considered it for his sons, but when the Catholics became desperate for a candidate at the end of Elizabeth's reign, they dusted the Farnese genealogy and displayed it.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>71</sup> H. Hallam, *The Constitutional History of England from the Accession of Henry VII to the Death of George II* (3 vols., London, 1872), I, 127–129, 291–293; *Dict. Nat. Biog.* articles on Sir Edward and Lady Catherine Seymour.


<sup>72</sup> *Dict. Nat. Biog.* article on Henry Stanley, fourth Earl of Derby.

<sup>73</sup> *Dict. Nat. Biog.* article on Henry Hastings, third Earl of Huntingdon; R. Reid, "The Political Influence of the 'North Parts' Under the Late Tudors" in *Tudor Studies*, R. W. Seton-Watson, ed. (London and New York, 1924), p. 224. See Genealogical Table III, p. 33.

<sup>74</sup> R. Doleman, *A conference about the next Succession to the crowne of ingland . . .* (1594), Pt. II, pp. 151–157.


<sup>75</sup> Genealogical Table IV, pp. 34–35.

GENEALOGICAL  
Hamilton and Lennox Claims



\* James, second Baron Hamilton and first Earl of Arran, was divorced from his second wife, Elizabeth, on the grounds that her former husband, Thomas Hay, son and heir to John, Lord Hay of Yester, was alive at the time of the marriage. Hamilton had no issue by this second marriage. The Duke of Lennox afterward disputed the legality of the divorce, claiming that Hay was dead when Hamilton married Elizabeth Home. Thus Lennox could argue that the descendants of Hamilton by his third wife, Janet Béthune, were illegitimate and could claim for himself the position of nearest legitimate heir to the Scottish throne.

TABLE I  
to the Scottish Throne





# GENEALOGICAL






TABLE II





# GENEALOGICAL TABLE III










TABLE IV  
(abridged)







TABLE V  
(abridged)





R. Doleman, in the book, *A conference about the next Succession to the crowne of ingland . . .*, lists these and many other claims, such as those of the houses of Braganza and Savoy and the claims of the Barringtons, an obscure family in England. Thomas Wilson wrote an interesting paper, "State of England, 1600," in which he discussed various rivals.<sup>76</sup> He listed Henry Percy, ninth Earl of Northumberland, and Charles Neville, sixth Earl of Westmoreland, but their blood claims were remote, Northumberland supported James, and Westmoreland was an abject Catholic exile. The Earls of Rutland and Essex and the Staffords, descendants of the Dukes of Buckingham, were mentioned at times, but the Staffords and Rutland made no showing, while Essex seemed to have no intention of competing with James Stewart. Boissize, the French ambassador in London in 1600, even listed Henry IV of France as a possibility, since he was descended from Henry II's granddaughter Blanche, the wife of Louis VIII, who tried to conquer England in 1217.<sup>77</sup>

In compiling the preceding Genealogical Tables, I have used Sir Bernard Burke's and Ashworth P. Burke's *Genealogical and Heraldic History of the Peerage and Baronetage, the Privy Council, and Knightage* (various editions, e. g., 86th ed., London, 1928); G. E. Cokayne's *Complete Peerage* (1st ed., 8 vols., London, 1887-1898; 2nd ed. in progress, 9 vols. completed to Nuneham, London, 1910-1936); the *Dictionary of National Biography*, Leslie Stephen and Sir Sidney Lee, eds. (1st ed., 63 vols., London, 1885-1900; rev. ed., 22 vols., London, 1908-1909); *Cambridge Modern History*, XIII, *Genealogical Tables and Lists and General Index* (1911); R. Doleman's *A conference about the next Succession to the crowne of ingland . . .* (1594); and the tables in C. Oman's *Political History of England, 1377-1485* (London, 1906) and in A. F. Pollard's *Political History of England, 1547-1603* (London, 1910). P. Morant's *Essex* (London, 1768), II, 504, has a few items about the Barrington family.

<sup>76</sup> S. P. Domestic, Eliz., CCLXXX.

<sup>77</sup> *Relations Politiques de la France et de l'Espagne avec l'Ecosse au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle*, A. Teulet, ed. (5 vols., Paris, 1862), IV, 226-227.

## APPENDIX II

## THE LENNOX LANDS

James was constantly trying to establish his right to inherit the English lands of his paternal grandparents, the Earl and Countess of Lennox. This grandmother was Margaret Douglas, daughter of Margaret Tudor by the Earl of Angus. James wanted the lands not so much because of their monetary value but because of the status they would confer upon him in England. According to medieval English common law, no alien could hold or inherit land in England.<sup>78</sup> One of the arguments frequently cited against James's claim to the English succession was the fact of his alien birth.<sup>79</sup> If, therefore, he could get English courts to acknowledge his right to these lands, his position would be immensely improved. The "special name of honor and dignity" requested in 1586 probably referred to the Lennox lands. At a later period Elizabeth very definitely refused to consider his pension a compensation for them. In 1596 the King angrily declared that the annuity the Queen was then withholding from him was "promised under her hand for 'contentacion' of our lands during her time as King Henry VIII gave unto her during her time."<sup>80</sup> Elizabeth firmly denied that the money was given for any such reason. She said that the pension was paid "not by way of bargain or contract for any thing due to him for any lands (as it is written) [i. e., by James], whereof we never heard motion to this day."<sup>81</sup> The argument was not settled so quickly in the King's mind. He still insisted:

. . . that many times he had claimed the lands in England whereof his grandfather, the Earl of Lennox, died seised, which claim, albeit your Majesty for many weighty causes did not plainly allow, yet he always found your Majesty tendering him

<sup>78</sup> Sir Frederick Pollock and F. W. Maitland, *History of English Law* . . . (2 vols., Cambridge, 1911), I, 459-460.

<sup>79</sup> E. g., Doleman, *Conference*, Pt. II, 112.

<sup>80</sup> S. P. Scotland, LVIII, No. 112, James to Foulis, June 30, 1596.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, LII, 129-134, copy, Elizabeth to Bowes, July 25, 1596.

with favorable respects in the same. Therefore, the better to enable him to accomplish all things to be observed and done on his part by that treaty and league and to testify your Majesty's kind regard towards him and his claim to the lands mentioned, it pleased your Majesty by Mr Randolph, then your Majesty's ambassador with him, to gratify him with the grant of the yearly payment of a sum of money. . . .<sup>82</sup>

Elizabeth, of course, ignored these explanations.

<sup>82</sup> S. P. Scotland, LIX, No. 24, Bowes to Elizabeth, Aug. 10, 1596.

## CHAPTER II

### YEARS OF EXPERIMENT

#### *The Brig o' Dee*

The significance of the failure of the Armada was not quickly grasped by the Catholic Earls in Scotland. As early as September, 1588, they appealed to Parma for men and money and suggested a second Spanish attack on England, promising coöperation in the North.<sup>1</sup> Loyalty to their King troubled them little. They later authorized Robert Bruce, their principal agent in the matter, to indicate their readiness to transfer their allegiance from James to Philip in case the Scottish King refused to fall in with their plans.<sup>2</sup> Details of their intrigues were revealed in February, 1589, when there was intercepted in England a packet of letters addressed to Philip and Parma from Huntly, Errol, and Robert Bruce. The letters contained assurances that the Catholic party in Scotland, led by Huntly, Errol, Crawford, Lord Claud Hamilton, and Maxwell, was eager to make common cause with Spain. Huntly wanted Philip to send six thousand men with money to recruit others; within six weeks of their arrival, he boasted, a great incursion could be made into England, thus weakening her in the North while Spain operated in another quarter.<sup>3</sup>

The scheme was illusory. Huntly admitted that the Protestant power in Scotland was so great that he had been

<sup>1</sup> *Cal. Spanish*, 1587-1603, pp. 429, 455-456.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 478-479.

<sup>3</sup> David Calderwood, *History of the Kirk of Scotland*, Thos. Thomson, ed. (IV-VI, Wodrow Society, Edinburgh, 1843-1845), V, 14-35, prints the letters; copies, preserved in the P. R. O., S. P. Scotland, XLIII, No. 11, inclosures, are calendared in *Cal. Scottish*, 1586-1588, pp. 684-697.

forced to take the Protestant oath to escape exile or open rebellion against his King.<sup>4</sup> The letters showed that Huntly, Lord Claud, and Maxwell were greedy for Spanish gold and wanted to make the lesser barons look to them for employment. The lesser barons shrewdly preferred to get money directly from Spain.<sup>5</sup> Apparently Bruce did not trust all of the conspirators, some of whom were to be left in ignorance of "finall intentionns."<sup>6</sup> Most important of all, Philip was not interested in the project. Its essential element was another attack on England by Spain; and a new Armada could not be produced at the whim of a few impecunious Scots nobles.<sup>7</sup>

Elizabeth was fortunate to have come upon the plot at such an early stage. Confronted with this bald evidence, James could have little excuse for failing to root out the "Spanish party" in Scotland before serious trouble arose. The Queen urged stern measures, but without success. Huntly was a favorite of the King, had recently married James's cousin, a sister of the Duke of Lennox, was Captain of the King's Guard and the greatest noble in the North. Strong measures against him would have revived old feuds or caused new ones. Angus and Morton, two recently created Protestant Earls,<sup>8</sup> were loath to incur the royal displeasure by urging action against the favorite; Angus, in particular, who had just successfully opposed the King before the Court of Session touching the right of succession

<sup>4</sup> Calderwood, V, 16-17.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, V, 21.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, V, 27-28.

<sup>7</sup> *Cal. Spanish*, 1587-1603, p. 499. See marginal note on letter, Philip to Mendoza, Dec. 27, 1588.

<sup>8</sup> Archibald Douglas, eighth Earl of Angus and Earl of Morton, died in 1588 and was succeeded in the earldom of Angus by William Douglas of Glenbervie, ninth Earl (*The Scots Peerage*, Sir James Balfour Paul, ed. [9 vols., Edinburgh, 1904-1914], I, 197). Sir William Douglas of Lochleven succeeded Archibald, eighth Earl of Angus and Earl of Morton, in the earldom of Morton in 1588. He is not to be confused with the Catholic Lord Maxwell who disputed the title and was often called the Earl of Morton (*ibid.*, VI, 371).



to his earldom, hesitated to raise a new issue. As usual, James's poverty was another serious obstacle to action.<sup>9</sup>

James reluctantly took up the matter when the incriminating letters were first sent to Scotland. Huntly was warded in Edinburgh castle immediately, but his wife and friends had access to him, James dined there with him, and within eight days he was again at court enjoying royal favor.<sup>10</sup> Although Lord Claud Hamilton was imprisoned, none of the other conspirators involved, Errol, Crawford, Robert Bruce, and the Jesuits, Crichton and Hay, was apprehended.<sup>11</sup> Nevertheless, Chancellor Maitland, by threatening to resign his post, forced the King to dismiss Huntly from the Captainship of the Guard. The Earl soon left court and went north to join Errol.<sup>12</sup>

The Catholic lords brought the matter to an issue with surprising rapidity. They had an unexpected ally in the Protestant Earl of Bothwell, who raised forces in the South to divert the King while Huntly and Errol gathered men in the North. Such a challenge to his authority James could not countenance. He summoned his liegemen to attend him and in April marched resolutely north, accompanied by Lennox, Lord John Hamilton, Mar, Angus, Morton, Maitland, the Master of Glamis, and many others, including a considerable force from Edinburgh. Many of Huntly's men, who had believed that they were freeing the King from Maitland, refused to fight against James in person and deserted. Neither party could have been eager for battle. James's forces were wearied by long marches, night watches, and cold weather, and were not well provisioned. Compromise was obviously best; and, although the King

<sup>9</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLIII, No. 31, Fowler to [Burghley], Mar. 14, 1589.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, XLIII, Nos. 16, 17, Fowler to Walsingham, Mar. 1, 1589; *ibid.*, No. 18, Ashby to Burghley, Mar. 2, 1589; *ibid.*, No. 29, Ashby to [Burghley], Mar. 14, 1589; Calderwood, V, 6-7, 36.

<sup>11</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLIII, No. 33, Ashby to [Walsingham], Mar. 15, 1589.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, XLIII, No. 31, Fowler to [Burghley], Mar. 14, 1589; *ibid.*, No. 32, Fowler to Walsingham, Mar. 14, 1589; *ibid.*, No. 34, Aston to Hudson, Mar. 15, 1589; *Border Papers*, I, 335-336.

appeared more eager than his Council for unconditional terms of surrender, the Council persuaded Huntly to deliver himself into James's hands and promised to intercede with the King that his life and lands might not be forfeited.<sup>13</sup> The other great lords of the rebellion soon "came in." Bothwell, Crawford, and Huntly, tried by an assize on May 24 for their activities against the government and religion, were found guilty, punishment being left to the King's decision. They were assigned to easy ward during the summer and were released in the early autumn, when James was eager to create peace and harmony in his realm in honor of his approaching marriage. Others compounded for their offence during the summer. Thus the affair of the Brig o' Dee—it derived its name from the place near Aberdeen where the forces met—died out. From the end of February, 1589, when the plot was discovered, until the end of April, when Huntly surrendered, the situation was critical. Then the danger disappeared and neither King nor Catholic lords could claim a great victory.<sup>14</sup>

The reasons for the lenient treatment of the rebels were chiefly two. During the critical weeks the King was without money and had little power. He had sent an ambassador, Colville of Easter Wemyss, to Elizabeth in March to remind the Queen of Ashby's Armada promises.<sup>15</sup> Fowler,

<sup>13</sup> *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, IV, 371–372; *Cal. Scottish*, 1589–1593, W. K. Boyd and H. W. Meikle, eds. (Edinburgh, 1936), pp. 20–71, *passim*. Excellent reports of the campaign are contained in the letters of Thomas Fowler, who accompanied the King. See B. M., Cotton MSS., Caligula B viii, ff. 137–138, [Fowler to Burghley], [Apr. 19, 1589]; Harl. MSS., 4647, ff. 128v–129, Fowler to Ashby, Apr. 28, 1589. Cf. Harl. MSS., 4647, ff. 123–124, Widdrington to Walsingham, Apr. 17, 1589, for Bothwell's activities.

<sup>14</sup> *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, IV, 384n., 412n., 413n.; S. P. Scotland, XLIV, Nos. 2, 14, Ashby to Walsingham, May 2, 12, 1589; *ibid.*, No. 30, indictment of Crawford and Bothwell; *ibid.*, Nos. 33, 43, Fowler to Walsingham, May 26, June 14, 1589; *ibid.*, No. 69, A. Douglas to Walsingham, Aug. 19, 1589; Cotton MSS., Caligula D i, ff. 422–423, Ashby to Burghley, June 28, 1589; Add. MSS., 23241, f. 27, Sir R. Cockburn to Maitland, Aug. 4, 1589; B. M., Egerton MSS., 2598, ff. 32–33, draft, Ashby to Burghley, Aug. 11, 1589.

<sup>15</sup> *Hat. Cal.*, XIII, 408; S. P. Scotland, XLIII, No. 39, Ashby to Burghley, Mar. 20, 1589.

an English intelligencer who accompanied James on the expedition against Huntly, wrote eloquently of the poor commissariat and of the King's need for money with which to maintain troops.<sup>16</sup> Elizabeth did not turn a deaf ear to the emergency. She said that she cared not for her purse in this cause and in April sent three thousand pounds to the King, a sum which she modestly belittled as merely the wherewithal "to pay for horsemeat" for the recent expedition.<sup>17</sup>

Equally important was the lack of unity among the Protestant nobles. While the King was near Aberdeen, there were whispers that some among the royal forces perhaps had secret communication with Huntly. The Duke of Lennox, Huntly's brother-in-law, was much suspected at that time,<sup>18</sup> but other Protestant noblemen may have quietly exerted their influence in favor of the Catholic Earls. Chancellor Maitland, the most powerful Protestant figure in the kingdom, was hated by both Catholic and Protestant nobles. The ancient nobility, said Huntly, felt that he was undermining their influence. In the summer after the Brig o' Dee action the opposition to Maitland became serious. It was led by the old Protestant "Stirling faction" and their successors, the Master of Glamis and the Earls of Angus, Mar, and Morton.<sup>19</sup> Glamis had been captured by the rebels while they were in the field in the North and had escaped, it was whispered, with the connivance of Huntly, so that he might intercede for the

<sup>16</sup> Cotton MSS., Caligula B viii, ff. 137-138, [Fowler to Burghley], [Apr. 19, 1589].

<sup>17</sup> Cotton MSS., Caligula D i, f. 398, and transcript in Harl. MSS., 4647, f. 104v, Heneage to Walsingham, Apr. 5, 1589; *Hat. Cal.*, XIII, 409-410; S. P. Scotland, L, Nos. 23, 72, lists of payments to the King of Scots.

<sup>18</sup> Cotton MSS., Caligula B viii, ff. 137-138 [Fowler to Burghley], [Apr. 19, 1589]; Harl. MSS., 4647, ff. 128v-129, Fowler to Ashby, Apr. 28, 1589; Gray, *Letters*, p. 157.

<sup>19</sup> The "Stirling faction," which had ousted Arran from power in November, 1585, at Stirling, was composed of Angus (Archibald, eighth Earl), Mar, and the Master of Glamis.

rebels and get lenient terms of surrender for them. He used his influence on behalf of Errol when that noble compounded for his offence. His actions prevented the formation of any united Protestant opposition to the Catholic Earls.<sup>20</sup>

Although the league and subsequent events showed James a fairly consistent friend of England, his constancy was ever questionable, his power dubious. There was a general feeling among English agents in Edinburgh that "the postern" was not yet secure. They suggested the old plan of building up a party devoted to the Queen's interests. The ambassador, Ashby, and the intelligencers, Fowler and Aston, agreed in recommending Chancellor Maitland to Elizabeth's favor as the person most able and most friendly to England.<sup>21</sup> Elizabeth was not willing to put complete confidence in him. Perhaps the memory of his speech in the Scottish Parliament after Mary's death made her mistrust him. No doubt the Master of Gray, his bitter enemy, who was in London in the spring of 1589, had something to do with it. Gray urged Elizabeth to assume the rôle of his political godmother and to procure his return to Scotland, where he said he could do much for her. He hated Huntly, who had obtained his share of the abbacy of Dunfermline after his disgrace. Elizabeth decided to see what Gray could do and paved the way for his return by obtaining the King's consent and Maitland's reluctant promise of friendship. She acted contrary to the advice of Fowler, Ashby, and Hudson,<sup>22</sup> all of whom urged

<sup>20</sup> Harl. MSS., 4647, f. 140r, Gray to Walsingham, May 6, 1589; S. P. Scotland, XLIV, No. 43, Fowler to Walsingham, June 14, 1589; *Cal. Scottish*, 1589-1593, pp. 137, 145-146; Gray, *Letters*, pp. 156-159.

<sup>21</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLIII, No. 33, Ashby to [Walsingham], Mar. 15, 1589; *ibid.*, No. 34, Aston to Hudson, Mar. 15, 1589; *ibid.*, No. 40, Fowler to Walsingham, Mar. 20, 1589.

<sup>22</sup> James Hudson was an agent frequently employed by the English government to the Scottish court. At times James sent him on errands to England. See *Warr. Papers*, II, 104n. Cf. below, p. 214.



her not to alienate Maitland by this favor to Gray.<sup>23</sup> Gray was in Scotland by the beginning of June,<sup>24</sup> but he had far overestimated his influence and soon dropped into the background. Elizabeth may have been wise in not building solely on one person in Scotland; Maitland was hated by most of the nobility; Gray had a rather sinister reputation to live down; and Scotland had ever been a center of shifting factions. For the time a period of comparative peace set in. James was absorbed in the question of his marriage and, the Catholic party having been checked temporarily, there was no immediate necessity for English interference. The divisions among the Protestants were ominous but the case was not urgent.

In a broader sense the affair of the Brig o' Dee did nothing to better the relations between England and Scotland. Easter Wemyss returned from his embassy with little more than the three thousand pounds. Elizabeth, he reported, would not budge from the position she had formerly taken concerning the Lennox lands, Ashby's promises, and the title.<sup>25</sup> There was dissatisfaction in Scotland at these answers. It may be more than chance that a day or two after Easter Wemyss' return there were rumors current of mercy to be shown to the rebel Earls.<sup>26</sup> James had managed the whole affair very astutely. By combining a show of royal authority with clemency for the culprits he refused to let his policy be dictated by Elizabeth and he evaded the necessity of identifying himself with either Protestant or Catholic party. The reasons were partly his personal

<sup>23</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLIII, No. 71, memorial for Hudson, going to Scotland; *ibid.*, XLIV, No. 7, Fowler to Walsingham, May 5, 1589; *ibid.*, XLIV, Nos. 11, 15, Hudson to Walsingham, May 6, 12, 1589; Cotton MSS., Caligula D i, ff. 351-352, Ashby to Walsingham, May 4, 1589.

<sup>24</sup> Gray, *Letters*, pp. 156-159.

<sup>25</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLIII, No. 68, answers to Easter Wemyss' proposals, Apr. 26, 1589.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, XLIV, No. 15, Hudson to Walsingham, May 12, 1589; *Cal. Scottish*, 1589-1593, pp. 72-73.



liking for Huntly, partly his anomalous position as King without sure power, and partly uncertainty about the outcome of the religious conflict in Europe, which was reflected in Scotland and which made it imperative for him to be neutral. To Elizabeth such neutrality was irritating.

While the last embers of the Brig o' Dee affair were dying out, there occurred an interesting episode in the story of James's relations with persons of importance in England. After Leicester's death James had instructed Archibald Douglas to get in touch with Essex. Apparently nothing resulted until the autumn of 1589, when Essex made an effort to establish friendship with the Scottish King through the medium of Richard Douglas, nephew of Archibald, and "Ottoman," formerly Leicester's secretary.<sup>27</sup> Lord and Lady Rich (Essex's sister) employed the same messengers to win James's favor, and one Constable carried commendations to him from the Countess of Warwick, the Countess of Cumberland, and Lady Talbot.<sup>28</sup> The ghost of Leicester may have influenced this group. It was also reported that the Earl of Derby, one of James's potential rivals for the throne, sought friendship with the King. James sent a reply to Essex and conferred at various times with the messengers, but little more was done. He was much preoccupied with arrangements for his wedding, and in November Fowler reported to Burghley that "Victor [James] regards not their offers much, and the instruments are worst rewarded of all that ever came here of that nation, which discourages somewhat their proceedings."<sup>29</sup>

<sup>27</sup> This was Jean Hotman, son of François, the great publicist. See David Baird Smith, "Jean de Villiers Hotman," *Scot. Hist. Rev.*, XIV (1916-1917), 154.

<sup>28</sup> The Talbot name used in this connection may be significant, since Arbella Stewart, one of the possible rivals for the throne, was living under the guardianship of Lady Shrewsbury, wife of George Talbot, Earl of Shrewsbury. It is not clear that Lady Shrewsbury was the person employing Constable to James, but the reference suggests that she or one of her daughters-in-law was attempting to safeguard the family interests by this cautious move.

<sup>29</sup> *Hat. Cal.*, III, 435-436, 438-439, 442-443.

In 1589 the King's relations with Burghley were very cordial. Fowler wrote to the Lord Treasurer in March:

. . . of my faith, my Lord, he [the King] esteems you the first and gravest councillor of Europe this day, and in plain dealing he says all his ministers hath found your Lordship a hard man in his causes, but he considers your sincere dealing for the Queen your mistress, saying in truth he cannot think evil of you for it, wishing of God he had such another for all he hath. And he desires nothing more, next her Majesty's good liking of him, than that your Lordship will think well of him and in his honest and good course toward her Majesty and realm you will favor his requests. . . .<sup>30</sup>

The quotation of itself proves little, but at this time Burghley was doing his best to excuse James to Elizabeth, who railed against the King's "contrariouss" proceedings with the Catholic lords. The Lord Treasurer wrote to Fowler:

. . . I do require her to hope better of the end, considering, I assure myself, of the King's settled devotion in religion and the diversity of government. There is to be considered that the King hath not so absolute authority there as she hath here, and the nobility there are not acquainted with absolute government of their king but rather are themselves in a sort absolute. . . .<sup>31</sup>

No doubt Burghley wanted Fowler to rehearse to James this passage with the Queen. Was he, too, looking to the "sun rising"? Later in 1589 he gave an even more concrete instance of his friendship. James, then in the midst of preparations for his wedding, sent Mr. John Colville to London to secure plate for the occasion. The resources of the Scottish treasury were proving inadequate and the anxious bridegroom wrote earnestly to Burghley "to kythe his af-

<sup>30</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLIII, No. 37, Mar. 20, 1589.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, XLIII, No. 41, Mar. 21, 1589.

fection." "It is now time to give a proof [of affection]," the King said plainly in his letter. "No hours nor days must be lost for *tempus* deals most straitly with me."<sup>32</sup> Elizabeth supplied two thousand pounds for plate, as well as one thousand in ready cash. Burghley evidently used his influence to obtain this advance, acting on the theory that a small sum spent now might prevent future expenditure.<sup>33</sup> Such incidents are trivial but they suggest that for the moment James had no need to worry about friends in England. Burghley was amiable, Essex was eager for the King's favor. The rivalry between these two was not yet the dominant note in English politics. Nevertheless, feeling confident of the Lord Treasurer, James may have decided that it was useless to do more than answer vaguely the overtures made by Essex.

### *The Danish Marriage*

Many princesses had been suggested for marriage with the King of Scots, but when he came of age only two were seriously considered. They were Catherine de Bourbon, sister of Henry of Navarre, and Anne, second daughter of Frederick II, King of Denmark. Both were Protestants, both from countries with which Scotland had had friendly relations by alliances, marriages, and trade, and both represented interests with which England was cautiously friendly.

Half-hearted negotiations for a Danish match had been going on since 1585. The youthful James had displayed a lively curiosity concerning the age, beauty, and "*bonnes mœurs*" of the Danish princesses. Frederick II, nevertheless, was inclined to raise the old dispute about the owner-

<sup>32</sup> Lansdowne MSS., lx, f. 101, Aug. 15, 1589, printed in *Original Letters, Illustrative of English History*, Henry Ellis, ed. (Series I, 3 vols., London, 1824), III, 28-29.

<sup>33</sup> Harl. MSS., 6994, f. 201, Heneage to Burghley, Sept. 8, 1589; *Hat. Cal.*, III, 430. Cf. S. P. Scotland, L, No. 90, and LXII, No. 26, lists of payments to the use of the King of Scots.

ship of the Orkney Islands. He readily passed over the uncertain advances of the Scottish King for those of the Duke of Brunswick, to whom he pledged his eldest daughter. If James wanted a Danish bride, the second one, Anne, must do.<sup>34</sup>

But James was not certain that he wanted Anne. In 1587, when his ambassadors were being treated somewhat coolly in Denmark, he was entertaining at the Scottish court the Huguenot poet, Du Bartas, who seems to have been furthering unofficially the Navarre match. The King sent for Catherine's portrait and for a description of her "rare qualities" and even wrote to the lady. He was, however, careful not to accredit fully the Frenchman, de l'Isle, whom he employed as agent to Henry of Navarre. For a long time he could not make up his mind on the relative merits of the two princesses; at last, having secured pictures of them, he spent fifteen days in devout prayer and meditation and then announced his decision in favor of Anne.<sup>35</sup>

His motives were probably mixed. It was put in his head by his ambassadors to Denmark that Catherine was "old and crooked, and somewhat worse if all were known . . .," and that her portion was spent.<sup>36</sup> She was almost seventeen years older than Anne<sup>37</sup> and, although her brother was in line of succession to the French crown, it was not obvious that he would gain it. Neutral Denmark may have appeared more stable financially than war-ridden

<sup>34</sup> Melville, *Memoirs*, pp. 161-167, 171, 176-177; Moysie, pp. 53, 63-65; *Historie and Life*, pp. 211, 225; *Warr. Papers*, II, 35-42, 46-47, 48-49; Cotton MSS., Caligula B viii, f. 211, instructions for Barnbarroch and Young, Scottish ambassadors sent to Denmark.

<sup>35</sup> *Hat. Cal.*, III, 254-260, *passim*; *Warr. Papers*, II, 68-70, 80-93; Add. MSS., 23108, ff. 23-24, draft of instructions for Colville of Easter Wemyss, going to the King of Navarre; Melville, *Memoirs*, pp. 176-177.

<sup>36</sup> Harl. MSS., 4647, ff. 130v-131, transcript, Fowler to Burghley, May 22, 1589; Cotton MSS., Caligula D i, f. 376, collated with the transcript in Harl. MSS., 4647, ff. 94v-95, Fowler to Burghley, June 7, 1589; Camden, p. 437.

<sup>37</sup> Catherine was born on Feb. 7, 1558 (*La Grande Encyclopédie*, 31 vols., Paris, 1886-1902), Anne on Dec. 12, 1574 (*Dict. Nat. Biog.*), and James on June 19, 1566 (*ibid.*).



France. James's instructions to his ambassadors had displayed his keen interest in the amount of the dowry.<sup>38</sup> Another motive, characteristic of so many of his actions, probably entered into his calculations. Henry of Navarre's Protestant faith was bound to involve him in war with ardent French Catholics and with Spain before he could make good his claim to the French throne. James was uncertain of the outcome of such a conflict and may have wished to avoid choosing sides. A marriage with Catherine would have strengthened his connection with the militant Protestant cause in Europe. A marriage with Anne, while it kept him safely within the ranks of Protestants, committed him to no open war against Catholics. Surely Anne was the safer choice.

James's reasoning on the problem was, no doubt, influenced by the attitude of his subjects who were interested in foreign trade. Toward the end of May, 1589, before he had made his final decision, a riot broke out in Edinburgh against Maitland and others who favored the Navarre match. The burgesses and merchants who took part made it known plainly that they favored Denmark. According to James's account, all the Scottish burghs, and especially Edinburgh, wanted that match because their most important trade was with the "Eisterlingis" and they hoped to get exemption from the tolls exacted by Denmark at the Sound.<sup>39</sup> Perhaps there was a further reason for their attitude. The merchants must have seen clearly that an alliance with neutral Denmark would hamper their trade with France and Spain less than the Navarre connection. A year or two later, when James was becoming rather bold in his foreign policy and posed as the valiant friend of Henry of

<sup>38</sup> *Hat. Cal.*, III, 420-422, instructions for the ambassadors going to Denmark; Add. MSS., 23108, ff. 23-24, instructions for Easter Wemyss, going to Navarre.

<sup>39</sup> Cotton MSS., Caligula D i, ff. 382-383, Fowler to Burghley, [May] 28, 1589; Harl. MSS., 4647, ff. 133v-134r, transcript, Poury Ogilvy to Walsingham, June 1, 1589; Melville, *Memoirs*, p. 179; *Warr. Papers*, II, 104-107.



Navarre by issuing letters of marque against certain French League towns and by forbidding Scots to carry wine from Bordeaux to certain towns disobedient to Henry IV, the burghs were greatly displeased. The English ambassador reported that they would never consent to a declaration of war by Scotland against the Catholic League in France. They had no desire to risk their fortunes by being drawn into the European war.<sup>40</sup>

Elizabeth played a negligible part in determining the marriage question, although she attempted to hinder the negotiations. Easter Wemyss, on his return from the English court in the spring of 1589, was noted to have talked against the Danish match, and a letter of the Master of Gray in June shows that the Queen was using him as an instrument to impede it.<sup>41</sup> Rumor in Scotland had it that she wanted to keep the King from any marriage in order to cut off his line and prevent him from attaining the English throne.<sup>42</sup> She may have been jealous, or her disapproval may have proceeded from real distrust of a Scottish-Danish alliance. Her relations with Denmark were colored largely by trade disputes, and she may have disliked the idea of a union between two northern countries who could injure English commerce. A third explanation lies in the possibility that Elizabeth preferred the Navarre match, which certainly would have drawn James closer to the militant Protestant princes of Europe. Nevertheless, although she discouraged the union with Anne of Denmark, there is little evidence that she encouraged the French match.

As in the affair of the Brig o' Dee, the King managed to

<sup>40</sup> *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, IV, 526, 615-616, 627-628, 674, 707-708; S. P. Scotland, XLVI, No. 58, Bowes to Burghley, Oct. 24, 1590.

<sup>41</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLIV, No. 26, Fowler to Walsingham, May 23, 1589; Cotton MSS., Caligula D i, f. 378, collated with Harl. MSS., 4647, f. 95v, Gray to Burghley, June 5, 1589. Cf. Gray, *Letters*, pp. 160-161.

<sup>42</sup> Camden, p. 437; Harl. MSS., 4647, ff. 133v-134r, transcript, Poury Ogilvy to Walsingham, June 1, 1589; Cotton MSS., Caligula D i, ff. 382-383, Fowler to Burghley, [May] 28, 1589; Melville, *Memoirs*, p. 179.

evade successfully the great problem raised by the religious conflict of the age and to remain fairly independent of England. Although he made his decision in opposition to Elizabeth's wishes, it was a Protestant match, and she could not be too vigorous in her disapproval. Denmark's neutrality was a political and financial advantage. The connection gave James a certain prestige in the next rôle he chose to play in the drama of European diplomacy.

*Confusion: 1590-1592*

The marriage with Anne was celebrated by proxy in August, 1589, and the Earl Marshall, James's ambassador, set sail from Denmark to bring the new Queen to Scotland. Storms drove the party to the coast of Norway, where bad weather detained them a long time. The young King, becoming impatient, gallantly set off in October to conduct his bride home in person. After meeting Anne, he decided that the winter passage to Scotland was too dangerous and whiled away the time by visiting the Danish court.<sup>43</sup>

Elizabeth worried lest the Catholic party seize power in Scotland while James was in Denmark. There was fear of an attempt to take Edinburgh in January, 1590, when several Papist lords resorted to the town. The captain and pilot of a Spanish ship lurking in the harbor were apprehended; they confessed to a plot for the bringing of Spanish aid to Scotland.<sup>44</sup> These and similar incidents induced the Queen to take precautions against the worst. She sent north as her resident ambassador Robert Bowes, a man already experienced in Scottish affairs. His mission was chiefly to weld together Protestant strength and to assure the Council of the Queen's help in case of danger.<sup>45</sup> Orders were

<sup>43</sup> Melville, *Memoirs*, pp. 179-181; Moysie, pp. 78-81.

<sup>44</sup> Calderwood, V, 70-71; Harl. MSS., 4647, f. 135r, transcript, Bowes to Walsingham, Dec. 31, 1589; Egerton MSS., 2598, ff. 265-266, R. Wigmore to [Ashby], Feb. 10, 1590; *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, IV, 827-831.

<sup>45</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLIV, No. 98, memorandum by Burghley for Bowes, [Dec. 1, 1589]; *ibid.*, Nos. 99, 100, copies, memorial for Bowes, Dec. 3, 1589.

given to the wardens on the marches to have their forces in readiness, so that upon notice from Bowes they could aid in repressing any borderers who might try to create disturbances in Scotland.<sup>46</sup> Elizabeth wrote several letters to the King, expressing her disapproval of his absence from the country.<sup>47</sup> Not only was it dangerous to risk his person in such a voyage but it was courting trouble from Spain and from his "disaffected" subjects. Fortunately, the evils she feared failed to materialize. Scotland was kept fairly quiet by a nice balance of power between Lord John Hamilton, on the one hand, and Bothwell and Lennox on the other.<sup>48</sup> Doubtless, knowledge of the Queen's watchful eye contributed to the effect.

After the King's return in May, 1590, the chief events in Scotland centered about the confused party politics of the times. Multiplicity of parties, coalitions swiftly formed and as swiftly dissolved, sudden elevations to power and equally sudden downfalls, marriages and deaths, all provided constant change and yet monotony. In the center of affairs was Chancellor Maitland, trusted by the King and very capable. Against him the Master of Glamis led a group of Protestant nobles, chiefly the old "Stirling faction." Glamis sought friends in the Catholic party as well, where Errol was his closest associate.<sup>49</sup> Then there was Bothwell, "unstable as water," ostensibly a Protestant, but more interested in dominating the kingdom than in anything else. He hated Maitland and was willing to coöperate with anyone, Papist or Protestant, laird or highest noble, against the Chancellor. The Duke of Lennox, whose primary quarrel was

<sup>46</sup> *Acts P. C. Eng.*, XVIII, 250-251.

<sup>47</sup> *Letters of Queen Elizabeth and King James VI. of Scotland*, John Bruce, ed. (Camden Society, London, 1849), pp. 57-59, 165-166. Cf. *Hat. Cal.*, IV, 12-13, 28-29.

<sup>48</sup> *Warr. Papers*, II, 110-113; *Historie and Life*, p. 241.

<sup>49</sup> Both Errol and the Master of Glamis had married daughters of the Earl of Morton. Glamis had interceded for Errol in the Brig o' Dee affair. (*S. P. Scotland*, XLVI, Nos. 4, 7, Bowes to Burghley, July 4, 11, 1590; *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, IV, 506-507 and n.)

with the Hamiltons over the succession, was usually in opposition to Maitland; naturally, Lord John Hamilton was reckoned one of the Chancellor's friends. Although Lennox was only sixteen and nominally a Protestant, Elizabeth mistrusted him because he was d'Aubigny's son and Huntly's brother-in-law. Huntly was more than ever in the public eye as leader of the Catholics, head of the Gordons, and King's favorite. He had been very bitter against Maitland in 1589 but was thought to find favor at the Chancellor's hands in these later years. The divisions among the Protestants had put him in a most advantageous position. At times the rival factions seemed to bid against each other for his support.<sup>50</sup>

Elizabeth's policy was directed against Huntly's influence in Scotland. After James's homecoming, she sent the Earl of Worcester to him to inform him of his election to the Garter, but more serious business was included in the embassy. Worcester obtained from the King a promise to deal with the "Briggers o' Dee" for their latest intrigues. Although the resident ambassador, Bowes, constantly pressed for fulfilment of that promise,<sup>51</sup> James countered his admonitions by sending an ambassador to the Queen to ask for her assistance in "so expedient a work." Elizabeth graciously answered the appeal by sending three thousand pounds to him, in addition to financing Stewart and Skene on their embassy to Denmark and Germany.<sup>52</sup>

Despite his affable words to the Queen,<sup>53</sup> James proceeded in leisurely fashion against the Catholic lords. Huntly, Sutherland, and Sir Patrick Gordon of Auchindoun

<sup>50</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLVII, Nos. 5, 15, Bowes to Burghley, Jan. 25, Feb. 23, 1591.

<sup>51</sup> Melville, *Memoirs*, p. 182; Moysie, p. 84; S. P. Scotland, XLV, No. 65, Worcester to Burghley, June 15, 1590; *ibid.*, XLVI, No. 7, Bowes to Burghley, July 11, 1590.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, L, Nos., 8, 22, 23, 72, 73, 82, and LXII, No. 26, memoranda of payments to the use of the King of Scots; Add. MSS., 23241, ff. 31-33, instructions for Carmichael. For Elizabeth's interest in the embassy of Stewart and Skene see below, pp. 126-127.

<sup>53</sup> *Letters of Elizabeth and James*, pp. 63-64.



were ordered to bring the Jesuit Father Gordon before the Council but apparently no action resulted from the summons.<sup>54</sup> On June 30, 1590 an Act of Council confirmed pardons granted for the Brig o' Dee affair and anything dependent thereon, although it was stated that suspects were to stand trial for all later acts against the King's estate and religion and were to submit to the kirk and to follow whatsoever order the King should prescribe.<sup>55</sup> Bowes effectively checkmated the efforts of the Master of Glamis to procure pardon for the "Briggs o' Dee" for their later offences, but Elizabeth could get no satisfactory action from James when, in November and December of 1590, she sent north fresh evidence that Spanish money was being sent to them.<sup>56</sup> The King even defended Huntly, who had been named as the chief probable recipient of the Spanish gold.

He [the King] opened how far Huntlay had bound himself to him to quench all intelligence with all foreign princes and what weakness he saw evidently in his person to enterprise or compass any matter of weight. . . . The King would . . . be always waking and watchful to look both to Huntlay and also to other subjects suspected in that behalf, concluding that he was sovereign to them all and must protect them and that the withdrawing of his countenance from Huntlay at this present should leave him to the "willes" of his adversaries and be his hasty overthrow.<sup>57</sup>

Even clearer evidence of the King's favor was the pardon which Huntly received, dated December 17, 1590, covering all matters cited in the "dittie" [indictment] of May 24, 1589 and "all action, criminal or civil, that we had, have,

<sup>54</sup> *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, IV, 484.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, 501-502.

<sup>56</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLVI, Nos. 7, 64, Bowes to Burghley, July 11, Nov. 20, 1590.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, XLVI, No. 73, Bowes to Burghley, Dec. 18, 1590.



or may have against him, his life, lands, or goods. . . ." <sup>58</sup>  
 Bowes exerted himself to create a strong Protestant unit by smoothing out the differences between Maitland, the Master of Glamis, and others, but little confidence was created among them. <sup>59</sup>

In April, 1591, the Earl of Bothwell suddenly sprang into the center of the stage and remained a most important factor in Scottish politics for several years. Toby Matthews, Dean of Durham, once described him in vivid terms.

The noble man hath a wonderfull witt, and as wonderfull a volubilitie of tongue, as habilitie and agilitie of bodie on horse and foote: competently learned in the Latine, well languaged in the Frenche and Italian; muche delighted in poetrie, and of a verie resolute disposition both to doe and to suffer; nothing daintie to discover his humor or anie good qualitie he hath. <sup>60</sup>

His parentage explains much in his career. Bothwell was the son of John Stewart, an illegitimate son of James V. His mother was the Lady Jane Hepburn, sister of the fourth Earl of Bothwell, who played such a colorful part in Mary Stewart's life. His marriage to the Lady Margaret Douglas, sister of the great Protestant Earl of Angus, enhanced his importance among the Scottish nobility.

Bothwell's "agilitie of bodie" was symbolic of his political life. He was ever restless, ever trying new schemes to make himself powerful. Some of the methods he chose were fantastic beyond belief, indicative of a mind that could not calculate coolly and persevere but had to rush on to try one riotous adventure after another. In the stormy days of Arran's power he had posed as the champion of

<sup>58</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLVI, No. 73, inclosure, Huntly's remission.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, XLVI, No. 22, and XLVII, No. 5, Bowes to Burghley, Aug. 1, 1590 and Jan. 25, 1591.

<sup>60</sup> *Border Papers*, I, 481-484.

the kirk. He had played no small part in the success of the raid of Stirling in 1585, which marked Arran's fall and the noticeable increase of English influence in Scotland.<sup>61</sup> Later, however, he changed loyalties. He was one of the loudest in his denunciations of England for Mary's execution, and in the affair of the Brig o' Dee he was one of the strongest allies of the Catholic lords. During James's absence from Scotland he had again pursued the will-o'-the-wisp of English friendship, only to find, to his disgust, that Elizabeth encouraged his friendly advances but would not trust him.<sup>62</sup> When the King returned to Scotland, he openly showed his dislike of Bothwell. It was the beginning of a long contest between the King and his cousin, in which James's endurance was destined to triumph over the more mercurial qualities of the Earl. The immediate occasions seem to have been Bothwell's maladministration on the borders, his support of Fintry, a Catholic conspirator, and of other murderers and excommunicated people, and his interference with the goods of Mr. Thomas Fowler, the English informant, who died in Edinburgh in April, 1590, having possession at the time of certain Lennox jewels which James claimed.<sup>63</sup> Bothwell blamed Maitland for the King's harsh attitude and shared in the intrigues against the Chancellor, although he did not always press an advantage against him.<sup>64</sup> Suddenly, in April, 1591, the Earl was accused of conspiring with witches

<sup>61</sup> *Dict. Nat. Biog.* article on Francis Stewart Hepburn, Earl of Bothwell.

<sup>62</sup> Cotton MSS., Caligula D i, f. 411, Ashby to Burghley, Nov. 7, 1589; Egerton MSS., 2598, f. 159, Walsingham to Ashby, Nov. 15, 1589; S. P. Scotland, XLIV, No. 97, draft, Elizabeth to Bothwell, Nov. 27, 1589; Harl. MSS., 6994, f. 113, Walsingham to Burghley, Mar. 16, 1590; *Cal. Scottish*, 1589-1593, App., No. 19, Bowes to Walsingham, Mar. 24, 1590; S. P. Scotland, XLV, No. 28, Bowes to Burghley, Apr. 16, 1590; *Hat. Cal.*, IV, 3, 11, 23-25, 26-27.

<sup>63</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLV, Nos. 44, 62, Bowes to Burghley, May 16, June 12, 1590; *Hat. Cal.*, IV, 30.

<sup>64</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLVI, Nos. 7, 9, Bowes to Burghley, July 11, 1590; Calderwood, V, 138, 153-156.

to accomplish the death of the King and was warded in Edinburgh castle.<sup>65</sup>

James tried to get a convention of the nobility, barons, and burghs for the arraignment, but the nobles refused to come.<sup>66</sup> According to one contemporary account, the reason was "becaus thay knew that the King had na just occasioun of greif, nor cryme to allege aganis him, bot onlie at the instigation of Chanciller Maitland, whome thay all haittit to the death for his prowde arrogance usit in Denmarc aganis the Erle Marshall. . . ." Scottish law decreed the death penalty for consultation with witches, the chronicler added, but the penalty had never been enforced and the nobility did not want to establish a precedent.<sup>67</sup> Legal opinion varied on the validity of the testimony of witches, and James acknowledged to the English ambassador the weakness of the evidence against Bothwell. In the end the King decided to exile Bothwell, but while he was trying to make the Earl accept such conditions as he proposed, Bothwell escaped from the castle and lurked near-by, just out of his reach.<sup>68</sup>

Why did the King dislike Bothwell? Calderwood said that James frankly charged him with ambitions for the throne.<sup>69</sup> The accusation of consulting with witches implied the same charge. Nevertheless, it seems very unlikely that Bothwell considered himself a rival for the throne, in view of the fact that his Stewart blood was illegitimate and that he would have had to contend with two other claimants in the persons of the Duke of Lennox and Lord John Hamilton. Bothwell believed that Maitland influenced the King against him. Both grounds of ill will may have existed, but a third lay in the antipathetic natures of the

<sup>65</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLVII, No. 43, Bowes to Burghley, Apr. 17, 1591.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, XLVII, Nos. 44, 57, Bowes to Burghley, Apr. 27, May 21, 1591.

<sup>67</sup> *Historie and Life*, p. 242.

<sup>68</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLVII, Nos. 46, 61, 70, Bowes to Burghley, May 5, June 8, 22, 1591; Add. MSS., 23241, ff. 40-41, James to Maitland [Apr., 1591].

<sup>69</sup> Calderwood, V, 160-161.

King and his cousin. Although Bothwell's lust for power was shared by many others, no other Scottish noble possessed his restless vitality. On several occasions he showed little respect for the King's person and James, though he lacked true regal dignity, was acutely aware of Bothwell's insults.

The English government is not free from responsibility for inciting the King against Bothwell, but its influence seems to have been exerted mostly after the first witchcraft charges were made.<sup>70</sup> An anonymous clergyman affirmed that "the derections projects proceedings plots and courses that hes bene used against the Erle Bothwell lyfe and estait were sent post from London and lighted with alls great haist in our court, ful of reproofes of great oversight and unadvysednes in not fallowing thar derections mair providentlie," and said that he had proof in the intercepted letters of Bowes.<sup>71</sup> An intercepted letter from the English ambassador was exhibited at the west port of Edinburgh, probably the one of which a copy exists in the Public Record Office, endorsed, "Copy of my letter addressed to the Lord Treasurer and intercepted at Cunningham in Scotland the 6th of May 1591."<sup>72</sup> This document shows beyond a doubt that Bowes had stressed Bothwell's former faults but it by no means proves that the English had contrived his ruin. Elizabeth had one great aim in her Scottish policy, namely, to break the power of the Spanish and Catholic party in that kingdom. She may have seen in Bothwell's predicament a chance not only to cripple the Earl so that he could not harm her but also to make a salutary example for the other "Briggers o' Dee." Bothwell had had his hands deep in that affair, and the Queen had

<sup>70</sup> Some Scottish witches, however, perhaps those who accused Bothwell, fled to England in February, and one at least was taken in England and delivered into James's hands. (S. P. Scotland, XLVII, Nos. 7, 31, Bowes to Burghley, Feb. 3, Mar. 24, 1591.)

<sup>71</sup> *Warr. Papers*, II, 158 and n. Cf. *Hat. Cal.*, IV, 110; S. P. Scotland, XLVII, No. 44, Bowes to Burghley, Apr. 27, 1591.

<sup>72</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLVII, No. 46.



since discovered letters that showed him continuing his intrigues.<sup>73</sup> Moreover, knowing that Bothwell had long been an enemy to Maitland, Elizabeth and her Council may have decided to try to remove this menace and thereby support the Chancellor. In any case, the government of Scotland strengthened its case against Bothwell by reviving the charge of armed rebellion. Judgment was pronounced against him for his share in the Brig o' Dee conspiracy and for his unholy dealings with witches. He was proclaimed a traitor and his goods and lands forfeited.<sup>74</sup>

During the summer of 1591, immediately following Bothwell's escape from the castle, James displayed much vigor in suppressing the Earl's followers and was congratulated by Elizabeth for his energetic actions. Bothwell himself managed to evade capture. The Queen reiterated her warning of a Spanish danger in Scotland, only to have the King make light of it. Huntly remained high in his favor, at times being the only noble in attendance.<sup>75</sup> In November, Chancellor Maitland won a decided advantage over the Master of Glamis, who was forced temporarily to surrender his place in the Session and to give up the office of Treasurer.<sup>76</sup>

The Chancellor's power led to an attack by Bothwell on Holyroodhouse on the night of December 27, 1591, when

<sup>73</sup> *Cal. Scottish*, 1589-1593, App., No. 19, Bowes to Walsingham, Mar. 24, 1590; Harl. MSS., 6994, f. 113, Walsingham to Burghley, Mar. 16, 1590.

<sup>74</sup> *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, IV, 643-644, June 25, 1591; *Cal. Scottish*, 1589-1593, pp. 535-537. The sentence was confirmed in the 1592 parliament. See *Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland*, T. Thomson and C. Innes, eds. (III-IV, 1814-1816), III, 537-538.

<sup>75</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLVII, Nos. 86, 87, 96, 98, 99, 100, 105, Bowes to Burghley, Aug. 6, 11, 27, Sept. 10, 17, 23, Oct. 19, 1591; *ibid.*, No. 89, Elizabeth to James, Aug. 12, 1591; *ibid.*, No. 115, J. Hudson to Burghley, Dec. 7, 1591.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, XLVII, Nos. 108, 112, 116, Bowes to Burghley, Nov. 10, 21, Dec. 9, 1591. Montrose, the Chancellor's supporter, obtained the place in the Session, but Bowes tried to keep him from the Treasurership. Although that office was nominally returned to Montrose, who had had it before 1585, he promptly resigned it to Sir Robert Melville. Lennox obtained a grant of the yearly fee of the office.



the Earl with a party stormed the palace, battered on the doors of Maitland's apartments, and even threatened the royal chambers. He was eventually driven off and once more took to lurking in secret places. His raid was a blunder if he hoped to placate the King's wrath against him. James was furious and rode in person in pursuit, once falling into the River Tyne while chasing him. The mishap probably heightened the royal anger.<sup>77</sup>

This enterprise at Holyroodhouse was more than an outburst from Bothwell. It represented dramatically the formidable opposition to the Chancellor. The Douglas Earls, Morton and Angus,<sup>78</sup> were suspected of complicity in it and evidence of Lennox's connivance was strong. Maitland took precautions to safeguard his life and seemed thenceforth to rely on the support of Lord John Hamilton and the Catholic nobles, Montrose, Maxwell, and Huntly, against the Stewarts and the Douglasses. The point is important in view of the spectacular crime which occurred in February, 1592.<sup>79</sup>

The feud between the Gordons and the Stewarts had troubled the highlands for many years. It culminated in the murder of the "bonny" Earl of Moray at Donibristle in February, 1592, by Huntly. The crime shook all Scotland and caused amazing changes in the relations of England with the kirk and with various nobles. The high rank of the murderer and of his victim, the fact that they personified the interests of the two contending religions, and the sinister suspicions that the King and Chancellor had some part in the outrage made it an event of first importance.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, XLVII, No. 128, Bowes to Burghley, Dec. 31, 1591, and incl., Aston to Bowes, Dec. 28, 1591; *ibid.*, XLVIII, No. 7, Bowes to Burghley, Jan. 26, 1592; Melville, *Memoirs*, pp. 195-197; Moysie, p. 87; *Historie and Life*, pp. 243-244.

<sup>78</sup> William, ninth Earl of Angus, had died in July, 1591. His son William was a Catholic and, although some effort had been made to disinherit him before his father's death, he was served heir to his father in November, 1591 (*Scots Peerage*, I, 197-199).

<sup>79</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLVII, No. 127, and XLVIII, Nos. 2, 3, Bowes to Burghley, Dec. 31, 1591, Jan. 5, 15, 1592.

Lord Ochiltree, a Stewart kinsman of the "bonny" Earl, had been trying to patch up the feud between Huntly and Moray. At Ochiltree's suggestion, Moray came to his house at Donibristle on the north side of the Forth in order to be near the court and to effect the reconciliation. Huntly, learning of Moray's whereabouts and claiming a commission of lieutenancy from the King by which he was authorized to bring Moray to court or to slay him,<sup>80</sup> rode to Donibristle one night early in February, surrounded the house with his men, and set fire to it. Moray's men were forced out and surrendered. The Sheriff of Moray followed and fought valiantly with his sword, hoping to divert attention and thus give the Earl a chance to escape. The Earl succeeded in reaching the shore, "bot he had tarreyitt so lang in the hous that his tippett of his steill bonatt wes on fyir, quhairby he wes bewrayitt, seine, and so slayne be the Erlle of Huntly and his men wpone the vii of Februar M. D. XCI." <sup>81</sup>

The extent of the King's and the Chancellor's implication in the crime is a matter of some doubt. Each had motives that could have influenced him. Calderwood said that James disliked Moray because of his relationship with the Regent Moray (he had married the Regent's daughter) and because of his favor to Bothwell.<sup>82</sup> Moray was young and handsome, and gossip had it that Queen Anne had re-

<sup>80</sup> There is some confusion about this commission. Sir James Melville said that it was a commission to pursue, with fire and sword, Bothwell and his accomplices (*Memoirs*, p. 201). I have not found any such commission for Huntly. If any existed, it was probably destroyed intentionally to save the King's name. The day after the murder Huntly was discharged from all commissions of lieutenancy and justiciary granted at any time to him (*Reg. P. C. Scot.*, IV, 725).

<sup>81</sup> *A Chronicle of the Kings of Scotland, From Fergus the First, To James the Sixth, in the Year M. DC. XI.* (Maitland Club, Edinburgh, 1830), p. 144; S. P. Scotland, XLVIII, Nos. 15, 17, Bowes to Burghley, Feb. 13, 17, 1592; *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, IV, 725n.

<sup>82</sup> Calderwood, V, 144-145. After the murder one of Bothwell's men was threatened with torture to obtain from him a confession that Moray was with Bothwell the night of the attack on Holyroodhouse. The confession was not obtained (*ibid.*, p. 147).

cently shown keen admiration for him.<sup>83</sup> Huntly, as a great favorite of James, had ample opportunity to turn the King against his personal enemy. With Maitland, the possible motive lay in his precarious position. His rivals, the Stewarts and the Douglasses, had shown themselves so strong at the time of Bothwell's attack on Holyroodhouse that he had been forced to ally with the Catholic party. He may have bought Huntly's support by promising him a free hand against Moray. In 1594, in connection with another murder, evidence was brought to light implicating Maitland in a "band" with Huntly, Maxwell, and others for the murder of Moray, Argyll, Argyll's brother, and one Campbell of Calder. The confessions on which this evidence was based were not wholly trustworthy. Some were obtained by threat of torture and were afterwards denied. Nevertheless, they strengthen the case against the Chancellor.<sup>84</sup>

Stories current after the crime related that James had kept Ochiltree from going to Donibristle about the time of the murder and that he himself, while hunting on the morning after the crime, had seen the smoke and fire but had failed to act and had prevented Ochiltree from riding thither. It was also said that the Chancellor had seen Huntly depart and had made no effort to stay him.<sup>85</sup> The

<sup>83</sup> "A Briefe Opinion of the . . . Noblemenn in Scotlande . . .," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, New Series, II (1873), 247; "The Diarey of Robert Birrel . . .," *Fragments of Scottish History* (Edinburgh, 1798), pp. 26, 27n., quoting Sir James Balfour, *Annales of Scotland*, in *Historical Works of Sir James Balfour* (4 vols., London, 1825), I, 369. "The Queine, more rashlie than wyslie, some few dayes before, had commendit (him) in the King's heiring, with too many epithetts of a proper and gallant man."

<sup>84</sup> *Highland Papers*, I, J. R. N. Macphail, ed. (Scottish History Society, Edinburgh, 1914), 144-194; *Warr. Papers*, II, 246-251; Donald Gregory, *History of the Western Highlands and Isles of Scotland . . .* (Edinburgh, 1836), pp. 245-254.

<sup>85</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLVIII, No. 15, Bowes to Burghley, Feb. 15, 1592, with incl., Aston to Bowes, Feb. 10, 1592; *ibid.*, No. 17, Bowes to Burghley, Feb. 17, 1592. Numerous accounts of the murder are given. See *Historie and Life*, p. 246; Melville, *Memoirs*, pp. 200-201; Calderwood, V, 144-145; Moysie, pp. 88-91. It is practically impossible to ascertain the truth of these details.

treatment Huntly received somewhat supported these suspicions. A proclamation was made to gather forces to pursue him, but the Earl offered to stand trial and entered ward at Blackness. He was soon released, two of his accomplices were executed for the crime, and little more was done to punish him.<sup>86</sup> The feud between him and Moray's young heir was settled only shortly before James came to England in 1603.

Popular wrath was raised to fever pitch by this atrocious crime; songs and rhymes commemorated it; and ministers thundered from their pulpits about it.<sup>87</sup> So great was the uproar that James deemed it wise to retire to the west for a time, nominally in pursuit of Bothwell.<sup>88</sup> The crime put a whip in the hands of the kirk and of the Queen of England to demand that James punish Huntly. It also gave James an opportunity to bargain with the kirk, to demand its coöperation against Bothwell in return for proceedings against Huntly. For the moment, however, the advantage lay with the kirk. The parliamentary act of May, 1592, which gave legal status for the first time to the Presbyterian system, its organization of the General Assembly, of synodal and provincial assemblies, of presbyteries, and of particular sessions, is usually considered a measure conceded by James to appease the people.<sup>89</sup>

The King in the same Parliament succeeded in getting Bothwell's forfeiture ratified; but the sonorous phrases of the statute book held little dread for the outlaw, who again attacked the King in the palace at Falkland, shortly before midnight on June twenty-seventh. Once more he was unsuc-

<sup>86</sup> *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, IV, 733-735 and notes; Moysie, pp. 91-92; Calderwood, V, 146-149.

<sup>87</sup> *The Autobiography and Diary of Mr James Melvill*, Robert Pitcairn, ed. (Wodrow Society, Edinburgh, 1842), p. 294.

<sup>88</sup> *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, IV, 729 and n.; S. P. Scotland, XLVIII, No. 19, incl., Aston to Bowes, Feb. 24, 1592.

<sup>89</sup> Calderwood, V, 162; Melville, *Autobiography*, pp. 294-298; *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, IV, Intro., p. lxvii, pp. 748-750n.; *Acts Parl. Scot.*, III, 541-542.



cessful in forcing an entry, but he humiliated James by a seven-hour siege of the tower wherein the King was locked for safety. Fresh efforts to apprehend the Earl were fruitless.<sup>90</sup>

Huntly's misdeeds and the odium attached to his name redounded to Bothwell's advantage. After all, the latter had never done anything quite so base as the murder of Moray. He was, furthermore, a Protestant and a kinsman of the "bonny" Earl, circumstances which made people look to him for vengeance for that crime. Elizabeth quickly recognized Bothwell's value as a counterpoise to Huntly but acted slowly. As early as the summer of 1591 Bothwell had angled for English friendship. At that time the ambassador, Bowes, knowing James's hatred for the Earl, refused to have anything to do with him.<sup>91</sup> In February, 1592, in the midst of the confusion created by Moray's death, Bowes again heard that he would receive overtures from Bothwell and stories were current that the English would offer refuge to the Earl's men.<sup>92</sup> Archibald Douglas seems to have been working for Bothwell in London. To the King, however, Elizabeth was very clear in her denunciation of such a violent rebel and in the summer of 1592 she gave orders against the reception of Scottish fugitives in England. The officer in charge of the west march had men ready to aid James in pursuit of Bothwell, should the King request them. The Queen's cue, nevertheless, was to emphasize Huntly's treachery. She attributed Bothwell's raid at Falkland to the lack of stern measures against Huntly, an explanation which James steadfastly ignored.<sup>93</sup>

<sup>90</sup> *Acts Parl. Scot.*, III, 537-538; S. P. Scotland, XLVIII, No. 59, Bowes to Burghley, June 28, 1592.

<sup>91</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLVII, Nos. 87, 95, 96, Bowes to Burghley, Aug. 11, 16, 27, 1591.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, XLVIII, Nos. 19, 20, 21, Bowes to Burghley, Feb. 27, Mar. 7, 8, 1592, with incls., Aston to Bowes, Feb. 24, Mar. 2, 1592.

<sup>93</sup> *Letters of Elizabeth and James*, pp. 70, 75-77; S. P. Scotland, XLVIII, No. 70, Bowes to Burghley, July 16, 1592; *Border Papers*, I, 398-402, *passim*.



In the summer of 1592 Elizabeth changed her tactics. The King still shielded Huntly and was surrounded by courtiers in whom Elizabeth had no confidence. Maitland had retired from court in August, forced out by the combined influence of Queen Anne, the Master of Glamis, and the Duke of Lennox.<sup>94</sup> Perhaps by encouraging Bothwell the Queen could frighten James into action against Huntly. She decided to try. The Master of Gray, representing Bothwell and other lords, forwarded to the Queen offers to serve her and to reveal Spanish practices.<sup>95</sup> Burghley directed Richard Lowther, an officer on the west march, to communicate with Bothwell and to obtain an explanation of his attacks on the King. Bothwell rose to the occasion with ready eloquence and mixed metaphors. He had not meant to hazard the King's life; on the contrary, he entertained great respect for His Majesty and had received great favors from him. ". . . nixt to succeid in his place I can nocht, and the favour of suche as hopis for the same is doutfull: his preservacion then is my suirtie and his dethe must nedis import my decay. . . ." The nobility, the Earl claimed, had acted in concert with him to preserve the King, benefit the realm, and defend themselves against evil favorites who sought to improve their "bas condition be our decay." Such favorites, "finding no profite bot be fisching in drumly watteris, hes blawin the belleis of discord. . . ." Scottish history was full of attempts of this sort, and Bothwell coolly cited the examples of the "Raidis" of Stirling and of Ruthven, in which the English had played a part. These, he said, differed from his own attempt to seize the King only in that they had been successful.<sup>96</sup>

<sup>94</sup> *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, Intro., p. viii, p. 6n.; S. P. Scotland, XLIX, No. 5, Bowes to Burghley, Aug. 12, 1592. Anne disliked the Chancellor because he had favored the Navarre match and because he disputed with her the title to Musselburgh.

<sup>95</sup> *Border Papers*, I, 402-404.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 406-408.

Elizabeth pondered. She continued to have proclamations issued forbidding the reception of Bothwell and his followers in England, and her forces were ready to aid James if necessary on his expedition in October against Bothwell's supporters. When the King complained that Bothwell resorted to England, frequented races, played football, and caroused over card games there, and when Lowther was slow to act, the officer was ordered by the Queen to apprehend those in England who received Bothwell and his accomplices. Yet the Master of Gray, one of his partisans, had "oversight" in England. Apparently the wardens were told not to enforce the laws too rigidly. The proclamations were designed to pacify James while their lax enforcement was an intimation to Bothwell of the Queen's open mind on the subject of his offers.<sup>97</sup> Since Bowes, in Edinburgh, was in a dangerous position, James being too suspicious to permit his dealing safely with the Earl, the matter was relegated to the hands of others. The Queen could not well give open countenance to the rebel, at least not before he had done something to justify his restoration to the King's grace.<sup>98</sup>

From the time of the King's return from Denmark until the Moray-Huntly-Bothwell imbroglio of 1592, the relations between Elizabeth and James had been friendly. James had complied gracefully with several requests made by his "dear sister" and she in turn had not been unkind. The point on which they concurred with greatest sincerity was that which concerned the Puritan and Presbyterian danger

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 411-420, *passim*; S. P. Scotland, XLIX, No. 27, Master of Gray to Burghley, Oct. 5, 1592; *ibid.*, No. 47, Bowes to Burghley, Nov. 21, 1592.

<sup>98</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLIX, No. 48, Bowes to Burghley, Nov. 30, 1592. "And because I saw myself suspected and the authors thereof awaiting to entrap me, so as myself can not safely deal with the Earl (as by your Lordship's last I am directed), therefore I have left this course to be carried betwixt Amphitrio and him and by the means of such as Amphitrio shall appoint; and, nevertheless, I shall endeavor that the Earl may be comforted here and kept at her Majesty's devotion." Burghley's marginal note indicated Hume as Amphitrio.

in their realms. Both thought of "the godly" as a menace to royal power. The King listened with sympathy to the Queen's complaints about the impertinent prayers of the Scottish ministers; he banished John Penry, a Puritan connected with the Marprelate tracts, who had taken refuge in Scotland; and he promised to exercise strict censorship over the press of Robert Waldegrave, an English printer in Edinburgh who had published a book by Penry.<sup>99</sup> He did not, however, alienate the kirk entirely. At the request of his ministers he wrote to Elizabeth to intercede for Udall and Cartwright, two Puritan preachers who were suffering from Her Majesty's wrath in 1591,<sup>100</sup> and there is some evidence that he spoke in person in the General Assembly, vowing to maintain the kirk and scorning the English service, which he likened to the mass.<sup>101</sup>

The surrender of the Irish rebel, O'Rourke, who came to Scotland for reinforcements, was an indication of the friendship between the monarchs. O'Rourke had appeared in Glasgow in February, 1591, with presents for the King, it was said. He was detained and at Elizabeth's request was delivered into her hands, although the people of Glasgow complained that their Irish trade would be injured by the act.<sup>102</sup> By this deed James attempted to convince the Queen that he was her gallant champion.

<sup>99</sup> Calderwood, V, 112, 117, 129-131; *Letters of Elizabeth and James*, pp. 63-64; *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, IV, 517-518 and n.; S. P. Scotland, XLVI, Nos. 18, 22, 64, Bowes to Burghley, July 23, Aug. 1, Nov. 20, 1590.

<sup>100</sup> Calderwood, V, 131-132; S. P. Scotland, XLVII, No. 63, James to Elizabeth, June 11, 1591.

<sup>101</sup> Calderwood, V, 106. W. L. Mathieson in his *Politics and Religion—A Study in Scottish History from the Reformation to the Revolution* (2 vols., Glasgow, 1902), I, 249n., questioned the truth of this account of James's words about the English service. Calderwood depends on Wm. Scot's *Apologetical Narration of the State and Government of the Kirk of Scotland . . .* (Wodrow Society, Edinburgh, 1846), which is the only contemporary authority for the tale.

<sup>102</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLVII, Nos. 15, 36, 44, Bowes to Burghley, Feb. 23, Apr. 6, 27, 1591; *ibid.*, No. 34, incl., Blantyre to James, Mar. 30, 1591; *ibid.*, No. 23, copy, Elizabeth to James, Mar. 6, 1591; *Letters of Elizabeth and James*, pp. 64-66.

I would to God [he wrote her] your greatest enemies were in my hands. If it were the King of "spaen" himself, he should not be long undelivered to you, for that course have I taken me to and will profess it till I die, that all your foes shall be common enemies to us both in spite of the "poap," the King of "spaen" and all the Leaguers, my cousins no excepted, and the devil their master.<sup>103</sup>

When certain English Catholics in exile on the continent wrote to James for permission to live in Scotland "with the benefit only of the air," Elizabeth was informed of the matter and her advice was requested. Charles Neville, Earl of Westmoreland, of whom Elizabeth once wrote that he was the first to have "made me knowe a traitor in my land,"<sup>104</sup> and Charles Paget were the most prominent exiles asking for shelter. Maitland, who revealed their requests to Bowes, was not left long in doubt as to Her Majesty's opinion. Bowes was reprimanded for even raising the question and was instructed to let the Chancellor know that Her Majesty thought no good councillor in Scotland would ever have any such doubts. She flatly rejected the idea of letting the exiles enter Scotland, and Maitland had to make excuses for his ill-advised overture.<sup>105</sup>

These incidents illustrate James's efforts to please Elizabeth. They met with some response from her. His yearly pension was paid, three thousand, five hundred pounds in 1590 (including five hundred for the ambassadors going to Germany), and three thousand in 1591, to say nothing of the financial aid the Queen gave him at the time of his

<sup>103</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLVII, No. 30, copy, James to Elizabeth, Mar. 22, 1591. The cousins were the Guise family at the head of the Catholic League in France.

<sup>104</sup> *Letters of Elizabeth and James*, p. 66 and n.

<sup>105</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLVI, No. 41, copy, Westmoreland to James, Sept. 10, 1590; *ibid.*, XLVII, Nos. 26, 34, Bowes to Burghley, Mar. 15, Apr. 3, 1591; *ibid.*, XLVII, No. 27, minute, Burghley to Bowes, Mar. 21, 1591; *Letters of Elizabeth and James*, pp. 64-66.



wedding.<sup>106</sup> Consideration for James was also shown when he entered complaint against the English churchman, Richard Bancroft, who had accused him of having written the *Declaration* of 1584, a virulent attack on the Presbyterian system. Bancroft was called to account by the Lord Treasurer Burghley for having uttered this libel against the Scottish King.<sup>107</sup>

These instances of cordial relations between James and Elizabeth belong to the years 1590 and 1591. In the next year the friendship had cooled. The change may have been due to Bothwell's becoming more acceptable to the kirk and to the English Queen as Huntly's crimes remained unpunished. Elizabeth always dreaded Spanish influence in the North. Then, too, she had seen fit to send the King in 1592 only two thousand pounds,<sup>108</sup> for which smaller sum he had had to wait long and plead with injured dignity. In December, 1591, he wrote to the Queen:

And as for Robert Tousies [Joussy's] earand, it is turned from one honorable annuitie to a volantarie uncertaintie almost after long begging, and now, at last, to als muche worse than nothing, as there is tyme spent in the seeking of it. . . . it is no wonder I wearie to be so long time sutire, as one who was not borne to be a beggar, but to be beggit at. A short refusall had les displeasid me than any anserlesse and disdainfull delay. Remember, that as I ame your kinsman, so am I a true prince. The disdainning of me can be noe honor to you. The use of tempting your freinds so sore cane turne you to no advantage. If you thinke my frendshipe worthie that annuitie, remember, *qui cito*

<sup>106</sup> Memoranda of payments, S. P. Scotland, L, Nos. 8, 22, 23, 72, 82; LIII, No. 13; LIV, No. 79; LXII, No. 26; *Border Papers*, I, 550. S. P. Scotland, L, No. 90 lists four thousand pounds paid in 1590 but this seems to be an error.

<sup>107</sup> Calderwood, V, 5-6, 73-81, 118-127; S. P. Scotland, XLVI, Nos. 64, 69, Bowes to Burghley, Nov. 20, Dec. 7, 1590; *ibid.*, No. 71, Maitland to Burghley, Dec. 7, 1590; T. MacCrie, *Life of Andrew Melville* (2 vols., Edinburgh, 1819), I, 386-397.

<sup>108</sup> See footnote 106 above.



*dat bis dat.* Let not the circumstances of the giver disgrace the gifte, for I wearie to be a suter, and for your pleasure I will promeis neuer to chalenge that debt any more if ye will not be contente als frielie to pay it as freelie ye promusit it.<sup>109</sup>

Parallel to this change in the relations between the two monarchs, there is a slight indication of a decline in the King's regard for Burghley. The Lord Treasurer had been rather friendly; and, when James sent Carmichael to London in 1590, the ambassador had been recommended to act upon Burghley's advice.<sup>110</sup> There is little later evidence of the King's attitude, but a note from him to Essex in October, 1592, hints that he was not then well pleased with the Lord Treasurer. Writing to the Earl on behalf of a Scotsman who had been injured by English pirates and had not been allowed to execute his license to transport grain, James complained that he had "from time to time recommended his [the merchant's] heavy case to the favorable regard of our trusty cousin, the Lord 'burghlie,' Treasurer of that realm, always without effect or prosecution of the order set down for his redress." The King requested Essex's help "that by the good effect which he shall find ye will give us a proof what our recommendation may do with you."<sup>111</sup>

The reasons for this annoyance with the Lord Treasurer undoubtedly went deeper. James must have held him responsible in part for the pension reduction and for the dealings with Bothwell. It is significant that in this small matter the King turned to Essex. Perhaps he was already entering upon some closer understanding with that Earl than he had in 1590 when the journey to Denmark had interrupted Essex's advances. This is an early manifestation of his dislike of Burghley, a dislike that was to become more intense in the next five years.

<sup>109</sup> *Letters of Elizabeth and James*, pp. 68-69.

<sup>110</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLV, No. 61, James to Burghley, June 10, 1590.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, XLIX, No. 37, James to Essex, Oct. 31, 1592.

## CHAPTER III

### THE SPANISH BLANKS

The Spanish bogey alarmed Elizabeth more than usual in 1592. Bowes, her ambassador, who had been absent from Edinburgh for six months, was sent back to his post in May with the Queen's urgent advice that stern measures be adopted against the Catholic lords.<sup>1</sup> In June the Queen forwarded to James the information that the Spanish intended to land troops in Scotland that very summer. The King, however, was inclined to minimize the peril, insisting that the Catholic lords had no power. He was possibly right in pooh-poohing the danger at that time, for the opinion was current in Scotland that Spanish enterprises depended on the success achieved by Parma in France, and Parma, having raised the siege of Rouen in April, 1592, returned, wounded, to the Low Countries, where he died in December.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, Elizabeth found plenty of evidence to confirm her fears. In August a seminary priest examined by her councillors revealed a plot to carry off Arbella Stewart to Spain that she might not make a serious bid for the throne in the event of Elizabeth's death. The same priest gave information concerning Sir William Stanley's plan to invade England in the spring of 1593. Stanley counted on landing first in Ireland and proceeding thence to England, where he hoped for assistance from a certain nobleman, probably Henry Stanley, fourth Earl of Derby.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Letters of Elizabeth and James*, p. 74.

<sup>2</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLVIII, No. 43, draft in Burghley's hand, Elizabeth to Bowes, June, 1592; *ibid.*, No. 49, Bowes to Elizabeth, June 16, 1592; *ibid.*, Nos. 44, 50, Bowes to Burghley, June 6, 17, 1592; E. Lavissee, ed., *Histoire de France*, VI, Pt. I by J. H. Mariéjol (Paris, 1911), pp. 351-352.

<sup>3</sup> Lansdowne MSS., xcvi, ff. 152-154, Young's confession, August 27, 1592. Cf. *Cal. Domestic*, 1591-1594, Mary Anne Everett Green, ed. (Lon-

Bowes's vigilance in Scotland was rewarded with news in July that the Catholic lords were sending an agent to Spain.<sup>4</sup> Three months later he discovered that letters had come addressed to Fathers Gordon, Abercromby, and Macwhirrie, telling them of the Catholic King's willingness to send men and money upon sufficient surety. James informed Bowes of vague overtures made to him by Parma about securing the English throne with Spanish help.<sup>5</sup>

The Presbyterian ministers shared Elizabeth's alarm in the autumn of 1592. James was constantly quarreling with them, alleging that they showed favor to his rebel, Bothwell. Their old enemy, Arran, who represented to them "all the skumme and verie ofscourings of the wicked," made a bid to return to power in November. The kirk never forgave him for the "Black Acts" of 1584 which had increased the King's power at the expense of the kirk. The godly were now strong enough to force Arran into retirement again. Always supersensitive to the Catholic menace, the ministers set up a permanent committee of vigilance and proposed maintaining an agent in Edinburgh to be liaison officer between the central committee and the presbyteries. Bowes used his influence with the King to further their plans. It is significant that the ministers decided to ask Elizabeth for financial aid to carry out these measures of

don, 1867), pp. 257-261, 255-256; *Hat. Cal.*, IV, 104-105, 407-409, 421-422, 461-463. Burghley warned Lady Shrewsbury, Arbella's grandmother, with whom she lived, of the plot against her (Lansdowne MSS., lxxi, f. 3, Lady Shrewsbury to Burghley, Sept. 21, 1592, printed in Ellis, *Letters*, Series II [4 vols., London, 1827], III, 165-168). One Richard Hesketh approached Ferdinando, fifth Earl of Derby, about Michaelmas, 1593, on behalf of the Catholics, but Derby apparently apprehended him and delivered him to the authorities to be tried. He was executed in November, 1593. See Thos. Birch, *Memoirs of the Reign of Queen Elizabeth . . .* (2 vols., London, 1754), I, 145; Camden, p. 477.

<sup>4</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLVIII, No. 68, Bowes to Burghley, July 8, 1592.

<sup>5</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLIX, Nos. 29, 31, Bowes to Burghley, Oct. 10, 13, 1592; *ibid.*, No. 41, Bowes's instructions to Nicolson, whom he was sending to Burghley, Nov. 4, 1592. The English government thought Lord Herries and possibly Lord Hume had been Parma's agents to James in this matter (Cotton MSS., Caligula D ii, ff. 76-83, memorial for Lord Burgh, early 1593).

precaution. The Catholic menace was making them forget their old distrust of England.<sup>6</sup>

Such was the state of affairs when, on December 27, 1592, Mr. Andrew Knox, minister at Paisley, apprehended Mr. George Ker, brother of Lord Newbattle, and found in his possession letters from Jesuits and Papists in Scotland to others on the continent and, what was more suspicious, a number of blanks subscribed by Huntly, Angus, Errol, and Sir Patrick Gordon of Auchindoun with their seals inclosed, evidently to be attached to the blanks later. Ker was brought to Edinburgh under safe convoy, and Angus, who chanced to be there on January first, was warded in the castle. James cut short his Christmas celebration with Mar and returned to his capital. Ker was examined several times and tortured, as was David Graham of Fintry, another Papist plotter. Eventually it was wormed from them that Crichton and Tyrie, two Scottish Jesuits in Spain, had sent word to Scotland that Philip was willing to aid the Catholics with men and money, provided he could have surety from the noblemen; that Father James Gordon and his fellows had obtained the signatures on the blanks, which were to be sent to Crichton to be filled out as commendations for the bearer, Ker, and as assurances to Philip; and that the plan provided for the landing of thirty thousand men in Scotland in the spring of 1593, of whom some four or five thousand were to remain in Scotland to aid in effecting the change in religion there, while the others were to invade England. Ker insisted that there was no intention to depose the King; on the contrary, the conspirators hoped to obtain the King's consent for the religious revolution.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Calderwood, V, 178-191; S. P. Scotland, XLIX, Nos. 47, 48, 49, Bowes to Burghley, Nov. [21?], 30, Dec. 4, 1592.

<sup>7</sup> Calderwood, V, 192-213, prints most of the letters. Copies are preserved in the Public Record Office, S. P. Scotland, L, No. 4, inclosures. Details of the confessions of Ker and Fintry are in S. P. Scotland, L, Nos. 19, 24 and incl., 25 and incl., 30 and incls.; *Warr. Papers*, II, 192-202. Cf. the pamphlet, "A discouerie of the unnaturall and traitorous conspiracie . . .," printed by R. Waldegrave, a copy of which exists in the



The details of the plot suggest a whimsical romance in which Huntly and his gallant companions stake their lives, fortunes, King, and country in a desperate gamble to restore the faith, while Philip plays the part of a Prince Charming about to rescue slumbering Scotland from her lethargy. Cold analysis robs the story of its color. Dr. Annie I. Cameron, the editor of the *Warrender Papers*, pointed out the improbability of Philip's venturing anything on the meager security of a few pieces of paper signed by the Catholic Earls and T. G. Law summed it up as a plot "born of the brain of a dreaming and impractical priest," Crichton, who entertained serious hopes of converting James to the Catholic faith.<sup>8</sup> It must be remembered that Catholic Europe was not united on any plan for the reconversion of Britain and that many in Rome and in Catholic France, to say nothing of a large number of English and Scottish exiles, mistrusted Spanish intentions.<sup>9</sup> Spain herself was busy with France and the Low Countries and, while a diversion in Scotland or Ireland could well serve her interests, the project required money, shipping, and armies, all of which were urgently needed for Philip's other enterprises. The failures in Scotland in 1588 and 1589 tended to discourage further ventures; nor did the tenor of the intercepted letters create much confidence in the ability of the Scottish Catholics. Father Gordon wrote that it was necessary to carry out the plan the next summer [1593], "otherwise yee will tyne [lose] credite heere with your factours. If yee come, yee will find moe freinds nor ever yee had; but, otherwise, yee will find fewer, becaus the nixt sommer manie are

P. R. O., S. P. Scotland, L, No. 29. See also Calderwood, V, 214, 224-231; John Spottiswood, *History of the Church of Scotland*, M. Russell, ed. (3 vols., Edinburgh, 1847-1851), II, 425-426; *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, 33-35 and n.

<sup>8</sup> *Warr. Papers*, II, 124; T. G. Law, "The Spanish Blanks and the Catholic Earls, 1592-4," *Scottish Review*, XXII (1893), 19.

<sup>9</sup> E. g., S. P. Scotland, XLVII, No. 6, Thos. Morgan to the Bishop of Dunblane [Jan., 1590]. Cf. *Cal. Scottish*, 1589-1593, pp. 229-237. See below, pp. 147-150; 153.



bownd to other countreis, and will not abide on you no longer.”<sup>10</sup> Ker was the only one who could be found willing to undertake at his own expense the journey to carry the blanks. Abercromby said that “. . . the mater was once whollie givin over, and almost cleene forgot, untill it pleased God, of his Divine providence, to stirre up this bearer to take the turne in hand. . . .”<sup>11</sup> Evidently the Scottish Catholics were slow to translate their faith into deeds. Nevertheless, the plot showed that Scotland could still be a menace to England and that the Protestant religion was still exposed to danger.

At first the King showed great vigor in pursuing the Earls. Huntly, Errol, and Auchindoun were denounced as rebels for failing to appear to answer the charge of intriguing with Jesuits and Papists. Angus was likewise proclaimed a rebel after he escaped from Edinburgh castle. To turn the affair to the King's financial profit an act declared that the escheats resulting from it should be “intromettit” for the King's use.<sup>12</sup> After David Graham of Fintry suffered the death penalty on February fifteenth, James rode north against the Earls. The success of his journey was very moderate. Huntly and the others flitted to distant parts, quite out of reach of the royal power. James merely took surety from various members of the gentry and from the town of Aberdeen not to aid the Catholic conspirators, collected evidence as to the handwriting on the blanks, garrisoned certain houses in the North, and sent some “apostats” to Edinburgh for trial. The Earls Marshall and Atholl were left as lieutenants in the northern counties with extensive powers for dealing with offenders and for apprehending the rebel lords and Jesuit plotters. It is noticeable that Huntly's capture was ordered on the grounds of his participation in Moray's murder, as well as

<sup>10</sup> Calderwood, V, 195.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, V, 195-196.

<sup>12</sup> *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, 42 and n.-44.

for his recent intrigues.<sup>13</sup> The measures were of little effect. Apparently the lands of the four principal rebels were administered by Atholl, Marshall, Sir George Hume, and several others, but Marshall was a cousin of Errol; Huntly's chief residence, Bog-of-Gicht, was retained by his Countess; and the Countess of Errol remained in possession of her husband's principal house. It was soon reported that the two Earls had returned to the vicinity of their strongholds.<sup>14</sup>

Naturally, Elizabeth gloated over the discovery of the Spanish Blanks. They provided her with the very evidence she needed to prove her persistent contention that the Catholic Earls were still plotting with Spain. She lost no time in sending north an ambassador, Lord Burgh. The main points of his instructions dealt with the problems which had disturbed the relations between the two countries in the last year. If necessary, Burgh was to urge the King against the rebels, pointing out the shining example of Elizabeth, who in thirty-four years had not suffered any disobedience from her subjects! As for Bothwell, the Queen denied that she had ever consented to or had had foreknowledge of his resort to England. She admitted that she could not excuse his attacks on Holyroodhouse and Falkland, but recommended to the King's consideration the offers Bothwell had recently made to reveal Catholic plots. She suggested that he was more valuable alive and active against the Catholics than dead as a rebel; in any case the possibility of his execution was very remote, since he had so many friends in Scotland. If James complained about receiving less money last year than before, Burgh was to explain the Queen's heavy expenses and to assure the King that she had no in-

<sup>13</sup> Calderwood, V, 224, 232-233; *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, 49-52 and n.

<sup>14</sup> S. P. Scotland, L, Nos. 42, 51, occurs in Scotland, Mar. 19, c. Apr. 7, 1593. I have found no official confirmation of this handling of the Earls' lands. The author of the *Historie and Life* (p. 268) said that the Countesses of Huntly and Errol had the keeping of their principal houses without accounting to the King for them. Cf. Calderwood, V, 238.

tention of neglecting his necessities. If James continued dissatisfied, the ambassador might put him in hope that "rather than [he should impute] the diminution of such sums as in former years [hath been yielded] unto him, though there was not any sum express[ed in the last] treaty, as it seemeth the King hath been informed, [as may appear] by the treaty itself, her Majesty will strain her[self to satisfy] him as far forth as her affairs can suffer her." <sup>15</sup>

Elizabeth's admonitions drew a lengthy reply from the King. He repudiated the suggestion of any foreign dealing.

. . . I refused long since too large and fair offers to become so foolish now as to be a consenter to my own double slavery both of soul and body. To "dissimull" with my own harm were a foolish "falset." I have been born a free prince and with God's grace I think never to be a willing loser of my own liberty. But I marvel that false reports should have moved you to have misinterpreted so my bypast actions, as if my words and deeds had not agreed, whereof I have ever been as careful to "kythe" [show] the contrary as any prince in the world. I never promised you that which I did not perform and I trust ye will meet me with the like frank dealing. . . .<sup>16</sup>

The last was probably a thrust at the Queen for the reduced pension. Concerning the rebel lords James wrote:

. . . I heartily pray you not only to assure yourself but likewise all other princes of the religion that I will in this cause of God's, without respect of the favor or hatred of any, hasard my crown, life, and all to the uttermost. The greater clemency I have used to them that are guilty of this practise, the farther have they foully abused the same. I swear they shall never have dwelling under me that are guilty of so foul a treason, and if I be honest,

<sup>15</sup> Cotton MSS., Caligula D ii, ff. 76-83, collated with transcript in Harl. MSS., 4648, ff. 56-60, memorial for Lord Burgh [c. Jan., 1593].

<sup>16</sup> Add. MSS., 23109, ff. 43-44, copy, James to Elizabeth, Apr. 3, 1593.

my pain shall never be spared to prosecute it to the end. Their livings shall also be annexed (according to your good advice) at the Parliament which is shortly to be holden. But on the other part your helpful hand must be had herein to. More particularly I have informed this nobleman your ambassador herein, to whose sufficiency I remit me. . . .

It was ominous that one draft of this reply contained the phrase that he would annex the Earls' livings "how far by a Parliament he may have lawful opportunity."<sup>17</sup> The sequel was to prove that in the next Parliament the King had not "lawful opportunity." In reply to the Queen's suggestion of mercy for Bothwell, James wrote in anger:

I will rather make choice to be a slave in the "turkes galles" than ever to hear in any sort of that man that hath so oftentimes dishonored his prince and whole nation through barbarous invading of me in my palaces with fire and sword, murdering of my men and daily hunting for bereaving me both of honor and breath. . . . I am sure ye can no think me so ignorant of the rudiments of a prince's honor except ye imagine me to be metamorphosed by that man from a king in a "lipper and sensles asse by the art of his circes," whom long since he fell awork to prove their cunning upon me.

Perhaps the Queen's remark about her thirty-four years of stern justice stung him. Obviously, the two were no nearer agreement than they had been the previous year. The King's eloquence against the rebel lords was balanced by his demand for assistance against them, and he showed no sign of leniency toward Bothwell.

Bothwell, at the moment, was the chief cause of trouble

<sup>17</sup> See abstract of the same document in *Hat. Cal.*, IV, 296. The copy in the B. M., Add. MSS., 23109, quoted at length above, omits any suggestion that Parliament might not forfeit them.



between the sovereigns. James complained bitterly of the help he received from Englishmen and of the "oversight" granted him on the borders. In spite of the Queen's glib statements, by means of her ambassadors, that it was entirely without her knowledge or warrant and in spite of her orders that he be not received in England, the favor there shown him was undoubtedly officially inspired. Bothwell caroused merrily on the marches and enlivened horse-races by his presence.<sup>18</sup> The Earl acknowledged kindness shown to him by Burghley and his son, Sir Robert Cecil, and the friendship of Admiral Howard, as well as Hunsdon's favor to Cuthbert Armorer, one of his close associates.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, Elizabeth was negotiating with him through Henry Lock and was urging him to "bear patiently her Majesty's abstaining from giving him of any succor or relief to be known to come from herself directly" until she could see the results of Burgh's embassy.<sup>20</sup> She encouraged Bothwell to send her in writing full particulars of the service he could do in Scotland.

Naturally, the Queen proceeded with great caution. Burghley wrote to his son, ". . . I find the matter as in a labyrinth, easier to enter into it than to go out."<sup>21</sup> Such misgivings were caused not only by James's well-known hatred of the Earl, but also by Bothwell's own unstable character. In June he was said to have uttered threats of what he would do if England did not relieve him soon and his past connection with the Catholic Earls suggested what form the threatened action might take. Burghley was also well aware of the King's efforts to secure Chancellor Maitland's

<sup>18</sup> S. P. Scotland, L, No. 47, Burgh to Burghley, Mar. 30, 1593; *ibid.*, Nos. 53, 62, Bowes to Burghley, Apr. 19, May 28, 1593; *Border Papers*, I, 432-433, 444, 456, 465.

<sup>19</sup> *Hat. Cal.*, XIII, 401-403, Bothwell to Musgrave, Feb. 26. The letter is assigned to 1589 in the *Calendar* but internal evidence points almost indubitably to 1593. Cf. *Border Papers*, I, 429 and S. P. Scotland, L, No. 38, Bothwell to Musgrave, Mar. 7, 1593.

<sup>20</sup> S. P. Scotland, L, No. 26, draft in Burghley's hand of instructions for Lock, Feb. 14, 1593.

<sup>21</sup> *Hat. Cal.*, IV, 319.



return to court, which, if successful, would have been a decided check to Bothwell.<sup>22</sup>

James decided to send Sir Robert Melville to the Queen to announce the appointment of a new Council, in which Lennox, Mar, the Master of Glamis, and Maitland figured prominently, and to declare his intention to proceed against the rebels in the coming Parliament set for July tenth. He hoped to obtain, as reward for this virtuous conduct, money to maintain six hundred soldiers for six months, discontinuance of any favor to Bothwell, and a promise that Elizabeth would in the future do nothing to prejudice "his title."<sup>23</sup> Melville tried to collect arrears of the annuity, reckoned at five thousand pounds a year. He alleged that Randolph had promised as much by virtue of the Queen's commission, but the English government remembered no such commission.<sup>24</sup> The ambassador received only four thousand pounds for the King, only half of which actually came to James's hands, since two thousand were paid to merchants in London on his debts.<sup>25</sup>

While Melville was pleading and expostulating in London, a Parliament was held in Scotland for the purpose of pronouncing sentence of forfeiture against the Catholic Earls. When the crucial time arrived, however, Mr. David Macgill, the King's Attorney, expressed the opinion that on the existing proof Parliament could not proceed to forfeiture. Mr. George Ker, whose evidence had been so im-

<sup>22</sup> *Border Papers*, I, 465; S. P. Scotland, L, No. 51, occurs of Scotland, brought by Lord Burgh on Apr. 14, 1593; *ibid.*, Nos. 53, 58, 59, 69, 70, Bowes to Burghley, Apr. 19, May 8, 20, June 20, 22, 1593; Add. MSS., 23109, f. 46, copy [James to Maitland], June 18, 1593.

<sup>23</sup> S. P. Scotland, L, No. 66, copy, Melville's instructions; *ibid.*, No. 79, requests to be made by Melville.

<sup>24</sup> Cotton MSS., Caligula D ii, f. 157, collated with transcript in Harl. MSS., 4648, f. 96v, Burghley to Mr. Mills, July 19, 1593.

<sup>25</sup> Memoranda of payments, S. P. Scotland, L, No. 90; LIV, No. 79; LXII, No. 26; LXVI, No. 12. Other lists, notably L, No. 71, and LVI, No. 105, enter only £2,000, omitting reference to the money paid to London merchants. See *Hat. Cal.*, V, 8, Windebank to Cecil, Oct. 16, 1594, for the statement that Elizabeth had heard that half of the £4,000 granted the previous year [1593] had remained in London.

portant in unraveling the mystery of the blanks, had escaped from his prison late in June, a fact which weakened considerably the case for the prosecution. It was said that the government put forth no great effort to recapture him. Bowes had warned Burghley of James's continued favor to Huntly, saying that it was likely to "kindle and burst out in flame" if Melville received no satisfaction in England. During the trying days in July, when Parliament was in session, James frankly told the English ambassador that his Council had advised him not to enter upon any action that he could not complete. He made it clear that without Elizabeth's financial aid he could not execute the forfeitures of the Earls and he followed this statement with a passionate outburst against Bothwell's reception in England. Bowes tried to influence noblemen, lawyers, and others to push forward the attainder of the three Earls, but it was useless. On July twenty-first Parliament adjourned for the time being, and the forfeitures were not among the acts resulting from its deliberations. If Elizabeth hoped to encourage James by money, the pension came just too late. Melville's acknowledgment of the Queen's bounty was dated July twenty-third.<sup>26</sup>

England's failure to give prompt satisfaction to the King may have been partly responsible for the lack of action by the Parliament. The alignment of parties in Scotland was another contributing factor. In contrast with the situation in the winter of 1591-1592, when Maitland and Huntly had been suspected of an agreement, Huntly's partisans were now identified with the opposition to the Chancellor. Maitland was still absent from court, having been driven off by the coalition of Queen Anne, the Duke of Lennox, and the

<sup>26</sup> S. P. Scotland, L, Nos. 68, 70, Bowes to Burghley, June 17, 22, 1593; Cotton MSS., Caligula D ii, ff. 101-103, same to same, July 10, 1593; *ibid.*, ff. 97-98, collated with transcript in Harl. MSS., 4648, ff. 64-66, same to same, July 14, 1593; Calderwood, V, 254; *Acts Parl. Scot.*, IV, 3-39; S. P. Scotland, L, No. 90, list of payments.

old Protestant "Stirling faction" of the Master of Glamis, Mar, and Morton. Glamis had evidently recovered his post as Treasurer in December, 1592, an indication of Maitland's lost prestige. Errol's marriage to Morton's daughter and Mar's marriage to Lennox's sister <sup>27</sup> (Lennox's other sister was Huntly's wife) made stronger the bond between the Stirling faction and Huntly's friends. In Bowes's estimation, Lennox exerted the greatest influence with the King. Lord Hume and the gentlemen of the King's Chamber—Sir George Hume, Sir Alexander Lindsay, and Sir James Sandilands—almost all of whom were Catholic or suspected of Catholic sympathies, were reckoned as Maitland's enemies. Among the eight nobles named Lords of the Articles in the Parliament, four at least—Morton, Mar, Hume, and Spyny (Sir Alexander Lindsay)—were prominent members of the Duke's party. Thus, the Duke and his friends, inspired not only by love of Huntly but also by hatred of Maitland, were largely responsible for the lenient treatment of the Catholic Earls.<sup>28</sup>

James had been making strenuous efforts to bring the Chancellor back to court in the spring of 1593. He had succeeded in settling the dispute between Anne and Maitland over the title to certain lands, but when he tried to reconcile Mar and Lennox to the Chancellor, he failed.<sup>29</sup> Lennox knew his sovereign too well to suppose that he had dropped the matter entirely. The Duke may have decided to divert James's attention by fostering his known favor to Huntly and his annoyance with England. There may have been a bit of pique in it, too, against Lord John Hamilton,

<sup>27</sup> *Scots Peerage*, III, 576; V, 621.

<sup>28</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLIX, Nos. 5, 45, 51, and L, Nos. 58, 68, 69, Bowes to Burghley, Aug. 12, Nov. 16, Dec. 17, 1592 and May 8, June 17, June 20, 1593; *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, Intro., p. viii, p. 6n.; Calderwood, V, 253. For the list of the Lords of the Articles, see *Acts Parl. Scot.*, IV, 7-8.

<sup>29</sup> S. P. Scotland, L, Nos. 69, 77, Bowes to Burghley, June 20, 28, 1593; Add. MSS., 23109, f. 46, copy [James to Maitland], June 18, 1593; *Acts Parl. Scot.*, IV, 23-24.

Maitland's friend, whom the English government trusted much more than it trusted Lennox.<sup>30</sup> The dispute between Lennox and Hamilton over the succession had flared up once again during these months. By sparing Huntly from forfeiture, the Duke's party was flaunting its anti-English principles and was acquiring the prestige of a success in direct opposition to Elizabeth's wishes. At the same time it was pleasing the King, who was annoyed with England and liked Huntly. As in 1589, the internal political situation played a decisive part in the treatment of the Papist conspirators. Lennox's primary concern was to keep Maitland out of court. A futile attempt had been made in June to secure Arran's return to his old office of Chancellor; the sudden return of Bothwell shortly after the Parliament adjourned was another move of Lennox to thwart Maitland; and one may read much the same motive in his efforts on behalf of Huntly.<sup>31</sup>

In the midst of this confused and petty political intrigue, the problems raised by the conspiracy of the Spanish Blanks had far deeper significance for the King than for any of his nobility. In the field of European politics it raised once more the question of James's attitude to England and Spain; at home it submitted to a new test the status of royal authority. It has been shown that, during the first six years after Mary's death, James pursued a policy which preserved for him liaisons with Protestant and Catholic forces, although on the whole he inclined to favor the Protestant cause in Europe and both Protestant and monarchical principles in Scotland. The fundamental opposition between the political philosophies of the King and of the Presbyterian kirk, together with the play of factions, had maintained an equilibrium between the forces of the Reformation and of the old faith in his kingdom. Royal power,

<sup>30</sup> See, e. g., Cotton MSS., Caligula D ii, ff. 76-83, memorial for Lord Burgh.

<sup>31</sup> S. P. Scotland, L, Nos. 68, 69, 70, 77, Bowes to Burghley, June 17, 20, 22, 28, 1593; Calderwood, V, 253.



feudal anarchy, and Puritan independence curbed one another. The Spanish Blanks crystallized the situation as nothing before had. Could the King again pursue a *via media*?

There is a paper, preserved at Hatfield House, entitled "Certain reasons which may be used to prove it meet or unmeet, the executing of this enterprise this summer or not. 1592." and endorsed "Copy of the Scottish King's instructions to Spain which should have been sent by Powry Ogel. but thereafter were 'concredit' to Mr. George Ker and withdrawn at his taking for safety of his Majesty's honor." <sup>32</sup> This may be a copy of the document to which Calderwood referred when, on the authority of John Davidson's diary, he said that among the letters found on Ker in December, 1592, was one "which tuiched the king with knowledge and approbatioun of the traffiquing, and promise of assistance, &c., but that it was not thought expedient to publishe it." <sup>33</sup> In May, 1594, the English government had obtained possession of some document composed by the King in which he discussed the foreign situation.<sup>34</sup> The contents of the paper at Hatfield House suggest that it is the one in question.

The document consists of a series of arguments for and against a speedy attack on England by Spain and Scotland. The author estimates the results, good and bad, of delay and the disadvantages of "so many strange princes, lying so far asunder, having had this matter so long in head." The objection that delay "will make the enterprisers cold" was dismissed with "surely, I would they were, in respect

<sup>32</sup> Hatfield House, Salisbury MSS., cxxxiii, No. 100. The document is calendared in *Hat. Cal.*, IV, 214-216. It is written in the hand of Henry Lock, Elizabeth's agent employed in her negotiations with Bothwell. For the document printed in full and for a discussion of its provenance, see Appendix to this chapter.

<sup>33</sup> Calderwood, V, 251. Calderwood said that Davidson was acquainted with all the intercepted letters and wrote a preface for the printed version of them.

<sup>34</sup> S. P. Scotland, LIII, No. 53, draft, Cecil to Bowes, May 17, 1594; *Hat. Cal.*, IV, 530-531. See below, pp. 121-123.

there are over many on the counsel of it, wherefore I would think it easier and more honorable to do it only by myself with some small help of men and money only from foreign parts." To answer the argument that delay would give Philip an opportunity to "dip" with Elizabeth for his own advantage, the writer replied that it would rather prevent Elizabeth from suspecting further meddling and would keep her occupied so that she could not stir up sedition in other countries. He pointed to his own weakness.

All things are not in readiness. In respect this country, which is the chiefest back that the strangers must have, has been in such disorder this time past by so often rebellions as it will be scarce possible to get it conquered and settled betwixt this and spring next, far less then can it be an help to conquer another in the meantime. And since I can scarce yet keep myself from some of their invasions, how mickle less can I make them invade other countries. As also I suppose, notwithstanding that this country had invaded and conquered the other, when I can scarce with my presence contain as yet this country from rebellions, how mickle more shall they rebel in my absence, and then instead of one, I shall have two countries to conquer both at once.

. . . I conclude that this enterprise can not be well executed this summer for my unreadiness, for the Queen of England's suspecting of it, and for over many strange princes dealing into it. Wherefore my opinion is that it "dil" [calm] down, as I said before. In the meantime I will deal with the Queen of England fair and pleasantly for my title to the crown of England after her decease, which thing, if she grant to (as it is not impossible howbeit unlikely), we have then attained our design "but" [without] stroke of sword. If by the contrary, then delay makes me to settle my country in the meantime and, when I like hereafter, I may in a month or two (forewarning of the King of Spain) attain to our purpose, she not suspecting such thing as now she does, which, if it were so done, it would be an far greater honor to him and me both.

These arguments certainly revealed a mind more keenly aware of the disadvantages of foreign intervention than of the advantages. Philip's aid was not an unmixed blessing. ". . . I have answered else, by not thinking him meet to mell any farther in the enterprise, except it were by assisting with money." Although in the conclusion Spanish aid was contemplated, the caution which characterized the whole paper showed how reluctantly such help would have been accepted.

James admitted having received overtures from Spain in the autumn of 1592, just before the blanks were discovered, and used the opportunity to impress Elizabeth with his fidelity to her, openly demanding a reward.<sup>35</sup> He was, in the following months, engaged in bitter disputes with her about his pension and Bothwell. At the same time the question of the English succession was cropping up in various ways. When the English Parliament met in February, 1593, Peter Wentworth had raised the point in London and had been promptly put in prison for his efforts.<sup>36</sup> The plot concerning Arbella Stewart had been revealed the previous summer, and hints were given that the Catholics were approaching Derby with suggestions about the crown.<sup>37</sup> Although there is no evidence to indicate that these matters were known in Scotland, it may have been more than coincidence that Melville, in the summer of 1593, had instructions to bring up the matter of the succession. At least his action was carrying out the suggestion outlined in the Hatfield House document attributed to James.

The discovery of the Spanish Blanks and the course taken with the conspirators immediately afterward did not force James to any decision between England and Spain. His relations with Elizabeth were becoming definitely

<sup>35</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLIX, No. 41, Bowes's instructions for Nicolson, Nov. 4, 1592.

<sup>36</sup> J. E. Neale, "Peter Wentworth," *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, XXXIX (1924), 186-202.

<sup>37</sup> See above, p. 74 and n.

more hostile. The failure to attain the Earls in the July, 1593, Parliament marked a peak in that hostility. A year later their attainder was accomplished, largely through the King's efforts, it was said. Had he chosen not to exert his influence earlier? It seems very probable, although one must remember that Huntly's friends, especially Lennox, had great power. James's anger with Elizabeth did not imply that he would act against her. He was not master in his own kingdom and his immediate concern was rather to achieve supremacy there than to entangle himself in foreign plots for attacking England. He was, of course, keenly interested in the European situation and vitally aware of its implications for him; nevertheless, the internal situation had to be settled before he could exert much influence abroad. The story of the succeeding months before the Chancellor's death in 1595 shows this vividly. The sudden and spectacular return of Bothwell to court, immediately after the July Parliament, is the most striking illustration of the need to establish royal authority.

Mainly through the efforts of Lennox, Atholl, Ochiltree, and other Stewarts, Bothwell gained access to Holyroodhouse on July twenty-fourth and fell on his knees before the King, dramatically offering his sword to his monarch, begging James either to pardon past offences or to take vengeance on the spot.<sup>38</sup> Since the court had been quietly seized by the Stewarts, James could only compromise for the time being. He agreed that Bothwell should stand trial on August tenth for the witchcraft charges,<sup>39</sup> and when the provost and townsfolk of Edinburgh hurried to the palace, having heard of the sudden change, he calmed their fears, quietly showing them that he was in no danger. His calmness, however, boded little good for Bothwell. Almost immediately, James tried to escape and flew into a rage when Bothwell peremptorily removed from the King's person

<sup>38</sup> Colville, *Letters*, pp. 254-258.

<sup>39</sup> Bothwell was, of course, acquitted.



those whom he detected trying to arrange the release. The ministers of Edinburgh and Bowes, who offered their services as mediators, succeeded in getting James to agree on August fourteenth to pardon Bothwell and his supporters for all bygone offences and to grant restitution of lands and goods, an arrangement which a Parliament, to be held before November twentieth, was to ratify. Bothwell won an advantage, in that Lord Hume, Maitland, Sir George Hume, and the Master of Glamis were denied access to the King until the Parliament should end; but James scored a better point when he insisted that the Earl and his followers retire from court. The King threatened to appeal to the people to rescue him if he were not allowed to be free, whereupon Bothwell had to acquiesce.<sup>40</sup>

The nobles who brought about Bothwell's return were not inspired by a common purpose. Atholl was angry that James had refused to outlaw his enemy, Huntly, in the Parliament. Lennox, who had no desire to injure his brother-in-law, Huntly, was chiefly interested in preventing Maitland's return to power. Bothwell himself needed some means to recover his prestige and assured the English government that his program was to pursue and punish the Catholic lords. The action was not wise. It prevented Maitland's return for a time, but it drove from court the Humes and the principals of the old Stirling faction, Mar, Morton, and the Master of Glamis. Knowing James's deep hatred for Bothwell and his faith in the Chancellor, the conspirators chose a very tactless, if old, method of forcing the royal will. It was eight years since a similar seizure of the King had taken place and James was no longer a youth.<sup>41</sup>

The Stewarts realized their weakness all too keenly and immediately tried to enlist English support. Bothwell rode into England and consulted Toby Matthews, the Dean of

<sup>40</sup> S. P. Scotland, LI, Nos. 6, 9, Bowes to Burghley, Aug. 11, 16, 1593, with 9 incl., James's pardon to Bothwell; Calderwood, V, 257-259.

<sup>41</sup> Moysie, p. 102; *Historie and Life*, pp. 269-270; S. P. Scotland, LI, No. 15, draft, Elizabeth to [Bowes], [Aug. 23], 1593.

Durham, who sent to Burghley a long account of the visit. The Earl described graphically how he had come to the King and how James had insisted that the English had abetted him, a thing Bothwell vigorously denied. When James persisted with "merveilous vehemencie," sharp words over his calm acceptance of Mary's death ensued. Bothwell was a bold, if inconsistent orator.

And farther, I make God a vowe . . . that if ye King Jemie your selfe, shall ever false your religion and faith to your God (as they saie the Frenche king hath doen to his shame and confusion) I shalbe one of the first to withdrawe from your Majestie and to adhere to the Quene of Englande, the most gracious instrument of God, and the ornament of the Christian warlde.<sup>42</sup>

His real errand in England was to convince Elizabeth of his desire and ability with her help to check the Spanish party in Scotland. Lennox and Atholl, he said, had taken solemn oaths to "runne such course as thErle Bothwell shall doe, eyther to the Queene, or any other waye."<sup>43</sup>

Meanwhile, events moved rapidly in Scotland. John Carey, with whom Bothwell dined in Berwick, wrote of a formidable coalition which was being formed against the Stewarts. "All the northern earles, Lords Hamilton and Hume with their forces, the Master of Glames and all his 'affynitie,' with 'Mautland the olde chancelor, and Maxwell his frende,' . . . are 'laying there heades, and gathering there forces together,' to breake this good course. . . ."<sup>44</sup> James, after freeing himself from Bothwell's tutelage, journeyed west, ostensibly to hunt, but probably to confer there with Lord John Hamilton. A convention, held at Stirling in September, declared that the King, being a free prince, could not be bound by the Au-

<sup>42</sup> *Border Papers*, I, 481-484, 490-492.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 480-481.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

gust fourteenth agreement with Bothwell. That Earl was forbidden to come within ten miles of his sovereign without license and an effort was made to get him to leave the kingdom on a promise of pardon for past offences and of restoration of his property. The very men denied access to the King by the August fourteenth agreement returned to the court, including the Chancellor, who had been absent for more than a year. James had managed this by effecting a temporary coalition of the Stirling faction, the Humes, and Maitland. The alliance was not stable but it sufficed for the moment.<sup>45</sup>

Meanwhile, Elizabeth heard Bothwell's overtures and characteristically gave him hope of her interest. She reproved him for his high-handed methods with the King and found fault with his open resort to the English borders. Yet she tempered this with a hint that she wished to know more particulars of his offers against the Spanish party. According to Henry Lock, her agent negotiating with the Earl, Bothwell had said that he and his allies, Atholl, Lennox, Mar, Ochiltree, and Spyny, could so chastise the Spanish party that they would be forced to leave the country within three months, or at least would have no power to accomplish anything. Lock understood that they wished about four thousand crowns from the Queen. Elizabeth made evasive replies. She authorized Bowes to receive secretly their ratifications of these offers in writing but discouraged Bothwell's idea of sending his son to her as hostage. That would have proved too embarrassing if James ever heard of it, as he must have done in time. She refused an answer about money until she should know their plans more completely.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>45</sup> S. P. Scotland, LI, Nos. 17, 20, 21, 22 and incl., 24 and incls. II and III, 25, 34, Bowes to Burghley, Aug. 30, Sept. 6, 10, 13, 15, 21, Oct. 5, 1593; *Historie and Life*, pp. 276-278; Spottiswood, II, 434-436; Calderwood, V, 259-261; *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, 97n.

<sup>46</sup> Cotton MSS., Caligula B v, ff. 298-302, and Caligula D ii, ff. 109-110, copies, "Certain things to be delivered to the Earl Bothwell to shew

In response to this cautious advance testimonials were obtained from various nobles and lairds, promising their concurrence with Bothwell in his negotiations with England. Atholl answered for himself, Gowry, Moray, the Master of Montrose, the Master of Gray, and Lords Innermeath and Forbes. Ochiltree, the Master of Caithness, the Tutor of Moray, Johnston, Farniehurst, and other lairds gave assurance of their good will. The proceeding was slow, these papers being procured for the most part only in October.<sup>47</sup> The guarantees of others, such as Lennox, Argyll, Mar, Morton, and Crawford, whom Lock in August had listed as Bothwell's allies, are not preserved with the above.<sup>48</sup> Their absence is significant.

At the same time the English government was toying with the idea of some understanding with the Catholic party in Scotland. In the spring of 1593, Angus, Huntly, and Errol had made overtures to Bowes, but he had snubbed them, writing, "these parties are so 'fyled' with pitch as I dare not touch or come near them. . . ." <sup>49</sup> Now, however, Elizabeth apparently felt that matters in Scotland were in a too critical state for her to overlook any method of exerting influence. Treating with the enemy himself was not out of the question. Bowes received orders to keep that avenue open as cautiously as possible. In August, after Bothwell's return, he reported that the "motioners" were entertained, although he found it impossible to negotiate with them directly because of his position and because of the eagle eyes of the kirk and courtiers.<sup>50</sup> He was placed in an anomalous position, for outwardly he had to urge the King against his Catholic subjects, while secretly he was to cultivate their

him what we have misliked or liked [him] in him for his late actions," Aug. 23, 1593; S. P. Scotland, LI, No. 15, draft, Elizabeth to [Bowes], [Aug. 23], 1593.

<sup>47</sup> S. P. Scotland, LI, Nos. 30, 31, 32, 35, 36, 37, 61.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, LI, No. 19.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, LI, Nos. 53, 59, Bowes to Burghley, Apr. 19, May 20, 1593.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, LI, No. 8, declaration by Shepersen, Bowes's servant, Aug. 13, 1593; No. 10, Bowes to Burghley, Aug. 18, 1593.



hopes of English friendship. In September it was evident that James might be planning a mark of favor to the Catholic Earls to offset the Bothwellian party. Burghley insisted that Bowes trim his sails to the wind, and the ambassador obediently followed directions. He wrote to the Lord Treasurer:

According to your Lordship's direction, given me by your Lordship's last letter of the xij<sup>th</sup> hereof, I shall both give to Chanus [Huntly] and his partners no ground whereof they may inform Petrea [James] of any my dealings in that cause and also entertain the instruments working for them with me and always keep myself free to them, as none advantage shall therein be gotten against me.

. . . if I shall find him [the King] disposed to favor these Earls to be reconciled, I shall forbear to hinder it. . . .<sup>51</sup>

Early in October stories circulated freely, possibly spread by the Earls' own agents, to the effect that Elizabeth would consent to their reception into the King's presence. The Queen promptly denied the reports. Her attitude, she said, had been

that it should be against the King's honor to receive them without the mediation of some great person to be an intercessor to the King thereby to save his honor; and she knew none more meet than herself. And so she would allow thereof with these conditions, that the Earls should renounce all the Spanish and popish faction and bear their faithful duties to the King in maintenance of the common quietness of the realm.<sup>52</sup>

The ever vigilant ministry, alarmed at the signs of growing popery in Scotland, excommunicated Angus, Huntly, Errol,

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, LI, No. 25, Bowes to Burghley, Sept. 21, 1593.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, LI, No. 38, Bowes to Burghley, Oct. 9, 1593.

Lord Hume, and Sir James Chisholm in the provincial synod of Fife, which met in September. Arrangements were made for commissioners of the gentlemen, burghs, and ministers to go to the King "to speeke plainlie unto his Majestie, that which all his true subjects thinke, tuiching his overmuch bearing with, favouring and countenancing of professed and treasonable tratours, Papists, and his negligence in repressing of idolatrie, and establishing of the kingdom of Christ into this realme."<sup>53</sup>

Before the godly had time to fulfil this self-appointed task of telling the King his shortcomings, James set out on a journey to the borders. As he rode near Fala on the twelfth of October, Huntly, Errol, Angus, and Chisholm suddenly appeared before him and, falling on their knees, begged his pardon and a just trial for all their offences. Instead of apprehending them immediately, the King ordered them to enter ward at Perth on the twenty-fourth to await their trial, which should take place in due course. Again confusion reigned in Scotland. The Catholic Earls wrote asking their friends to come in strength to Perth, and the ministers and barons, fearing the worst, took measures to arm and asked the King's leave to guard him there. James was furious at their presumption and postponed the appointed convention.<sup>54</sup>

Meanwhile, the Catholic Earls had written more plainly to the Queen and to Archibald Douglas in London, through whom they now negotiated with Elizabeth. They thanked Her Majesty for her past favor in desisting from rigorous pursuit of them and requested her mediation with the King and kirk that they might be permitted to live in peace in Scotland and not compelled against their consciences. The letters with this appeal for toleration arrived in London

<sup>53</sup> Calderwood, V, 261-268; Melville, *Autobiography*, pp. 309-310.

<sup>54</sup> S. P. Scotland, LI, Nos. 38, 44 and incl., 45, 46, 47 and incl., Bowes to Burghley, Oct. 9, 12, 18, 20, 1593; *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, 97-98, 101n.; Calderwood, V, 269-273; Melville, *Autobiography*, pp. 310-311; Moysie, pp. 105-107; *Historie and Life*, pp. 281-282, 284-290.

long after news of the Fala incident.<sup>55</sup> They drew from the Queen a sharp reply. The Earls had presumed too far, she said, when they thanked her for past favors. She "never had one thought to deal for them in the terms they stand in."

. . . Neither can she be won with a phrase in a letter to make herself the author either of the untimely favors which hath been already extended by the King or is hereafter purposed to be shewed them, either by partial trial or by palpable connivance at their presumption in daring thus untried to present themselves to their sovereign's eyes, of whose kingdom's "prodicion" they stand (by more than probabilities) deeply condemned.

And therefore as their treasons preceded their punishment, so her Majesty (through experience of government) hath been ever far from dealing for them, neither would she begin it until by due form of law by indifferent assize and not by combined favorers they shall be acquitted or delivered to the King's mercy and power . . . they are much mistaken if with all their finesse they can so overfathom her Majesty as, by insinuating thanks for that favor which was never afforded, to serve their particular turns by possessing the world with a conceit that a prince of her wisdom would suffer herself to be made an instrument for their grace and credit, of whom she is not assured to what use their power or means should be employed.<sup>56</sup>

Elizabeth refused flatly to intercede for them unless they stood fair trial and gave "reasonable" conformity in matters of religion. Her sanguine hopes of winning the Catholic Earls to her allegiance disappeared.

<sup>55</sup> S. P. Scotland, LI, No. 39, Angus, Huntly, and Errol to Elizabeth, Oct. 11, 1593; No. 42, Huntly and Errol to A. Douglas, same date. The latter made clearer the desire for toleration which was not explicitly stated in the former. The letters apparently arrived on Oct. 29 (*ibid.*, LI, No. 54, A. Douglas to Sir John Fortescue).

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, LII, pp. 4-7, "A copy of a letter written by Sir John Fortescue in answer of the letters which came from the three Earls of Huntly, Angus, and Errol, sent by 'Arch: Dowgless,' and this answer made to him for them to see," Nov., 1593.

The Earls scarcely needed English support. After several futile attempts to hold conventions to deal with the problem, an Act of Abolition was passed on November twenty-sixth. It provided that there should be only one religion professed in the realm, namely, "godis trew religioun publiclie preicheit and be law establissit in the first zeir of his hienes Reigne"; all who refused to conform before February 1, 1594 were to leave the kingdom, never to return without first professing the true faith; Angus, Huntly, Errol, Auchindoun, and Chisholm were not to be accused of crimes connected with the blanks and intercepted letters and were to refrain from practising with Jesuits, seminary priests, and Papists; they were to confer with ministers and subscribe the articles of religion before February first or leave Scotland; heavy surety was demanded of each, and each had to make a decision by January first as to whether he would accept or reject the conditions outlined above. The act was lenient but was by no means a complete surrender to the Earls. It was expressly stated that it did not extend to "murthouris slauchteris fyre rasing or vthiris criminall materis quhatsumeuir," which implied that Moray's murder was not forgotten; and only a relatively short time was given them in which to make a decision. Moreover, if the Earls had already sent pledges out of the realm or should in the future do so to the peril of religion, King, or country, the Act of Abolition was to be null.<sup>57</sup>

In the convention which passed this act James appeared in person to influence the votes in favor of it. There was some suggestion that he tampered with its contents after it had been approved.<sup>58</sup> It is interesting to note that among the nobles attending the convention were Lennox and Mar, connected with Huntly by marriage, and Lord Livingston, whose wife was Errol's sister.<sup>59</sup> Neither the English gov-

<sup>57</sup> *Acts Parl. Scot.*, IV, 46-48.

<sup>58</sup> Calderwood, V, 288-289; Melville, *Autobiography*, p. 312; S. P. Scotland, LI, No. 69, Bowes to Burghley, Dec. 2, 1593.

<sup>59</sup> *Scots Peerage*, V, 445; III, 572.



ernment nor the kirk saw in the Act of Abolition much virtue. That the Earls should be allowed to enjoy their incomes and suffer no punishment seemed preposterous. It was feared that they would raise sufficient forces at home and abroad to challenge the supremacy of the government and of the "trew religioun."<sup>60</sup> Yet what could James do? Assailed on one side by Bothwell, on another by the kirk and by England, on a third by the Catholic party itself, what alternative remained? The Protestant nobility gave no united support. If the Catholic Earls could be converted to at least outward conformity in religion, if they would promise not to traffic with foreigners in the future, something might be gained. Leniency to them might keep the King independent of England and kirk and at the same time scotch Bothwell's ambitions. Naturally, the good faith of the parties accepting the Act of Abolition was the core of the matter. Their past record was not encouraging and during the summer of 1593 they had an agent in Spain, John Cecil, to solicit aid for them.<sup>61</sup> Nevertheless, despite the warning of the minister, Robert Bruce, that the King's reign would be troublesome and short if he abolished not the Act of Abolition,<sup>62</sup> the Act had some merit.

From England came continual protests throughout the autumn and early winter. Bowes had difficulty in getting audience at times, a toothache or a hunting expedition serving to put him off from day to day.<sup>63</sup> When the ambassador obtained an interview, it was the old story. James pointed out Elizabeth's bad faith in breaking the promises of Randolph and Ashby and declared that, although he was

<sup>60</sup> Robert Bruce, the conspirator, was thought to have brought money for the Earls and King from Flanders (S. P. Scotland, LI, No. 64, Bowes to Burghley, Nov. 17, 1593). There was news in Scotland of forty-eight ships preparing on the coast of Spain and Portugal for some enterprise, and it was reported that the Spanish had appointed a rendezvous in Brittany from which an expedition to Scotland was intended (*Border Papers*, I, 504, 518, 520-521).

<sup>61</sup> *Cal. Spanish*, 1587-1603, pp. 603-608.

<sup>62</sup> Calderwood, V, 283, 288-290.

<sup>63</sup> S. P. Scotland, LI, Nos. 57, 59, Bowes to Burghley, Nov. 5, 8, 1593.

willing to punish the Earls, he could not do so without the Queen's aid. He had to pursue Bothwell and could not simultaneously "daunt" the Catholic lords. He promised, however, to inform her Majesty of any measures to be taken regarding them and to request her advice and consent.<sup>64</sup> He delayed writing to her about the Act of Abolition until after it had been passed.<sup>65</sup> Then he explained it as follows and asked her advice. Huntly, Angus, and Errol, he said, confessed to hearing mass and receiving Jesuits; they acknowledged the blanks but said they were for other purposes than to bring in Spanish forces; Huntly denied any foreign intrigue since 1589; Fintry was dead, Ker escaped, and no confession of guilt could be obtained from the principals. In consulting the estates, the King had been advised not to insist upon a trial, both in view of the Earls' "constant denying" and because "the last parliament went so neir the clearing of thaim if it hadd bene putt to thaire votis."<sup>66</sup> Therefore, the Act had been devised as the best way to insure the safety of religion and of the State.

Elizabeth's reply to this was the speedy dispatch of Lord Zouche to Edinburgh. Her letter of credence for him was characteristically forceful.

I doubt whether shame or sorrow have had the upper hand when I read your last lines to me. Who, of judgment that deemed me not simple, could suppose that any answers you have writ me should satisfy, nay, enter into the opinion of any one not void of four senses, leaving out the first.

. . . And when I remember what sore punishment those so lewd traitors should have, then I read again, lest at first I mistook your mind; but when the reviewing granted my lecture true, Lord! what wonder grew in me. . . .

<sup>64</sup> S. P. Scotland, LI, No. 60, Bowes to Burghley, Nov. 12, 1593.

<sup>65</sup> On the margin of Bowes's letter telling of James's intention to write about it, Burghley wrote sarcastically, "*Après demayn*" (*ibid.*, LI, No. 68, Nov. 30, 1593).

<sup>66</sup> *Letters of Elizabeth and James*, pp. 95-98.

. . . For your own sake play the king, and let your subjects see you respect yourself. . . .<sup>67</sup>

Zouche's instructions outlined in detail the Queen's attitude to the whole question. She could not accept James's excuses for the Act, nor could she think that he meant to let the Earls go unpunished. Her only advice was to execute stern and impartial justice. She considered the King's failure to consult her before passing the Act a breach of good faith. If James should seem heedless of these words, Zouche and Bowes were to make a solemn declaration of Her Majesty's determination. Let the King not think

us so negligent of our own estate as we will not employ our power to the uttermost to withstand the landing of any strange forces in Scotland, . . . for we were very simple to imagine that any foreign prince . . . would be at charge to send either men or money into Scotland, . . . to gain anything in Scotland but by that means only to invade England; and of this purpose we have a multitude of advertisements monthly from Spain and from the Low Countries that the King of Spain hath only expected upon overtures made to him to have some assurance of some noblemen in Scotland to join with his forces, which . . . was to have been effected; so must we think that if the said Earls be permitted to go out of the realm, they shall have much better commodity to perform the former, not by blanks subscribed, but personally with their own offers to accompany the same without any fear of forfeiting their bonds.

And, therefore, if the King will not speedily suppress the traitors either by condemnation or restrain them by imprisonment, we must be forced to prevent these dangers by all the good means that we can.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 98-100n., reprinted from Patrick Fraser Tytler's *History of Scotland*.

<sup>68</sup> S. P. Scotland, LII, pp. 8-15, copy, instructions for Zouche, Dec. 20, 1593. Cf. *ibid.*, LI, No. 73, copy, instructions for Zouche, same date.

The last was, perhaps, a hint at what was a second and more important part of Zouche's mission. It concerned Bothwell. Henry Lock had gone before Zouche into Scotland to canvass among Bothwell's supporters. Acting on Lock's advice,<sup>69</sup> Zouche was to inform the Earl's partisans of the King's reply to Elizabeth's demand for action against the Catholic Earls. If Bothwell's party mistrusted James's sincerity, Zouche was to confer with them for the purpose of building up in Scotland a faction to defend the Protestant faith and the English alliance. Elizabeth would assure them of her favor and countenance. If they desired money, the ambassador might even further their requests with her and obtain speedy answer.<sup>70</sup>

It was a delicate undertaking for the Queen, a prince and "absolut ruler," to deal with the rebel of another prince. Secrecy was important and Bothwell was notorious for his "aptnes to open unto all what he fyndeth from any."<sup>71</sup> Elizabeth could not with honor aid him, but what other course was satisfactory? Huntly and his companions enjoyed the King's favor and had great power. Although Maitland had returned to court, Bowes could not place complete confidence in him.<sup>72</sup> The old Stirling faction, because of its connections with Errol and Huntly, was not to be relied upon. Abroad, the situation was becoming very

<sup>69</sup> Zouche was to receive information from one who had preceded him into Scotland. This was probably Lock (*ibid.*, LII, pp. 23-25, copy, [Cecil] to Lock, Jan. 18, 1594), although Sir Robert Carey, who was in Edinburgh late in December, 1593, may have had something to do with the affair (*ibid.*, LI, Nos. 71, 74, Bowes to Burghley, Dec. 7, 22, 1593).

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, LI, No. 72, memorial for Lord Zouche; *ibid.*, LII, pp. 16-17, copy of Zouche's instructions; Cotton MSS., Caligula D ii, ff. 118-121, another copy. Note that the copy of the instructions in S. P. Scotland, LII, pp. 16-17, reads, "you shall promise them on our part to further their demands to the uttermost of your power . . ." while that in Cotton MSS., Caligula D ii, ff. 118-121, reads, "you shall promise them on your part. . . ." The latter, putting the responsibility on Zouche, is probably the meaning she intended.

<sup>71</sup> *Border Papers*, I, 509.

<sup>72</sup> S. P. Scotland, LI, No. 33, instructions for Nicolson, going to Burghley, Oct. 4, 1593; *ibid.*, No. 60, Bowes to Burghley, Nov. 12, 1593.



uncomfortable. Henry IV had become Catholic. News of Spanish preparations poured into the Privy Council constantly. In Ireland Tyrone and O'Donell were raising rebellion. Elizabeth authorized an inspection of border defenses and took precautions to fortify the Channel Islands.<sup>73</sup> She felt that it was both necessary and justifiable to tamper with Bothwell.

Zouche found matters in Edinburgh little to his liking. The Act of Abolition was automatically annulled by the Earls' failure to accept its lenient terms.<sup>74</sup> James gave the ambassador a declaration in writing that no offers from the Papist Earls would be heard until they entered ward, that he would consult with Elizabeth and his Council before showing them any favor, that he meant to prosecute them with all rigor if they refused to enter ward unconditionally, and that Parliament would be summoned as soon as possible.<sup>75</sup> Elizabeth, nevertheless, had little confidence in his resolutions, "vanishing into smoke." She refused to give the King any help before the Earls were in safe custody.<sup>76</sup> An order was issued in January, commanding them to surrender themselves, but they completely ignored it. James repeated that he was willing to proceed against them by law in the Parliament but that he could not use force without English aid. His conferences with Zouche and Bowes were very bitter.<sup>77</sup>

Discouraged in their formal errand to the King, the am-

<sup>73</sup> Note Hesketh's execution in November, 1593 (see above, p. 75n.). For news of Spanish preparations, see Birch, *Memoirs*, I, 132 and *Border Papers*, I, 497, 504, 518, 520-521. For Elizabeth's defence preparations, see *Cal. Domestic, Adda.*, 1580-1625, pp. 350-355, *passim*, pp. 358-360; Camden, pp. 468-470, 477.

<sup>74</sup> *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, 116-117; *Acts Parl. Scot.*, IV, 52-53. Only Chisholm accepted its terms.

<sup>75</sup> S. P. Scotland, LIII, No. 10, inclosed in Zouche's letter to Burghley, dated Jan. 26, 1594, *ibid.*, No. 9.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, LII, pp. 31-35, copy, Cecil to Zouche, Feb. 1, 1594.

<sup>77</sup> *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, 130; S. P. Scotland, LII, p. 39, copy, Cecil to Zouche, Mar. 4, 1594; Cotton MSS., Caligula D ii, ff. 136-148, and transcript in Harl. MSS., 4648, f. 84v, seq., Zouche's report of his conference with James [early March, 1594].

bassadors turned to Bothwell. Elizabeth well realized that she could not appear to countenance any threat to the King's person. In dealing with Bothwell she assumed that he was to remove the King's evil councillors and to work against the Catholic Earls. She took care to keep free from any accusation of instigating the Earl to action.

But seeing the events of all actions of this nature are casual, albeit her Majesty is thoroughly assured that in all their present attempts they will most tenderly preserve the person of the King . . . and albeit she doth know also that the innocency of their own hearts . . . will be sufficient warrant for their own actions or attempts, yet if her Majesty shall be first a beginner or inciter of any such course, it were dishonorable for her; because it may well be said that she, being a second person, cannot look into the hearts of men and therefore, if any disaster should happen (which she little feareth), it might yet be imputed to her Majesty as a neglect of a king or an overcredulity of the party; but if they shall once of themselves and as they often have promised to begin (having such a party as they say) to remove his wicked instruments from him, who are the chiefest cause of this danger, whereunto both his person and his estate are running headlong, her Majesty stands too much upon her honor and reputation to see them any way fall in pursuing their enterprises for want of assistance and full strengthening them by all means possible.<sup>78</sup>

The distinction between an inciter and an accessory after the fact who had given assurance of help beforehand was a quibble. So, too, was the distinction between acting against the King and against the councillors about him. Elizabeth knew that the difference could not be maintained except in polite phrases, but it was useful to her to pretend it. When, therefore, Lock wrote of Bothwell's plan to besiege Stirling Castle and said, "if he [the King] should fly, go where he will, we will follow him," Cecil promptly cau-

<sup>78</sup> S. P. Scotland, LII, pp. 23-25, copy, [Cecil] to Lock, Jan. 18, 1594.

tioned him that the undertaking was against Huntly and his friends and not against the King.<sup>79</sup>

Bowes and Zouche were in a dilemma. In January they had been sent permission to assure Bothwell's party that the Queen would have money on the borders to aid them in their enterprise against the adversaries of God's cause and the peace of the kingdoms, providing they made a beginning without her. Much was left to the discretion of the ambassadors. A marginal note on the minute of these instructions shows a keen appreciation of their position. "This argueth the Queen would have her ministers do that she will not avow," it read.<sup>80</sup> The note aptly described what happened. At Elizabeth's direction Sir Robert Cecil had reproved Zouche for failing to realize the difference between following closely the letter of one's instructions and observing the general purport. Goaded by this, the ambassador had ventured too far with Bothwell and evidently delivered to the Earl four hundred pounds, accepting as security a jewel and some plate. The Queen immediately repudiated the transaction and rebuked her ambassadors for it. She wrote to Zouche:

We hope that although for encouragement and comfort you and our servant Bowes have enlarged yourselves, yet you have not proceeded (things being thus raw) either to borrow for them to begin with or promise to lend upon any pawn whatsoever any money before such time as those grounds were publicly laid which might justify our actions, which we will not color by such palpable devices as to refuse to give and yet to be content to lend, or to like that our ambassadors in such a case should do that as private men which were not justifiable in their persons, being public ministers.

. . . We do thus require you to understand us, that whensoever they shall have begun any open action of themselves and shall

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, LII, pp. 42-46, copy, Cecil to Lock, Mar. 4, 1594.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, LII, pp. 25-29, copy, Cecil to Zouche, Jan. 23, 1594.

thereby make manifest that they have a party like to suppress those traitorous and dangerous ministers, we will help them immediately; but to hire them or help them to begin any action whatsoever by furnishing them directly or indirectly, though it may have never so much color of secrecy, we neither will do it nor may allow you to do it, either as private or public servants; but if they shall proceed otherwise of themselves by any means seeming best to them to prevent the inconveniences like to ensue, they shall find us a prince that will not see them want for anything we can do for them.<sup>81</sup>

A month later Cecil scolded them for this.

. . . a matter without any warrant given you, and such an act as, being known, cannot but be interpreted to be an act of hers to give the Earl money of purpose to encourage him to enterprise attempt against the King's person, which she never meant nor can conceive a thought of.<sup>82</sup>

James was to be assured from the Queen that

. . . if we loved not him, yet we love ourselves so well and hold all rules of kingly offices so sacred as we would not desire life any longer after we should either allow or animate any persons for any cause in any so rebellious action. . . . Such is the warrant of our conscience as we may not betray so much our own innocency as to think that any action of ours hath afforded the least cause of such conceit.<sup>83</sup>

The Queen, however, was not very angry with her ambassadors. Cecil wrote to Zouche, ". . . had not your Lordship been too hasty in the matter of four hundred pounds, your Lordship's dealing with the King hath wonderfully

<sup>81</sup> S. P. Scotland, LII, pp. 36-39, copy, Elizabeth to Zouche, Feb. 13, 1594.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, LII, pp. 46-52, copy, Cecil to Zouche, Mar. 12, 1594.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, LII, pp. 52-57, copy, Elizabeth to Zouche, Mar. 20, 1594.



satisfied her Majesty." He added in a postscript, "The Queen is well satisfied with Mr. Bowes, as with your Lordship for all things, if she may see that this be so handled as that neither she, who is innocent, be suspected nor you, who are her ambassadors, reproached."<sup>84</sup>

Elizabeth's policy was a clever and unscrupulous one. Unblushingly she protested to James her innocence of any design against him and calmly threatened him with Bothwell. She led the Earl on with hopes of men<sup>85</sup> and money, to say nothing of her countenance after he had once begun the action on his own responsibility. She could disavow Bothwell if he threatened an attack on the King's person. Her ambassadors had to shoulder the blame for any dealing with the Earl, while she could assume the air of a martyr-neighbor, wronged by slander and exasperated by James's conduct. Her well-grounded mistrust of Bothwell and her customary policy of keeping more than one iron in the fire led her to approach Maitland at the same time in hopes of winning his coöperation against Huntly.<sup>86</sup> If Bothwell should succeed in checking the Spanish party, or if the mere threat of Bothwell should force James to act against them, or if Maitland could accomplish it, her end was gained.

In this maze of faction and intrigue the Presbyterian kirk was England's able ally. Bothwell posed as its champion against idolatry and papistry. The ministers could not

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, LII, pp. 46-52, minute, Cecil to Zouche, Mar. 12, 1594.

<sup>85</sup> The English wardens were commanded to stand upon their defence, but Lock was promptly told that whereas he had written "that her Majesty's forces of the borders are in readiness but have no direction to go into Scotland, it is a thing her Majesty never purposed they should, but only to defend her own, if any road should be made by the Scots" (S. P. Scotland, LII, pp. 57-60, copy, Cecil to Zouche, Mar. 20, 1594; *ibid.*, pp. 60-62, copy, Cecil to Lock, Mar. 20, 1594).

<sup>86</sup> S. P. Scotland, LI, No. 79, Dec. 30, 1593, copy of part of a letter from Burghley to be imparted to the Chancellor if Bowes thought fit; *ibid.*, LIII, No. 8, Bowes to Burghley, Jan. 20, 1594; Cotton MSS., Caligula D ii, ff. 136-148, transcript in Harl. MSS., 4648, f. 84v, seq., Zouche's report of his conference with James and Maitland; S. P. Scotland, LII, pp. 57-60, copy, Cecil to Zouche, Mar. 20, 1594.

condone his obvious misdeeds but they were reluctant to thunder against him before "God's knowne enemeis" were punished. Mr. Robert Bruce even announced from the pulpit that Bothwell "had taikin the protection of the good caus, at least, the pretence therof, to the king's shame, becaus he tooke not upon him the querrel."<sup>87</sup>

While the ministers stormed and while Elizabeth negotiated with Bothwell and with Maitland, Bothwell suddenly precipitated matters by his "Rode of Leith" on April 3, 1594. He entered Scotland from England and advanced to Leith, the port of Edinburgh, with four cornets of horsemen. James had word of his approach and tried without success to prevent it. Excitement in the capital ran high. James appealed to the people in the Great Kirk, declaring plainly, ". . . if yee will assist me against him at this tyme, I promise to persecute the excommunicated lords, so that they sall not be suffered to remaine in anie part of Scotland; . . . if the Lord give me victorie over Bothwell, I sall never rest till I passe upon Huntlie and the rest of the excommunicated lords."<sup>88</sup> The test had come. The King took the field in person, whereupon Bothwell retreated in orderly fashion. The Earl defeated Lord Hume, but the assistance he expected from Atholl, Gowry, Montrose, and others did not come. Since no concerted attack seems to have been attempted, Bothwell's "action" failed. He had merely increased James's prestige.<sup>89</sup>

Zouche hastened to London with James's customary declaration that he meant to act against the Catholic Earls and with the recurrent plea for money. Elizabeth heard both coldly, although she permitted her ambassador to hint at the possibility of financial relief *after* the King had sup-

<sup>87</sup> Calderwood, V, 294-295; *Historie and Life*, p. 310; Spottiswood, II, 447-448; Camden, 480-481.

<sup>88</sup> Calderwood, V, 296.

<sup>89</sup> S. P. Scotland, LIII, Nos. 24, 25, 29, Lock to Cecil, Apr. 2, 5, 9, 1594; *Border Papers*, I, 524-527; Calderwood, V, 296-297; Colville, *Letters*, pp. 259-260.

pressed the rebels and had seized their lands beyond hope of recovery. She gave vague assurances that Bothwell should have no aid in England against his sovereign.<sup>90</sup> To give James a chance to prove his good faith she advised Bothwell to postpone any new action until the middle of May.<sup>91</sup> Actually, the King did little. The Scottish Parliament summoned for April was postponed indefinitely. James appeared more interested in the prosecution of Atholl, one of Bothwell's allies, and in the dispatch of ambassadors, Colville of Easter Wemyss and Mr. Edward Bruce, to London to invite Elizabeth to the baptism of his first-born son and to complain of Bothwell's reception in England.<sup>92</sup>

Eventually, Elizabeth decided to send James some tangible evidence of her good will. Although she dismissed his ambassadors on the seventeenth of May with a refusal of their requests for money, in a few hours she changed her mind. At midnight Cecil was busy writing to Bowes that her Majesty had decided to be generous.<sup>93</sup> Perhaps a letter from Lock, warning her that Bothwell's party was considering a coalition with Huntly, influenced her decision.<sup>94</sup> The four thousand pounds sent<sup>95</sup> called forth a response from James. Largely through his personal influence, the forfeitures of Huntly, Angus, and Errol were

<sup>90</sup> Cotton MSS., Caligula D ii, f. 198, articles brought by Zouche from James; S. P. Scotland, LII, pp. 68-72, minute of the Queen's answer; *ibid.*, LIII, No. 38, draft of Elizabeth's answer. Cf. *Hat. Cal.*, IV, 513-514, 519-520; S. P. Scotland, LII, p. 68, copy, Cecil to Bowes, Apr. 20, 1594; *ibid.*, LII, p. 73, and LIII, Nos. 39, 40, minutes, Burghley to Bowes, Apr. 20, 1594; *ibid.*, LIII, No. 45, Bowes to Burghley, Apr. 30, 1594, with incls., I and II, two forms of Elizabeth's answers to the King's articles.

<sup>91</sup> *Hat. Cal.*, IV, 513-514, 517-518.

<sup>92</sup> *Acts Parl. Scot.*, IV, 55; *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, 143; S. P. Scotland, LIII, No. 45, Bowes to Burghley, Apr. 30, 1594; *ibid.*, No. 35, James's instructions for Easter Wemyss and Bruce. Prince Henry Frederick Frederick Henry was born at Stirling on Feb. 19, 1594 (Calderwood, V, 293).

<sup>93</sup> S. P. Scotland, LIII, Nos. 53, 54, Cecil to Bowes, May 17, 1594.

<sup>94</sup> *Hat. Cal.*, IV, 530-531.

<sup>95</sup> P. R. O., E 404, Bdl. 131, warrant dated June 22, 1594; *Border Papers*, I, 550; S. P. Scotland, LIV, No. 79, and LXII, No. 26, lists of payments.

passed by Parliament in June.<sup>96</sup> The marginal note which Cecil scribbled several days before this on Bowes's report of the King's good intentions, "Credo in Deum," for once was not justified.<sup>97</sup>

Several other factors influenced James to take this step. He was on better terms with the kirk, its May General Assembly having transacted various items of business that pleased him. Lord Hume was absolved from excommunication; John Ross, a minister who had called James a traitor to God, was "admonished" for his severe preaching; Andrew Hunter, a preacher who had openly "partied" Bothwell, was deposed from the ministry; an old act by which ministers promised to complain directly to the King and not to speak irreverently of him from the pulpit was ratified; and every minister was charged to dissuade his flock from concurring with Bothwell or any other traitor to his Majesty.<sup>98</sup> Possibly James felt that the Catholic menace was at length becoming grave. A Spanish or Flemish ship had arrived at Montrose at the end of April with money, it was thought, for the Earls.<sup>99</sup> The King may have felt that they were ungrateful in refusing the Act of Abolition. Then, too, the birth of an heir may have conjured up vivid memories of his own childhood, when one faction after another had ruled in his name and deprived his mother of her realm. Were the Catholics strong enough to repeat that experience?

It was not clear during the summer of 1594 that James meant to carry out the sentence of forfeiture against the Earls. The elaborate preparations for the baptism of the young prince required much time, thought, and money, and the slow arrival of the foreign ambassadors summoned

<sup>96</sup> *Acts Parl. Scot.*, IV, 56-61; *Historie and Life*, pp. 327-330; *Border Papers*, I, 534; Calderwood, V, 329-332; S. P. Scotland, LIII, No. 64, Bowes to Burghley, June 9, 1594.

<sup>97</sup> S. P. Scotland, LIII, No. 61, Bowes to Cecil, May 30, 1594.

<sup>98</sup> Calderwood, V, 316-328.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, V, 306; S. P. Scotland, LIII, No. 43, ——— to Bowes, Apr. 29, 1594; *ibid.*, No. 48, Bowes to Burghley, May 10, 1594.



to it delayed the ceremony until the end of August. Nothing could be done against the Earls until these festivities were ended.<sup>100</sup>

During these months Bothwell committed the error that ruined completely whatever chance he had of reinstating himself in Scotland. Lock had hinted in May that he was considering an alliance with Huntly. In June the Earl boldly outlined the plan to Bowes and asked advice. Elizabeth made a non-committal reply and the Earl continued his negotiations with Huntly.<sup>101</sup> His next proposal to the Queen was that he should accept the twenty-five thousand crowns offered him by the Catholic lords and with that money should levy troops to wage war against them. If he were to do this, he begged that Elizabeth would reimburse the Earls for the money they gave him. His "honor" demanded that! If Elizabeth should refuse to approve of this plan, he suggested that she grant him refuge in England, or else money to support him in Liddesdale until she could procure the King's mercy for him. If she should agree to none of these alternatives, he hoped that she would not think him false to her or to his religion if he accepted the readiest means at hand, an implied threat that he would join the Catholic lords.<sup>102</sup> Elizabeth ignored these suggestions. Cecil discouraged any messenger of Bothwell from coming to London.<sup>103</sup> In September, John Colville, one of the Earl's councillors, warned the English that he was not to be trusted in these dealings with the Catholics.<sup>104</sup> The

<sup>100</sup> *Warr. Papers*, II, 126-127, 258-262.

<sup>101</sup> *Hat. Cal.*, IV, 530-531; S. P. Scotland, LIII, No. 65, Bowes to Burghley, June 20, 1594; *ibid.*, XLVII, No. 74, Cecil to Bowes, June 30, [1594]. The last letter is placed in a volume of correspondence for 1591, but it clearly belongs to 1594. Cf. its contents with S. P. Scotland, LIII, Nos. 65, 75.

<sup>102</sup> Colville, *Letters*, pp. 113-117; S. P. Scotland, LIV, No. 29, Lock to Cecil, August, 1594.

<sup>103</sup> *Border Papers*, I, 545.

<sup>104</sup> Colville, *Letters*, pp. 123-125. Cf. S. P. Scotland, LIV, No. 34, Bowes to Burghley, Sept. 8, 1594, and incl., anonymous letter to Bowes, Sept. 6, 1594.

Earl himself described his needy condition in his protestation addressed to the presbytery of Edinburgh, dated September seventh, in which he justified his conference with Errol and Angus on the grounds that all—King, kirk, England, nobility, burghs, and ministers—had deserted him and that the Catholic lords merely proposed to remove evil councillors from the King.<sup>105</sup>

Huntly and his companions were very active during the summer of 1594 and confident of the future. They met on Midsummer's Eve for a merry celebration consisting of bonfires, dancing, and drinking, and mocked the King's threats.<sup>106</sup> In July another ship arrived at Aberdeen and landed several passengers and barrels of "salt." Two of the passengers, the Jesuits Gordon and Abercromby, escaped to Huntly, but the others were detained by the townsmen. Upon news of this, the Catholic lords gathered their men and threatened to burn the town unless the prisoners and "salt" (probably papal gold) were delivered to them. They made such a great show of force that Aberdeen complied with their demands.<sup>107</sup>

After this episode, preparations for the King's expedition against the Earls were pushed forward more rapidly. James appealed to the kirk for its support, appointed lieutenants in the North, summoned his subjects to attend him at the end of August, and made desperate efforts to get money.<sup>108</sup> Sir Richard Cockburn, Maitland's nephew, was sent to London to solicit the Queen's help, but Elizabeth refused

<sup>105</sup> *Warr. Papers*, II, 262–266.

<sup>106</sup> S. P. Scotland, LIII, Nos. 71, 76, Bowes to Burghley, July 6, 14, 1594.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, LIII, Nos. 82, 85, Bowes to Burghley, July 21, 23, 1594; *Bor-der Papers*, I, 543–544. In D. O. Hunter Blair's translation of A. Belle-sheim's *History of the Catholic Church of Scotland*, III (Edinburgh, 1889), App. IV, p. 449, there is printed a document showing that Sapiretti, papal fiscal agent, and Father Gordon saw the money delivered to Angus, Huntly, and Errol, Aug. 1594.

<sup>108</sup> *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, 155, 157–159; Calderwood, V, 341–342; S. P. Scotland, LIII, Nos. 80, 86, news from Scotland, July 21, 24, 1594; *ibid.*, LIV, No. 57, Bowes to Burghley, Sept. 24, 1594.

to give any until November, long after James had started on his journey. Then the sum was only two thousand pounds, definitely said to be part of whatever gratuity Her Majesty might be pleased to give him in the following year.<sup>109</sup>

In the crisis the King had to depend on the strength he could command within his own kingdom. The battle of Glenlivet, fought early in October between Argyll, the King's Lieutenant, and Huntly, is generally conceded to have been a victory for the Catholic Earls, but their triumph was short-lived.<sup>110</sup> James set out from Edinburgh on October fourth, gathering forces as he proceeded. He depended on feudal levies, money payments from those who excused their services, contributions from burghs and barons, and loans from noblemen and councillors. Several ministers accompanied him who bore witness to his zeal and seconded his appeals to Edinburgh for funds. As before, the Earls withdrew into secret places whither bad weather made pursuit unwise. The principal castles of the rebels, Strathbogy, Newton, and Slanes, were destroyed. For the time little more could be done. The feudal forces disbanded early in November and it was uncertain how long the hired troops could be kept together. Lennox was left as lieutenant in the North, while James returned to Edinburgh, having taken fines and punished various minor adherents of the Earls and having obtained surety against any future aid to the rebels.<sup>111</sup>

As the winter wore on, any serious opposition from Both-

<sup>109</sup> *Warr. Papers*, II, 251-258; S. P. Scotland, LXVI, No. 12, and LXII, No. 26, lists of payments.

<sup>110</sup> S. P. Scotland, LIV, No. 62 and incls. I and II, Bowes to Burghley, Oct. 7, 1594; *ibid.*, No. 63, Bowes to Cecil, Oct. 8, 1594; Calderwood, V, 348-353; Moysie, p. 120; *Historie and Life*, pp. 338-343; Patrick Fraser Tytler, *History of Scotland* (7 vols., Edinburgh, 1845), VII, 267-272.

<sup>111</sup> Calderwood, V, 353-357; *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, Intro., p. xxix, pp. 187-189; S. P. Scotland, LIV, No. 57, Bowes to Burghley, Sept. 24, 1594; *ibid.*, No. 81, occurrences from Aberdeen, Nov. 3, 1594; Cotton MSS., Caligula D ii, f. 194, Bowes's instructions to Sheperson, Sept. 17, 1594.

well or the Catholic Earls disappeared. It had been suggested that Bothwell create a diversion in the South while James rode north against Huntly; but he had no power. A judicious distribution of his lands among Hume, Buccleugh, and Cessford had impoverished him. John Colville, one of his warmest supporters, deserted him and other followers were caught and hanged. The kirk lost all faith in him, since he again made common cause with the Catholics.<sup>112</sup> At the same time the Catholic Earls made futile overtures to Elizabeth and sent agents to Spain.<sup>113</sup> Their pleadings brought no response. In January fresh evidence of their dealings with Bothwell was secured from the confession of Sir James Scott of Balweary, an old associate of Bothwell. Scott revealed that, before the baptism, the three Catholic Earls, Auchindoun, and Bothwell had made a "band" to capture the King. He gave vague testimony about another plan to depose James, crown the young prince, remove their opponents from court, and distribute the high offices of state among Papists.<sup>114</sup>

This was sufficient to bring the affair to a relatively simple issue. James at last got the presbytery of Edinburgh to excommunicate Bothwell. Lennox returned from the North and was released honorably from his commission. A final solution was achieved by forcing Huntly and Errol to leave Scotland under guarantee not to return without license and not to plot in the meantime against King, country, or re-

<sup>112</sup> S. P. Scotland, LIV, Nos. 34, 57, 59, Bowes to Burghley, Sept. 8, 24, 28, 1594; *ibid.*, No. 34, incl., ——— to Bowes, Sept. 6, 1594; *ibid.*, No. 59, incl., copy, Bothwell to Presbytery of Edinburgh, Sept. 21, 1594; *ibid.*, No. 71, Nicolson to Bowes, Oct. 24, 1594; Colville, *Letters*, pp. 123–125, 127–128; *Hat. Cal.*, IV, 629–630; Calderwood, V, 347, 364; Spottiswood, II, 461; Warr. *Papers*, II, 262–266.

<sup>113</sup> S. P. Scotland, LIV, No. 48, draft, Elizabeth to Bowes, Sept. 16, 1594; *ibid.*, LII, pp. 99–103, fair copy. Cf. *ibid.*, LIV, No. 78 for a series of articles to be performed by the Catholic Earls and answers by A. Douglas, who dealt for them. For the Spanish negotiations, see *Cal. Spanish*, 1587–1603, pp. 613–616.

<sup>114</sup> Colville, *Letters*, pp. 136–137; Calderwood, V, 359–360; Spottiswood, II, 461; S. P. Scotland, LV, No. 10, news from Scotland, Jan. 15, 1595; *ibid.*, No. 20, Balweary's confession, Jan. 28, 1595.



ligion. The lands of the two Earls went to Lennox as "factory" but he permitted their wives to enjoy the livings. Angus received harsher treatment. The Duke took over his estates, while Angus himself remained in Scotland, a forlorn and almost forgotten outcast. After lurking in the Orkneys and Caithness for a time, Bothwell left the country to spend the rest of his life on the continent, a debauched and reckless wanderer. By the end of March, the three most important trouble-makers had gone.<sup>115</sup> The terms granted to the Catholic Earls were lenient but, considering the inadequate resources of the King,<sup>116</sup> it seems almost a miracle that so much had been achieved.

What had been the gain to each of the three parties, James, Elizabeth, and the kirk, who were most concerned with the problems of these years? James's position in Scotland was certainly more settled and secure. He had made his authority felt by banishing Bothwell and disposing of his lands, as well as by forcing Huntly and Errol to leave on more lenient conditions. The way was opened for more friendly relations with the kirk, since the two greatest causes of misunderstanding were removed. The kirk had gained legal recognition for its organization. It had triumphed in the departure of the Earls, but its pleasure was somewhat embittered by the fact that their wives enjoyed their revenues. Elizabeth, too, could feel some satisfaction in the Earls' exile, although they were on the continent where they could continue their plots. Since they had no remission from the King for the crimes with which they were charged, they were liable to punishment on their return;<sup>117</sup> that, however, was the only item in which the final

<sup>115</sup> *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, 207-208 and n.; Calderwood, V, 363-365; Spottiswood, II, 460; Moysie, pp. 120-122; *Historie and Life*, p. 343; S. P. Scotland, LV, No. 37, Nicolson to Bowes, Feb. 19, 1595; *ibid.*, No. 60, Aston to [Bowes], Mar. 24, 1595.

<sup>116</sup> By the middle of January, lack of money had reduced the Duke's forces to fifty horse and fifty foot (*ibid.*, LV, No. 10, news from Scotland, Jan. 15, 1595).

<sup>117</sup> S. P. Scotland, LV, No. 37, Nicolson to Bowes, Feb. 19, 1595.

settlement was more rigorous than the proposed Act of Abolition of November, 1593. In the last analysis, it was James who profited most by the confusion of the past three years. With Bothwell gone he breathed more easily in Scotland. He had succeeded in maintaining himself independently of England, having relied more on his own resources than on English money when the crisis came. The merciful treatment of the Catholic lords was a continuation of his old policy of evading a decision in the great struggle of the age. Elizabeth may have felt that her postern was more secure, but James, its guardian, had been taught self-help by the Queen in none too gentle a fashion. He was of a temper to profit by the experience.

One other aspect of these years deserves attention. There is some evidence that James viewed Lord Burghley and his son, Sir Robert Cecil, with increasing dislike. It was they who had managed the intrigues with Bothwell, a fact which James must have known. In the summer of 1593, when the King's complaints about Bothwell's reception in England were loud, James denied suspecting Elizabeth of connivance, but added ominously that "he could not acquit so clearly" some of her councillors.<sup>118</sup> A year later he spoke openly against Lord Burghley and Cecil.<sup>119</sup> Though the Lord Treasurer directed Bowes to try to smooth out the difficulties, at the end of the year James was still angry. Cockburn wrote then:

Toward my Lord Treasurer and his son, Sir Robert Cecil, I can not "dissimill" but I find a vehement impression hardly to be removed in his Majesty of their professed evil will towards him, which is augmented of late, as I take it and believe shall be found true, by some revelation made by such as was privy

<sup>118</sup> S. P. Scotland, LI, No. 23, Bowes to Elizabeth, Sept. 15, 1593.

<sup>119</sup> Colville, *Letters*, p. 108; S. P. Scotland, LIV, No. 10, Bowes to Burghley, Aug. 6, 1594.

to Bothwell his dealing and friendship there, who to insinuate themselves in further grace has de[te]ct[ed] more than is of verity and have evil acquit that undeserved favor shown to themselves. . . .<sup>120</sup>

Probably John Colville was the one who revealed to James the details of the negotiations with Bothwell.<sup>121</sup>

Other factors contributing to the King's anger were undoubtedly his disappointment about his pension and his worry about the English succession. Although he received ten thousand pounds in the two years 1593 and 1594, he had had to argue long to get it.<sup>122</sup> As for the succession, he definitely listed Burghley with those whom he considered hostile to his pretensions when he described Lord Zouche as "Burlyis dependar who favouris the house of Hartforde."<sup>123</sup>

At the same time James was very friendly to Essex. Mr. David Foulis, often employed by the King on financial matters in London, corresponded with Anthony Bacon, Essex's close friend. In his letters Foulis wrote of the King's high regard for Essex.

My master has commanded me to recommend him to PLATO [Essex], and says, that he is happy in his acquaintance there; and wishes, that it may have the best success; and that he is extremely glad to have recover'd in him SIR PHILIP SIDNEY.<sup>124</sup>

<sup>120</sup> S. P. Scotland, LIV, No. 106, R. Cockburn to Bowes, Dec. 12, 1594.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, LIV, No. 105, Hudson to Cecil, Dec. 4, 1594; *ibid.*, No. 107, Aston to —, Dec. 12, 1594.

<sup>122</sup> See above, pp. 83, 109, 113.

<sup>123</sup> *Warr. Papers*, II, 43. It is interesting to note that on the continent in 1595 much seems to have been made of the marriage of Burghley's granddaughter, Elizabeth de Vere, to William Stanley, sixth Earl of Derby, one of the candidates for the English throne (P. R. O., Rom. Trans., Bdl. 85, advices from Flanders, Feb. 3, 12, May 6, 26). I have found no indication that it created any worry in James's mind, although it may have contributed to his dislike of the Cecils.

<sup>124</sup> Birch, *Memoirs*, I, 183. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 181–182.

Essex kept in close touch with affairs in Scotland,<sup>125</sup> but there seems to be no mention of his knowledge of Bothwell's negotiations with the Queen and with the Cecils. If he knew of them, he may have concealed from James any hint of his cognizance. In the spring of 1594, when the Bothwellian trouble was at its height, the King especially recommended his ambassadors, Easter Wemyss and Bruce, to Essex, commanding them to be guided by his advice in all their proceedings.<sup>126</sup> It signified much that James paralleled his dislike of the Cecils with marked favor to Essex.

### APPENDIX

HATFIELD HOUSE, SALISBURY MSS., VOL. 133, NO. 100

Certain reasons which may be used to prove it meet or unmeet, the executing of this enterprise this summer or not. 1592.

This enterprise in head is one of the greatest enterprises that ever was since it is to conquer England partly by an foreign force and partly by some among themselves. But since all great enterprises ought to be suddenly and resolutely executed, therefore this ought to be executed at farthest in harvest next.

The reasons why.

1. All things are in such readiness, both money and men, specially men, that it will be both sumptuous and hard to entertain so great an army all this winter to come.
2. Delay of time will certainly make the Queen of England get intelligence thereof, in respect that great enterprises taken in hand by divers princes, remaining far asunder and their army being one part of them in field and the rest in

<sup>125</sup> E. g., Birch, *Memoirs*, I, 99, 108, 148. Cf. Maitland's offer of correspondence with Essex through Richard Cockburn, his nephew, and through Anthony Bacon, and Essex's reply indicating that he had consulted Elizabeth and would hold correspondence with no one without her consent. Maitland died shortly thereafter. (Hist. MSS. Comm., *Supplementary Report on the Manuscripts of the Earl of Mar and Kellie preserved at Alloa House, Clackmannanshire* [London, 1930], pp. 36-37, Summer, 1595.)

<sup>126</sup> Birch, *Memoirs*, I, 175.



readiness, will be cause of the breaking forth of the bruit thereof if time be delayed.

3. It will make the enterprisers cold, if delay of time be used.
4. Delaying this harvest, it will not be possible to execute that purpose until the next, that corn may be on ground, whereas so long delay will constrain the army else listed to "skall" [disperse], if it were but only for lack of a color for their holding together.
5. If it be delayed, the King of Spain will be able in the meantime to dip with her for his own particular, which (if it so fell out) it would disappoint this whole enterprise.
6. The Queen of England getting by delay intelligence thereof, she would be moved to stir up in the meantime sedition in the realms whom she feared, as she has oft done for the quieting of her estate, besides the periling of me so far as in her lay; whereas, if she were holden occupied that way, she would rather be diligent in keeping her own estate than in the periling of others.

The reasons to be objected to the contrary. *Antithesis*

1. The greatness of the enterprise ought to be a reason that it should be slowly, advisedly, and "sickly" [surely] deliberated upon, *nam sat cito si sat bene*. Wherefore it can not be goodly put to execution this harvest next. The reasons whereof are these following.
1. All things are not in readiness. In respect this country, which is the chiefest back that the strangers must have, has been in such disorder this time past by so often rebellions as it will be scarce possible to get it conquered and settled betwixt this and spring next, far less then can it be an help to conquer another in the meantime. And since I can scarce yet keep myself from some of their invasions, how mickle less can I make them invade other countries. As also I suppose, notwithstanding that this country had invaded and conquered the other, when I can scarce with my presence contain as yet this country from rebellions, how mickle more shall they rebel in my absence, and then instead of one, I shall have two countries to conquer both at once.

2. Delay of time will rather keep it secret nor make it open. Because so many strange princes, lying so far asunder, having had this matter so long in head, it can not be but the Queen of England hath gotten some intelligence of it, as I am surely informed she hath, wherefore the best way were to make it secret again, to let the bruit of it (spread abroad already) once "dil" [calm] down. And when so it is, it may be thereafter attempted of new with fewer strange princes on the secret of it and with as mickle or more provision of money.
3. As for making the enterprisers cold in it, surely, I would they were, in respect there are over many on the counsel of it, wherefore I would think it easier and more honorable to do it only by myself with some small help of men and money only from foreign parts.\*
4. As for the King of Spain's dipping in the meantime, I have answered else, by not thinking him meet to mell any farther in the enterprise, except it were by assisting with money. But albeit he dipped with her in the meantime for his particular, it could do no harm, but rather good two ways; as well for putting her out of suspicion of any other farther meddling because of his dipping him alone, as also by holding her occupied so as she could stir up no sedition in the meantime in other countries.
5. This answers also the 5. and last objection, for if either the bruit of it were "dil" down or if the King of Spain held her occupied in his own particular, she could by no means harm the countries.

I subsume then that as well in respect of these reasons preceding as also in case it were enterprised and failed, what discouragement and dishonor would it be to all the enterprisers, what cumber to me and my country, lying next her; for the proverb is certain, The higher and suddener an man climb the greater and sorer shall his fall be, if his purpose fail, as surely it is likely this shall do if it be executed so suddenly as is devised, since both the Queen of England is in suspicion of it, as also since the help that is looked for of the most part of the country-

\* Margin—same hand: "This reason answers both the 3. and 4th."

men will be [but?] scarce while their mistress lives, considering also the nature of the Englishmen, which is ready to mislike of their prince and consequently easily moved to rebel and free takers-in-hand but slow to follow forth and execute and ready to leave off from time they hear their prince's proclamation, as experience has oft times given proof.

Upon all this then that I have subsumed, I conclude that this enterprise can not be well executed this summer for my unreadiness, for the Queen of England's suspecting of it, and for over many strange princes dealing into it. Wherefore my opinion is that it "dil" down, as I said before. In the meantime I will deal with the Queen of England fair and pleasantly for my title to the crown of England after her decease, which thing, if she grant to (as it is not impossible howbeit unlikely), we have then attained our design "but" [without] stroke of sword. If by the contrary, then delay makes me to settle my country in the meantime and, when I like hereafter, I may in a month or two (forewarning of the King of Spain) attain to our purpose, she not suspecting such thing as now she does, which, if it were so done, it would be an far greater honor to him and me both.

Endorsed: Copy of the Scottish King's instructions to Spain which should have been sent by Powry Ogel. but thereafter were "concredit" to Mr. George Ker and withdrawn at his taking for safety of his Majesty's honor

This document is probably the paper which had fallen into the hands of the English government in May, 1594, and which cast grave suspicions upon James. The King then ordered Easter Wemyss and Bruce, his ambassadors in London, to expostulate with the Queen, showing that any such paper, if it betrayed any ill intentions toward England, was counterfeit; otherwise it could be justified. Henry Lock, the man in whose handwriting the Salisbury manuscript is written, then advised the Queen to say that such papers had been cast up in a coffer on the shore in Holland or had been found in a trunk. Elizabeth adopted the suggestion when she saw the ambassadors. She told them that

their King "may be sure he hath done nothing of long time in matter of practise which is unrevealed unto her, and for any writing, she heard that in one of the gentlemen's trunks that passed by into the Low Countries with 'Gaiddy,'<sup>127</sup> some writing was found cast up on the shore, but as yet she knows not what it was. . . ." <sup>128</sup> Aston's remarks in December, 1594, possibly refer to the same document.

. . . the King is made acquainted with Mr. John Geddy's doings, chiefly in delivering to the Earl "bodwel" certain notes which the King wrote with his own hand long since, Mr. John having the keeping of the King's papers where that was among the rest. The manner and matter I know you are acquainted with. The King thinks he has had great wrong by Mr. John in delivering that to his disadvantage which he wrote but for his pleasure and not for any accomplishing, he having the credit thereof. Oftentimes it was told the King they had his "hand writt" to be a witness against him. When I myself hath told him by such intelligence as I had among them, he stood to the denial, not having any mind of this, being so long since as he swears the great oath he had never mind of it for it was written before the incoming of the "spanyartes" and "west" not where it was. . . .<sup>129</sup>

John Colville, some years later, referred to a "project written by his [the King's] own hand" which Colville had urged Geddy to give to Elizabeth.<sup>130</sup> Perhaps Bothwell secured through Geddy a paper written by James and sent a copy to Elizabeth by means

<sup>127</sup> Aston, in 1591, spoke of Mr. John Geddy, secretary of the Chamber, who had given him information of Spanish intrigues (*Cal. Scottish*, 1589-1592, pp. 601, 603, 617).

<sup>128</sup> S. P. Scotland, LIII, No. 53, draft, Sir Robert Cecil to Bowes, May 17, 1594; *Hat. Cal.*, IV, 530-531. Years later, when James again denied having written instructions to the Pope and the King of Spain, he said that "he had never given any such instructions nor any at all to them, since that 'draught' which was with his hand written yet not meant to be used and which was given her Majesty." (S. P. Scotland, LXIII, No. 23, Nicolson to Cecil, Oct. 3, 1598.)

<sup>129</sup> S. P. Scotland, LIV, No. 107, Aston to Bowes, Dec. 12, 1594.

<sup>130</sup> *Hat. Cal.*, VIII, 146-147.



of Henry Lock. He may have done it with the hope of showing Elizabeth how little faith she could put in the King and how necessary it was for her to help him in bringing the King back to the paths of righteousness. If that was the case, the scheme did not work well. In the first place, the document quoted above, which may be the one in question,<sup>131</sup> failed to prove that James was ready to embark on any hostile action against Elizabeth. In the second place, Elizabeth was wise enough to restrain her anger against James. She knew that he was the least objectionable of any of the candidates for the throne at her death. It will be shown in the following pages that her policy was quietly to resign herself to the validity of his "title," although she refused to make an outright declaration in his favor. There were many occasions when she could have denounced him for his intrigues abroad and for his attitude to her, but she did not. She hinted subtly to him that he must keep within the bounds of good sense, advice which, on the whole, James took, although he accepted it at times with ill grace.

<sup>131</sup> The reference to the time of the composition as "before the incoming of the 'spanyartes'" would seem to put it before the Armada. Perhaps James had a conveniently bad memory, or perhaps he referred to a later projected invasion of England by Spain. Another hypothesis, of course, is that this document is not at all the one connected with Geddy.

## CHAPTER IV

### FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1589-1598

James's policy with respect to continental Europe after the Armada had as its main objective the creation of a circle of friendly nations who would either actively support him for the English succession or who would at least do nothing to hinder him. The Protestant nations of northern Europe, Denmark, certain German principalities, and the United Provinces, were the first friends to seek. France had to be considered, although after the assassination of Henry III in 1589 she was weakened by the conflicting religious convictions and dynastic ambitions of the Guises, who headed the Catholic League, and of Henry of Navarre, the Huguenot heir. James naturally favored Navarre as a counterpoise to Spanish and Catholic influence. He had reason to mistrust Philip's designs on England. The King also had certain interests in common with the Catholic and anti-Spanish party in Rome and Italy. All these potential friends he strove to cultivate. He was, nevertheless, too insecure in his position in Scotland to command much influence and authority abroad, while Elizabeth, jealous and annoyed at his concern for her throne, did her best to prevent the fulfilment of his plans. Hence his adventures in the field of European affairs described in this chapter are a minor and rather ineffectual aspect of the years when Scottish history was dominated by domestic and insular troubles.

#### *The Project for Peace or a Protestant League, 1589-1590*

While James was in Denmark in the winter of 1589-1590, celebrating his marriage and waiting for favorable weather to transport his bride to her new home, he discussed at length with the Danish Council a scheme for general peace

and, in case this failed, the formation of a great Protestant League. Although his plans betrayed a youthful impetuosity and a desire to win fame for himself, they also revealed a capacity for shrewd and calculating thought and a certain breadth of vision. It has been suggested that the King was sincere in his proposal for a general compromise to be arranged with Rome by a great council summoned to bring peace and union among Christian nations.<sup>1</sup> Shortly after his accession to the English throne in 1603, peace between England and Spain was achieved. The plans he furthered in 1589, though vague and relatively unimportant, were in a sense the prelude to his later activities.

Apparently, the honor of first suggesting the move for peace belongs to Denmark. Frederick II had been active in endeavors to mediate between England and Spain in 1587.<sup>2</sup> After his death in 1588 his policy seems at first to have been followed by the Regents and Queen Mother who governed during the minority of Christian IV. When Colonel William Stewart was in Denmark in October, 1588, on one of his numerous journeys, he had discussed measures to check the Spanish menace with members of the Danish Council. The Danes had then proposed that James, after marrying a Danish princess, send an embassy to Philip to remonstrate against any attack on Great Britain and to attempt to remove the causes of war. Denmark would send ambassadors to second these efforts. If Philip should refuse to heed them, Scotland, Denmark, and their friends would join England to withstand the common foe and no victuals or "habiliments" of war would be sent to him from any of them.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Negotiations between King James VI. and I. and Ferdinand I. Grand Duke of Tuscany*, J. D. Mackie, ed. (St. Andrews University Publication, 1927), Intro., pp. xxi-xxv; Mackie, "The Secret Diplomacy of King James VI. in Italy, prior to his Accession to the English Throne," *Scot. Hist. Rev.*, XXI (1923-1924), 270-271. See below, p. 247.

<sup>2</sup> Read, *Walsingham*, III, 261-263.

<sup>3</sup> *Cal. Scottish*, 1589-1593, App., No. 6, Bowes to Walsingham, Feb. 7, 1590.

James readily adopted the latter idea of a league of Protestant states. When his ambassadors went to Denmark in June, 1589, to make final arrangements for his marriage, they were instructed to treat for an offensive and defensive league between Scotland and Denmark and to try to draw other princes and states of the reformed religion into it.<sup>4</sup> The King's presence in Denmark gave him new opportunities to push the matter. He and Maitland, who accompanied him, discussed it with the governors of that state. James knew that he could do nothing about it without Elizabeth's consent and therefore took care to inform her. Colonel Stewart transmitted to the English government by means of Bowes, the ambassador resident in Edinburgh at the time, a series of propositions outlining the plan.<sup>5</sup>

Elizabeth made a prompt reply, expressing some interest in the suggestions. After a dignified reminder of her ability thus far displayed to withstand her enemies without the aid of her neighbors, she indicated approval of the plan to send ambassadors to Spain; if Philip, contrary to expectations, should pay serious attention to the proposals, the ambassadors might assure him of her concurrence in an honorable peace, each sovereign to retain his rights. With an eye to practical advantages, the Queen agreed that the league mentioned in case of a Spanish refusal seemed promising and pointed out the benefit to the common cause if Denmark would refuse naval supplies to the enemy.<sup>6</sup>

Until the King's return to Scotland on the first of May,

<sup>4</sup> Cotton MSS., Caligula D i, ff. 177-178, transcript in Harl. MSS., 4647, ff. 35-36; *Hat. Cal.*, III, 420-422, instructions for the ambassadors.

<sup>5</sup> *Warr. Papers*, II, 133-134; *Cal. Scottish*, 1589-1593, App., No. 6, Bowes to Walsingham, Feb. 7, 1590; S. P. Scotland, XLV, No. 43, Bowes to Burghley, May 9, 1590; Calderwood, V, 84-85.

<sup>6</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLIV, No. 101, answers to Stewart's propositions. The paper is here assigned to Dec., 1589, but I think the date should be February, 1590. Bowes, in a letter of Mar. 5, 1590, acknowledged receipt of the answers to the overtures proposed by Stewart (*Cal. Scottish*, 1589-1593, App., No. 12). See also *ibid.*, App., No. 6 for Bowes's letter of Feb. 7, 1590, in which he summarized these proposals delivered to him by Stewart.



1590, little progress was made other than discussions in Denmark with the Council and with various German princes assembled there for the marriage of Anne's elder sister to the Duke of Brunswick.<sup>7</sup> Once home, James hastened to send ambassadors to Brunswick before Trinity Sunday (June 14), when the Queen Mother of Denmark, the Dukes of Mecklenburg, Pomerania, and Saxony, the Margrave of Brandenburg, and the Landgrave of Hesse were to meet to celebrate the wedding. After some delays, due to the necessity of consulting England, lack of money, and the general bustle attendant upon the King's return, Colonel Stewart and Mr. John Skene were sent off to Germany and Denmark. Elizabeth objected to Stewart's presence in the embassy because of his former relations with the Spanish party,<sup>8</sup> but in the end he accompanied Skene. They were financed by five hundred pounds granted to them by the English Queen.<sup>9</sup>

James's instructions to them, printed in full in the *Warrender Papers*, are the most interesting document in connection with the whole episode.<sup>10</sup> The details differed little from the outline of the earlier plans. The confused motives for the project were candidly set forth. High ideals of peace among Christian princes and peoples were professed, but most of all the defence of the "trew religioun" was emphasized. The proposal to send embassies simultaneously from Scotland, Denmark, and the German princes to Elizabeth, Henry IV, and Philip, seemed impartial. It was significant, nevertheless, that if Philip should refuse to listen, "we all wilbe enforced aither wilfullye or shamefullye to perishe,

<sup>7</sup> *Cal. Scottish*, 1589-1593, App., Nos. 20, 21, Bowes to Burghley, May 1, 4, 1590; S. P. Scotland, XLV, No. 43, same to same, May 9, 1590.

<sup>8</sup> E. g., *Cal. Spanish*, 1587-1603, p. 92, relates an instance in 1587.

<sup>9</sup> *Cal. Scottish*, 1589-1593, pp. 309-311; S. P. Scotland, XLV, No. 72, Bowes to Burghley, June 29, 1590. Elizabeth's further interest in the plan is shown by the fact that her ambassador in Edinburgh urged the King to appoint his emissaries to be sent to Spain. James named Sir James Melville and his brother William. Apparently they did not go. (*Cal. Scottish*, 1589-1593, pp. 357, 364, 380.)

<sup>10</sup> *Warr. Papers*, II, 133-141, June 9, 1590.

or sincerelye joyne our selves together in a firme amitye and seur contreleague, and with joynt myndes and forces occur and tymouslye obviat to the cruell desseingis, and ungodlye projectis of the adversarye, whiche yf it be offensyve and defensive, he were not habill to mainteane his Yndes against all our power be sea. . . .” If, on the other hand, Elizabeth or Henry IV should refuse to consider these peace proposals, the only threat was that “we will deme there quarrell unlawfull, thame selves enemeyis to quyetnes and disturbatouris of the public peax, yeeld up to all amitye and freyndship with thame . . . and suffer our subjectis and commodities of our dominions be used to the ayde and maintenance of there adversarye.” James had reminded the Danes that they would be “particularlye twiched bothe for Religions cause and thair toll,” the latter always a subject of great interest to them.

James admitted, too, some “privat interest” in the matter. The veiled reference undoubtedly concerned the English succession question. In Denmark he had evidently appealed to the German princes and his wife’s family to support his title to the English throne. The “contreleague” in his eyes had the value of a weapon he might use if he should ever have to fight for his right.<sup>11</sup> He had instructed his ambassadors, “Let your chief travell be that a league (at least defensive yf forder may not be obteaned) be firme-lye promitted in case the king of Spaine continew obstinat, reject the legatioun, geve flat refuse or use shiftes . . . to frustrat the effect thareof.”<sup>12</sup> He invariably emphasized the league, displaying little confidence in the success of the peace overtures. Both, however, promised decided advantages when the great day for decision of the succession

<sup>11</sup> *Cal. Scottish*, 1589–1593, App., Nos. 20, 21, Bowes to Burghley, May 1, 4, 1590; *The Scots Brigade in Holland*, vol. I, James Ferguson, ed. (Scottish History Society, Edinburgh, 1899), 157. Cf. Cotton MSS., Caligula D i, ff. 177–178, article 4 of James’s instructions for his ambassadors going to Denmark, June, 1589.

<sup>12</sup> *Warr. Papers*, II, 140.

question should arrive. Spain at peace with England or Spain cowed by a Protestant League might not push her claim to the throne. Peace on the continent or the more secure status of Protestantism there might bring greater order in Scotland. After all, the intrigues of the Catholic party among the nobility were a potential menace to the King. Finally, his care to inform Elizabeth and to procure her coöperation may argue in him not only a keen sense of the necessity to have her approval for the success of the plan, but also a very real desire to please the Queen and to make smoother the relations between the two countries.

In spite of his high hopes, James was forced to see his pet project die out in the course of the year 1590. In July, Nicholas Kaas, a Danish councillor, wrote graciously of it, but in September the tone of the letters from Denmark was not encouraging. The Danish Council understood that the German princes differed somewhat in their opinions concerning the sending of an embassy to Spain; therefore, the Council had decreed that Denmark should await the result of the common deliberations and not act separately.<sup>13</sup> Maitland confessed that even when he was in Denmark the Council had seemed reluctant to entangle their King in a league.<sup>14</sup>

The reasons for the failure were several. The Danes were more interested in the peace overture than in the league and were slow to commit themselves further. There is some evidence that they sent an embassy to Spain but nothing came of it.<sup>15</sup> Some German princes were not enthusiastic about James's proposals, alleging imperial ties—a convenient fiction—which prevented them from making leagues without the emperor.<sup>16</sup> When James wrote to them recom-

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 142-144; Nat. Lib. Scot., Denmilne MSS., 33. 1. 11, nos. 18, 45, Christian IV and Danish Councillors to Stewart and Skene, Sept. 26, 29, 1590. Cf. *Hat. Cal.*, IV, 54, 72.

<sup>14</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLV, No. 43, Bowes to Burghley, May 9, 1590.

<sup>15</sup> *Warr. Papers*, II, 143n.; S. P. Scotland, XLVII, No. 81, Bowes to Burghley, July 21, 1591.

<sup>16</sup> *Scots Brigade*, I, 142-143, 157.

mending to their consideration Henry IV's envoys who were seeking aid against Spain, they seized on these letters as an excuse and said that they thought the King had discarded his peace project.<sup>16a</sup> The principal reason for the failure lay in the situation in France. Henry IV, having just succeeded to the throne in 1589, had to fight desperately against the Catholic League and Spain before he could enjoy his heritage. It was scarcely a time for peace and James, whose keener interests had always been in the league, must have realized that. He permitted Easter Wemyss to enlist men for service in France,<sup>17</sup> offered to proclaim war against the Leaguers,<sup>18</sup> used his influence to help Henry's envoys when they sought aid in Denmark and Germany,<sup>19</sup> and even offered Henry three thousand Scots in case of need. His wishes far outdistanced his abilities and Henry had the grace not to put the last offer to a test.<sup>20</sup> Henry himself had a project for a European league at heart,<sup>21</sup> but Elizabeth was not eager. She succeeded in getting postponed indefinitely an attempt to renew the old league between France and Scotland.<sup>22</sup> She may have wished to keep James in the background, although obviously he could be of little material assistance to Henry. She was giving the French King some support and could see no advantage in a close general alliance.

James had a definitely Protestant bias in his foreign pol-

<sup>16a</sup> Warr. *Papers*, II, 143n.; S. P. Scotland, XLVII, No. 81, Bowes to Burghley, July 21, 1591.

<sup>17</sup> F. Michel, *Les Écossais en France; Les Français en Écosse* (2 vols., London, 1862), II, 123, 124n. Apparently fifteen hundred Scots were included in the reinforcements sent by Elizabeth to Normandy in October, 1589. See E. P. Cheyney, *A History of England from the Defeat of the Armada to the Death of Elizabeth* (2 vols., New York, 1914-1926), I, 222.

<sup>18</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLVI, No. 58, Bowes to Burghley, Oct. 24, 1590.

<sup>19</sup> Warr. *Papers*, II, 146-148, 152.

<sup>20</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLVI, No. 75, Bowes to Burghley, Dec. 26, 1590; Cotton MSS., Caligula E vii, f. 382, Henry to Beauvoir, Mar. 4, 1591; Warr. *Papers*, II, 153.

<sup>21</sup> Cheyney, I, 216, 231-232.

<sup>22</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLVI, Nos. 37, 42, Bowes to Burghley, Sept. 4, 17, 1590; *Cal. Scottish*, 1589-1593, p. 380.



icy at this time and displayed more enthusiasm abroad against the Catholics than he did at home. His proposal to rattle the sword to impress Philip was made in the interests of self-preservation, as were the peace proposals, which were to precede and, if accepted, render unnecessary the formation of a "contreleague." Nevertheless, the idea of arbitration by neutral countries, however mildly promulgated, was no mean thought; it displayed in this King, who was always concerned with finding a middle course, a certain capacity for handling constructive ideas.

*Relations with the Protestant Low Countries and with France, 1589-1598*

During Henry IV's struggle for the French throne, Elizabeth was forced in her own interest to help him against the Catholic League and Spain. She gave grudgingly—indeed, she gave only because the best way to defend England was to curtail Spanish ambitions on the continent. For a similar reason she had been helping the Dutch since 1585. When once Henry had won Paris "with a mass" and had made his position in France more secure, and when the Dutch seemed to prosper in trade and war, Elizabeth lessened her charitable works. The Queen, being true English, remembered the centuries of hostility between England and France. She may have foreseen the three-cornered struggle of the seventeenth century, when Holland, France, and England were to compete for world dominion. Certainly she had no intention of sending her subjects to death, of pouring out pounds, shillings, and pence abroad, of weakening her kingdom for the sake of nations who could help themselves. England was experiencing hard times. The war created a tremendous drain on the treasury; service abroad was unpopular among men; the year 1596 was one of bad weather and poor crops; and Ireland, egged on by Spanish intrigue, was growing restive. "Charity begins at

home," reasoned the Queen. All English forces in France were withdrawn in 1595. Soon Elizabeth began to remind the Netherlands that they owed her much money. Her dread of Spain overcame these impulses momentarily in 1596 when Calais fell to the enemy. She then formed a triple alliance with France and the United Provinces, but the alliance had little significance. Within two years France and Spain agreed to the peace of Vervins. Much to Elizabeth's disgust, Henry let his allies carry on alone against Spain while he devoted his attention to reconstructing his exhausted kingdom.<sup>23</sup>

Meanwhile, in Scotland, where Elizabeth was trying to educate James in the business of ruling a kingdom and at the same time was making it impossible for him to rule well, she watched jealously his tendency to flirt with nations on the continent. Time after time the Scottish King, bustling with importance over his grandiose schemes for leagues of friendship with Protestant and anti-Spanish countries, sent embassies abroad. Invariably Elizabeth regarded them coldly. She would do nothing to coöperate. Her studied indifference contributed more than anything else to the failure of his plans. James was continually overshadowed by her. She was like a domineering elder sister who wanted no understandings reached between her weak younger brother and outsiders. Her vigilance warded off any alliance of Scotland with France or with the Low Coun-

<sup>23</sup> For the story of Europe in these years and the wearisome negotiations with England, see Cheyney, I, chaps. ix-xiv, xxiv; *ibid.*, II, chaps. xxvii-xxxii, xlii; *Cambridge Modern History*, III, *The Wars of Religion* (1907), 662-668; G. H. Gaillard, "Négotiations de M. de Loménie . . ." and "Négotiations de MM. de Bouillon et de Sancy . . ." in *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la bibliothèque du roi*, published by L'Académie Royale des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres, II (1789), 103 ff. and 115 ff.; *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, Relating to English Affairs, Existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice, and in other Libraries of Northern Italy*, H. F. Brown, ed. (VIII and IX, London, 1894-1897), IX, 1592-1603, pp. 156-157, 182-184, 186-188, 287, 327-328; Du Vair, *Oeuvres* (Paris, 1625), App., p. 46; *Corps Universel Diplomatique du Droit des Gens*, J. Dumont, ed. (8 vols., Amsterdam and The Hague, 1726-1731), Tome V, Pt. I, 525-526, 561-564.

tries, both of whom she considered at best selfish and designing friends.

Scotland was on the whole very friendly to the Estates of the Low Countries. Occasionally disputes arose over fishing rights in the Orkney Islands and in Shetland and over injuries done to individual subjects.<sup>24</sup> James backed Colonel William Stewart of Houston in his efforts to collect from the Estates arrears of pay for the services performed by his company of soldiers, a tedious controversy which lasted for years.<sup>25</sup> Once, when James was angered over Dutch interference with his subjects' trade with Spain, he uttered stinging words about "their new erected republic, which consists only upon rebels and rebellion."<sup>26</sup> Nevertheless, these cases of friction were comparatively rare. The King looked upon the Low Countries as a valuable friend whose help he might enlist in case of necessity.

Shortly after the discovery of the Spanish Blanks, James dispatched Colonel William Stewart to the Estates to inform them of this conspiracy which threatened the "trew religioun" and the interests of all Spain's enemies. The King requested the advice of the Estates and their coöperation in case he found it necessary to use at home the Scots soldiers who were serving in the Netherlands and in case he needed powder and arms. The project for a peace or a Protestant league was revived. The King received friendly replies to his overtures. The Estates agreed that it was more than time for a general alliance, defensive and offensive, of France, England, Scotland, Denmark, and other princes,

<sup>24</sup> *Warr. Papers*, II, 244 and n.; Cotton MSS., Galba D xi, ff. 17-19, instructions for Col. Wm. Stewart, 1595.

<sup>25</sup> *Scots Brigade*, I, 115-119, 121-126, 132-141, 145-147; *Letters of Elizabeth and James*, pp. 160-161; *Cal. Foreign*, 1588, R. B. Wernham, ed. (H. M. Stationery Office, London, 1936), pp. 221-222, 244, 285, 289, 372; *Cal. Scottish*, 1589-1593, p. 426; Cotton MSS., Galba D v, ff. 182-183, Estates to Maitland, Nov. 12, 1590; *ibid.*, ff. 172-173, Estates to James, same date; *ibid.*, ff. 184-194, Estates' answers to Stewart's objections; Cotton MSS., Galba D x, f. 77, agreement between Stewart and the Estates.

<sup>26</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXIV, No. 80, Scottish intelligence, June 8, 1599.

estates, and republics against Spain. They seemed willing to concur and suggested that it was expedient for James, the originator of the scheme, to proceed with it.<sup>27</sup>

The domestic troubles caused by Bothwell, kirk, and Catholic lords busied the King for the time, but the baptism of the young Scottish prince in August, 1594, afforded an excellent opportunity to discuss the league once more. James sent ambassadors to England, France, Denmark, the Low Countries, and to certain German princes to announce the birth of an heir and to extend invitations for the baptism.<sup>28</sup> He urged upon Elizabeth the advantage of working out the details of the league when so many foreign representatives would be conveniently gathered together in Scotland.<sup>29</sup> Again the proposal was doomed to failure. Only the Dutch envoys came prepared to discuss seriously the "contreleague" with the King and his Council and the other ambassadors. Since the other ambassadors were not commissioned to deal in it, little progress could be made. Henry IV was not even represented at the baptism. Even James lost interest, being busy with preparations for his final expedition against the Catholic Earls. Elizabeth displayed no enthusiasm whatsoever for the project. No doubt, had she wished it, something could have been accomplished. The Dutch said that their masters were favorable to the plan, "provided that it was carried out along with others, with the goodwill of the Queen of England, with whom for her sake they were ready to come into closer communication under the oversight of other Kings and princes. . . ." But Elizabeth did nothing to help.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>27</sup> Cotton MSS., Galba D x, f. 26, Stewart's letter of credit, Feb. 16, 1593; *ibid.*, ff. 24-25, copy, instructions for Stewart; *ibid.*, ff. 74-76, copy, answer of the Estates General to Stewart's propositions, July 7, 1593; *Scots Brigade*, I, 142-143; *Warr. Papers*, II, 215-220.

<sup>28</sup> *Warr. Papers*, II, pp. 232-245.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 253-254, 257.

<sup>30</sup> For these negotiations at the baptism of the prince, see *Scots Brigade*, I, 154-174, where a précis of the detailed report prepared by the Dutch ambassadors is printed.



The Queen's mistrust was due to several reasons. When the Dutch ambassadors visited her on their return from Scotland, they found her jealous of the Estates. She spoke of the aid which they had sent to France and implied that they no longer needed any assistance from her. She suspected that James had tried to wheedle some substantial help from the Estates and from the German princes.<sup>31</sup> Although she was probably unaware of the detailed instructions James had drawn up for Mr. Peter Young, whom he sent to Denmark and Germany in April, 1594, Elizabeth knew perfectly well that the King was furious with her about Bothwell. James had, in fact, told Young to reveal to the princes the many injuries he had suffered because of English intrigues with Bothwell and to solicit aid in the form of diplomacy, men, ships, and artillery in case England should trouble him further. Young was authorized to negotiate a loan from Denmark and the German princes and to deposit it at interest in France for use in case of necessity at Elizabeth's death.<sup>32</sup> Elizabeth might well question the advantage of a league which would include Scotland, Denmark, German princes, and others. Although it was obvious that the German princes and Denmark were not interested and that James could do little with France or the Low Countries without her sanction, her relations with the King were at the time too hostile to lead her to strengthen his hands needlessly. By ignoring the league proposals she isolated Scotland and kept that country dependent upon her. Confronted with the rising success of France and the Low Countries, she preferred not to see a combination of these two countries with Scotland.

Several months later another incident showed very clearly her attitude toward both the Netherlands and Scotland. In the beginning of 1595 the Queen sent Mr. Thomas

<sup>31</sup> *Scots Brigade*, I, 172-173.

<sup>32</sup> *Warr. Papers*, II, 42-44, 48.

Bodley to the United Provinces to begin negotiations for relieving Her Majesty of part of the expenses she was incurring by garrisoning Flushing and Brill and by maintaining auxiliary forces in the field. In view of their increased territory, growing commerce, and more secure position, she felt justified in demanding some payment on the debt owed her and some lessening of her immediate expenses. The recent aid sent by the Estates to France, she argued, proved that the Estates could pay. Needless to say, the Estates objected, protested their inability, and excused the aid to Henry IV as an expedient to divert Spain and prevent a Franco-Spanish peace. Conferences, secret proposals, counter-proposals, and long arguments ensued. Bodley worked on the matter for more than a year. No settlement was reached until 1598.<sup>33</sup>

It was rather unfortunate from James's point of view that he had chosen to send Colonel William Stewart to the Estates at the very time [1595] when Bodley was bringing pressure to bear on them. The one positive result of the Dutch embassy to Scotland at the time of the baptism had been the renewal of the treaty of Bins, made in 1550 between Scotland and the Emperor Charles V, which was now confirmed as between Scotland and the Estates of the United Provinces. Its provisions were general ones touching peace, mutual assistance in case of attack, provided the aggressor were not allied by treaty or "Parentage" to the country not attacked, and arrangements concerning piracy, reprisals, and fishing rights.<sup>34</sup> Stewart was to bring back the final confirmation of this treaty under the great seal of the Estates but this part of his errand was the least important. The burden of his commission was to recount to the Estates the danger from the Spanish party in Scot-

<sup>33</sup> Lansdowne MSS., 817, ff. 145-154, "Mr. Thomas Bodely his relation of his employments into the United Provinces of the Low Countries"; Birch, *Memoirs, ad indices* under Bodley; Cheyney, II, 117.

<sup>34</sup> Dumont, IV, Pt. III, 10 ff.

land and to request their advice and assistance.<sup>35</sup> Stewart visited Bodley at The Hague and told him in general terms of his errand. He excused James's action, saying, "since his majesty cannot be supported by the queen of England, by whom he saw his estate but slenderly regarded, to whom should he seek but the people of these provinces?"<sup>36</sup> From another source Bodley learned that Stewart was seeking money to employ a thousand foot and five hundred horse for six months or, if the Estates were hard pressed, three months' entertainment immediately and the rest paid later.<sup>37</sup>

The Estates were somewhat puzzled to know how to answer Stewart. They told Bodley that "they [the Estates] for themselves were nothing well instructed of the state of that king, nor of those proceedings of his rebels: But if it were so as those writings imported, and they should farther understand by the colonel's relation, there was great reason offered to move her majesty and them, and as many, as were embarked in this cause together, to heed it in good season, and to afford the king a round assistance."<sup>38</sup> Acting on Bodley's suggestion, they wrote to Elizabeth for advice. The Queen grudgingly answered that she "would well like thereof to have the King gratified" if he still desired succor, but since the Catholic Earls had made terms with him, she saw no cause for him to raise more troops.<sup>39</sup> Stewart was kept waiting for several months and finally

<sup>35</sup> Cotton MSS., Galba D xi, ff. 17-19, copy in French of Stewart's instructions [Jan., 1595]; *ibid.*, ff. 37-38, English copy of the same; S. P. Scotland, LV, No. 33, another copy.

<sup>36</sup> Birch, *Memoirs*, I, 207; Cotton MSS., Galba D xi, ff. 29-30, Bodley to Burghley, no date.

<sup>37</sup> Birch, *Memoirs*, I, 209, 219. Cotton MSS., Galba D xi, f. 40 is a paper outlining these detailed requests from James to the Estates, dated Mar. 13, 1595, with the name Colonel William Stewart below. It is apparently a copy.

<sup>38</sup> Birch, *Memoirs*, I, 211. Bodley's letters describing Stewart's errand are in Birch, *Memoirs*, I, 204-233, *passim*, and in *Hat. Cal.*, V, *ad indices*. Several are preserved in Cotton MSS., Galba D xi.

<sup>39</sup> State Papers, Holland, L, minute, [Burghley or Cecil] to Bodley, Mar. 22, 1595.

received his answer on May 6 (N.S.), 1595—a polite refusal of any money on the grounds that heavy war expenses, the recent flood, and other occasions had burdened the Estates and a suggestion that the best means of withstanding Spain was a general alliance, which it was expedient for James to initiate by dealing with England.<sup>40</sup> Undoubtedly the perception of the Queen's disapproval partly influenced the Estates to give a negative reply. It would have been hard to parry Elizabeth's demands if they were to show generosity to both Henry IV and James.

James blamed the English government for the failure of Stewart's embassy,<sup>41</sup> although there is some evidence that the Colonel's path was blocked not only by Bodley but also by several of his own countrymen who were in the Low Countries at the time.<sup>42</sup> Stewart obtained only a confirmation of the old treaty and a license to transport arms and armor to Scotland.<sup>43</sup> His negotiation in itself was unimportant but it illustrates aptly the influence of England on James's foreign affairs. Sir William Keith might write that the States "in their hearts make no comparison, but love us far better than you [the English]; and, except as wise men upon necessities, they will kaith it in time and place. . . ." <sup>44</sup> Nevertheless, for the time, Elizabeth was mistress of the situation. The Estates had no intention of

<sup>40</sup> Cotton MSS., Galba D xi, ff. 90–92, copy of the answer to Stewart's propositions. Birch, *Memoirs*, I, 233 supplies the date.

<sup>41</sup> S. P. Scotland, LVIII, No. 23, Bowes to Burghley, Feb. 24, 1596.

<sup>42</sup> Bodley congratulated himself in a letter to Essex upon having "dashed this Designe . . . and peradventure sundrie more that depended upon it . . ." (*A Collection of State Papers Relating to Affairs in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth From the Year 1571 to 1596*, W. Murdin, ed., London, 1759, p. 684). Colonel Murray and Robert Denniston, Conservator of the Scottish nation, stationed at Camphvere—who was employed by James as ambassador lieger to the Estates—worked to prevent Stewart's success. Murray said that Maitland counseled this embassy to force Elizabeth to grant the King money and intimated that the money, if obtained, would only find its way into the pockets of courtiers about the King (Birch, *Memoirs*, I, 209, 217).

<sup>43</sup> Cotton MSS., Galba D xi, ff. 90–92; *Scots Brigade*, I, 175–176.

<sup>44</sup> Birch, *Memoirs*, I, 228.



jeopardizing present aid for James's sake. They thought, perhaps, that they could conciliate him easily enough when and if he came to the English throne. The license to transport armor was an indication of their friendship and at that things must rest.

During these years France displayed an attitude of reticent friendship toward Scotland. Henry IV appealed to James in 1590 and received prompt avowals of the Scottish King's good will. James gallantly said that Henry "may count upon the whole of our forces, means or credit for the advancement of this most just and holy war. . . ." He urged Denmark and the German princes to help the French King <sup>45</sup> and offered three thousand Scots to be sent upon Henry's demand. Henry thanked him, but it was a letter "*que n'est que pour le remercier sans refuser ny accepter.*" <sup>46</sup> James was told politely that the French King meant to reserve the Scots as a last resource, but that the offer came at a most opportune moment. <sup>47</sup> Except for Scottish mercenaries, such as those serving in English pay in France under Easter Wemyss and possibly some members of the Scots Guards in France, <sup>48</sup> there is little evidence that James supplied any troops for Henry. <sup>49</sup> His chronic poverty made

<sup>45</sup> Warr. Papers, II, 146-154, and Add. MSS., 19401, ff. 145, 151-152, letters of James, Turenne, and Morlans [Dec.], 1590-July, 1591.

<sup>46</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLVI, No. 75, Bowes to Burghley, Dec. 26, 1590; Cotton MSS., Caligula E vii, f. 382, copy, Henry to M. Beauvoir, his ambassador in England, Mar. 4 (N.S.), [1591]; Villeroi, *Memoires d'Estat* (4 vols., Sedan and Paris, 1622-1623), III, 1-3, Henry to James, undated.

<sup>47</sup> Warr. Papers, II, 153.

<sup>48</sup> Wm. Forbes-Leith, *The Scots Men-at-arms and Life-Guards in France* . . . (2 vols., Edinburgh, 1882), I, 107-111; Michel, II, 123-125n. In 1612 about two-thirds of the Scots Guards were French. See Ralph Winwood, *Memorials of Affairs of State in the Reigns of Q. Elizabeth and K. James I* . . . (3 vols., London, 1725), III, 359.

<sup>49</sup> There is a vague reference to some Scots apparently serving in France in 1595, but no definite place is mentioned in the letter (S. P. France, XXXVI, Thos. Jeoffry to Lord Cobham, Sept. 26, 1595). M. de la Fontaine mentioned Scots sent from Holland who were in Monstreuil (P. R. O., Fr. Trans., Bdl. 29, f. 43, M. de la Fontaine to M. de Loménie, Oct. 29, 1595). These were probably paid by France or by the Low Countries.

his coöperation a matter of good will rather than deeds.

In 1590 there had been some suggestion of a Franco-Scottish league, which England had skilfully discouraged.<sup>50</sup> The matter was thrust into the background for several years, only to be brought out again at the time of the baptism of the Scottish prince in 1594. Colville of Easter Wemyss, the bearer of the formal invitation to Henry to be represented at that ceremony, had instructions to suggest the renewal of the old alliance between France and Scotland "with additioun of quhat forder shalbe thought necessare to be capitulated." He was also to investigate the conditions of Mary's revenues and debts in France, to obtain redress for the losses suffered by Scottish merchants there, and to get restored to the aged Archbishop of Glasgow, Mary's former ambassador, the revenues of which he had been deprived.<sup>51</sup>

Henry affably agreed to the latter two requests and issued a declaration confirming the privileges granted to Scots in France in the time of his predecessors, especially in the time of Henry II.<sup>52</sup> He found it impossible to assist at the baptism. He wrote in September to excuse this breach of etiquette, alleging that he had been too busy in Picardy to attend to the matter. According to Edmondes, the English resident in France, the truth was that Henry had no money to fulfil this social obligation.<sup>53</sup>

Although nothing much seems to have been accomplished by Easter Wemyss on this errand, Elizabeth was

<sup>50</sup> *Cal. Scottish*, 1589-1593, p. 380; S. P. Scotland, XLVI, Nos. 37, 42, Bowes to Burghley, Sept. 4, 17, 1590.

<sup>51</sup> *Warr. Papers*, II, 237-240.

<sup>52</sup> Cotton MSS., Caligula E ix, f. 266, copy, Henry to James, Sept., 1594, printed in *Recueil des Lettres Missives de Henri IV*, Berger de Xivrey and J. Guadet, eds. (9 vols., Paris, 1843-1876), IV, 218-221. Copies of the confirmation of privileges are in the Cotton MSS., Caligula E ix, f. 267, dated Oct. 26, 1594, and in S. P. Scotland, LIV, No. 49, Sept. 26, 1594, and *ibid.*, No. 50, endorsed Oct. 26, 1594. See also *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, 216-217.

<sup>53</sup> *Edmondes Papers*, G. G. Butler, ed. (Roxburghe Club, London, 1913), p. 163.

very suspicious of it. When the ambassador returned through England, early in 1595, she spoke sharply to him for having concealed from her some points of his commission.<sup>54</sup> Burghley reprimanded Edmondes for his failure to report fully on the Scottish ambassador's activities.

I marvel that you could never come to the understanding of a secret treaty that hath been there during the time of the L. of "Wemmes" being there by the means of the B. of "Glasco," who is now known to be the King of Scots ordinary ambassador there, who hath treated and concluded of the renovation of an ancient league between France and Scotland and hath yielded to these points hereafter following: first, that the Prince of Scotland, the King's son, shall have a great pension and a band of men-at-arms in France; likewise, that there shall be a complete guard of Scottishmen about the King's person, as in ancient time hath been; and that also the Prince shall have hereafterwards a seignory in Xantoigne, and all Scottish people shall be free to traffic by sea and land in France without paying any more customs than in ancient times they were wont to do, a matter very beneficial to all the nation and hurtful to our merchants. . . .<sup>55</sup>

Edmondes, in reply, said that Wemyss had been neglected in France and had accomplished little.<sup>56</sup> He could not get the exemption from new customs which the Scottish merchants wished,<sup>57</sup> Glasgow was not established as

<sup>54</sup> *Hat. Cal.*, V, 97-98.

<sup>55</sup> B. M., Stowe MSS., 166, ff. 193-194, Jan. 23, 1595, printed in *Edmondes Papers*, p. 210, and in Thos. Birch, *An Historical View of the Negotiations Between the Courts of England, France, and Brussels, From the Year 1592 to 1617* . . . (London, 1749), pp. 18-19.

<sup>56</sup> *Edmondes Papers*, pp. 212-214. Cf. Birch, *Historical View*, pp. 19-20.

<sup>57</sup> Under Francis I and Henry II, Scots merchants had obtained a definite declaration of their exemption from new imposts (T. Moncrieff, "Memoirs concerning the Ancient Alliance between the French and Scots . . ." in *Miscellanea Scotica*, IV, Glasgow, 1819, pp. 49-53). It seems that the intention was to include this privilege in the 1594 general confirmation of the privileges granted to Scots by former kings (*Reg.*

the King's ambassador,<sup>58</sup> and no pension or lands had been granted. The net result was merely the confirmation of the old alliance, the declaration of Henry's intention to maintain a company of men-at-arms in the name of James or of his son,<sup>59</sup> the assurance of freedom of trade to Scots, and their exemption from "aubaine," the right of the lord justiciar of a bailiwick, liberty, or manor to certain dues from the possessions of foreigners who died within his jurisdiction.<sup>60</sup>

Edmondes was correct in his estimate of the embassy. Some of the items treated were insignificant. To other more important ones Henry replied with fine words. Scottish merchants continued to struggle for exemption from customs and no closer friendship was established between France and Scotland. Henry could not afford to lose Elizabeth by flirting with the Scottish King. He answered James's courtesies in kind but went no further. Elizabeth's power was sufficient to curtail James's endeavors in foreign affairs.

From 1595 until the peace of Vervins, in 1598, there was little communication between France and Scotland. Henry spoke of sending an ambassador shortly after the baptism and one young Frenchman, a relative of James, volunteered to go at his own expense. Apparently, neither he nor any other agent went.<sup>61</sup> There were similar vague intentions in

*P. C. Scot.*, V, 217), but the merchants seem not to have succeeded in realizing it. They were still troubled about it in 1597 (*Warr. Papers*, II, 350 and n.), and in 1599 Henry IV issued a specific confirmation of merchants' exemptions as in the time of Francis I and Henry II (*Moncrieff, op. cit.*, pp. 53-57).

<sup>58</sup> See Appendix I to this chapter.

<sup>59</sup> There were apparently two military units under the name of Scots in France from the early fifteenth century well through the sixteenth: a company which formed part of the King's Guard and a company of men-at-arms. The Guards apparently had a continuous existence but the company of men-at-arms lapsed during the period of the civil wars. Although Henry IV in Sept. 1594, signified his intention to erect the latter again in the name of the young Scottish prince (*Lettres Missives*, IV, 218-221), it seems not to have been accomplished for ten more years (*Forbes-Leith*, I, pp. 12-13, 32, 55, 106-108).

<sup>60</sup> *Edmondes Papers*, 213n.

<sup>61</sup> *Lettres Missives*, IV, 218-221; *Edmondes Papers*, pp. 212-214.



Scotland of sending ambassadors to Henry, none of them fulfilled. It is significant that these projected embassies from Scotland usually linked renewal of ancient treaties with troublesome efforts to obtain for James what was due from Mary's income and requests for exemptions from imposts.<sup>62</sup> While it was to the advantage of both France and Scotland to exclude a Spaniard from the English throne, D'Ossat, Henry's adviser in Rome, pointed out that it was not to the best interests of France that Britain should be united under James.<sup>63</sup> The future was to confirm his opinion.

In the negotiations for the triple alliance of 1596 Scotland had been snubbed to the extent of not even being mentioned specifically in the general clause of the Anglo-French pact which provided for the invitation of other Christian princes and states to act with the signatories against Spain.<sup>64</sup> The pact between the Netherlands and France stated explicitly that Scotland should be invited to join as soon as possible.<sup>65</sup> During the tiresome preliminaries to the treaty Elizabeth let it be known that she thought only those should be asked to join who could render material assistance.<sup>66</sup> Scotland could scarcely do so. Moreover, it was quite unlikely that the Queen had changed her mind as to the advantage of a close alliance between James and her allies. Not until September did she inform James of the treaty which had been concluded in May and had

<sup>62</sup> S. P. Scotland, LVIII, Nos. 44, 94, and LX, Nos. 44, 48, Bowes to Burghley, Mar. 26, June 2, 1596 and Mar. 9, 21, 1597; *ibid.*, LXI, No. 16, Aston to Sir Robert Cecil, July 21, 1597; *Warr. Papers*, II, 350n.; *Records of the Convention of the Royal Burghs of Scotland*, J. D. Marwick, ed. (I and II, Edinburgh, 1870), I, 482, 493, 498.

<sup>63</sup> Birch, *Historical View*, pp. 38-43. Cf. *Cal. Domestic*, 1595-1597, Mary Anne Everett Green, ed. (London, 1869), p. 494 and *Correspondance d'Ottavio Mirto Frangipani (1596-1606)* (2 vols. have appeared, Rome, Brussels, Paris, 1924-1932), I, 301.

<sup>64</sup> Dumont, V, Pt. I, p. 525.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 538.

<sup>66</sup> S. P. Foreign, Treaty Papers, Bdl. 8, negotiations between the English Privy Council and the French ambassadors, May, 1596.

been formally sworn to at the end of August.<sup>67</sup> She excused her failure to consult him in these terms:

. . . when we considered that no greater bands of amity nor stricter laws of friendship could ever be made between the King our brother and us than already remaineth in force, we did forbear to trouble the King at this present with this new treaty because we know not how he was affected to be further charged or bound with the French King than already he is by former treaties; neither could we well tell how far he was disposed to enlarge or abbreviate his former bands of amity with France. . . .

Of this we pray you [Bowes] inform the King as the person with whom we first begin to communicate this late action and whom we shall ever hold in the foremost rank of our dearest brethren and friends. . . .<sup>68</sup>

James had reason to be displeased. He and the French King had been elected simultaneously to the Garter in 1590,<sup>69</sup> although neither had been formally invested with it. Elizabeth sent the Earl of Shrewsbury to Henry in September, 1596, with the Garter but made no similar courteous gesture to James. James was not one to let the slight pass unnoticed.<sup>70</sup> The reports on the treaty negotiations, written by his agent Foulis, who was in London during the summer of 1596, must have aroused his anger. Foulis told him:

<sup>67</sup> Cheyney, II, chap. xxxii.

<sup>68</sup> S. P. Scotland, LII, pp. 135-138, copy, Elizabeth to Bowes, Sept. 12, 1596.

<sup>69</sup> *The Book of Dignities*, J. Haydn, ed. (London, 1894), p. 739.

<sup>70</sup> S. P. Scotland, LIX, No. 44, Bowes to Elizabeth, Sept. 23, 1596. James, in talking to Bowes, had said that he knew of the league and of the sending of the Garter to Henry, "wherein," wrote Bowes, "his desire for the Garter and his hope to get and enjoy it after the delivery of it to the French King sufficiently 'brast' forth and appeared." James was never actually invested with it. By his accession he became head of the Order.

Some dissuasion hath been made to invite your Majesty and the King's Majesty of Denmark. Whether it be done to obscure your name and to set your expectation light in the eyes of the world, or not, I will not judge, but it hath been alleged that your Majesty may be hereafter easily brought in to join, per accidens, as it were, in respect of others' proceeding, and not per se as these that will be only called the chief members. . . .<sup>71</sup>

Yet the Scottish King, when informed officially by the English ambassador of this new league, made a dignified reply. He said that he had expected to be informed before the conclusion of it, pointed to his former efforts to create a similar alliance in 1590 and after, and referred to his offers to serve Elizabeth personally, although he had "the dignity to be a king and a monarch of a kingdom, as other kings have." He concluded, however, with frank offers to be ready to join, "wishing to understand timely your Majesty's further advice and pleasure for his entrance into other confederacy and league with your Majesty, the French King, or any other prince."<sup>72</sup>

Nothing more was done to include Scotland in the league. Possibly James was satisfied to let matters rest. He had declared his friendly feelings to Spain's enemies; further activities might have embroiled him too deeply in the struggle on the continent which was as yet undecided. The Scottish King's strength lay in his weakness. His poverty and lack of real authority in Scotland made him of little immediate value to either side. Deprived by Elizabeth of the opportunity to join the league against Spain, he could take comfort in the thought that he was, after all, not forced to make a definite choice. It will be shown in the following chapters that the years from 1595 to 1597 witnessed stern measures by him against the kirk of Scotland, increased influence of Catholics in his government, and serious dis-

<sup>71</sup> *Hat. Cal.*, VI, 372, Doul [Foulis] to James, Sept. 7, 1596.

<sup>72</sup> S. P. Scotland, LIX, No. 44, Bowes to Elizabeth, Sept. 23, 1596.

agreements with England. Mysterious incidents were constantly occurring which linked his name with "practices" in Rome, Spain, and Brussels. Although it is impossible to decide upon the extent of his complicity, the fact that such episodes occurred shows how readily he could be considered even then an ally of the Catholic powers.

### *Catholic Opinion in Europe*

The task which confronted Pope Clement VIII was far more difficult than any that confronted the temporal monarchs of Europe. As Supreme Pontiff, his highest duty was to protect the Roman Catholic faith and to restore it to its old position of prestige in western Europe. In concrete terms this meant three things. On the eastern frontier the infidel Turks had to be held in check, since it seemed impossible to dislodge them from Europe. In the north those nations or groups which were less than nations who adhered stubbornly to the Protestant faith had to be brought back to the arms of the Church or, if that should prove impossible, the Church was obliged at least to prevent any further defections and to weaken the heretics. Lastly, Clement had to defend the honor of his office, the traditional independence of the Vicar of Christ. For many years Spain had tried to dominate the papacy. France also attempted to make it her satellite. Clement determined to remain independent of both. His difficulties were many.<sup>73</sup>

There were two methods of realizing the ardent Catholic ambition of restoring England to Catholicism, the use of force or the exercise of peaceful persuasion. A watchful government and Elizabeth's popularity made it difficult to organize rebellion in England. Spanish force had failed in 1588, and it was certain that France, under Henry IV, would never help but rather hinder another attempt by

<sup>73</sup> Ludwig Pastor, *The History of the Popes from the close of the Middle Ages*, English edition, R. F. Kerr, ed., XXIII, XXIV (London, 1933), *passim*. Cf. *Cal. Venetian*, 1592-1603, p. 200.



Spain. The authority of the Pope alone was insufficient; and yet, if Clement should enlist either France or Spain to act with him, he would alienate the one not enlisted and would surrender to some extent his own highly prized independence. Clement fully realized the strength of England and the condition of Catholic Europe, weakened by war and civil strife. He therefore turned to consider the method of peaceful persuasion. He continued the policy which one of his famous predecessors, Sixtus V, had begun after 1588. Cardinal Allen acted as protector to English Protestants in Rome. Papal passports were actually issued to English vessels in the Mediterranean.<sup>74</sup> Most important of all, the Pope heard thoughtfully the rumors that James of Scotland, most likely successor to the English throne, might yet be won to the Catholic faith.<sup>75</sup>

During the last decade of the sixteenth century, dissensions among the ranks of loyal Catholics weakened the force of the Counter-Reformation. The Jesuits, whose rigid training and disciplined energy made them its most capable instrument, aroused the jealousy of many. When certain prominent Jesuits, in particular, Father Robert Parsons, identified their interests with Spain and appeared to use their influence to further Spanish ambitions, they met with the opposition of such English Catholic exiles as Charles Paget and Thomas Morgan in Flanders. The latter were ably supported by the faction in Rome which hated Spain.<sup>76</sup> Clement found himself listening to the arguments of ardent Catholics who said Spain alone could win back England

<sup>74</sup> A. O. Meyer, *England and the Catholic Church under Queen Elizabeth* (trans. into English by J. R. McKee, London, 1916), pp. 358-365. For an instance of papal protection to English ships carrying alum, see P. R. O., Rom. Trans., Bdl. 84a, Aldobrandino to the nuncio in Spain, Oct. 27, 1592.

<sup>75</sup> A. O. Meyer, "Clemens VIII und Jakob I von England" in *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken*, VII (1904), 268-298.

<sup>76</sup> J. H. Pollen, "The Politics of the English Catholics during the Reign of Queen Elizabeth," Pt. VI, "After the Armada," *The Month*, C (1902), 181-182; Meyer, *Eng. and the Cath. Church*, pp. 380-395, 401.

and to the arguments of equally zealous Catholics who almost seemed to prefer that England remain heretic rather than be ruled by Spain.

Father Robert Parsons, an English Jesuit who founded a college in Spain to train priests for the English mission, was the most able expounder of the case for Spain. In 1594 appeared a book, entitled *A conference about the next Succession to the crowne of ingland . . .*, a political pamphlet which claimed to set forth impartially the grounds upon which all rivals contested for the English throne. According to the title page, the author was R. Doleman, but this was commonly thought to be a pseudonym of Parsons.<sup>77</sup> The most valuable part of the book was that in which the author outlined his theory of government. It was characteristic of the sixteenth century that "Doleman" should cite democratic principles to support his case on behalf of the most autocratic monarchy Europe had known. The authority of a prince, he wrote, was not absolute but delegated apparently by the people; subjects might break their oaths of obedience if it was for the "weale publique" or if the prince broke his coronation oath. In choosing a ruler, although the principle of heredity was useful and important, three qualifications were essential. The ruler should be religious, should dispense justice, and should be able to defend the country. Of the three, the first was the most important. ". . . the highest and chieftest end of euery common vvealth, is *Cultus Dei*, the seruice of God, and religion. . . ." ". . . for any man to giue his helpe, consent or assistance towards the making of a king, whom he iudgeth or beleueth to be faultie in religion, & consequently would aduance either no religion, or the wrong . . . is a most greuous and damnable sinne to him that doth it. . . ." <sup>78</sup> Whatever its claim of impartiality, the book was obviously propaganda for the Infanta, whose religion was

<sup>77</sup> See Appendix II to this chapter.

<sup>78</sup> Doleman, *Conference*, Pt. I, pp. 76, 131, 196, 201-207, 216.

above reproach in the author's eye, and who might be expected to have the backing of all Spain's resources for the conquest of England.

The *Conference* immediately aroused resentment from the anti-Spanish Catholic party. Even before its appearance, the General of the Society of Jesus had written to Parsons to try to suppress it. Aquaviva feared the hostility it would create. His warning came too late.<sup>79</sup> In Flanders Paget and Gifford raged against the *Conference* and used their influence with Malvasia, the papal representative in Brussels, to write a hostile account of it to Rome.<sup>80</sup> Even within the Society of Jesus it caused controversy. The Scottish Jesuit Crichton, outraged that his monarch's claim should be thus prejudiced, attacked Parsons for publishing a book which only stirred up evil and did no good. Curtly he quoted, "*leporem non esse capiendum tympano.*" Parsons was unmoved.<sup>81</sup>

Meanwhile, Clement heard other arguments from the anti-Spanish Catholic group. The Cardinal Secretary Aldobrandino, who was Clement's nephew, had requested Malvasia to report on the Scottish situation. Malvasia sent a long reply.<sup>82</sup> He dismissed briefly the chimera that Scotland could be won by force. Most Scottish Catholics he considered "tepid" and untrustworthy. Angus, Huntly, and Errol were willing but for the moment disabled. It was best, therefore, to use a conciliatory policy with James, who had already shown his kindly disposition to Catholics by refusing to enforce the penal laws against them, by listen-

<sup>79</sup> J. H. Pollen, "The Question of Queen Elizabeth's Successor," *The Month*, CI (1903), p. 524.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 525; *Hat. Cal.*, VI, 511-513. For a sample of Gifford's eloquence against the book, see P. R. O., Rom. Trans., Bdl. 85, Nov. 17, 1595.

<sup>81</sup> Pollen, *op. cit.*, p. 528; *The Letters and Memorials of William, Cardinal Allen (1532-1594)*, T. F. Knox, ed. (London, 1882), pp. 381-386. Years later Parsons wrote in defence of the book, alleging that it was in no way intended to prejudice James's claim. See copies of his letters, S. P. Scotland, LXVI, No. 4, and Cotton MSS., Julius F vi, ff. 148-150.

<sup>82</sup> Printed in Bellesheim, III, App. viii, 460-473.

ing to disputations between priests and Protestant preachers, and by employing some Catholics in high offices of state. Malvasia calmly acknowledged that James was "by common consent, the most legitimate aspirant and the nearest in succession to the English crown." The papal agent argued that the King could count on no loyal support to win England except from his nobility, most of whom were at heart Catholic and all of whom hated the Presbyterian preachers. It would be best, therefore, for James to declare himself Catholic. Even the English would prefer Romanism to the narrow ideas of Presbyterianism. Since James suspected Philip's designs on England, it was the Pope's task to win the King. Malvasia proposed several methods. Huntly and Errol were soon to be recalled to Scotland, Father Gordon might be sent, and an annual pension would do wonders. Huntly had suggested a threat of excommunication from the Pope, a thing James greatly feared lest it deprive him of Catholic support in England. Lastly, Malvasia recommended excluding Jesuits from all state affairs in England and Scotland. The enemies of the Jesuits were well disposed to James, they desired the union of England and Scotland, and they hated Spanish dominance.

Information about the King of Scots was available from another source. John Ogilvy of Poury, a Scottish gentleman who could not resist an opportunity for intrigue, appeared in Rome about the end of 1596, claiming to bear James's requests to the Pope for money, confirmation of his title to England, excommunication of all English who opposed him, support against Spain, and a cardinalate for the Bishop of Cassano, recognized leader of the Scottish party among the Catholics on the continent. Ogilvy's journey had been a long one. He had dealt in Brussels with the anti-Spanish group, Malvasia, Gifford, Paget, and their friends, and with Stephen d'Ibarra, principal representative of Philip of Spain in the Low Countries at that time. He had then visited Venice, Milan, and Florence and had



come at last to Rome, where he communicated both with the Spanish ambassador, the Duke of Sessa, and with the Cardinal Secretary, Aldobrandino. The burden of his errand was to obtain for the King of Scots whatever Catholic support he could for the succession to the English throne and to suggest James's inclination to the Catholic religion.<sup>83</sup>

Ogilvy's capacity for double-dealing was fatal to him. In Flanders he conferred with Ibarra concerning the delivery of the Scottish prince into Spanish custody and the transfer of certain Scottish fortresses to Philip. In Rome he told Sessa that he doubted James's sincerity in hinting at his possible conversion to Catholicism. Sessa persuaded him to go to Madrid, where he proposed a league between James and Philip against Elizabeth. In Spain the opposition of John Cecil, an English priest who spied on him, and the evidence against him brought by Ibarra caused his imprisonment until 1598.<sup>84</sup>

The real interest of Ogilvy's journey lies in the question

<sup>83</sup> Ogilvy's story is told at length in the Introduction and documents printed by T. G. Law in vol. I of the *Miscellany of the Scottish History Society* (Edinburgh, 1893), pp. 1-70, under the title "Documents Illustrating Catholic Policy in the Reign of James VI." See also S. P. Scotland, LVIII, Nos. 81, 82, and Cotton MSS., Caligula B viii, ff. 202-203, petitions to be presented to the Pope; S. P. Scotland, LVIII, No. 83, arguments to show James's Catholic inclinations; Nat. Lib. Scot., Balcarres MSS., vi, nos. 92-94 incl. and 96-103 incl., and S. P. Scotland, LIX, No. 6, incls. I and II, copies of Sessa's reports to Madrid; Birch, *Memoirs*, I, 408-420; *Cal. Domestic*, 1595-1597, pp. 55-56; S. P. France, XXXVI, Edmondes to Burghley, Dec. 20, 1595, copy in Stowe MSS., 166, ff. 289-290, printed in Birch, *Historical View*, pp. 36-38, and in *Edmondes Papers*, pp. 289-293.

<sup>84</sup> Some controversial literature over the sincerity of the King of Scots arose from this incident. Father Crichton wrote an "Apologie" in defence of James which is printed by Law in *Scot. Hist. Soc. Misc.*, I, 41-64; Cecil replied in *A Discoverye of the Errors Committed and Inivryes don to his Ma: off Scotlande and Nobilitye off the same realme, and Iohn Cecyll Pryest and D. off diuinitye, by a malicious Mythologie titled an Apologie, and compiled by VVILLIAM CRITON Pryest and professed Iesuite, vvhose habite and behavioure, vvhose cote and conditions, are as sutable, as ESAV his handes, and Iacob his voice*. The latter, of which a unique copy of the original edition is preserved in the British Museum, is reprinted in the Appendix of J. R. Elder's *Spanish Influences in Scottish History* (Glasgow, 1920).

whether he was a *bona-fide* agent of the Scottish King. On available evidence it is impossible to decide. We have little more than his own untrustworthy statement that he had James's commission, a statement which he denied years later.<sup>85</sup> Seals and signatures were easily counterfeited; letters could be procured by fraud. Ogilvy was a poor hand at intrigue, a person scarcely to be trusted if James had in mind a serious mission to the Pope. The Scottish King constantly denied any responsibility for him, yet acknowledged to Bowes that he had received news from the Low Countries by means of Ogilvy and had requested him to continue his advertisements.<sup>86</sup> Professor Mackie has pointed out the fact that James often employed as agents abroad men whom he could easily repudiate or whose indiscretions were likely to be so foolish that serious-minded persons would never hold the King responsible.<sup>87</sup> Whatever Ogilvy's authority, his presence on the continent stressed the fact that James could be considered a Catholic candidate for the English throne.

Clement, of course, took no action on these suggestions. He had in 1594 sent to the Catholic Earls money which had done no good.<sup>88</sup> He must have been skeptical about James's Catholic convictions. He well knew that nothing could be done at the moment. In the negotiations leading up to the peace of Vervins in 1598, he seemed to discountenance James's claim to England.<sup>89</sup> Nevertheless, he was still cautiously watching events. He refused to alienate France and raise Spanish prestige by recognizing the In-

<sup>85</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVII, No. 70, copy, Poury Ogilvy to James, 1601.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, LIX, Nos. 19, 20, Bowes to Cecil and to Burghley, Aug. 3, 1596.

<sup>87</sup> Mackie, *Negotiations*, Intro., pp. xii-xiv; Mackie, "Secret Diplomacy . . .," *Scot. Hist. Rev.*, XXI (1923-1924), 267-282.

<sup>88</sup> See above, p. 112n.

<sup>89</sup> P. R. O., Rom. Trans., Bdl. 111, Aldobrandino to the Cardinal Legate in France, May 31, 1597. Aldobrandino pointed out that James's accession to the English throne would be in no way beneficial to France.

fanta's claim. Perhaps time would provide a way out of the dilemma.

During this period James did not neglect the group of secular Catholic princes in Italy who were hostile to Spain. In 1594 Chancellor Maitland had intimated to the Dutch ambassadors that Venice was negotiating with James for a treaty against Philip. Maitland added that Florence and Mantua were favorable to the idea.<sup>90</sup> The Duke of Tuscany had a servant in Edinburgh in November, 1595, who was well received by the King.<sup>91</sup> These hints of friendly dealings with Italians are meager but they show that James was ignoring no potential ally. In 1596 he had at Venice Sir William Keith, a young Scottish gentleman who pretended to be traveling abroad "for learning of the language and other virtues." Keith met the Doge and various Councillors several times and tried to get some definite assurance of aid in case James should need it after Elizabeth's death. He secured only vague assurances of friendship.<sup>92</sup>

There were other channels of intrigue connected with Scotland. Huntly and Errol were on the continent, having left Scotland in the spring of 1595. They seem to have expected to return almost immediately but they were overly optimistic. Their agents, John Cecil,<sup>93</sup> Sir Walter Lindsay of Balgavie, and Hugh Barclay of Ladyland, had no success in securing aid for them either in Rome or Spain. What

<sup>90</sup> *Scots Brigade*, I, 157. It is interesting to note that the Dutch were already informed of it.

<sup>91</sup> S. P. Scotland, LVII, No. 64, Nicolson to Bowes, Nov. 19, 1595.

<sup>92</sup> Nat. Lib. Scot., Balcarres MSS., vi, no. 19, Keith's report to James, Feb., 1596. See documents printed in *Letters and State Papers during the Reign of King James the Sixth . . .*, J. Maidment, ed. (Abbotsford Club, Edinburgh, 1838), pp. 8-12, 20-23. Bowes, in Edinburgh, knew of this commission to Keith and wrote to Sir Robert Cecil, "And that same is intended rather for profit than practice, as to yourself may hereafter be better known than can presently be discovered by me" (S. P. Scotland, LX, No. 56, Apr. 11, 1597).

<sup>93</sup> The same who played a part in thwarting Poury Ogilvy.

the real plans of the Earls were no one knew, least of all, probably, the Earls. There was talk of seizing the prince in order to put control of affairs in Catholic hands, yet Huntly at times counseled measures of moderation when he talked to Malvasia. He and Errol wanted money and power. They cared not whether they got it from Spain at James's expense, or by favor from the King, or from Rome.<sup>94</sup>

James had the advantage of the situation. On the one hand he had allies within the Catholic camp and on the other he stood forth as the enemy of "popish superstition." Evidence of an effort on his part to approach Rome and Spain directly is slight. Actually it was unnecessary for him to take the initiative in that direction. His Catholic nobles, the Paget faction of English exiles, the Scottish Jesuit Crichton, and others were acting in his interest or were busy in soliciting Catholic aid for their own ends, which could be turned to the King's advantage. In the meantime he cultivated friends in Protestant and in anti-Spanish Catholic Europe. Elizabeth's jealousy and his unstable position at home kept him from accomplishing much by way of diplomacy. His cue, like Clement's, was to wait. From 1595 until 1598 he did little abroad. Home affairs and petty quarrels with Elizabeth absorbed his attention.

## APPENDIX I

There seems to be some confusion about the position of James Beaton, Archbishop of Glasgow, who had been Mary's ambassador in France. After Mary's death James sent him a com-

<sup>94</sup> Their agents, Cecil, Lindsay, and Barclay, did not coöperate. See Nat. Lib. Scot., Balcarres MSS., vi, nos. 94, 98, 102, Sessa to Philip, Jan. 30, Feb. 20, Mar. 5, 1596; Birch, *Memoirs*, I, 407-408, 414-418; *Cal. Spanish*, 1587-1603, pp. 613-614; P. R. O., Rom. Trans., Bdl. 111, Casano to Aldobrandino, Sept. 6, 1595, inclosing advices from Madrid, Aug. 12, 1595; *ibid.*, Bdl. 85, Father Gordon to Aldobrandino, Aug. 17, 1595, letters from the nuncio in Spain, Sept. 23, 1595, and advice from Madrid, May 20, 1595; Calderwood, V, 359; Bellesheim, III, App. viii, pp. 460-473.



mission without date or signature, appointing him resident ambassador.<sup>95</sup> Glasgow had scruples about serving a heretic King but at papal and Spanish prompting he apparently overcame them. Sometime later he seems to have resigned.<sup>96</sup> Burghley in January, 1595, thought that Glasgow was James's ambassador in ordinary at Paris and yet there is evidence that James wrote to Beaton almost two years later, urging him to accept the post. Beaton turned to the papal legate in France for advice.<sup>97</sup> His close connection with the Spanish party in Paris made him distasteful to Elizabeth. The Queen reproved Henry for receiving as ambassador a man so involved with their common enemies.<sup>98</sup> James's desire to employ him and his recommendation of him to Henry's favor<sup>99</sup> were possibly gestures to indicate toleration of Catholics. Beaton must have been the one who knew best the state of Mary's revenues in France, a qualification which made him useful to the Scottish King.

## APPENDIX II

Father J. H. Pollen, in his article, "The Question of Queen Elizabeth's Successor," *The Month*, CI (1903), pp. 523-526, inclines to the opinion that the printer, Richard Verstegan, wrote the *Conference about the next Succession*, that Parsons had a share in it, having inserted corrections, and that Parsons was largely responsible for the publication of the book. Pollen bases this view on the fact that Dr. William Gifford recognized the handwriting of the manuscript, which Paget had caused to be stolen from the printer, as that of Verstegan, with interpolations and changes in the hand of Parsons. There is in the Public Record Office a transcript of a letter to the Pope from Sir Francis Englefield, the aged Englishman exiled for years in Spain, in

<sup>95</sup> *Warr. Papers*, II, 56-68.

<sup>96</sup> See letters of Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador in France, *Cal. Spanish*, 1587-1603, pp. 81, 96, 131, 518, 533, 541, 565.

<sup>97</sup> P. R. O., Rom. Trans., Bdl. 85a, letter from the Cardinal Legate in France, Nov. 25, 1596; *ibid.*, Bdl. 111, letter from Rome to Cardinal Legate in France, Jan. 18, 1597. See below, p. 227.

<sup>98</sup> S. P. France, XXXV, ff. 118-119, copy, Elizabeth to Henry IV, Mar. 8, 1595.

<sup>99</sup> *Warr. Papers*, II, 240.

which Englefield clearly designated Parsons as the author. The letter is a long account of the Jesuit's services, among which Englefield listed the books he had written.

Si vero praeterea consideremus quae calamo quoque et scriptione praestiterit, non erunt fortassis his ipsis multo minora, ut enim multos libros praeter eam, quos contra haereticos viriliter scripsit, quatuor tamen hoc loco commemorabo, quibus maxime causae catholicorum nostratium profuisse noscitur. . . . Tertius est quem me caeterisque multis viris catholicis petentibus ante biennium collegit de iure successionis regiae apud Anglos, cum enim de religionis articulis iam plurima essent apud nosrates praescripta contra haereticos, nihil autem quicquam de hac successionis regiae controversia. . . .<sup>100</sup>

Englefield, by the testimony of Parsons himself, saw the *Conference* before it was published.<sup>101</sup> Later, when Parsons was trying to gain James's good will, he named Cardinal Allen "together with Sir Fra. Inglefield and some others" as the "chief authors" of the book.<sup>102</sup> He frequently argued that one man was not responsible for it. For a discussion tending to prove Parsons the author, see M. A. Tierney's edition of Dodd's *Church History of England* . . . (5 vols., London, 1839-1843), III, 31-35n.

<sup>100</sup> P. R. O., Rom. Trans., Bdl. 111, from Borghese Archives, I, 448, dated Sept. 2, 1596.

<sup>101</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVI, No. 4, copy, Parsons to Angus, Jan. 24 (N.S.), 1600.

<sup>102</sup> Cotton MSS., Julius F vi, ff. 148-150, Parsons to ---, May 24, [1603].

## CHAPTER V

### GREATER INDEPENDENCE, 1596

However attractive the intrigues on the continent were, James was forced to devote most of his attention to domestic problems. The departure of Huntly and Errol, early in 1595, solved only one of the many difficulties confronting him in Scotland. The Earls' reappearance in the summer of 1596 showed the temporary nature of that solution. Faction still prevailed among the nobility, finances caused serious worry, the kirk was as stiff-necked as ever, and border disputes flared out. James managed skilfully to establish better order in Scotland and to increase his authority very noticeably in the years from 1595 to 1599. With Elizabeth he pursued a general policy of friendship, qualified more and more as the years passed by wrangling over petty matters. On the surface the "amity" was never broken; underneath, hostility and mistrust increased.

The evidence for the undercurrent of hostility rests on many incidents that bear directly on James's struggle for power in Scotland. They show no clear pro-Catholic or anti-English policy on his part. His appointment of Papists to offices of state, his leniency to Huntly and Errol, and the harsh treatment of the kirk are not conclusive. Undoubtedly, the cumulative effect of these incidents was to make the godly anxious and to arouse the suspicions of England, a result which James must have foreseen and desired. Nevertheless, they were primarily matters of internal administration and as such should be put in their proper perspective.

For the first part of 1595, Elizabeth displayed little inter-

est in Scotland. In July the King protested that he had had no letter from her for nine months.<sup>1</sup> Ambassador Bowes had returned to England, leaving his servant, George Nicolson, to perform the duties of resident agent in Edinburgh and to send what news there was. Three thousand pounds were paid to the King in August without much ado.<sup>2</sup> Elizabeth, however, tartly reminded James that his own "lethargie" had caused his troubles with the rebel Earls. She intimated, too, her displeasure at his "complaints and moans made to forraine estates," a neat thrust at Stewart's errand to the Dutch.<sup>3</sup>

The calm of 1595 served Elizabeth well when, in the next year, she was again threatened by a Spanish armada. Information about expeditions to land in Wales and Scotland was received in Edinburgh and promptly forwarded to Elizabeth by Nicolson. James held several "wapenscha-wings" (musters) in the winter to put his subjects in readiness.<sup>4</sup> To his Council the King plainly declared his determination to side with England against Spain. According to Aston's report of his speech, he made no pretence of lofty motives, said baldly that he esteemed England "more dearer" to him than Scotland, and added:

. . . although I have had sufficient cause of quarrel and have been pressed to it both by foreign princes and my own subjects, yet when I considered my own estate and the way that might lead me best to my intent was to allow and maintain the lawful successor and to keep my hands clean of practise and blood that the people should have no cause to think that I meant by Scot-

<sup>1</sup> *Letters of Elizabeth and James*, pp. 110-112.

<sup>2</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXII, Nos. 25, 26, and LXVI, No. 12, memoranda of payments to the use of the King of Scots.

<sup>3</sup> *Letters of Elizabeth and James*, pp. 168-170.

<sup>4</sup> S. P. Scotland, LVII, No. 67, Nicolson to Bowes, Nov. 27, 1595, with incl., advertisements, Nov., 1595; *ibid.*, No. 72, Nicolson to Bowes, Dec. 1, 1595; *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, Intro., p. xxxvi, pp. 235-236, 274, 282; *Tudor and Stuart Proclamations, 1485-1714*, Robert Steele, ed. (2 vols., Oxford, 1910), II, 259; Calderwood, V, 389-393.



land to "covnqvst" England but by the contrary by England to "covnqvcs" Scotland; and if the Queen will assist me, I shall not only hazard my life for the defense of my own country but for her and her country and shall be ready as she shall appoint with what number she shall think convenient.<sup>5</sup>

Shortly after this outburst, copies of Doleman's book on the English succession arrived in Scotland. As Father Crichton observed, its publication did the Catholic cause more harm than good. For once James and his Presbyterian ministers were in complete agreement. Both denounced the book violently. The clerical attitude was highly gratifying to the King.<sup>6</sup>

Meanwhile, within Scotland attention was concentrated on Chancellor Maitland's last efforts to maintain his power. The removal of Bothwell and of his old enemies, the Catholic Earls, had not ended his troubles. The new opposition, headed by Lennox, Mar, Argyll, and Morton, had forced him into strange familiarity with the Master of Glamis and Queen Anne, both of whom had once hated him, and with Buccleugh and Cessford, two powerful border lairds. This latest coalition directed its energies to the removal of Mar from his most responsible posts, the keepership of Edinburgh and Stirling castles and the custodianship of the prince.<sup>7</sup>

Anne clung to the latter objective with the persistence of a nagging wife. Motherly affection may have played its part in her desire to have the child with her but, beyond a doubt, she had a penchant for meddling in state affairs. James was well aware of the dangers inherent in

<sup>5</sup> S. P. Scotland, LVII, No. 69, Aston to Bowes, Nov. 28, 1595.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, LVII, No. 84, and LVIII, No. 10, Aston to Bowes, Dec. 16, 1595 and Jan. 18, 1596; *ibid.*, LVII, No. 95, and LVIII, No. 3, Nicolson to Bowes, Dec. 29, 1595 and Jan. 7, 1596.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, LIV, No. 96, LV, Nos. 44, 47, LVI, Nos. 19, 24, Nicolson to Bowes, Nov. 29, 1594; Mar. 3, 9; June 25, 30, 1595; *ibid.*, LIV, No. 107, LVI, No. 68, Aston to Bowes, Dec. 12, 1594, July 31, 1595; Colville, *Letters*, pp. 164-166.

the plan. The prince, in unscrupulous or careless hands, might mean his own deposition and the organization of a new government under the nominal authority of the eighteen-months-old child. Bothwell's recent agreement with the Catholic Earls had included a project for seizing the prince.<sup>8</sup> The King remembered vividly his childhood when he had been used as a pawn against his mother. Was history to repeat itself? Not if James could prevent it. He authorized Mar to continue his guardianship of the child, come what might. Maitland, who was suspected of advising Anne in the affair, dared not go too far and bowed before the King's wish. He steered a dangerous but successful course, maintaining favor with both James and Anne. After his death, which occurred in October, 1595, Anne's party was deprived of its most able and cautious member. The question about the keeping of the prince sank temporarily into oblivion.<sup>9</sup>

It is difficult to estimate accurately the influence of Maitland of Thirlestane on Scottish history. Calderwood said of him, "He was carefull to keepe peace betuixt the two nighbour countreis, betuixt the king and the kirk, and to withdraw the king's favour from the Papists. . . . Yitt it was thought that all the good he did, he did it to winne the ministrie and to strenthen himself against Bothwell."<sup>10</sup> Was he merely a clever and ambitious politician, or did he deserve the name of statesman?

Elizabeth and her ministers had never trusted Maitland.

<sup>8</sup> See above, p. 114. Cf. Calderwood, V, 359; P. R. O., Rom. Trans., Bdl. 85, advices from Madrid, May 20, 1595. It was a favorite scheme of Catholic intriguers abroad. Poury Ogilvy had dealt with Ibarra in Flanders about it (Nat. Lib. Scot., Balcarres MSS., vi, no. 98).

<sup>9</sup> S. P. Scotland, LVI, No. 68, and LVII, No. 73, Aston to Bowes, July 31 and Dec. 1, 1595; *ibid.*, LVI, No. 88, and LVII, No. 32, Nicolson to Bowes, Aug. 15 and Oct. 4, 1595; Colville, *Letters*, pp. 171-173; Hist. MSS. Comm., *Report on the MSS. of the Earl of Mar and Kellie Preserved at Alloa House, Clackmannanshire* (London, 1904), pp. 43-44, James to Mar, July 24, 1595.

<sup>10</sup> Calderwood, V, 382. Cf. Melville, *Autobiography*, pp. 271, 329-330, and the *Historie and Life*, p. 349.

It was he who, in the name of the nobles, had urged James to avenge Mary's death. Disliked by the old nobility, who were jealous of his power and considered him a parvenu, he had temporized from time to time with his most bitter enemies, Huntly and Bothwell. Yet, when the crisis came in 1594, he played no small part in pushing matters against the Catholic Earls. Bowes admitted that he "served well" in the Parliament which forfeited them and that he volunteered to furnish fifty horsemen at his own expense for the campaign against them.<sup>11</sup>

It would seem that Maitland taught James the fundamental principles on which the King based his actions in the years from 1587 to 1603. The tendency to keep all parties in suspense, to balance favors, to change swiftly from one faction to another, characterized both men. Both were essentially politically minded, both were fundamentally Protestant, not so much from conviction as from appreciation of circumstances and shrewd analysis of the best way to utilize those circumstances. To both may be ascribed the ideal of creating orderly government in Scotland, no mean ideal, even if the mind that conceived it was in the case of the King that of a fatuous egotist and in the case of the Chancellor that of a clever opportunist. No one could exist politically in Scotland without "playing politics." Maitland's claim to greatness rests not on his skillful maneuvers through the mire of faction, but on the general lines of policy followed by James during his chancellorship. First, the passing of the old feudal order was seen in the Chancellor's own career and in the fact that Huntly and Errol had at last been worsted, not so much by the efforts of rival clans as by the appearance of a national force led by the King and inspired by his kirk ministers. Second, Scotland had not truckled to England but had

<sup>11</sup> S. P. Scotland, LIII, Nos. 31, 64, 85, Bowes to Cecil and Burghley, Apr. 13, June 9, July 23, 1594; Cotton MSS., Caligula D ii, ff. 136-148, Zouche's report [early 1594].

maintained the alliance without sacrificing independence. Third, the Presbyterian kirk was placed on firmer footing than ever before. There is no doubt that James felt that it had too much power. Possibly Maitland thought likewise. He was not one to let the godly rule him. Yet, during the period of his power, there was no violent rupture between King and kirk, save in 1592 when James gracefully gave in to the kirk's pressure and hushed up the Moray case as far as possible by granting legal status to Presbyterianism. After Maitland's death internal administration in Scotland took on a definitely more Catholic cast. More Papists held high offices and harsh measures were inaugurated against the Presbyterian ministers. Indirectly, these influenced the attitude taken with respect to England. There were many elements contributing to the widening gulf between Elizabeth and James, one of which may well have been the absence of the moderating influence of the Chancellor.

With Maitland gone, James set about the business of kingship in very earnest fashion. He refused to appoint a new chancellor, although Mar and Walter Stewart, Prior of Blantyre, tried to get the nomination in their hands, Montrose sought the office through the influence of Sir George Hume, and Anne worked to get Alexander Seton, Lord Urquhart, Prior of Pluscardin, named.<sup>12</sup> The King displayed great vigor and determination in the maintenance of law and order,<sup>13</sup> while in the department of finance, in which he recognized his incompetence, he instituted an entirely new régime.

James's chronic poverty seems to have become particularly acute at this time. Party politics were partly responsible for the ousting of Glamis from the Treasurership and of David Seton of Parbroath and Robert Douglas of Lincluden from the offices of Controller and Collector; but

<sup>12</sup> S. P. Scotland, LVII, No. 37, Nicolson to Bowes, Oct. 8, 1595; *ibid.*, Nos. 43, 50, Aston to Bowes, Oct. [15], 26, 1595.

<sup>13</sup> *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, Intro., pp. xxxvi-xxxviii; *Hat. Cal.*, VI, 7-9.



financial distress figured largely in the decision to appoint a special council to reign supreme over the King's revenue.<sup>14</sup> On New Year's Day, 1596, Queen Anne's Council presented their mistress with a thousand five-pound pieces of gold, a large part of which she promptly gave to her husband, "spering the King when his Council would give him so much."<sup>15</sup> The broad hint sufficed. For weeks rumor had it that the Queen's Council wanted control of the King's finances as a stepping-stone to the chancellorship. On January ninth their desires seemed fulfilled. A new comittee of eight, at least half of whom were drawn from Anne's Council, was formally constituted to control the Exchequer. Its powers were so great that even the King could not override its decisions, a wise precaution by which he could escape the odium attached to any stringent measures which the Council might take to correct the lax collection and disbursement of money.<sup>16</sup>

The Octavians, as the group was called, played an important rôle in Scottish history in 1596. Four appointed from Anne's Council were reputed Papists or had close Catholic connections. They were: Alexander Seton, Lord Urquhart, Prior of Pluscardin; James Elphinstone of Innernaughty; Thomas Hamilton of Drumcain; and John Lindsay of Menmure. The first three were thought to be Catholics. Elphinstone, years later implicated in a scheme to draw James into correspondence with the Pope, had a brother on the continent who was a Jesuit. Lindsay, although apparently a sincere Protestant and author of the famous "platt" to endow ministers and churches with suf-

<sup>14</sup> S. P. Scotland, LVII, No. 93, Aston to Bowes, Dec. 29, 1595; *ibid.*, LVIII, No. 34, Bowes to Burghley, Mar. 10, 1596.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, LVIII, No. 3, Nicolson to [Bowes], Jan. 7, 1596.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, LVII, No. 83, Nicolson to Bowes, Dec. 15, 1595; *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, Intro., pp. xl-xlvi, pp. 254-258 and n. Although Nicolson (S. P. Scotland, LVIII, No. 3) seemed to think only four of the Octavians, Urquhart, Elphinstone, Lindsay, and Hamilton, were on the Queen's Council, two others, namely, Blantyre and Mr. Peter Young, had been appointed to serve in that capacity in 1593 (*Acts Parl. Scot.*, IV, 26).

ficient revenues, had a wandering Catholic brother, Sir Walter, whose intrigues on the continent must have embarrassed him considerably. Of the remaining four not tainted with popery, Walter Stewart, Prior of Blantyre, and the Clerk Register, John Skene, deserve mention. These six attended committee meetings regularly and, if not already filling important offices of state, soon received such appointments.<sup>17</sup> Their conscientious and efficient administration brought some order into Scotland's finances. Unfortunately, the power concentrated in the group made them unpopular with the other courtiers of the King and the doubtful religion of some evoked the wrath of the kirk. As a body they functioned for only one year.<sup>18</sup>

The English government watched with interest the career of the Octavians. Lord Burghley wrote to his son, Sir Robert Cecil, "I see these new councillors preferred for the Queen are evil disposed, as I doubt, being hollow papists."<sup>19</sup> Aston had warned the English to expect trouble if Pluscardin once attained power. Events seemed to justify this lack of confidence on the part of the English government. In the bitter quarrels that arose over the "Kinmont Willie affair," a famous border outrage, the Octavians opposed any suggestion of yielding to Elizabeth's demand that Buccleugh, the principal offender, be delivered into her hands. When Elizabeth withheld the King's pension, they intimated that by careful management the King could get along without such dishonorable and servile depend-

<sup>17</sup> The other two were David Carnegie of Colluthy and Peter Young, the royal eleemosynary. Blantyre was Lord Privy Seal but soon resigned that to become Lord Treasurer; Pluscardin was President of the Court of Session; Elphinstone became Controller and Collector; Hamilton was King's Advocate; and Lindsay served as Secretary from May 28, 1596 until Jan., 1598. See *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, Intro., pp. xli-xlv; *Acts Parl. Scot.*, IV, 26; *Scots Peerage*, I, 511, 516-517, 556-562, and III, 536; Calderwood, V, 420-433.

<sup>18</sup> *The Exchequer Rolls of Scotland*, XXIII, G. P. M'Neill, ed. (Edinburgh, 1908), Intro., pp. xxxviii, xlv.

<sup>19</sup> S. P. Scotland, LIX, No. 4, July 10, 1596.

ence on English subsidies. Rumors that some of the Octavians intrigued abroad were not calculated to calm the English Privy Council. Pluscardin's share in obtaining favor for Huntly when that ubiquitous Earl reappeared in Scotland in the summer of 1596 gave color to the suspicions.<sup>20</sup> Yet the English government did little to oppose the Octavians in Scotland. One obvious factor from which Elizabeth might have derived advantage was the mistrust existing between two Octavians, Blantyre and Pluscardin. Blantyre hinted through Aston his desire to enter into "close correspondence" with some one in England in special credit with Her Majesty. Sir Robert Cecil, to whom these overtures were forwarded, apparently ignored them.<sup>21</sup>

In view of the forbidding aspect of foreign affairs at the end of 1595, the Queen ordered Robert Bowes back to his post as resident ambassador in Scotland. He arrived in February, 1596, armed with pages of memoranda from Lord Burghley. Their import was that he should be on his guard against Catholic Octavian influence, although the new financial group was not mentioned by name in the document. Bowes was to discourage the sending of any embassy to England and was to evade solicitations for more money. He might "take knowledge" of the rumors that James favored Spain, but was to emphasize the Queen's confidence in the King's judgment as to the better side. Papist plots the ambassador was to thwart, "using the credit of the church men." For the custody of the prince and for the vacant chancellorship, Bowes was to support the "best affected to religion and to the amity." Although

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, LVII, No. 62, Aston to Bowes, Nov. 15, 1595; *ibid.*, LVIII, No. 109, Hudson to Cecil, June 25, 1596; *ibid.*, LVIII, No. 113, and LIX, Nos. 18, 23, advices from Scotland, June, July, Aug., 1596; *ibid.*, LIX, No. 1, Bowes to Burghley, July 3, 1596; *Border Papers*, II, 135, 185; Calderwood, V, 437-438.

<sup>21</sup> S. P. Scotland, LVII, No. 50, Aston to Bowes, Oct. 26, 1595; *ibid.*, LVIII, No. 3, Nicolson to [Bowes], Jan. 7, 1596; *ibid.*, LIX, Nos. 16, 61, Aston to Cecil, July 28, Oct. 25, 1596.

vaguely phrased, the instructions implied that Elizabeth approved of Mar as guardian of the child.<sup>22</sup>

The question of the custody of the prince was connected with another article of Bowes's instructions. For some time it had been rumored in Catholic circles on the continent that Anne of Denmark was a secret convert to the Catholic faith. Exiles are often guilty of accepting as facts illusive hopes, but in this case Anne's actions lent a color of truth to the story. It is practically beyond question that in 1600 she acknowledged her belief in the Catholic religion, accepting the Pope as her spiritual guide and thereby playing an important part in her husband's political career. Her Lutheran training was not congenial to the more stern and uncompromising Calvinist faith of Scottish Presbyterianism. Anne was not popular with the kirk ministers, who condemned her enjoyment of dancing and light pleasures and her frequent absences from church. Of her Council, Pluscardin, Elphinstone, and Hamilton were thought to be Catholics. They may have carried much weight with her. She had something to do with the appointment of the Octavians. Lady Huntly was her close friend. Might not her determined efforts to remove Mar from the guardianship of the prince point to a desire to oversee his education in the Catholic faith?<sup>23</sup>

Elizabeth, ever sensitive to the slightest circumstances that might affect her interests, determined to warn Anne of the dangers into which she was straying. Bowes was to present to Anne a letter from the Queen with a postscript in Her Majesty's own hand. The letter was a brief general

<sup>22</sup> S. P. Scotland, LVIII, Nos. 18, 19, "Mr. Bowes articles" and Burghley's replies.

<sup>23</sup> S. P. Domestic, Elizabeth, CCLII, Nos. 8, 9, Dr. Wm. Gifford to Thos. Throgmorton, May 17 (N.S.), 1595; *Calendar of State Papers, Relating to Ireland, 1592-1596*, H. C. Hamilton, ed. (London, 1890), p. 232; Meyer, "Clemens VIII und Jakob I," pp. 275, 279-281, 301-305; *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, XX (1905), 126-127, Anne to Cardinal Borghese, July 31, 1601; Calderwood, V, 409, 459-460; S. P. Scotland, LIX, No. 74, Nov. 24, 1596, proclamation reciting the statements alleged to have been made by Mr. David Black in sermons at St. Andrews.



salutation and a complaint that communication between the two Queens had "of late passed under greater silence than we would have expected." At the end Elizabeth wrote, "Sister, I beseech you let a few of your own lines satisfy me in some one point that is boasted of against you, which this bearer shall tell you."<sup>24</sup> The "some one point" was clearly Anne's alleged conversion. Elizabeth wanted Anne to know that she thought they had abused their trust who had urged on Anne the removal of the prince from Mar's care.

. . . for that it is very certainly known to her Majesty, [wrote Burghley in his instructions for Bowes] that some of these have assured the Pope by their own speeches that they doubted not but to move the Queen to change her religion contrary to the King's mind. Yea, some of them have also secretly reported that the Queen hath in her own heart changed her religion and that she is secretly reconciled to the church of Rome, but to this later report the Queen's Majesty is very loath to give that credit that she hath cause to give to the former and yet her Majesty can not but for her professed friendship to her but to inform her hereof.<sup>25</sup>

Bowes dutifully followed orders upon his arrival in Edinburgh. The Scottish Queen promised to hold correspondence with Elizabeth, blamed the dead Maitland for the trouble about the prince, and disclosed nothing about her religion. She acknowledged

that some purpose was intended to have drawn her from the religion professed by her and this church, and which still she holdeth, with full resolution to persevere therein. But the matter was not prosecuted and she liked not to reveal the names of the

<sup>24</sup> S. P. Scotland, LVIII, No. 15, copy, Elizabeth to Anne, Jan. 28, 1596. The copyist marked the postscript as written by the Queen herself.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, LVIII, No. 19, articles 7 and 8.

practisers or practise any further, promising directly that if any person shall hereafter deal with or tempt her to any such change, that she will acquaint your Majesty with all their attempts and of her own doings therein. . . .<sup>26</sup>

The words were meaningless. Anne had no intention of confessing any fault, and Elizabeth evidently decided that further remonstrance was useless. The pro-Catholic trend of events in Scotland continued. Although it is impossible to determine precisely the extent of Anne's influence, she was a factor to be reckoned with in Scottish politics.

In the other points of his mission the English ambassador could report equally unsatisfactory results. James made graceful protests about his eagerness to defend England and Scotland, but added that he was "much unable" to arm his subjects adequately. He hinted broadly that only English pounds could insure the frontier against invasion. He reminded Bowes of his exertions and heavy expenses in the campaign against the Catholic Earls in 1594 and of Stewart's recent failure to get money from the Low Countries, which failure he attributed to English influence. He insisted that Doleman's book was written in England, an implied criticism that the English secret service and censorship was not thorough or that the English government was not very cordial in its attitude to him.<sup>27</sup> He felt slighted that Elizabeth sent him so little information about the imminent danger from Spain. Did Her Majesty, he queried, not trust him? Did she believe false stories about him? Let her realize that "suppose he agree to hear and know the devices of the enemy, yet he shall never consent to them." With a burst of self-righteousness, he made capital of Henry IV's apostasy, saying that *he*, James VI, would never change his religion and "do as the French King hath done to gain any kingdom or save his own or yet his

<sup>26</sup> S. P. Scotland, LVIII, No. 24, Bowes to Elizabeth, Feb. 24, 1596.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, LVIII, No. 23, Bowes to Burghley, Feb. 24, 1596.

own life.”<sup>28</sup> He tried to keep secret the object of a new embassy he was preparing to send to Elizabeth and was much annoyed to hear that its purpose had supposedly leaked out. Bowes had been instructed to discourage any mission, but David Foulis went, apparently laden with news of popish plots and requests for money. The latter were ignored for the time.<sup>29</sup>

By far the liveliest incident that troubled the relations between England and Scotland in 1596 was the “Kinmont Willie affair,” a border event that brought dashing romance into the humdrum of politics. Lawlessness thrived on the borders, encouraged both by mutual hatred of Englishmen and Scots and by family feuds within each country. Thievery, especially cattle rustling, was common. Both governments maintained wardens on the marches to keep order and to defend the region from hostile incursions. Days of truce were observed at intervals when opposite wardens or their deputies met to “fyle bills” of complaint and to settle disputes. When a day of truce was proclaimed, men from both parties were legally immune from arrest until sunrise of the next day. In the spring of 1596, when a party of Englishmen were returning from such a day of truce, they chanced to see riding on the other side of a “burn” Willie Armstrong of Kinmont, a swaggering Scottish borderer who had long been a thorn in the side of the English warden. An opportunity to capture him was too good to be missed. He was seized and put in Carlisle castle, the headquarters of Lord Scrope, warden of the west march. Peaceful efforts to secure his release failed, whereupon Buccleugh, the Scottish keeper of Liddesdale, determined to trouble no more with idle parleying. On the night of April 13, when darkness and mist conspired to help them, Buccleugh and a band of followers succeeded in entering

<sup>28</sup> S. P. Scotland, LVIII, No. 4, Nicolson to Bowes, Jan. 11, 1596.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, LVIII, No. 8, Nicolson to Bowes, Jan. 16, 1596; *ibid.*, Nos. 23, 34, Bowes to Burghley, Feb. 24, Mar. 10, 1596; *ibid.*, No. 112, copy, James to Foulis, June 30, 1596; *Hat. Cal.*, VI, 371–373.

Carlisle castle and in spiriting their comrade Willie to safety.<sup>30</sup>

The exploit was the most daring event in years of border history. Scottish blood raced with pride, while English blood boiled with rage at the insult thus perpetrated on Her Majesty. To have been so completely surprised in what was one of the most important northern defences of the realm intensified the chagrin. Elizabeth was thoroughly aroused and demanded that Buccleugh be "fyled" (found guilty) and delivered to her for punishment. The laird had not been in favor with Her Majesty before this because of his suspected Catholicism<sup>31</sup> and because he had been one to encourage Anne in her struggle to remove the prince from Mar's keeping. He found able defenders, however, in the Scottish Council, who argued that his deed was justified by the fact that Armstrong had been unlawfully detained. The Scots suggested a joint commission of the two nations to settle the affair. Elizabeth refused. She stopped James's pension, but since the Octavians were exercising their financial authority with good results, this had no immediate salutary effect on the King. Some of the Council urged James to be independent of English money.<sup>32</sup>

Although the Catholic members of the Octavians took the lead in defence of Buccleugh, they alone cannot be blamed for the stiff refusal of the Queen's demands. James said that not one of his nobility, council, barons, burgesses, or ministry approved of surrendering Buccleugh to Elizabeth. With great difficulty the King got a Convention to consent to refer the matter to commissioners. He took credit for being more anxious to please Elizabeth than his advisers. When, in August, Buccleugh was commanded to ward

<sup>30</sup> *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, Intro., pp. xlix-li, p. 290n.; *Border Papers*, II, Intro., pp. xii-xiv, pp. 120-122; *Warr. Papers*, II, 292-299; D. L. W. Tough, *The Last Years of a Frontier* (Oxford, 1928), pp. 260-261.

<sup>31</sup> S. P. Scotland, LVIII, No. 19, article 18.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, LVIII, No. 93, Bowes to the English Privy Council, June 2, 1596; *ibid.*, LVIII, No. 109, Hudson to Cecil, June 25, 1596; *ibid.*, LIX, No. 1, Bowes to Burghley, July 3, 1596; *Acts Parl. Scot.*, IV, 99-100.



in St. Andrews castle (though technically, it may have been, for another matter), Ambassador Bowes wrote that James had done it without the consent and approval of his nobility and council, except Blantyre and one or two others.<sup>33</sup>

Elizabeth was mollified to some extent by the imprisonment of Buccleugh, although she claimed that she had not her due until he should be delivered to her. She sent the delayed pension, three thousand pounds, in September and agreed to be godmother to the King's first daughter, born in August. Doubtless she had a double motive for this generosity. The Cadiz expedition of Essex in 1596 goaded Philip of Spain into sending a naval force against England in the autumn. Again luck was with the Queen, for storms drove it back. Elizabeth, however, could not foretell weather. She felt safer by buying James's gratitude. The return of Huntly and Errol to Scotland in the summer had created new complications and Elizabeth decided to be affable.<sup>34</sup>

The reappearance of the Catholic Earls was no unexpected event. As early as August, 1595, Father Gordon had predicted their return in the autumn of that year<sup>35</sup> and Malvasia in Brussels was sure that they would be recalled.<sup>36</sup> Lady Huntly and Lady Errol had been permitted to enjoy the revenues of their husbands' estates and appear to have exercised great influence at court.<sup>37</sup> Lady Huntly,

<sup>33</sup> S. P. Scotland, LVIII, No. 109, Hudson to Cecil, June 25, 1596; *ibid.*, LVIII, No. 94, and LIX, Nos. 1, 28, Bowes to Burghley, June 2, July 3, Aug. 19, 1596; *ibid.*, LIX, No. 18, advertisements from Scotland, July, 1596; Moysie, pp. 126-127; *Border Papers*, II, 205, 206, 209, 217.

<sup>34</sup> S. P. Scotland, LIX, No. 42, copy, Elizabeth to James, Sept. 21, 1596; *ibid.*, LII, pp. 154-156, copy, Elizabeth to Bowes, Oct. 23, 1596; *ibid.*, LXII, Nos. 25, 26, memoranda of payments made to the use of the King of Scots; *Cal. Venetian*, 1592-1603, pp. 233-245, *passim*.

<sup>35</sup> P. R. O., Rom. Trans., Bdl. 85, Father Gordon to Aldobrandino, Aug. 17, 1595.

<sup>36</sup> Bellesheim, III, App. viii, pp. 463, 466.

<sup>37</sup> S. P. Scotland, LII, pp. 123 ff., copy, Cecil to Bowes, Mar. 4, 1596; *ibid.*, LVIII, No. 38, Bowes to Burghley, Mar. 16, 1596.

sister of Lennox, was Queen Anne's intimate friend. Lord Livingston, whose wife was a Papist and sister of Errol, had been appointed guardian of the newborn princess Elizabeth.<sup>38</sup> In March, 1596, Lady Huntly had obtained permission from the King to send one George Chalmers overseas to her husband to persuade him to embrace the true religion.<sup>39</sup> At the same time James received letters from the exiles desiring to be "received upon their submission" or to be left unmolested. The King protested that he would grant them no license to return without the advice of "the state and ministers," but he took that advice in his own way. When the General Assembly suggested confiscation of the Earls' lands for the purpose of employing "waiged men" to defend Scotland, the Convention of Estates passed an act forbidding such confiscation until it had been tried whether they had plotted against religion during their exile.<sup>40</sup>

There were rumors that the Earls were in Scotland as early as June, 1596.<sup>41</sup> The story could not have been wholly true, since Errol was detained by the Dutch in July,<sup>42</sup> but Huntly was certainly in the north of Scotland by the beginning of August and Errol had returned by October.<sup>43</sup> A Convention of Estates, held at Falkland in August, referred the details of Huntly's submission to the King and

<sup>38</sup> *Scots Peerage*, V, 443-445; III, 536-538. Livingston's sister was the wife of Alexander Elphinstone, a brother of one of the Catholic Octavians.

<sup>39</sup> Cotton MSS., Caligula D ii, f. 202, copy of a license to Chalmer. See also S. P. Scotland, LVIII, No. 75, Bowes to Burghley, May 7, 1596.

<sup>40</sup> S. P. Scotland, LVIII, Nos. 34, 71, Bowes to Burghley, Mar. 10, Apr. 30, 1596; Calderwood, V, 416-417; *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, 289-290; *Acts Parl. Scot.*, IV, 99.

<sup>41</sup> S. P. Scotland, LVIII, No. 110, advertisements from Scotland, June 27, 1596.

<sup>42</sup> *Analecta Scotica* (2 vols., Edinburgh, 1834-1837), I, 374-375, Conservator to James, July 10 (N.S.), 1596; S. P. Scotland, LVIII, No. 103, Estates of Zealand to James, June 29, 1596; Nat. Lib. Scot., Balcarres MSS., vi, no. 8, James to the Estates of Zealand [1596].

<sup>43</sup> S. P. Scotland, LIX, No. 27, advertisements from Scotland, Aug. 11, 1596; *ibid.*, Nos. 28, 34, 46, 57, Bowes to Burghley, Aug. 19, Sept. 5, 23, Oct. 12, 1596.

to such as he should choose to advise him. Although James moved slowly, waiting until the end of November to announce the conditions he meant to impose on Huntly, the trend of events was apparent.<sup>44</sup>

Elizabeth assumed a rather unexpected attitude. She must have estimated correctly that the Earls would get no immediate support from Rome and Spain. Letters from Rome which had fallen into her hands in July proved that quite conclusively.<sup>45</sup> She was inclined, therefore, to think that Huntly and Errol could do less harm in Scotland than on the continent. At home they might be watched closely or might be won to reveal the latest Spanish plans for an armada. As early as April, Lord Burghley seems to have instructed Bowes to work for their return, for the ambassador replied to one of his letters, saying, "I dare not well instant the ministry to receive the submission of the'rle of Angus, or like of the return of Huntly and Errol, as your Lordship wisheth they should do."<sup>46</sup> Bowes worried lest the slightest hint from him encourage the Papists too much. He was ordered to stifle his fears and to follow the dangerous course which might easily have alienated the kirk from him. Sir Robert Cecil wrote to him in August:

Of this matter you may inform yourself, and if you find that his peace will be wrought, as surely by the manner of it there is great likelihood, then shall you do well so to work as that the Earl [Huntly] may address himself to the Queen to be a mediator for him to the intent that in his composition with the King there may be regard had both to secure his practises hereafter against England and to reveal what he knows already of their purposes for

<sup>44</sup> *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, 310–311, 317, 328–329.

<sup>45</sup> In July Elizabeth had received from France and Scotland copies of the intercepted letters written by the Duke of Sessa, Spanish ambassador in Rome, concerning Poury Ogilvy and the agents of the Catholic Earls who had visited Madrid, John Cecil, Lindsay of Balgavie, and Barclay of Ladyland. See J. D. Mackie, "The Elizabethan Intelligence Department," *Scot. Hist. Rev.*, XXV (1927–1928), pp. 385–386. Cf. above, pp. 150–153.

<sup>46</sup> S. P. Scotland, LVIII, No. 65, Bowes to Burghley, Apr. 18, 1596.

offence to her Majesty's crown; for surely to my poor understanding, though I will not take upon me to speak definitely of it, it seemeth very disputable whether he may not do more harm out of the realm ill affected or in the realm reduced and confirmed.<sup>47</sup>

The ambassador still demurred, writing in reply that "The well affected here . . . will be exceedingly wounded with the discovery of any mean to be made by her Majesty against their present suit for th'indellate retreat of Huntly out of this realm. And in this case no course can be tendered to Huntly which shall not readily come to the knowledge of the King and of the well affected. . . ." <sup>48</sup>

James probably sensed this not wholly harsh attitude in Elizabeth and realized that he could manage affairs as he wished without incurring too great wrath from the Queen. After all, his interests were identical with hers in that both wished to win the Earls in this time of renewed threat of Spanish invasion in order to learn Philip's plans and to take ample guarantee of their future good behavior. The King quietly managed affairs in favor of Huntly and Errol without so much as consulting the Queen, who, of course, protested loudly at such treatment. James promised her vaguely not to forgive the Earls or to permit them to remain in Scotland unless they satisfied the kirk, gave surety to stand trial for any "practises" during their exile, and offered guarantees for the future.<sup>49</sup> By this time, however, the long quarrel between King and kirk was fast coming to a crisis and interest shifted from the Catholic lords to one of the greatest constitutional conflicts of the period.

Although the year 1596 marked no sudden change in the relations between England and Scotland, it may be

<sup>47</sup> S. P. Scotland, LII, pp. 134-135, copy, Cecil to Bowes, Aug. 27, 1596.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, LIX, No. 37, Bowes to Cecil, Sept. 5, 1596.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, LII, pp. 154-156, copy, Elizabeth to Bowes, Oct. 23, 1596; *ibid.*, LIX, No. 65, Bowes to Elizabeth, Nov. 10, 1596.



considered the point at which James manifested more independence of Elizabeth's wishes and opinions than formerly. Amity was still preserved, the King having shown himself throughout the year steadfastly opposed to Spanish plots. The pension, Elizabeth's consent to be godmother to the young princess, and the efforts to appoint joint commissioners to settle accumulated border disputes<sup>50</sup> were signs of friendship. Yet there was the other story. With Maitland gone, Catholic councillors dominated the government. Huntly and Errol looked to the King for favor and received it. The "Kinmont Willie affair" showed the temper of the Scottish people. James was annoyed at English interference with Stewart's embassy in the Low Countries and felt neglected because he had not been asked to join the triple alliance arranged by France, Holland, and England this year. He aired his old grievances about the Lennox lands and Ashby's promises of 1588 and assumed a pose of injured virtue.<sup>51</sup> Did Elizabeth thus requite true friendship? Elizabeth's pointed reminder that "the English, whose regard I doubt not but you have in some esteame for ther good thoughts of you, will measure your love by your deedes, not your wordes in your paper"<sup>52</sup> may have been sufficient to keep him within the bounds of discretion. Nevertheless, he by no means sacrificed anything to do so. He was now thirty years of age, no longer the youthful monarch who could be toyed with so easily. In minor matters he was drifting from any great reliance on England or any grave concern for the Queen's opinions.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, LIX, Nos. 34, 35, Bowes to Burghley, Sept. 5, 1596.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, LVIII, No. 112, James to Foulis, June 30, 1596; *ibid.*, LIX, No. 7, Hudson to Cecil, July 14, 1596; *ibid.*, LII, pp. 129-134, copy, Elizabeth to Bowes, July 25, 1596.

<sup>52</sup> *Letters of Elizabeth and James*, p. 115.

## CHAPTER VI

### DISCORD, 1596-1599

Every European country which experienced the Reformation witnessed far more than an upheaval in religion. The movement was a challenge to established authority, whether spiritual or temporal. The repudiation of papal supremacy set an example for revolution in political theory and practice. In England and in some German principalities the power of the monarch was temporarily increased by the substitution of king or prince for Pope, a precedent set by Henry VIII. Where Calvinism held sway, the political consequences were even more startling. The Genevan system, which associated laymen with ministers in church government, contained within it the seeds of democracy.

The plan worked out in Scotland by Calvin's disciple, John Knox, and his followers rested on the organization of each congregation as a separate unit, controlled by lay elders and the minister. Congregations were grouped together in presbyteries and synods and almost every year there was held a General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, attended by ministers and lay elders from the smaller units. The Scottish system had nothing in common with the organization of the Roman Catholic church or even with that of the English church, where ecclesiastical authority was centered in one person—Pope or king—from whom radiated the power exercised by archbishops and bishops. In Scotland the kirk structure was built up from congregations; in England and in the Catholic system the structural principle was to build down from the one person who had absolute control.

For centuries in Europe, church and state had been en-

gaged in a struggle for supremacy which had its logical culmination in the Reformation. In sixteenth century Scotland, both King and kirk paid lip service to the ideal of divided authority. Andrew Melville, Knox's spiritual heir, often acknowledged that "there were two kings in Scotland, two kingdoms, and two jurisdictiones, Christ's and his [the King's]. . . ." <sup>1</sup> James, in his *Basilicon Doron*, advised his son:

And when any of the spirituall office-bearers in the Church, speake vnto you any thing that is well warranted by the word, reuerence and obey them as the heraulds of the most high God: but, if passing that bounds, they vrge you to embrace any of their fantasies in the place of Gods word, or would colour their particulars with a pretended zeale, acknowledge them for no other then vaine men, exceeding the bounds of their calling. . . .<sup>2</sup>

The essential problem, the definition of the limits of spiritual and temporal authority, neither James nor his ministers could solve. The King admitted that ministers had the right to speak anything "well warranted by the word"; at the same time he insisted that they leave to him all matters of state. He reserved to himself the right to judge when they had trespassed on his ground, a claim which the kirk could in no way admit. The clergy agreed that they should render unto Caesar Caesar's due, but they claimed authority from God to criticize the government if it functioned contrary to the Word. To them this duty was no trespass; rather, failure to perform it would have been a sin against the Lord. Their influence with the people by means of their sermons, the coöperation between laymen and ministers

<sup>1</sup> Calderwood, V, 378, 440; Melville, *Autobiography*, p. 325.

<sup>2</sup> *The Workes Of The Most High And Mightie Prince, Iames By The Grace Of God, King Of Great Britaine, France And Ireland, Defender of the Faith, &c.* (London, 1616), p. 154.

in kirk government, and the democratic form of kirk government, which had no place for bishops, were powerful weapons in their hands. James recognized the root of their strength and determined to deprive them of it. He attacked bitterly their candid censures of his conduct and resolved to restore the office of bishop in order to control them more completely. His conception of the divine right of kings was incompatible with the pretensions of his clergy.<sup>3</sup>

At the beginning of the year 1596 a general atmosphere of peace and good will existed between King and ministry. Calderwood rhapsodized about the kirk "now come to her perfectioun, and the greatest puritie that ever she atteaned unto, both in doctrine and discipline."<sup>4</sup> The violent language of the clergy against Doleman's *Conference* had pleased James. In a famous General Assembly in the spring, the King warmly protested "before god that to this day my heart and affection has been toward the religion. . . . And if any man have any thing to lay to my charge, I shall either confess the same and amend it if it crave amendment, or if any man has heard any thing other wise nor the truth, I hope to satisfy them."<sup>5</sup> This ideal state of affairs could not last long. By the end of the year James was engaged in the most serious quarrel he had yet had with the kirk, which was justly alarmed to see the Octavians in power, nothing done to provide adequate stipends for the clergy despite more stringent financial administration, Huntly and Errol returned, and the newborn princess assigned to a guardian whose wife was Catholic. There was even a hint that Arran, the old enemy, might reappear in the chancellor's office.<sup>6</sup> In characteristic fashion the kirk prepared for the worst.

Throughout the late summer and autumn of 1596, the

<sup>3</sup> See, e. g., James VI, *Works*, pp. 153-154, 160, 175, 182.

<sup>4</sup> Calderwood, V, 387.

<sup>5</sup> S. P. Scotland, LVIII, No. 44, incl., Mar. 25, 1596.

<sup>6</sup> Spottiswood, III, 40.



ministers made an eloquent stand to safeguard the "trew religioun." Although they tried to prevent the return of Huntly and Errol, some of them were amenable to royal influence and the King carried the day.<sup>7</sup> In September they exhorted the King to make preparations against the rebel Earls' "dangerous endeavoures." This was the occasion when Andrew Melville plucked James by the sleeve and addressed him as God's "sillie vassall" and when "howbeit the king used his authoritie in most craibed and cholerrick maner, yitt Mr Andrew boore him down."<sup>8</sup> Commissioners of the General Assembly met frequently in Edinburgh and took steps to summon the entire kirk organization to vigilance.<sup>9</sup>

James was infuriated by this assumption of power and meddlesome activity. He had "crabbitlie querrelled" the September meeting of the Assembly's Commissioners, alleging that it was held without warrant. In November the dispute came to a head. The ministers determined to go directly to the King, to tell him plainly their complaints, to hear his answers, and to listen in turn to his complaints against them. This frank interview served only to widen the breach. The brethren "perceaved cleerelie that the overthrow of the libertie of Christ's kingdom was intended, and were verie glade that his Majestie had uttered his meaning so plainlie."<sup>10</sup>

Thus matters stood when Mr. David Black, minister at St. Andrews, was taken to task by the King for certain remarks made by him in sermons. Black had formerly been in difficulties with James for having preached a sermon in which he pointed to Mary, the King's mother, as an example of God's judgment. Although James at that time did not try to pronounce upon Black's "doctrine" and the

<sup>7</sup> Calderwood, V, 438; Melville, *Autobiography*, pp. 368-369; *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, 311n.

<sup>8</sup> Calderwood, V, 439-441.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, V, 443-449; Spottiswood, III, 9-10.

<sup>10</sup> Calderwood, V, 439, 450-453.

matter was settled "in privat and homelie maner," the St. Andrews minister flatly denied the right of the King to judge him.<sup>11</sup> In November, 1596, he was charged with having said publicly that Queen Elizabeth was an atheist, that all kings were children of the devil, that there was no cause to pray for Queen Anne, and that Huntly and Errol had come back to Scotland with the consent of the King.<sup>12</sup> He was also accused of having convened armed men in St. Andrews in June, 1594, a deed amounting to rebellion.<sup>13</sup> The kirk, fearing a far-reaching encroachment on its liberties, drew up a "declinatour," a denial of the right of the King and Council to censor Black's preaching and a protest that such jurisdiction pertained only to the "propheits," "the ecclesiastick senat," in the first instance. A copy of the "declinatour" was circulated among the ministers for their signatures. Avowedly, the kirk meant to settle the point for all time. Such a declinator had been made previously but it had been verbal and, therefore, "vanished, and forgett and denied." This time the brethren meant it "to be made by writt, weill qualified and fortified with good reasouns." They did it in the teeth of James's express warning that it would be the worse for them. Thereupon a contest began which reached a climax on December 17.<sup>14</sup>

It was commonly reported that certain "Cubiculars," courtiers who hated the Octavians, fanned the quarrel between King and kirk to oust their rivals from power. Certainly the ministers and people were in a state of tension when they met in Edinburgh to hear Master Balcanqual preach on Friday morning, December seventeenth. Balcanqual's suggestion that noblemen, gentlemen, and the "well-

<sup>11</sup> Melville, *Autobiography*, pp. 323-328; Calderwood, V, 376-381.

<sup>12</sup> *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, 334-336; S. P. Scotland, LIX, No. 74, proclamation, Nov. 24, 1596.

<sup>13</sup> Note that this was about the time of Bothwell's intrigues with England, before Huntly and Errol had been forced to leave the country.

<sup>14</sup> Calderwood, V, 453-510; Spottiswood, III, 13-27; *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, 332-333, 340-349.

affected" hold a meeting in the Little Kirk after the sermon was readily carried out. The self-constituted assembly sent representatives to the King to ask for the removal of Seton, Elphinstone, and Hamilton, hated Catholic Octavians, from office and for the abrogation of all recent acts prejudicial to the church. The commissioners, receiving no satisfactory reply, returned to the Little Kirk assembly where, upon the motion to make a new Covenant with God to stand firm in their faith, there was a general raising of hands and applause. At this point shouts from the street were heard, warning folks to arm, and some people thronged to the Tolbooth, where James was and where he had just rebuffed the petitioners. Town magistrates quieted the stir but it could not be denied that there had been most disorderly conduct. The incident gave James his opportunity.<sup>15</sup>

Taking a high tone about the obedience due a King, James proclaimed the riot treason and threatened to remove the seat of government from Edinburgh. The town lost its privilege of free election of its magistrates, paid a huge fine, and suffered other penalties. The four ministers who preached in Edinburgh were forced to flee, some finding shelter in England. Their houses, formerly all in one close, were taken by the King and an order was issued that henceforth Edinburgh's ministers should live in various quarters of the town.<sup>16</sup> The King had won a victory over the kirk, although it was by no means an overwhelming one. It was but the first step in a long and cautious program he had set for himself to establish episcopacy. The

<sup>15</sup> Calderwood, V, 510-514; Spottiswood, III, 27-32; *Warr. Papers*, II, 418-423; Moysie, pp. 129-132; University of Edinburgh, Laing MSS., 203, vol. II of "Dr. Anderson's Manuscript of the History of Scotland from Fergus I," ff. 258-261; S. P. Scotland, LIX, No. 87, Bowes to Cecil, Dec. 17, 1596; *ibid.*, LIX, No. 91, and LX, No. 14, Bowes to Burghley, Dec. 21, 1596, Jan. 13, 1597; *ibid.*, LIX, No. 92, Aston to Cecil, Dec. 23, 1596. Accounts vary in details.

<sup>16</sup> *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, Intro., pp. lx-li, pp. 357, 374-377.

General Assemblies held after March, 1596, he managed with considerable adroitness so that in time he achieved his end.<sup>17</sup>

The interests of the English government did not coincide completely with those of the extreme Protestant element in Scotland in 1596. Although Lord Burghley had instructed Bowes to rely on the ministers for help against Spanish intrigues, later, when Elizabeth toyed with the thought of leniency toward the Catholic Earls, the ambassador was ordered to take steps in that direction notwithstanding his fears of losing the friendship of the kirk.<sup>18</sup> Bowes had intended to protest about Black's offensive speeches concerning Elizabeth and to demand his punishment, but due to James's zeal such protest was apparently not necessary. The ambassador reported that during the crisis the ministers spoke highly of Elizabeth.<sup>19</sup> Nevertheless, more than one minister in his heart probably agreed with Black's alleged opinion that Elizabeth was an "atheist." Her Protestant camouflage could not conceal the fact that she was first, last, and always Queen of England, with the emphasis equally divided between her consciousness of royal authority and her patriotism.

The kirk had often publicly recognized the fundamental antagonism between the Elizabethan church settlement and its own system. In the General Assembly of June, 1595, a fast had been appointed, one of the causes being compassion for "our brethrein of other churches" who were persecuted in Poland, England, Saxony, and elsewhere.<sup>20</sup> An anonymous letter, handed to the King in January, 1597, told

<sup>17</sup> Calderwood, V, 420, 576-725, *passim*; Melville, *Autobiography*, pp. 374-442, *passim*; Spottiswood, III, 71-75.

<sup>18</sup> See above, pp. 173-174.

<sup>19</sup> S. P. Scotland, LIX, No. 63, Bowes to Burghley, Nov. 1, 1596, with incl., Aston to Bowes; *ibid.*, No. 75, Bowes to Burghley, Nov. 27, 1596. Birch, *Memoirs*, II, 206, prints a contemporary letter which said that Bowes refused to accuse Black on a false report. Elizabeth ignored Black in so far as the matter concerned her (S. P. Scotland, LII, pp. 159-160, copy, Elizabeth to James, Mar., 1597).

<sup>20</sup> Calderwood, V, 376.



him that if he meant to be supreme head and judge in all causes, following the example of other princes, "there is not a Popish prince in Europe darre clame the like stile, and a Protestant prince, say they, there is none but her Majestie of our nighbour countrie. And yee know, Sir, how King Henrie the Eight gott that stile, and how she has bruiked it sensyne. . . ." <sup>21</sup> When James relentlessly proceeded with his plan to establish episcopacy, the kirk quickly pointed out the inexpediency of challenging its system "When that unformall conformitie is sought by our nighbour enemeis of the discipline, the bishops of England." <sup>22</sup> The ministers were quite right in sensing James's admiration for the English church. His words in the *Basilicon Doron*, published several years later, and his actions proved it. <sup>23</sup>

Distasteful as the expedient was, the kirk had to turn to England for aid after the disorders of December seventeenth. Two of the banished ministers wrote to the Earl of Essex asking refuge in England. <sup>24</sup> His answer was not cordial. Essex, on consulting the Queen, found her suggestion to be that the ministers "retire into some other country till the storm were blown over." <sup>25</sup> Although she refused them shelter, Robert Bruce and Walter Balcanqual evidently fled to England and remained for a while in the North. <sup>26</sup> Moreover, the Queen fully realized that completely to discountenance the godly in Scotland would be a great boon to the Spanish and Catholic parties. She, therefore, wrote to James shortly after receiving news of the December riot and, while admitting that "no king for the manner ought

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, V, 545-546.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, V, 585.

<sup>23</sup> E. g., James VI, *Works*, pp. 160-161; S. P. Scotland, LXI, No. 15, anonymous intelligence, no date.

<sup>24</sup> Birch, *Memoirs*, II, 267-268, Bruce and Balcanqual to Essex [Jan. 20<sup>th</sup>], 1597.

<sup>25</sup> *Hat. Cal.*, VII, 10, Essex to the ministers of Scotland [Jan. 8<sup>th</sup>], 1597. The letter seems to be an answer to that printed by Birch, although the latter is dated Jan. 20.

<sup>26</sup> Melville, *Autobiography*, p. 374; Calderwood, V, 521.

beare the same," emphasized the provocation the ministers had received. Her policy was to interfere little in the dispute, but what comments she permitted herself to make were designed to soften the King's anger against his ministers and to turn his attention to the Catholic menace.<sup>27</sup>

That menace was increasing in 1597. Huntly and Errol were forced by their King to make submission to the kirk and to renounce their Catholic faith. The ceremony took place at Aberdeen in June.<sup>28</sup> Probably the Earls did it with their tongues in their cheeks, although they knew it was best for them to conform outwardly. Their former stubborn adherence to Romanism had profited them in no way and they were appreciative of James's astuteness in forcing the kirk to receive them. In the Parliament which met at the end of 1597, the forfeitures of Angus, Huntly, and Errol were annulled; they appeared at the Council board; and Angus was given the responsible post of Lieutenant on the borders.<sup>29</sup> The Octavians had asked leave as early as November, 1596, to resign their commission or to have others appointed to share their duties. The latter request was granted. The finances of Scotland were thereafter administered by a larger group, but the Octavians individually retained their important offices of state and seats in the Council.<sup>30</sup> The pro-English Blantyre gained great influence for a time; then ill health checked his career.<sup>31</sup> Likewise, early in 1598, ill health forced the Protestant Secretary Lindsay to resign his office to James Elphinstone,

<sup>27</sup> *Letters of Elizabeth and James*, pp. 120-121; S. P. Scotland, LX, No. 9, [Cecil] to Bowes, Jan. 6, 1597; *ibid.*, Nos. 16, 37, Bowes to Burghley, Jan. 16, Feb. 26, 1597; *ibid.*, No. 17, Bowes to Cecil, Jan. 16, 1597.

<sup>28</sup> *Analecta Scotica*, I, 299-302; Calderwood, V, 633-640; Spottiswood, III, 53-55, 62.

<sup>29</sup> *Acts Parl. Scot.*, IV, 124-130; *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, Intro., pp. lxxii, lxxv-lxxvi, p. 427.

<sup>30</sup> *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, Intro., p. lix, pp. 336-338, 357.

<sup>31</sup> S. P. Scotland, LX, Nos. 16, 37, 44, Bowes to Burghley, Jan. 16, Feb. 26, Mar. 9, 1597; *ibid.*, LX, No. 55, and LXI, No. 60, Aston to Cecil, Apr. 11, Dec. 12, 1597; *ibid.*, LX, No. 41, Cecil to Bowes, Mar. 6, 1597; *ibid.*, LXI, No. 53, articles conferred upon by the treasurer and Thos. Foulis.

one of the Catholic Octavians.<sup>32</sup> Lord Hume, a suspected Papist, had a responsible border office;<sup>33</sup> and the Duke of Lennox, never completely trusted by Elizabeth, scored a triumph over his rival when Lord John Hamilton was forced to surrender to him the keeping of Dumbarton castle.<sup>34</sup> These items do not necessarily indicate an anti-English purpose or a Catholic policy on the part of James, but Elizabeth could not have been pleased.

During the same year of 1597, border matters demanded much attention. By May, commissioners from England and Scotland had completed the preparation of a treaty which provided for better execution of border justice and an exchange of hostages to insure enforcement. Two things hampered these good intentions: one was the ever-recurring border outrages committed even while the commissioners were sitting; the other was the failure to deliver the prescribed "pledges" or hostages. Elizabeth became so indignant at the general lawlessness that she threatened to break the treaty and to use force to restore order.<sup>35</sup> The Scottish Council, it was rumored, made "a flat answer of defiance," letting Her Majesty know that "since it . . . [was] her Majesty's will so to say, so it should be his Majesty's will by a like letter to answer by these same terms that he must and would be defensive as she should or would be offensive."<sup>36</sup> After several unsuccessful attempts

<sup>32</sup> *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, Intro., pp. lxx-lxxi.

<sup>33</sup> *Border Papers*, II, 440.

<sup>34</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXI, No. 63, Aston to Cecil, Dec. 21, 1597; *ibid.*, LXII, No. 1, Nicolson to Cecil, Jan. 19, 1598; *ibid.*, LXII, No. 4, Scottish advices, Feb. 2, 1598.

<sup>35</sup> There is much material on border affairs among the State Papers and in the Cotton MSS. See, e. g., S. P. Scotland, LIX, Nos. 34, 35, 49, 54, 75, 93; *ibid.*, LX, Nos. 5, 46, 47, 64, 66, 67, 69, 71; *ibid.*, LII, pp. 134-151, 171-183; Cotton MSS., Caligula D ii, ff. 221-224, 234-235, 260, 304, 309-315, 366-370, for documents and correspondence of Elizabeth, Burghley, Cecil, Robert Bowes, Sir William Bowes, Lord Scrope, and others, Sept., 1596-June, 1597. Cf. *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, 360-361, 365-366; *Border Papers*, II, 199-324, *passim*.

<sup>36</sup> S. P. Scotland, LX, No. 77, advertisements sent by Lord Scrope, May 27, 1597.

to deliver the Scottish pledges, Buccleugh and Cessford, the Scottish lairds responsible for handing over a large number of the delinquents, surrendered themselves into English hands and were detained in England for several months in the winter of 1597–1598.<sup>37</sup> The treaty was eventually fulfilled but it had intensified the bitterness between the monarchs. Elizabeth felt justified in withholding the annual pension throughout 1597. The customary three thousand pounds were not sent until April, 1598, almost nineteen months after the last payment.<sup>38</sup>

Ireland was another factor in the strained relations between the monarchs. That island, never completely subdued by England, broke out in serious revolt under the leadership of The O'Neill, Earl of Tyrone. Tyrone trafficked with the Spanish King, who saw in him a chance to annoy Elizabeth. He also had hopes of help from Scotland. The rebel Irish septs were closely related by blood to the wild Scottish clansmen of the western isles. Elizabeth feared that the Scots, ever eager for war, would cross to aid their kinsmen against her. She occasionally sent financial "tokens" to certain western lords, notably McLane of Duart, expecting them to return her courtesy by restraining the islanders. She thought at times of employing the Scots against the Irish, although these plans apparently never matured. The lively trade which flourished between towns in southwestern Scotland and the rebellious sections in Ireland was another source of worry to the Queen.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>37</sup> Tough, *Last Years of a Frontier*, pp. 262–269.

<sup>38</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXII, Nos. 25, 26, and LXVI, No. 12, memoranda of payments to the use of the King of Scots.

<sup>39</sup> See, e. g., S. P. Scotland, LVII, No. 28, Sir Wm. Russell, deputy in Ireland, to Bowes, Oct. 3, 1595, with incls. written by Geo. Thornton and McLane; *ibid.*, LVIII, No. 22, and LII, pp. 123 ff., Cecil to Bowes, Feb. 18, Mar. 4, 1596; *ibid.*, LVIII, Nos. 30, 37, 62, 76, Bowes to Cecil, Mar. 6, 16, Apr. 18, May 7, 1596; *ibid.*, LVIII, No. 40, McLane's offers [1596]; *ibid.*, LVIII, No. 58, Bowes's instructions for Nicolson to be shown to Cecil, Apr. 5, 1596; *ibid.*, LVIII, No. 97, McLane to Cecil, June 8, 1596; *Cal. Ireland, 1592–1596*, pp. 412, 522; *ibid.*, 1596–1597, E. G. Atkinson, ed. (London, 1893), pp. 139, 189, 227, 232, 362, 390, 393; *Calendar of*



If the English government could have enlisted James's effective coöperation in restraining this trade and the migration of the clansmen to Ireland, it might have eased considerably the situation in Ireland. Two factors made such coöperation impossible. In the first place, the King's control over western Scotland and the isles was not very firm. In 1596 Colonel Stewart went there as King's Lieutenant to establish order, but his expedition was an empty display of force. In 1598 another scheme to reduce the islands by means of lowland colonizers met with failure.<sup>40</sup> James issued proclamations to forbid the Irish trade and any aid to the rebels. Proclamations, however, were cheap; enforcement was another matter.<sup>41</sup>

The second element which made the situation difficult was the dubious sincerity of the King. As early as January, 1597, vague hints were received in London that the Irish rebels had suggested to James that he undertake the protection of the island.<sup>42</sup> There was little further mention of the matter until September, when Bowes heard of letters and messages sent to James from Tyrone. Bowes spoke of the matter to the King and received voluble protests that no such communication had been received.<sup>43</sup> Nevertheless, spies in Ireland continued to inform Elizabeth that James and Tyrone exchanged letters and had reached some agreement.<sup>44</sup> The presence in Scotland of one Sir James MacSorley, a western leader who seemed to owe a double allegiance to Elizabeth and to James, gave color to the tales. MacSorley had a questionable connection with Tyrone and was considered by the Queen a rebel. James

*the Carew Manuscripts, preserved in the Archiepiscopal Library at Lambeth*, J. S. Brewer and Wm. Bullen, eds. (2 vols. covering 1589-1603, London, 1869-1870), 1589-1600, p. 197; Tytler, VII, 295-301.

<sup>40</sup> *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, Intro., pp. xlvi-xlix, pp. 288-289, 295n., 296-297, 324n.; Tytler, VII, 373-375; Audrey Cunningham, *The Loyal Clans* (Cambridge, 1932), pp. 171-175.

<sup>41</sup> Steele, *Proclamations*, II, 258, 263.

<sup>42</sup> S. P. Scotland, LX, No. 13, advices from Edinburgh, Jan. 11, 1597.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, LXI, No. 31, Bowes to Burghley, Sept. 15, 1597.

<sup>44</sup> *Cal. Ireland, 1596-1597*, pp. 435, 446-449.

knighted him and received him cordially at court. Although MacSorley's quarrel with certain western chiefs in disfavor with James may explain the King's attitude, Elizabeth could scarcely interpret it favorably.<sup>45</sup>

More damning was the knowledge, which at length became certain, of an exchange of letters between Tyrone and James. Elizabeth sent Sir William Bowes north in January, 1598, with numerous complaints, one of which was the King's failure to inform her of the receipt of any letter from Tyrone, her rebel.<sup>46</sup> James unblushingly acknowledged that Tyrone had sent messages in the time of Robert Bowes<sup>47</sup> and of late a letter which was no more than "congratulations and offers of his service . . . after the Queen's Majesty of England." To this James had replied that "he would participate with him in nothing, which might be any way offensive to the Queen of England."<sup>48</sup> Apparently Tyrone showed James's reply to Ormonde, Elizabeth's military governor in Ireland, who, of course, forwarded a copy to the Queen. Among the Lansdowne manuscripts in the British Museum is a copy of a letter from James to Tyrone, dated December 22, 1597, probably the letter in question.<sup>49</sup> In it James accepted gracefully Tyrone's offer of service and postponed the date of using that service until the time "when it shall please God to call our Sister the Queen of England by death." In answer to Tyrone's complaint of ill usage at the hands of English deputies, James wrote,

<sup>45</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXI, No. 65, Nicolson to Cecil, Dec. 23, 1597; *ibid.*, No. 63, Aston to Cecil, Dec. 21, 1597; Cotton MSS., Caligula D ii, ff. 348-349, Cecil to Sir Wm. Bowes, Jan. 4, 1598; R. Bagwell, *Ireland under the Tudors* (3 vols., London, 1885-1890), III, 289-290.

<sup>46</sup> Cotton MSS., Caligula D ii, ff. 348-349, Cecil to Sir Wm. Bowes, Jan. 4, 1598.

<sup>47</sup> Robert Bowes had died in November, 1597 (S. P. Scotland, LXI, No. 58, Nicolson to Cecil, Nov. 22, 1597).

<sup>48</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXII, No. 3, Sir Wm. Bowes to Burghley, Feb. 1, 1598.

<sup>49</sup> *Cal. Ireland, 1598-1599*, E. G. Atkinson, ed. (London, 1895), p. 69, Ormonde to the English Privy Council, Mar. 1, 1598; Lansdowne MSS., lxxxiv, f. 79.

"If . . . it shall seem good to you to sue for any remedy thereof, we shall be ready upon advertisement to importune our credit and all the good means we can in your weal and the effecting of your desire, whereof you may persuade yourself of our good will in all your honest and lawful affairs whatsoever." The King was angry with Tyrone for showing this letter to Elizabeth's officers. Perhaps this indiscretion prompted him again to forbid by proclamation in August, 1598, all aid to the Irish rebels. The proclamation even named Tyrone, O'Donnell, and MacSorley as rebels.<sup>50</sup>

The Irish problem illustrates James's favorite method of double-dealing. He, a King, could not openly countenance Elizabeth's rebellious subjects, not only because it was unbecoming in a monarch, especially a friend of Elizabeth, but also because he would undoubtedly find, if he inherited England from her, that he had inherited her rebels. Tyrone's connection with Spain made of him a potential menace in case Philip should claim the English throne at Elizabeth's death. The Earl was strong enough to hold England at bay for several years. Was it not wise, therefore, to wean him from Spain by cautiously phrased letters, by favors to his allies, and by connivance at the trade between Ireland and Scotland? James balanced his actions neatly. While the words of his August proclamation against the Irish rebels were pronounced, the King was inspecting a gift of Spanish cannon, relics of the Armada, sent to him by MacSorley.<sup>51</sup>

Toward the end of 1597 James appeared very much worried about his inheritance of the English throne. He thought the "title" would be discussed in the English Parliament which met at that time. In September it was said that the King would take no action on border matters un-

<sup>50</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXII, No. 73, and LXIII, No. 33, Nicolson to Cecil, Aug. 30 and Oct. 14, 1598; *ibid.*, LXII, No. 62, the proclamation. Cf. Steele, *Proclamations*, II, 264.

<sup>51</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXII, No. 73, Nicolson to Cecil, Aug. 30, 1598.

til "he seeth what the Queen will do for him at this Parliament."<sup>52</sup> Rumors in Edinburgh constantly had it that Elizabeth was ill, that the Spaniards had landed in England or were shortly to do so, and that the Queen had "established the crown either by a second person or some other great office that might carry away the matter if God should call her Majesty."<sup>53</sup> The European situation was uncomfortable, due in part to the imminent treaty between France and Spain and in part to the trade dispute between England and the Germanic towns. The King, always alert, took steps to safeguard his interest. His claim to the Lennox lands in England had been renewed without success in 1596. If he could get them, he had a strong answer to the charge that he was an alien and therefore incapable of succeeding to the throne. He persisted in his efforts to acquire them.<sup>54</sup> In November, 1596, he caused to be registered on the records of the Scottish Privy Council Elizabeth's letter of June 2, 1586, in which she assured him of her intention to permit nothing that might injure the right he "pretended" to succeed her.<sup>55</sup> A year later, when the Scottish Parliament met, he made a speech that aroused Elizabeth's wrath. Nicolson reported it as follows:

The King made an oration among his nobility, signified how far he was wronged by the death of his mother, the want of the gratuity with scornful answer given about the seeking of the same, the mint [attempt] made at the Parliament in England to have defeat his title there, and by her Majesty's blaming him wrongfully as a stirrer up of "Pole" and Denmark to the courses taken in hand against her Majesty, for the late accidents in Ireland, and for border causes, . . . adding he would send a noble-

<sup>52</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXI, No. 39, occurs out of Scotland, Sept., [1597].

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, LXI, Nos. 58, 59, Nicolson to Cecil, Nov. 22, Dec. 9, 1597; *ibid.*, No. 60, Aston to Cecil, Dec. 12, 1597.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, LXIII, No. 17, copy, Elphinstone to [Foulis], Sept. 26, 1598.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, XL, Nos. 1, 2, 3, are copies of the letter. It is printed in Scots form in *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, 324-325 under the date Nov. 14, 1596.



man to her Majesty to be plain in these behalfts, and to know what he may trust to anent the title, gratuity, and her Majesty's good will towards him, and to be resolute in all things, as also that he would send to France and all his friends in these causes, adding some speeches of our estate and of new particulars therein; praying his nobles to think on the matter as he might have both their advices and concurrency therein; reaching thereby withall as is conceived for a taxation for the bearing of the charges of these his ambassadors.<sup>56</sup>

The outcome was a grant of two hundred thousand marks to send ambassadors to England and to other foreign nations. James wanted his fellow monarchs to exert pressure on Elizabeth to declare him outright heir and was eager to know what military aid they would give him if he had to fight for the throne at Elizabeth's death.<sup>57</sup> Nothing, however, was accomplished. Only one embassy was sent, that to Denmark and Germany. James wasted much of the money on lavish entertainments in honor of the Duke of Holstein, Anne's brother-in-law, who was visiting Scotland at the time.<sup>58</sup> The only result was an angry reproof from Elizabeth.

Naturally, the Queen despised such clumsy efforts to force her hand. She wrote a "verye sharpe" letter to the King, "full of sowernes," and listed the many injuries she had received at his hands.<sup>59</sup> James insulted her by believing false tales, such as that she had caused his mother's body to be dishonored or that she had said he caused trouble between herself and the King of Poland. She had just cause for complaint about his correspondence with MacSorley and Tyrone. His pension depended entirely on satis-

<sup>56</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXI, No. 61, Nicolson to Cecil, Dec. 15, 1597.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, LXI, No. 62, secret advices from Scotland, Dec. 17, 1597; *ibid.*, No. 63, Aston to Cecil, Dec. 21, 1597; *Acts Parl. Scot.*, IV, 142.

<sup>58</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXII, No. 35, Aston to Cecil, June 12, 1598; *Warr. Papers*, II, 358-380, 433.

<sup>59</sup> *Letters of Elizabeth and James*, pp. 121-123.

factory settlement of border disputes. To these remarks by Elizabeth, Sir Robert Cecil added a warning calculated to make the King drop his aggressive attitude. The Secretary instructed Sir William Bowes to show him the harm he did to his own cause.

. . . so must you let fall unto him [the King] this, that you were sorry to hear how great disadvantage he doth himself in any future expectation, first, by suffering so cruel spoils on the borders unrighted, whereby he alienateth the hearts of that people, and now also to accuse a prince in public assembly unheard of such things as were never thought of, as a great disadvantage to him in the eye of the world to his judgment that he would apprehend any matter so great on such a weak foundation; but which is most of all, especially now at this time of our Parliament it might be an occasion for the Queen to take that offer which her people have often made her to receive into her own power by consent of the 3 estates the disposition (by nomination in her last will) of the crown of England, a burthen which the Queen would never yet receive; and as for any his title, all the world sees whether ever her Majesty did suffer any act to be done to justify any other or weaken his. So if by unkindness and by unjust imputations he shall at this time both grieve her 3 estates and give her cause of offence neither in redressing her injuries nor in proceeding respectively with her, surely then it may bring with it harder consequences than were to be wished.<sup>60</sup>

Sir William Bowes enlarged on these instructions to advantage. People in London, he told James, were offended by his actions.<sup>61</sup> James decided that it was time to retreat. After all, he did not wish to alienate his future subjects. He wrote a "soft" answer to the Queen's tart note but added tactlessly that he hoped "that the fruitis of our contesting

<sup>60</sup> S. P. Scotland, LII, pp. 198-201, copy, Cecil to Sir Wm. Bowes, Jan. 4, 1598.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, LXII, No. 3, Sir Wm. Bowes to Burghley, Feb. 1, 1598.

shall be sweet, althoch the buddis thair of wairre soure." <sup>62</sup> Elizabeth's reply was a cryptic reminder, "he hasteth well that wisely can abide." She warned him proudly, "Remember aswell with whom you deal, as what you would obtain." <sup>63</sup>

In the spring of 1598 a new subject for dissension appeared in the person of one Valentine Thomas, an Englishman seized on the border in March by an English deputy warden and sent up to London, where he was imprisoned. Thomas was a reputed horse-thief and Catholic "practiser." He was also said to have had many secret interviews with the King of Scotland in which he advised James to insure the English succession by favor to English Catholics. Once in prison, Thomas hinted that James had employed him to murder Elizabeth. The story was rather obviously the invention of a half-mad criminal who hoped to obtain his freedom by making accusations against important persons. The Queen tried to keep the matter secret, but it soon leaked out and stories rapidly traveled the northern route to Edinburgh. <sup>64</sup>

James, touchy on anything that concerned his "title," reacted quickly. After all, he had seen Thomas at least once. <sup>65</sup> He had never been able to resist the temptation of conversing with mysterious agents who offered a connection with the Catholic world. The assassination story, nevertheless, was preposterous. Elizabeth assured the King by letter that she utterly discredited Thomas' confession. She kept the culprit in prison and never arraigned him during her reign. Her action was a generous concession to James's interests. By her refusal to try the man, James was spared the dishonor of having his name uttered in open court and

<sup>62</sup> *Letters of Elizabeth and James*, p. 124.

<sup>63</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXII, No. 29, copy, Elizabeth to James, Apr. 25, 1598.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, LXII, Nos. 47, 48, 49, instructions for one going to Scotland, July 1, [1598]; *Hat. Cal.*, VIII, 77-78; *Border Papers*, II, 520-522; Camden, p. 563.

<sup>65</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXIV, No. 11, Nicolson to Cecil, Jan. 20, 1599.

entered on a formal record. Yet he was not satisfied. Thomas had been examined and his confession written down. This evidence could be used against the King, even after Elizabeth's death. There remained on English statute books the Act of Association, passed several years before Mary's death, which excluded from the throne any claimant who should plot against the Queen's life or who should have guilty cognizance of such a plot.<sup>66</sup> James, therefore, demanded that everything be erased from the records which connected his name with an assassination plot. He wanted Elizabeth to make a public declaration of his innocence.<sup>67</sup>

Elizabeth refused both requests. She sent him an abstract of the points in Thomas' confession which concerned him and accompanied it with a letter, signed by herself and sealed with the signet, protesting her disbelief in Thomas' statements.<sup>68</sup> James sent the letter back to her. Its tone, he said, implied that she sent it to him only because he asked for it, not because he deserved it. Elizabeth angrily complained of his ingratitude. She, nevertheless, promised to stay the arraignment of Thomas as long as James behaved well.<sup>69</sup> Thomas languished in prison until 1603 when, upon James's accession, he was speedily examined, tried, convicted, and condemned to be executed for having falsely accused James of plotting Elizabeth's death in order to pre-

<sup>66</sup> *Statutes of the Realm*, IV, Pt. I, pp. 704-705.

<sup>67</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXIII, Nos. 4, 5, account of Foulis' dealings with the English Privy Council, Sept., 1598; *ibid.*, No. 17, Elphinstone to [Foulis], Sept. 26, 1598; *ibid.*, Nos. 30, 31, demands of Foulis, Oct. 9, 1598.

<sup>68</sup> S. P. Scotland, LII, pp. 227-228, 236-239, copies, Cecil to Nicolson, Nov. 7, Dec. 31, 1598; *ibid.*, LXIII, No. 81, abstract of Thomas' confession; *ibid.*, LXIII, No. 82, declaration signed by Elizabeth. Cf. *Cal. Domestic*, 1598-1601, Mary Anne Everett Green, ed. (London, 1869), pp. 134-135.

<sup>69</sup> *Letters of Elizabeth and James*, pp. 128-131; *Hat. Cal.*, IX, pp. 1-3; S. P. Scotland, LXIV, No. 33, Elphinstone to Cecil, Feb. 28, 1599; *ibid.*, LII, pp. 243-244, copy, Elizabeth to James, Apr. 12, 1599. Cf. Cotton MSS., Caligula D ii, ff. 391-397, Elizabeth's instructions for Sir Wm. Bowes, Apr. 25, 1599; *ibid.*, ff. 381-384, Sir Wm. Bowes to Elizabeth, May 31, 1599; S. P. Scotland, LXIV, No. 76, and Cotton MSS., Caligula D ii, ff. 85-86, James's answers to Sir Wm. Bowes's propositions.



vent him from coming to the throne.<sup>70</sup> James magnified the matter out of all proportion. Elizabeth's treatment of it was wise. She would not let it endanger the King's claim to succeed her, yet, by keeping Thomas alive and retaining his depositions, she had a weapon to restrain James. That was all she desired.

The misunderstanding caused by the Valentine Thomas affair was scarcely ended when a fresh incident occasioned further altercation between the monarchs. It was the kidnapping of a Buckinghamshire gentleman, Edmund Ashfield, who was visiting the Scottish court in May, 1599, and enjoying great favor there. Ashfield was apparently trying to effect an understanding between James and English Catholics. He had obtained from the Governor of Berwick, Lord Willoughby, a license to go to Scotland and had promised to return in three days. He failed to keep that promise. Willoughby heard from Sir William Bowes, Elizabeth's ambassador, and from a man named Waynman, then in Edinburgh, that Ashfield acted in a suspicious and "lewd" manner and was preparing to go to the continent. The Governor decided to spirit him back to England with Bowes's aid. One day, while Ashfield disported himself with other gentlemen on the sands of Leith, the English ambassador passed in his coach and joined the merry-makers. Soon the servants of Bowes and Willoughby enticed Ashfield into the coach and drove off with him, apparently without protest or commotion. He was soon back in Berwick under the watchful eye of the Governor, who promptly sent him up to London.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>70</sup> P. R. O., King's Bench, Baga de Secretis, No. 54; *Fourth Report of the Deputy Keeper* (1843), App. ii, pp. 290-291; P. R. O., Placita Coram Rege, 1379, membrane 5; P. R. O., Controlment Roll, 243, membranes 5, 15. Cf. *Hat. Cal.*, XV, 34-35, 119-120. I am indebted to Miss Marjorie Blatcher of the Institute of Historical Research, Malet St., London, and to Miss Margaret Hastings of Bryn Mawr College for help in finding this case in the King's Bench records for the Easter term, 1 James I.

<sup>71</sup> *Border Papers*, II, 607-622, *passim*; *Cal. Domestic*, 1598-1601, pp. 226-227, 250-252; *Hat. Cal.*, IX, 227, 230, 307-310; S. P. Scotland, LXIV,

James resented the affair. It "touched his honor" to have one to whom he had granted his protection thus unceremoniously removed from his kingdom. He vainly demanded Ashfield's return. Like the Thomas affair, the matter died out, but not before the English ambassador in Edinburgh suffered grave indignities as Her Majesty's representative. Again, like the Thomas affair, it implied some connection between James and English Catholics, although evidence in both cases is obscure.<sup>72</sup> Perhaps Ashfield refused to talk in London. Perhaps the Queen chose not to pursue the matter further.

On the whole, in the period from 1595 to 1599 the relations between James and Elizabeth changed from the comparatively simple issues of the Bothwell and Spanish Blanks period to more complicated problems. The Catholic question, while still a central theme, manifested itself in many minor incidents. Ireland, the borders, the preponderance of Catholic officers of state, Valentine Thomas, and Ashfield are typical. Overtopping all in importance was the question of the succession. As he created a more orderly régime in Scotland and tightened his grip on the kirk, James concentrated on ways to obtain the coveted prize, England. He entered upon a frenzy of preparation. He had semi-official agents on the continent, seemed in touch with factions in England, and directed propaganda in Scotland. At the end of 1599 he was busy with a plan to equip his subjects with arms and armor in case of need on the great day.<sup>73</sup> A "band" circulated among his nobility to insure

Nos. 83, 84, 85, Sir Wm. Bowes to Cecil, June 16, 18, 22, 1599; *ibid.*, LXV, No. 24, answers to James's protests, Aug. 26, 1599; Cotton MSS., Caligula D ii, f. 230, Sir Wm. Bowes's declaration concerning Ashfield.

<sup>72</sup> There is in the British Museum, Cotton MSS., Julius F vi, ff. 139-141, a paper headed "Sir Edmund Ashfeild to the King of Scottes." It is a list of suggestions James might follow to attain the English throne. One is the idea of offering toleration to Catholics. Cf. "An apologie of the Scottische king," Univ. of Edinburgh, Laing MSS., 245, pp. 55-56, 59-60.

<sup>73</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXV, No. 80, Nicolson to Cecil, Dec. 15, 1599; *ibid.*, No. 81, Aston to Cecil, Dec. 16, 1599.

their support for the occasion.<sup>74</sup> Books were printed in defense of his title.<sup>75</sup> Ambassadors were being sent abroad and received in Scotland in a fashion that implied much. The air was charged with a restless energy.

Meanwhile, Elizabeth used her superior position to advantage. She refused to give way on any point that would in the least weaken her power. Her experience as the "sun rising" during her sister Mary's reign had perhaps determined her never to suffer what Mary had then endured. Nevertheless, her indefinite words about her successor did not conceal her secret recognition of James as the obvious one to follow her. She refused him an outright declaration and hedged her promises not to prejudice his title with the reservation, "as long as he shall give us no just cause of exception." Yet she never chose to interpret his questionable actions as "just cause of exception."<sup>76</sup> Her handling of the Valentine Thomas affair and Ashfield's case displayed much forbearance on her part. Although she was well aware of James's flirtations with Papists, she knew how to prevent them from becoming serious and how to tie his hands by her pension and the hope of succession. Until 1599 her management had been successful. The monarchs quarreled, but James had never broken the alliance, challenged her authority in England, or committed any outrageously hostile act. Could she maintain this *status quo* until her death?

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, LXV, Nos. 72-75, copies of the band, 1599.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, LXV, Nos. 46, 80, 85, Nicolson to Cecil, [Sept.], Dec. 15, 24, 1599. Peter Wentworth's book on the succession was printed in Edinburgh about this time and Robert Waldegrave printed another tract entitled *A Treatise Declaring, And confirming against all obiections the just title and right of the most excellent and worthie Prince, Iames the sixth, King of Scotland, to the succession of the croun of England*. See James P. R. Lyell's account of it in *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, LI (1936), pp. 300-301.

<sup>76</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXII, No. 49, Elizabeth's instructions for one to be sent to Scotland, July 1, [1598].

## CHAPTER VII

### THE CRISIS: ESSEX

Within England the tale of Elizabeth's last years centered on the rivalry between Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex, heir of the Leicester-Walsingham faction of the middle years, and the Cecils, the great Lord Treasurer Burghley and his son Sir Robert Cecil, who had been made the Queen's Secretary. Essex, in whose veins a trace of royal blood from Edward III mingled with Boleyn blood,<sup>1</sup> had made his appearance in court in the last years of Leicester, his step-father. Young, brilliant, and attractive, commander of armies and of fleets, hero of the people, leader of the high-spirited youth among the nobility and gentry, he added to the circle about Elizabeth an impetuous spirit, eager to dominate the policy of the government. His vitality and ambition urged him to seek military glory. He served in numerous land and naval expeditions and at the council table invariably raised his voice in favor of war. He had gained by his campaigns great popularity and a fine reputation for chivalry. Elizabeth granted him honors and offices in abundance, but when he tried to utilize his favor with the Queen to get offices for his friends, he failed. He could not see that the reason for his failure lay in himself, in his lack of moderation, in his masterful impetuosity which never permitted him to count the cost before exe-

<sup>1</sup> See Genealogical Table V, pp. 36-37. Through his mother, Lettice Knollys, granddaughter of Mary Boleyn and thus grandniece of the ill-fated Anne Boleyn, Essex was related to Elizabeth herself. Moreover, through Elizabeth Howard, mother of Anne and Mary Boleyn, Essex could claim descent from Thomas of Brotherton, son of Edward I. Camden (pp. 482, 568) said that Essex's followers claimed that his royal blood gave him a better claim to the succession than any other candidate. I do not believe that Essex thought seriously of claiming the throne.



cutting rash plans, and in his boundless ambition. He attributed the thwarting of his hopes to the opposition of the Cecils. His explanation was correct in that they possessed the qualities he lacked so conspicuously.

Lord Burghley, now aged and ailing, had served the Queen faithfully since her accession. His industry, shrewdness, and caution had been of invaluable assistance to her in guiding England through the troubles of her reign. As Treasurer he must have sympathized with and influenced Elizabeth's well-known aversion to the costly gamble of war, although he sometimes saw its necessity to save the Protestant cause in Europe. In the 1590's he could look back with satisfaction on the work of his younger years. The bitterness of watching his strength diminish and his ability to handle the cares of office decrease must have been softened somewhat by the presence of his two surviving sons, the elder, Thomas, a man of mediocre ability and large family, who would inherit the title, and the younger, Robert, well-trained by his father to assume the burdens of state. It was in Robert Cecil that the sharp contrast with Essex appeared. In physical traits, character, and ability the two stood at opposite poles. Essex was tall and handsome, of high spirit and winning personality; Robert Cecil was slight and pale, handicapped in appearance by a humped back. The violence of the young Earl was often outmatched by the cool, calculating mind of the other. Essex lost his temper frequently; Cecil rarely. Essex wasted his strength in noisy, futile blusterings to get his way with the Queen, while the Secretary, possibly schooled to endurance by his deformity, worked quietly along carefully considered paths. He had the advantage of his father's training, influence, and advice. Although there were some occasions when good will between Essex and the Cecils prevailed and although Essex felt some reverence for the kindly Lord Treasurer, who had been his guardian, the contest between them was inevitable. It rose to fever pitch on

numerous occasions. After Burghley's death in August, 1598, the feud was rarely abated.

Writers of English history have described this rivalry especially as it influenced Elizabeth's foreign policy. No detailed study, however, of its effect on the relations between England and Scotland has been made. The story deserves attention. Scotland and her King were too important to be neglected by either faction, and James was well aware that both in immediate questions arising between the monarchs and in the ultimate question of the succession the voices of the Queen's councillors had great weight.

In the years immediately following the Armada, the King was on friendly terms with the Lord Treasurer. Burghley had once excused James's vacillating treatment of his Catholic nobles to the Queen and had influenced her to send him money.<sup>2</sup> James was grateful. The cordiality, however, was of short duration. By 1592 the King spoke peevishly of Burghley and during the troublesome period of the Spanish Blanks he considered the Lord Treasurer and Sir Robert Cecil his enemies.<sup>3</sup> Henceforth he blamed them for much of the friction that arose between himself and Elizabeth. The reasons were many.

First, there was the persistent money question in which the Lord Treasurer, from the very nature of his office, was concerned. In 1596 when the annuity was delayed because of Buccleugh's raid on Carlisle and James's failure to mollify the Queen, the Cecils were blamed. No money was paid to James in 1597, owing to the failure of the border treaty. Although the 1597 allowance was remitted to him in the spring of 1598 and the pension was paid to him more regularly thereafter, the frequent delays and his failure to get as much as he wanted vexed him.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> See above, pp. 49-50.

<sup>3</sup> See above, pp. 73, 116-117.

<sup>4</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVI, No. 12, memorandum of gratuities paid to James

The second grievance James nursed was his suspicion that the Cecils still communicated with his rebel, Bothwell. After Bothwell left Scotland in 1595, he wandered here and there on the continent, offering his services to Philip, to the Archduke, to Elizabeth, to any one who could pay. His capacity to harm was exhausted, but James never forgot his hatred of the man and feared some new enterprise, either by sea or on the borders, with English support. Bothwell's name was anathema to him. Therefore, when he heard that Sir Robert Cecil, while on an embassy in France in 1598, had conferred with the Earl in Rouen and when he heard that John Colville, one of Bothwell's old associates who had deserted him, was cordially received in London, the King was angry. Cecil hastened to deny dealing with Bothwell and to explain that there was no foundation for the story of English support for the Earl. As for Colville, although the Secretary "entertained" him for a time, the liaison was soon broken. Nevertheless, in view of Elizabeth's plot with Bothwell in 1594 which had been managed by the Cecils, this latest incident, however insignificant, could only increase the King's annoyance.<sup>5</sup>

Somewhat similar was the fact that Archibald Douglas, the Scotsman who had once been James's diplomatic representative in London but had been repudiated by the King, remained there, supported in part by grants from the Queen. Douglas was a bitter enemy of David Foulis, the man whom James often employed on errands to Elizabeth. Perhaps professional jealousy inspired the feud. Foulis had no love for the Lord Treasurer, from whom he could never wheedle so much money as he wished. No doubt Foulis poisoned the King's mind against Burghley, citing the lat-

by the Queen, 1592-1600; *ibid.*, LIX, No. 61, Aston to Cecil, Oct. 25, 1596; Birch, *Memoirs*, II, 162, 183. Cf. Table of Pension, p. 293.

<sup>5</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXII, Nos. 19, 32, 64, 67, 74, Nicolson's advertisements to Burghley and Cecil, Apr. 15-Aug. 15, 1598; *ibid.*, LXV, No. 28, [Nicolson to Cecil], no date; *ibid.*, LXII, No. 31, and LXV, No. 44, Hudson to Cecil, May 29, 1598, Sept. 19, 1599; *ibid.*, LXV, No. 33, [Cecil] to Colville, Sept. 1, 1599; Colville, *Letters*, p. 206.

ter's niggardly response to his requests for money and casting suspicions on his relations with Douglas, whom the King disliked.<sup>6</sup>

James's struggle with the kirk may have had its bearing on his attitude to the Cecils. Burghley often relied on coöperation from the ministers to thwart the Catholic party in Scotland.<sup>7</sup> It was rumored in Edinburgh at the time of the Tumult of December 17, 1596 that the English had encouraged the ministers against the King.<sup>8</sup> In the difficult days thereafter Burghley tried, though unsuccessfully, to restore harmony.<sup>9</sup> James's anger was so bitter that any suggestion of favor to the ministers must have been displeasing to him. Perhaps that was why Essex replied so coldly to Bruce and Balcanqual, who wrote to him in January, 1597, for help. He seemed to shift responsibility to his rivals' shoulders when he wrote that "if they [the disgraced ministers] know any Councillor in this place that hath been more used in the causes that concern them, or hath given them cause to presume of favour, that then they would address their letters unto him, for perhaps such a man shall be able to do them more good than I that am a stranger to their former proceedings."<sup>10</sup>

While the King's favor toward the Cecils declined, Essex's credit rose. James had always been friendly to the Earl but their intimacy developed slowly. The attempt Essex had made in 1589 to open a secret correspondence with him had not prospered.<sup>11</sup> Later, as factional rivalry in

<sup>6</sup> For Elizabeth's grants to Archibald Douglas see, e. g., *Hat. Cal.*, IV, 334, 364-365. For Foulis' relations with Douglas and with Burghley see, e. g., S. P. Scotland, LIX, No. 30, Scottish advertisements by Douglas, Aug., 1596; *ibid.*, No. 61, Aston to Cecil, Oct. 25, 1596; Birch, *Memoirs*, II, 164.

<sup>7</sup> E. g., S. P. Scotland, LVIII, No. 19, article 12 in instructions for Bowes, Feb., 1596; *ibid.*, LIX, No. 4, Burghley to Cecil, July 10, 1596.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, LIX, No. 92, Aston to Cecil, Dec. 23, 1596.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, LX, Nos. 16, 34, 37, Bowes to Burghley, Jan. 16, Feb. 20, 26, 1597.

<sup>10</sup> *Hat. Cal.*, VII, 10-11.

<sup>11</sup> See above, p. 48.



England grew keener, the King began to rely more on the Earl. In 1592 he asked Essex for help in a minor suit which he had formerly referred to Burghley "always without effect."<sup>12</sup> In 1594 he recommended his ambassadors to Essex, on whose advice he counted to prevent the Queen from being "abused any longer with suche as praeferre thaire particulaire and unhonest affections to the quenis princelie honoure, and peax of both the realmes." Undoubtedly he referred thus to the Cecils, who through Lord Zouche were setting Bothwell on him.<sup>13</sup> He encouraged the Earl with flowery compliments and promises of reward for his "affection."<sup>14</sup> By 1598 their friendship had grown to such an extent that the French ambassador in London noticed how James entrusted to Essex all that he wished negotiated in the English court.<sup>15</sup>

Essex watched Scottish affairs closely. There remains little evidence of a direct exchange of letters between the King and him; the Earl's action in destroying his papers before surrendering to the Queen's officers after his rebellion in February, 1601, may account for this. But there were numerous other avenues of "intelligence." The Earl of Mar occasionally wrote to him in most cordial terms.<sup>16</sup> Anthony Bacon, Essex's confidant, maintained a regular news service between London and Edinburgh, using as agents Dr. Morison,<sup>17</sup> one Mr. Bruce,<sup>18</sup> John Bothwell, laird of Holyroodhouse, and Dr. Harris, physician to the French King, who

<sup>12</sup> S. P. Scotland, XLIX, No. 37, James to Essex, Oct. 31, 1592.

<sup>13</sup> Birch, *Memoirs*, I, 175. Complaints about Bothwell were the principal subject of this embassy (see above, p. 109).

<sup>14</sup> Birch, *Memoirs*, I, 183.

<sup>15</sup> P. R. O., Fr. Trans., Bdl. 30, Boissize to Henry, Dec. 12, 1598 and Feb. 16, 1599; P. Laffleur de Kermaingant, *L'Ambassade de France en Angleterre sous Henri IV; Mission de Jean de Thumery Sieur de Boissize (1598-1602)* (2 vols., Paris, 1886), I, 480-483.

<sup>16</sup> E. g., Birch, *Memoirs*, II, 138.

<sup>17</sup> Undoubtedly Fynes Morison, a friend of Essex. See *Shakespeare's Europe*, Charles Evans Hughes, ed. (London, 1903), Intro., pp. xix-xx.

<sup>18</sup> Probably Edward Bruce, Abbot of Kinloss, though it may have been Mr. Robert Bruce, the minister, as Birch suggested (*Memoirs*, II, 42).

visited Scotland in 1598. Letters from Ambassador Robert Bowes, James Hudson, and Roger Aston appeared in the files of this intelligence bureau as well as in the Cecil files. James's diplomatic agent, David Foulis, was as friendly to Essex and Anthony Bacon as he was hostile to Burghley and Sir Robert Cecil.<sup>19</sup>

The attitude of Essex and the Cecils to the succession was of prime importance. The French ambassador gathered the impression that Essex favored James, although the Earl was very reticent about it.<sup>20</sup> Certainly his actions bespoke it. At one time he wrote to James, ". . . such as I am, and all whatsoever I am (tho' perhaps a subject of small price) I consecrate unto your regal throne. . . . Neither do I doubt, that the minds of all my countrymen . . . will jointly unite their hopes in your majesty's noble person, as the only center, wherein our rest and happiness consist."<sup>21</sup>

And what of the Cecils? James clearly mistrusted their intentions. In 1594 he considered Burghley a supporter of the Suffolk claim.<sup>22</sup> Early in Elizabeth's reign it had been thought that Burghley favored the Suffolk line, but as the years passed and Edward Seymour, styled by courtesy Lord Beauchamp, in whose person the claim rested, showed no promise, Burghley was said to have shifted his preference. Although the marriage of his granddaughter, Elizabeth de Vere, to William Stanley, sixth Earl of Derby, a descendant of Henry VIII's younger sister Mary, caused some comment in continental circles, in England it created little stir. Derby's claim to the throne was insignificant compared with those of James, Arbella Stewart, and Lord Beau-

<sup>19</sup> Birch, *Memoirs, ad indices*. Holyroodhouse and Harris are not indexed. See Birch, *Memoirs*, II, 158 for Holyroodhouse; for Harris see *Cal. Domestic*, 1598-1601, p. 74, and S. P. Scotland, LXV, No. 4, information concerning persons at the Scottish court, July 9, 1599; *ibid.*, LXIV, No. 60, and LXVI, No. 27, Nicolson to Cecil [Apr. 14, 1599], May 15, 1600.

<sup>20</sup> Laffleur de Kermaingant, *Boissize*, I, 482-483.

<sup>21</sup> Birch, *Memoirs*, I, 176. The letter is dated from London, May 17. It fits well with the circumstances of 1600, although it may be of earlier date. It is signed with the cipher "7."

<sup>22</sup> *Warr. Papers*, II, 43.

champ. Burghley himself was too clever to give any unequivocal hint as to his mind in the matter. It has been suggested that from 1584 he thought James the best candidate and governed himself accordingly.<sup>23</sup> If so, his ideas and actions coincided with Elizabeth's. He would not blatantly curry favor as Essex did, he well knew how much the King disliked him, and yet no item in the list of grievances James nursed against him and his son was an insuperable obstacle to a reconciliation in case Elizabeth died suddenly. After all, he had not always turned deaf ears to James's plea for money. Moreover, Burghley had managed to survive successfully three accessions to the throne involving violent changes: Edward VI's, Mary's, and Elizabeth's. Surely his son Robert could repeat his achievements! Between them, the Lord Treasurer and the Secretary had so much power and influence in England and so much ability that in the end James might be glad to seek their friendship, in spite of a dozen Earls of Essex.

But whose power was the King to fear in England? Warning voices whispered that Essex might be a powerful rival rather than a staunch supporter.<sup>24</sup> James, however, paid little attention to them. He trusted the Earl's sincerity, cherished his hatred of the Cecils, and watched closely the course of the contest between them.

Essex had become more and more discontented with his position at court. At times he was insolent to the Queen herself. For months he sulkily absented himself from her presence only to return, to be forgiven, and to quarrel again. He needed some great occasion to increase his prestige and discredit his enemies. Ireland afforded such an opportunity. He was sent there in the spring of 1599 as Queen's Lieutenant to settle once and for all time the re-

<sup>23</sup> See above, p. 19.

<sup>24</sup> *Hat. Cal.*, IX, 307-310; S. P. Scotland, LXIII, No. 33, Nicolson to Cecil, Oct. 14, 1598. It is interesting to note that Ferdinand of Tuscany, in advising James about the succession, thought Essex the man in England most able to hinder a pretender (Mackie, *Negotiations*, pp. 10-11).

bellion which had become Elizabeth's gravest worry. He commanded larger forces than previous deputies had had and his commission gave him extensive powers. Although he had counseled an immediate attack on Ulster, Tyrone's greatest strength, and had criticized others for failing to do that, he wasted time, men, and money in minor expeditions and when at last he marched against the rebel leader with greatly reduced forces he accomplished nothing. On the contrary, he had a personal interview with Tyrone, arranged a truce with the possibility of a future peace on terms quite unacceptable to Elizabeth, and, if the testimony of witnesses may be trusted, negotiated secretly with Tyrone to the end that Tyrone should control Ireland and Essex become ruler of England. Driven to desperation by Elizabeth's coldness and Cecil's influence with her in his absence, the Earl left his command in Ireland contrary to the Queen's express order and hastened to court in September, 1599, where he was soon called to account for his disobedience and mismanagement. He was first committed to the custody of his friend Egerton for some months, then permitted to occupy his own house under surveillance, and eventually allowed to go where he would except to court.

Essex chafed at the inactivity. It was too much to be brought from the center of authority, responsibility, and power to—nothing. He interpreted his enforced absence from court as a sign that his enemies had full sway. He bemoaned their puissance: Raleigh dominated in the West and in Jersey, Cobham in the Cinque Ports and in Kent; Cecil's brother, the new Lord Burghley, was Lord President in the North; Carew held an important post in Ireland; Buckhurst as Treasurer controlled "the sinews of action"; and Admiral Howard commanded the navy. One thought obsessed the Earl: He must come into the Queen's presence, recover her favor, and overthrow his enemies whom he blamed for his continued misfortune. But Elizabeth was not to be moved. She read his letters and throughout the



weary months of 1600 continued to refuse him access. She refused to renew his patent for the custom on sweet wines, a generous gift she had bestowed on him some years before, which expired in the autumn of 1600. Essex shortly thereafter turned to a plan which must have been in the back of his mind for some time. Persuasion had failed. Only force remained.

When in Ireland he had proposed to return to England with part of his army, a scheme from which his friends dissuaded him. Actually he came back accompanied by a group of his friends on whom he relied to release him if he were committed to the Tower or were in any other way severely punished. At that time Elizabeth cleverly planned her moves so as not to stir these young bloods to action. Now the Earl determined to stake all on one final attempt. It was an ugly thing to contemplate, this use of force, and although Essex vowed allegiance to the Queen, what if she should prove obdurate? Her past conduct and her Tudor blood should have told him clearly what to expect, but Essex had never been wont to calculate shrewdly the future. He was a victim of his own shortcomings and of the encouragement of his friends, who flocked to him and assured him of the support of the populace. He squared his conscience and tried to justify his scheme by planning that after he had come to the Queen—which meant after he had taken possession of the court by force—and had ousted his enemies, he would call a parliament and get James's right to the succession clearly recognized. The Queen, disturbed by the unusual number of visitors at Essex House, summoned him on February 7, 1601 before her Council. He refused to come, appealed to London on Sunday morning, February eighth, failed to arouse any support, and in the end capitulated. He was tried for treason, convicted, and executed within three weeks.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>25</sup> For the last years of Essex's career and his relations with the Queen, see Cheyney, II, Part IX, chaps. xlii-xliv; James Spedding, *The Letters and the Life of Francis Bacon* . . . , II (London, 1890), 122-239; Birch,

The complete details of the connection between Essex and James during the Earl's sojourn in Ireland and his subsequent disgrace are not clear, but the depositions of witnesses closely associated with the February rising hint at a fairly close understanding.<sup>26</sup> Henry Cuffe, a servant of Essex deeply implicated in the rebellion, confessed that Essex "had intelligence" with the King for at least two years, which puts the date back to early 1599.<sup>27</sup> Christopher Blount, Essex's stepfather, admitted "that, to his remembrance, even at his going into Ireland he confessed to have practised with Scotland."<sup>28</sup> In the summer of 1599 Charles Blount, Lord Mountjoy, Essex's devoted friend who advised him in these troublesome days, sent one Henry Leigh as messenger to James. Mountjoy's purpose was to assure the King that Essex had no thought of rivalry and would countenance no heir to the throne but James, and to discuss some course for his recognition as heir in the Queen's lifetime. It was a general invitation to James to back the Earl's efforts to oust his rivals from the government of England. Sometime after Essex's dramatic return to London, Mountjoy received from James a letter "wherein was nothing but compliments . . . and referring him for the matter to the bearer, who delivered unto him that the King would think of it, and put himself in a readiness to take any good occasion." This was cautiously encouraging.<sup>29</sup> Mountjoy replied by sending Leigh again to Scotland about February, 1600, with a more definite plan that James should prepare an

*Memoirs*, II, 394-492; and the very suggestive chapters xviii-xxi of J. E. Neale's *Queen Elizabeth* (London, 1934).

<sup>26</sup> Spedding (II, 245-365) prints Bacon's *Declaration touching the Treason of the Late Earl of Essex and his Complices* with the depositions of the witnesses in full. He includes the parts of the testimony suppressed in Bacon's original published work. Much of the same evidence is printed in Bruce, *Correspondence*, pp. 80-110. Important parts of the treason were confessed by the Earl's accomplices only after his condemnation and execution.

<sup>27</sup> Spedding, II, 330.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 357.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 335, 358-359; Birch, *Memoirs*, II, 470-471.

army "at a convenient time" and declare his purpose, and that Mountjoy would coöperate with forces from Ireland "in establishing such a course as should be best for our country." Leigh did not return until after Mountjoy left for Ireland to take up his duties as commander there. James's answer this time was "dilatory."<sup>30</sup>

The English government was suspicious of Leigh's journeys to Scotland and was kept informed of his movements. After his second trip Leigh went to London, where he gave a lively and quite ingenious account of his expeditions. He went, he said, to get a license to levy men and buy provisions for the service in Ireland, to escape his creditors, and to settle numerous personal affairs. Yes, he had seen the King privately several times, either in the fields or in the royal "Caponnet," being ashamed to appear publicly in court, since he had traveled without luggage and therefore could not dress in fashion. The King had talked of the succession, had asked many questions about affairs in England, and had given him no money, only "one little ring of diamonds." The Council was apparently not satisfied with this tale of good fellowship between James and an unlicensed, impecunious traveler. Leigh was kept in prison until August, 1600, when a warrant for his release was issued.<sup>31</sup>

The next person to share a fate similar to Leigh's was Sir William Eure, brother of Lord Eure, warden of the middle march. Sir William got Lord Willoughby, Governor of Berwick, to send him into Scotland on border affairs and used this opportunity to visit James in October, 1600, at Spott, where the King was with Sir George Hume, Cessford, and Sir Thomas Erskine. Details of the consultations are unknown, but it was rumored that Eure proposed that James, when he saw anything attempted in England,

<sup>30</sup> Spedding, II, 336-337, 359.

<sup>31</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVI, No. 13, Nicolson to Cecil, Feb. 23, 1600; *Bor-der Papers*, II, 624, 628, 648-654; *Hat. Cal.*, X, 61, 64-66, 93-94, 134-135, 158, 173, 194, 270.

should assist with five thousand men. Eure was promptly summoned to London to give an account of himself and was kept in custody until long after the February rising. James was annoyed that any one should incur such penalties for merely speaking to him and ordered his ambassadors to complain about it.<sup>32</sup>

It is difficult to estimate just how much Elizabeth and her Secretary knew of what was going on between Essex and the King of Scotland. In the letters of George Nicolson, the English agent in Edinburgh, there is very little trace of the Essex story before it reached its climax in February, 1601. Nicolson reported faithfully the coming of any Englishman<sup>33</sup> and in February, 1600, about the time of Henry Leigh's second journey, wrote that James was soon to go to the borders. "Some judge that some Englishmen shall quietly meet him there, of which I say nothing."<sup>34</sup> An interesting note in cipher appears in one of his letters to Cecil, dated July 9, 1600, which he asked Cecil to read and burn.

*Nicolson* tells me he understands by one who never abused him that *the king* is by all means seeking a party and hath a party *in England*, and by party or faction, if he can have commodity by either as he reckons he hath by a party, intends *not to tarry upon her Majesty's death* but take time so soon as without peril he can.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>32</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVI, No. 85, Nicolson to Cecil, Oct. 28, 1600; *ibid.*, LXVII, No. 14, Ralph Gray to Cecil, Feb. 13, 1601; *Border Papers*, II, 701-702, 713-718, 727-728; *Hat. Cal.*, X, 407-408, 418-419; *ibid.*, XI, 15, 90, 198; *Cal. Domestic*, 1598-1601, pp. 500-501, 537; *ibid.*, 1601-1603, . . . Mary Anne Everett Green, ed. (London, 1870), p. 42; *Birch, Memoirs*, II, 511.

<sup>33</sup> E. g., S. P. Scotland, LXVI, Nos. 25, 41, Nicolson to Cecil, May 2, July 9, 1600; *ibid.*, No. 40, Aston to Hudson, July 6, 1600; *ibid.*, No. 108, Nicolson to Sir Henry Brounker, Dec. 10, 1600; *ibid.*, No. 114, Brounker to Cecil, Dec. 20, 1600. The references of July and December speak of a Charles Leigh who had access to the King. Henry Leigh was again in Scotland in February, 1601 (*Hat. Cal.*, XI, 84-85; S. P. Scotland, LXVII, No. 15, Nicolson to Cecil, Feb. 14, 1601).

<sup>34</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVI, No. 11, Nicolson to Cecil, Feb. 16, 1600.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, LXVI, No. 41, words in italics in cipher, deciphered.



The reckoning demanded from Henry Leigh and Sir William Eure showed that the government was suspicious, but neither culprit seems to have revealed much.

The state of parties in Scotland had some connection with the Essex story. There the pro-Catholic element under the leadership of Secretary Elphinstone and the gentlemen of the King's Chamber, especially Cessford, Sir George Hume, Sir George Elphinstone, and Sir Patrick Murray, contended with Mar and his party not only to control the government but also to guide its relations with England.<sup>36</sup> The Scottish ambassadors and agents who came to London usually represented some faction at home and afforded an excellent opportunity for communication with Cecil or with Essex.

One of the first of these was James Sempill of Beltreis, an accomplished penman who had aided James in the preparation of the manuscript of the *Basilicon Doron*. He was appointed to the English embassy partly through the influence of Secretary Elphinstone and the Chamber.<sup>37</sup> He was in London at the time of Essex's return from Ireland and remained in England until March, 1600. For some time Nicolson had been urging a close correspondence between Cecil and Secretary Elphinstone, a proposal that seemed to fall on deaf ears as far as Cecil was concerned.<sup>38</sup> Elphinstone probably hoped that Beltreis' presence in London would facilitate some understanding between himself and Cecil. While in England, Sempill was very friendly to the English Secretary and soon after his return received various sums of money at Cecil's direction.<sup>39</sup> The inference

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, LXIV, No. 53, Cecil's notes on "the present state of Scotland how it groweth every day into more affection to popery" [early 1599]; *ibid.*, No. 56, Hudson to Cecil, Apr. 3, 1599; *ibid.*, No. 75, Sir Wm. Bowes to Cecil, May 20, 1599; *ibid.*, No. 81, Nicolson to Cecil, June 9, 1599.

<sup>37</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXV, Nos. 10, 11, 14, Nicolson to Cecil, Aug. 2, 12, 17, 1599; *ibid.*, No. 21, [Hudson] to Cecil, Aug. 26, 1599; *Scots Peerage*, VII, 548-549.

<sup>38</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXIV, Nos. 34, 49, 51, 60, 81, and LXV, No. 39, advices from Nicolson to Cecil, early 1599-Sept. 11, 1599.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, LXV, No. 41, Hudson to Cecil, Sept. 14, 1599; *ibid.*, LXV, No.

that he was wholly devoted to Cecil's service cannot, however, be made. Anthony Bacon apparently considered him a partisan of Essex.<sup>40</sup>

Sir Robert Ker, laird of Cessford, and Sir George Hume, both gentlemen of the King's Chamber and favorite courtiers, were influential in Scotland.<sup>41</sup> Although they at times worked with the Elphinstone party against Mar, both were too restless and ambitious to be identified with any interest but their own. Cessford, created Lord Roxborough and named privy councillor in spite of Elizabeth's displeasure, tried to mend his ways and gain English approval by unwonted good conduct in his border office. He proposed for a time a journey through England with the purpose, it was thought, of negotiating for the King, but the idea was abandoned. Both he and Sir George Hume were with James when Sir William Eure came to Hume's home in Spott to see the King.<sup>42</sup> Although it was whispered later that Hume was Eure's "beurayer,"<sup>43</sup> no evidence has come to light showing that either he or Cessford was in league with Cecil. Hudson urged the English Secretary to put no faith in Secretary Elphinstone, Cessford, or Sir George Hume.<sup>44</sup>

63, Beltreis to Cecil, Nov. 3, 1599; *ibid.*, LXVI, No. 17, Nicolson to Cecil, Mar. 25, 1600; *ibid.*, LXVII, No. 66, incl., note of money disbursed by Nicolson, June 27, 1601; *ibid.*, LXVIII, No. 52, [Nicolson to Cecil], no date. Cipher "99" apparently meant Beltreis. Cf. *ibid.*, LXVII, No. 66, incl., and No. 131.

<sup>40</sup> Hist. MSS. Comm., *Report on the Manuscripts of the Earl of Ancaster, preserved at Grimsthorpe* (Dublin, 1907), pp. 348-349, A. Bacon to Willoughby, Jan. 4, 1600. Beltreis is not mentioned by name in the letter but seems clearly to be the person indicated.

<sup>41</sup> Cecil (S. P. Scotland, LXIV, No. 53) listed Ker as one of the Chamber. I have found no confirmation of the statement.

<sup>42</sup> Cotton MSS., Caligula D ii, ff. 381-384, Sir Wm. Bowes to Elizabeth, May 31, 1599; S. P. Scotland, LXV, No. 70, [Nicolson to Cecil], no date; *ibid.*, LXV, No. 76, and LXVI, Nos. 13, 21, 28, Nicolson to Cecil, Nov. 27, 1599, Feb. 23, Apr. 20, May 27, 1600; *ibid.*, LXVI, Nos. 92, 99, Nicolson to [Cecil], Nov. 12, 20, 1600; *ibid.*, LXV, No. 77, Aston to Cecil, Nov. 27, 1599; *ibid.*, LXVI, No. 80, Robert Douglas to [Archibald or Thomas Douglas?], no date; *Border Papers*, II, 655-656.

<sup>43</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXIX, No. 38, Thos. Douglas to Cecil, Nov. 24, 1602.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, LXIV, No. 56, Hudson to Cecil, Apr. 3, 1599.

The possibility, however, that Cecil and Nicolson used them or their subordinates to discover the plans of Mar's faction must not be overlooked.

James relied mainly on the Earl of Mar and Mar's cousin, Sir Thomas Erskine, to advise him in English affairs. Edward Bruce, titular Abbot of Kinloss, David Foulis, and the Englishman, James Hudson, were associated with them. Hudson once named as Elizabeth's friends in Scotland the following:

The good, honorable, true Earl of Mar, the Earl of Cassils, now Treasurer, making this profession, Sir John Carmichel, the old Treasurer [Blantyre?], Sir Thomas Erskine of the "chalmer," . . . Mr. David "fowels," and divers other, but these be chiefly them that advise reverence and honor to be still given to her Majesty; and of these only employed in affairs touching England is first the Earl of Mar, Sir Thomas Erskine, and Mr. David "fowels." This Earl is so publicly known for honorable, true, wise, and well affected and having the affairs with England chiefly referred to him that the other sort dare not joust with him but by craft under thumb.<sup>45</sup>

It was Mar and Kinloss who alone backed the King when James appealed without effect to a Convention in June, 1600, for money to have an army in readiness for his accession to the English throne.<sup>46</sup> In view of Mountjoy's suggestions to James some months earlier, this appeal for money seems significant. At about the same time Nicolson reported James's activity in seeking a party in England and his intention "not to tarry upon her Majesty's death."<sup>47</sup> It was Mar and Kinloss who went as ambassadors to London during the critical days of February, 1601. Their errands at

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, LXIV, No. 56, Apr. 3, 1599.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, LXVI, No. 37, Nicolson to Cecil, June 29, 1600.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, LXVI, No. 41, Nicolson to Cecil, July 9, 1600.

that time were kept secret from the rest of the Council, Secretary Elphinstone himself not being permitted to assist in drawing up their instructions.<sup>48</sup> This clique guarded jealously its influence. In August, 1600, James sent to London as "remaying agent" one James Hamilton, whom Hudson mistrusted and whose appointment coincided with Hudson's temporary recall. In February, 1601, during the very days of the Essex crisis, Sir Thomas Erskine had Hamilton brought back to Edinburgh. Erskine charged him with too great familiarity with Sir Robert Cecil!<sup>49</sup>

These agents, and doubtless many others, were traveling back and forth between England and Scotland, or were writing their letters during the long months of 1600, while Essex tried in vain to recover Elizabeth's favor. Mountjoy, on whose help with the Irish army Essex had depended, now turned cold. Knowing that Essex's life was not in danger and foreseeing the tremendous difficulties and dangers, he refused to venture further with the Earl.<sup>50</sup> Before Christmas, 1600, Essex determined to act and wrote for his friends to come up to London. He also appealed to James for moral support and wrote him a letter on Christmas Day, a long tirade against the Cecil faction.<sup>51</sup> He had suffered in silence this long, he said, not believing that men could do such evil and fearing to "engage the state" in a private quarrel.

<sup>48</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVII, No. 8, Nicolson to Cecil, Feb. 7, 1601.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, LXVI, Nos. 46, 47, James's letters of recommendation for Hamilton, Aug. 4, 1600; *ibid.*, No. 49, Nicolson to Cecil, Aug. 5, 1600; *ibid.*, No. 78, Hudson to Cecil, Oct. 19, 1600; *ibid.*, LXVII, No. 8, Nicolson to Cecil, Feb. 7, 1601; *ibid.*, No. 10, T. Douglas to Cecil, Feb. 10, 1601.

<sup>50</sup> Spedding, II, 337.

<sup>51</sup> I have discovered in the British Museum, Additional MSS., 31022, ff. 105-108, what I believe to be an authentic copy of this letter, which until now has been known only through Cuffe's and Southampton's descriptions. It is a copy endorsed "A true copy of the Earl of Essex his last letter written with his own hand (from which I took this immediately) to James the 6. [then only] King of Scotland." The letter is printed in full in the Appendix to this chapter. For Cuffe's and Southampton's testimony, see Spedding, II, 330-333, 342-343, 362-363. Cf. Stowe MSS., 145, ff. 12-15, copy, Cuffe to Cecil, describing the instructions Essex prepared for Mar; Bruce, *Correspondence*, pp. 81-84; Spedding, II, 352-355.



. . . now hath this reigning faction left no degree, county, nor no man almost of living, courage, or understanding without some complaint against them. Now doth the world see that I am oppressed by them that charge me with no new offence and in public hearing in June last did clear me of all disloyalty, ill affection, or the least intent to do anything to the disservice of my sovereign or of my country. Now doth not only their corrupting of my servants, stealing of my papers, suborning of false witnesses, procuring of many forged letters in my name, and other such like practises against me appear; but their seeking to suppress all noble, virtuous, and heroical spirits, their ill affection to our best confederates, their juggling with our enemies, their practise for th' Infanta of Spain, and their devilish plots with your Majesty's own subjects against your person and life, whereby they may keep themselves from giving accompt, secure their great estates for the time to come, and have the same pleasure of rocking a cradle which some in this state enjoyed when your Majesty first came to that crown. Now am I summoned of all sides to stop the malice, the wickedness and madness of these men, and to relieve my poor country that groans under her burthen. Now doth reason, honor, and conscience command me to be active. Now do I see by God's favor the fairest and likeliest hopes that can be of good success. This only remaineth, that your Majesty, as you are most interested, so you be first declared in this business. For . . . you have been a little wanting to yourself in not declaring your just griefs against your practising enemies in this state. For as they seduce some that are weak and ignorant by their slanderous reports of your Majesty, so they abuse others that are well affected to you by a persuasion that this faction hath a great secret interest in your favor, which doth more advantage them and hurt your Majesty and your friends than any one thing whatsoever.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>52</sup> The warning that Cecil and his friends plotted with the King's own subjects against his person and life may possibly be a veiled reference to the Gowry plot and the rumor that it had been hatched in England (S. P. Scotland, LXVI, No. 55, Nicolson to Cecil, Aug. 11, 1600). The fact that Elizabeth was toying with the idea of a peace with Spain in 1600 lent color to Essex's suggestion about the Infanta. James was worried lest an Anglo-Spanish agreement prejudice him. At the time he preferred Essex's militarism to the general peace policy of the Cecils (*ibid.*, LXVI, No. 21,

Essex therefore proposed that James send an ambassador, preferably the Earl of Mar, to London by February first to assist in thwarting James's enemies in England. "And when by God's favor your Majesty shall be secured from all practises here and against all competitions whatsoever, you shall be declared and acknowledged the certain and undoubted successor to this crown. . . ." The Earl arranged for a cipher answer to this letter. It was said that the paper he wore in a little black bag around his neck which he burned before delivering himself to the Queen's officers on February eighth was James's reply.<sup>53</sup>

James fell in with the suggestion and prepared to send Mar and Kinloss to London, but before they started on their journey, news of Essex's miserable failure of February eighth reached Edinburgh and altered the situation. The King drew up "Notes for my ambassadoures anent this accident," in which he left it to the advice of his "friendis" whether it were better to "lye still" or to "kythe" in the matter.<sup>54</sup> He trusted much the discretion of his two representatives.

Ye sall temper and frame all youre dealing uith the quene or counsall, by the aduise of my freindis thaire, quhose counsall ye sall directlie follou in all youre behaiouire thaire, with these reseruatiouns only, quhiche by tounge I deliuered unto you, and if that actuallie thay performe thaire, promiseis on thaire pairt, I giue you by these presentis of my owin hande, ample powaire to giue thaim full assurance of my assisting thaim accordinglie.<sup>55</sup>

Nicolson to Cecil, Apr. 20, 1600; *ibid.*, No. 23, Beltreis to Cecil, Apr. 29, 1600).

<sup>53</sup> Spedding, II, 342-343; Bruce, *Correspondence*, pp. 80-81. For details of the cipher answer, see the postscript of Essex's letter, Appendix, p. 224.

<sup>54</sup> Birch, *Memoirs*, II, 510.

<sup>55</sup> Maidment, *Letters and State Papers*, p. 37.

By the time Mar and Kinloss arrived in London, the drama, so far as Essex was concerned, was played out and the Earl had paid the penalty for his indiscretion. The story of James's *volte face*, the astute fashion in which his ambassadors arranged quietly with Cecil an entirely new order of affairs, belongs to another chapter. The King's lively mistrust of the English Secretary appeared in the instructions he sent to Mar and Kinloss in April, but he realized that "maister secretarie . . . is king thair in effect" and promised favor to him if he would work to please the King.<sup>56</sup>

Many of the details outlined above concerning Essex's intrigues with James through Mountjoy and Henry Leigh came to light by the depositions of Essex's confederates, Southampton, Cuffe, and Danvers, only *after* the Earl's trial. Until then the English government was probably ignorant of the extent of the liaison, although it was keenly aware that some understanding with James existed. Whatever its knowledge, it displayed wise restraint in not pushing the matter in the Earl's trial and afterwards. Once or twice during the legal proceedings against Essex, Scotland's King was mentioned, but the prosecutors for the government, probably acting on instructions, never followed it up. The cue was apparently to ignore any inference touching James.<sup>57</sup> In the officially inspired narrative of the rebellion written by Bacon, no mention of Scotland was made; even in the testimony of witnesses appended to Bacon's work, all references to Scotland were suppressed.<sup>58</sup> The subject was evidently not brought up in the later trials of Cuffe, Danvers, and others. Elizabeth tried to force Mar

<sup>56</sup> Birch, *Memoirs*, II, 510–513.

<sup>57</sup> Spedding, II, 222, 325; *A Complete Collection of State Trials and Proceedings for High Treason . . .*, T. B. Howell, ed., I (London, 1816), p. 1343; *The Lives and Criminal Trials of Celebrated Men*, D. Jardine, ed. (Philadelphia, 1835), pp. 328–329; P. R. O., Fr. Trans., Bdl. 32, Boissize to Henry IV, Mar. 5 (N.S.), 1601.

<sup>58</sup> Spedding, II, chap. x, pp. 245–365.

and Kinloss to reveal details of the "traffic," but they avoided the issue and the Queen eventually dropped it.<sup>59</sup>

Elizabeth's moderation at this time recalls her policy in the Valentine Thomas case. To herself she must have acknowledged James her successor. Her willingness to suppress anything that might have jeopardized his claim is evidence. She had removed the danger of rebellious subjects in Essex's person and reckoned on her old policy with the King to calm him. Money and the promise to do nothing prejudicial to his title "pretended" had on the whole kept him faithful to the alliance in the past. True, he had become very restive in recent years, had considered more seriously than ever since 1587 a rupture with her, had come perilously near an act that might have involved him in a charge of conspiracy against her. Her wisdom in ignoring it gave James opportunity to retrace his steps. The Queen was teaching her successor an excellent lesson in statecraft by thus preparing quietly for his accession while withholding an outright declaration. A year later she reminded him, ". . . though many exceed me in many things, yet I dare profess that I can ever keep taciturnity for myself and my friends. My head may fail but my tongue shall never, as I will not say but yourself can in yourself though not to me witness. . . ." <sup>60</sup> Was this an obscure reference to her reticence concerning the Essex affair?

James was worried during those early months of 1601. Nicolson said he was "in dumps" at the news of Essex's rebellion and he expressly directed Mar and Kinloss to obtain from the Queen "a plaine declairatoure, quhiche must be enacted in her ouin recordis, that I am untouchid in any action of practice, that ever hath bene intendit against her, especially in this last." <sup>61</sup> Apparently they did not press

<sup>59</sup> Cotton MSS., Titus C vii, ff. 126-127, copy, Elizabeth to James, May 11, 1601; *Hat. Cal.*, XIV, 176.

<sup>60</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVIII, No. 74, copy, July 4, 1602.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, LXVII, No. 16, Nicolson to Cecil, Feb. 14, 1601; Birch, *Memoirs*, II, 511.



the point. Probably they knew the inexpediency of mentioning it and trusted to the King to forgive them, since he left so much to their discretion. James was relieved to learn that his name was not brought publicly in question. There the matter rested.<sup>62</sup>

Although James was deeply concerned in the Essex affair, he characteristically held aloof from active participation. The answer Henry Leigh brought back from his second trip into Scotland was quite indefinite; Danvers thought that the King was either not ready or could not bring himself to "declare himself" before Mountjoy was more secure in Ireland; Southampton said that he replied "that he liked the course well, and would prepare himself for it." The conspirators, however, did not count greatly on his aid and thought Mountjoy's Irish army alone would suffice. Early in 1600 they had some vague idea of joint action by Scottish forces, Essex's friends in England, and the army from Ireland, but when the crisis approached Essex asked James only for his countenance in the person of an ambassador, preferably the Earl of Mar. The ambassador, on arriving in London, was to act with Essex in bringing about the fall of the latter's enemies, notably Cecil, Cobham, Raleigh, Admiral Howard, and Buckhurst, who, said Essex, by securing all strategic places in the government and country were preparing to advance the Infanta's claim. The Earl promised to instruct Mar at greater length on his arrival.<sup>63</sup>

James was willing to send Mar, but Mar came much later

<sup>62</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVII, No. 27, Nicolson to Cecil, Mar. 8, 1601. "*King was anxious to know if his name was in question or no, and glad it was not.*" (Words in italics in cipher, deciphered.) Nicolson wrote on Mar. 14 (*ibid.*, No. 28), "Some of the very best as I have told them the matter [concerning the rebellion] was very curious to know of me if in the examination of the matter anything was said of them here or no, to which I answer nothing at all, no, not any suspicion at all that I hear." Cf. Birch, *Memoirs*, II, 508-509.

<sup>63</sup> Spedding, II, 336-337 and n., 352-355, 359; Add. MSS., 31022, ff. 107-108, copy, Essex to James, Dec. 25, 1600; Stowe MSS., 145, ff. 12-15, Cuffe to Cecil, describing the instructions Essex prepared for Mar.

than February first, the date Essex had suggested. He started on February eighteenth, knowing that the revolt had already been attempted on February eighth. He traveled slowly, reaching London only on March sixth, by which time Essex had been tried and executed and some of the lesser accomplices had been tried and condemned.<sup>64</sup> In view of the slow transportation of the age and the difficulties of communication in the winter season, all the delay can not fairly be attributed to the King's hesitancy. Yet James acted with caution. Only when his friends had fulfilled their promises were Mar and Kinloss to give assurance of the King's aid.<sup>65</sup> The ease with which he entered upon an understanding with Cecil so soon after Essex's death is a tribute to the skill of the negotiators, but it shows in James his innate capacity for caution and opportunism. Henry Leigh said that James had spoken of Essex as "a very gallant nobleman, but he suspected him somewhat ambitious"; as for Cecil, "Somewhat he towched your honors self, as both to wyse and to riche for my Lord of Essex. . . ." <sup>66</sup> Moreover, the King's grief for Essex was said to have been lightened by considerations that the Earl might have become too great.<sup>67</sup> It was ever James's policy not to rely solely on one party. Perhaps this explains why he employed Sempill of Beltreis and James Hamilton in England during the critical years. Neither can be said to have been definitely of Mar's faction.

James had become exceptionally nervous about his claim to the English throne at this time. He hustled about, dispatching embassies, buying armor, raising money, and trying to train his reluctant people for military service.<sup>68</sup> He was attracted by Essex's schemes and let himself venture

<sup>64</sup> Calderwood, VI, 102; Birch, *Memoirs*, II, 509.

<sup>65</sup> Maidment, *Letters and State Papers*, p. 37.

<sup>66</sup> *Border Papers*, II, 649.

<sup>67</sup> *Cal. Ireland, 1600-1601*, E. G. Atkinson, ed. (London, 1905), pp. 242-243.

<sup>68</sup> *Warr. Papers*, II, 358-362 ff.; *Hat. Cal.*, X, 59-62; *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, Intro., p. lxxv, p. 462; *ibid.*, VI, Intro., pp. xix-xx, p. 18; S. P. Scotland,

more boldly than usual, though not without reservations. Elizabeth was reluctantly, yet obligingly blind; her Counsellors, once their rival was gone, became charmingly agreeable; and the King had been careful not to go too far. His instructions to Mar and Kinloss in April show him taking a rather high hand, demanding "yone declairattoure, that I am cleare and untouchid in any of those practises" and threatening Secretary Cecil with his wrath in days to come. Nevertheless, in the same paper he cautioned his representatives apropos of any action to be "vell sensid; the chief propertie quhairof is to take the tyme richt, quhiche vill make you to escheu the tuo extremities" of precipitation and of overlong delay.<sup>69</sup> Again luck was with him. As in most past crises, he was spared the necessity of acting before it was clear in what direction the wind lay.

#### APPENDIX

BRITISH MUSEUM, ADDITIONAL MSS., 31022,  
FF. 107-108

Essex to James, December 25, 1600:

It is high time that I, who have been so much and so injuriously talked of by others, should speak somewhat for myself, especially to your Majesty, of whom I desire to be understood and believed, not for small or self-loving considerations, but for the happiness of my country and all honest men in it. And lest that your Majesty should think that my silence or patience hitherto had prejudiced myself or any that have interest in me, I will truly deliver what are the things which tied both my hands and my tongue from the beginning of my troubles until now. First, it was far beyond my belief or opinion that they which have only skill to handle humors should grow so potent in a state as they could oppress innocency, cancel merit, justify con-

LXV, No. 80, Nicolson to Cecil, Dec. 15, 1599; *ibid.*, No. 81, Aston to Cecil, Dec. 16, 1599.

<sup>69</sup> Birch, *Memoirs*, II, 510-513.

spiracy, make law, inspire judges, overawe the people, bury freedom, usurp sovereignty for the present, and prepare a way for an unjust succession hereafter. Secondly, though they might use the name and power of a prince (who now believing none nor hearing nothing but as they direct, must needs be led blindfold into her own extreme danger), yet I thought their ambition had been limited in monopolizing the prince, governing the court, enriching themselves, and supplanting me, whose opposition they had sometimes found and would ever fear, for still me thought it was madness, if not impossibility, for men so base, so cowardly, and that knew themselves to be so odious, to aspire higher. Thirdly, I remembered their ancient and constant practise to draw from me th'affections of my countrymen and to stir up against me th'envy of my peers, the suspicion of my sovereign, and above all things the jealousy of your Majesty, by giving out that I could not content myself with the state of a subject, but had I know not what absurd and frantic designs without either shadow of pretence or any one circumstance of strength to effect them; and therefore my reason as well as my conscience did tell me that I must not engage the state in a quarrel of mine, but wait opportunity to sacrifice myself in the quarrel of the state; that I had no party but of the best men, who, if they found I took in hand an evil cause, would be the readiest of all men to cut my throat; that I must learn out of Christian philosophy to bear both fortunes and neglect private injuries if the public state of my country could prosper in the meantime. And lastly, I saw plainly the more patience I shewed and silence I used the more would mine enemies increase their insolency and multiply their errors; the more would the world discover mine innocency and apprehend my unjust persecution; the more use should my country have of me, when a general oppression, an imminent hazard of the state, and your Majesty's concurrence for your own interest should summon all the generous spirits of England to seek reformation; or at least the more I should mend the quarrel if I were indirectly cut off and proved a martyr. And so by God's providence it hath fallen out. For now hath this reigning faction left no degree, county, nor no man almost of living, courage, or understanding without some complaint against them. Now doth the world see that I am oppressed by



them that charge me with no new offence and in public hearing in June last did clear me of all disloyalty, ill affection, or the least intent to do anything to the disservice of my sovereign or of my country. Now doth not only their corrupting of my servants, stealing of my papers, suborning of false witnesses, procuring of many forged letters in my name, and other such like practises against me appear; but their seeking to suppress all noble, virtuous, and heroical spirits, their ill affection to our best confederates, their juggling with our enemies, their practise for th'Infanta of Spain, and their devilish plots with your Majesty's own subjects against your person and life, whereby they may keep themselves from giving accompt, secure their great estates for the time to come, and have the same pleasure of rocking a cradle which some in this state enjoyed when your Majesty first came to that crown. Now am I summoned of all sides to stop the malice, the wickedness and madness of these men, and to relieve my poor country that groans under her burthen. Now doth reason, honor, and conscience command me to be active. Now do I see by God's favor the fairest and likeliest hopes that can be of good success. This only remaineth, that your Majesty, as you are most interested, so you be first declared in this business. For (if I may speak it with pardon) you have been a little wanting to yourself in not declaring your just griefs against your practising enemies in this state. For as they seduce some that are weak and ignorant by their slanderous reports of your Majesty, so they abuse others that are well affected to you by a persuasion that this faction hath a great secret interest in your favor, which doth more advantage them and hurt your Majesty and your friends than any one thing whatsoever. There is nothing desired of your Majesty but this, that you send hither by the first of February a qualified, stout, well spoken, discreet, secret, and faithful ambassador, who may speak to, of, and against your enemies here that which shall be needful; that he come provided with as many things to object as your Majesty already knoweth or shall before his coming away discover; and for the rest, that you command him to receive such supply as we shall give him here, which shall be sufficient though he come otherwise empty. And when by God's favor your Majesty shall be secured from all practises here and against all competitions whatsoever, you shall

be declared and acknowledged the certain and undoubted successor to this crown and shall command the services and lives of as many of us as shall undertake this great work, which are as many as you shall find cause to prize in all our nation. I make reservation of my duty to my sovereign, because as I am born her subject, so I protest before the living God that I would die before I would see or suffer any harm to be done to her person or her just authority taken from her in her own time. And so committing th'importance of this cause to your Majesty's princely wisdom, and your person and cause to God's divine protection I rest

As much your Majesty's as my former reservation will allow

ESSEX

25 of Dec.

This bearer knows not what he carrieth; therefore, for answer, if your Majesty grant the demand, it shall be sufficient that with your own hand in a loose paper you write these words, Send hither to your correspondent these books, in Spanish the chronicles of Caribay and Ambrosio Moralis, and in English Stowe's Chronicle which I hear is newly reprinted and enlarged.

At margin on last page:

In this letter I will hazard none but myself, and therefore I set not down particulars, but all shall be communicated to your Majesty's ambassador, whom I presume you will choose accordingly. If I should nominate, th'Earl of Mar should be he to whom we would commit our lives, honors, and fortunes.

Endorsed:

A true copy of the Earl of Essex his last letter written with his own hand ( from which I took this immediately ) to James the 6. [then only] \* King of Scotland.

\* The words "then only" are crossed out in the MS.

## CHAPTER VIII

### FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1598-1603

The peace of Vervins was agreed upon between France and Spain in May, 1598. Poverty had forced Henry IV to it, while Philip II was reluctantly ready to abandon the losing struggle against a king he could no longer accuse of heresy. Spain's empire demanded all her attention. With France quiet, perhaps more could be done in the Netherlands. Philip, however, was too old and too ill to accomplish much. He died in September of the same year and was succeeded by his son Philip III, a man of mediocre ability.

Although French armies ceased to fight Spanish armies after 1598, the diplomatic war between the two countries continued.<sup>1</sup> Henry was eager to keep his old allies in the lists against Spain. Elizabeth, on the other hand, was not sure that she wished to carry on the costly war. Peace talk was in the air. Her commissioners actually went to Boulogne in 1600 to discuss possible terms with representatives of Philip and of the Archdukes. Although quarrels over precedence broke up these meetings, the idea persisted. The Queen felt that Henry was letting her fight his battles while he idled. Unwilling to abandon the Estates of the Low Countries, she tried to draw him into active war again but he evaded her designs. He knew that France was exhausted by a generation of civil wars. In spite of their common mistrust of Spain, the two monarchs could not agree on the best means to curb Spanish power. They quarreled inces-

<sup>1</sup> There were disputes over merchants' privileges in Spain, the privileges of ambassadors, and the critical situation in Savoy. Philip III was slow to confirm the 1598 treaty. Spain was thought to have been involved in the Biron conspiracy of 1602 which threatened Henry's life (R. Couzard, *Une Ambassade à Rome sous Henri IV* . . . , Paris [1902], pp. 21-47).

santly over this and other problems, such as trade and maritime freedom and the debts Henry owed the Queen.<sup>2</sup>

The situation with respect to Scotland was much the same as in former years, except that James's value as a friend was considerably enhanced as the likelihood of his succeeding to the English throne increased. It was Henry's policy to cultivate the Scottish King's friendship to prevent any renewal of the old Burgundian and Spanish connection when Elizabeth should die. That James would be her successor Henry did not doubt. The point was to bring it about in such fashion that James would recognize in Henry his indispensable ally.<sup>3</sup> The difficulties were great, especially since the Queen's jealous dislike of a "sun rising" did not diminish with advancing years, and Henry was bound to adapt himself to her attitude. In view of their numerous quarrels he dared not outrage her feelings too much and risk driving her into the arms of Spain; nor could he sacrifice the Scottish friendship.

On his side James was eager to resume cordial relations with France. He was thus fortifying himself with a powerful ally against Spain and was opening another avenue for communication with Rome. Since Henry's conversion and absolution by the Pope, the French King's star was in the ascendant there. In one sense, his influence in Catholic Europe measured the importance James attached to him. It is significant that one of the first steps taken to restore the "auld amitie" between France and Scotland was the

<sup>2</sup> J. B. Black, *Elizabeth and Henry IV* (Oxford, 1914), pp. 140-188, *passim*.

<sup>3</sup> See the correspondence between Henry and his ambassadors in London, Boissize and later Beaumont, especially P. R. O., Fr. Trans., Bdl. 32, Henry to Boissize, Apr. 12, 1601; *ibid.*, Bdl. 33, Beaumont to Henry, May 1, 1602; *ibid.*, Bdl. 35, Beaumont to Henry, Jan. 23, Mar. 24, 1603; Teulet, IV, 288-290, Henry to Beaumont, Mar. 27, 1603. Cf. P. Laffleur de Kermaingant, *L'Ambassade de France en Angleterre sous Henri IV; Mission de Christophe de Harlay Comte de Beaumont (1602-1605)* (2 vols., Paris, 1895), I, 79-82, 94-95, and Couzard, pp. 80, 97-98. Note that the dating of French diplomatic correspondence is according to the New Style.



renewal of the Catholic Archbishop of Glasgow's appointment as resident ambassador at the French court.

The Archbishop, Mary's former agent in Paris, had been continued in his office by James after her death. He had conscientious scruples about serving a heretic monarch and seems to have resigned. The King apparently reappointed him at the end of 1597. Glasgow wanted license from the Pope to hold the position. Since Clement VIII and his advisers saw in the aged man an excellent way of reaching James, they gave him satisfactory assurances, although they refused the license. Clement's envoy in Paris was instructed not to recognize him officially but to treat him in friendly fashion. The Scottish King's actions in reconstituting him official ambassador in France and in restoring him at least nominally to his honors and benefices in Scotland were signs of a desire to reach Rome.<sup>4</sup>

From the time of Easter Wemyss' journey to France in 1594 to invite Henry to the baptism of the Scottish prince there had been little direct communication between James and Henry, save by letter.<sup>5</sup> Henry was preoccupied with his own troubles and lack of money always spoiled James's elaborate plans for embassies. At the end of 1598, sorry to have lost so much time, James talked of dispatching Lord Seton or the Prior of Pluscardin, but seems to have contented himself with a non-noble and consequently less expensive representative.<sup>6</sup> In December of that year Henry wrote to his ambassador in England that a Master of Re-

<sup>4</sup> See above, pp. 154-155; also, P. R. O., Rom. Trans., Bdl. 85a, letter from the Cardinal Legate in France, Nov. 25, 1596; *ibid.*, Bdl. 111, letter to the Legate from Rome, Jan. 18, 1597; *ibid.*, Bdl. 86a, letter from the nuncio in France, Nov. 6, 1601, and reply from Rome, Dec. 5, 1601; Add. MSS., 18738, f. 46, James to Henry, Dec. 29, 1597; S. P. Scotland, LXI, No. 52, Bowes to Burghley, Oct. 31, 1597; *Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, 464 and n.

<sup>5</sup> See above, p. 142; S. P. Scotland, LXI, No. 52, Bowes to Burghley, Oct. 31, 1597; *Hat. Cal.*, VIII, 180-182.

<sup>6</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXIII, No. 77, Nicolson to Cecil, Dec. 16, 1598. Secretary Lindsay had been appointed ambassador to France in 1597 but ill health prevented the journey (*ibid.*, LX, No. 48, Bowes to Burghley, Mar. 21, 1597; *Dict. Nat. Biog.*).

quests had come from the Scottish King to join the Bishop of Glasgow in requesting the renewal of the ancient treaties between the sovereigns of France and Scotland.<sup>7</sup>

The sudden request put Henry in an embarrassing position. He had no wish to snub James but felt that he must consult Elizabeth before replying. Elizabeth quickly voiced her disapproval of such an alliance and complained of the Scottish King's tactless remarks about her age.<sup>8</sup> Henry gallantly bowed to her wishes, escaping the horns of his dilemma by confirming the privileges of Scots resident in France and by renewing old patents exempting Scottish merchants from new imposts. He explained to his ambassador in London that these concessions were not of such consequence as a treaty of alliance would have been.<sup>9</sup> To make this polite refusal more palatable to James he decided to send a formal embassy to Edinburgh, a courtesy he had not observed since his accession to the throne. He informed Elizabeth of his intention and, in spite of her obvious displeasure, dispatched Philippe de Béthune, brother of the Duke of Sully, to Scotland.<sup>10</sup>

The instructions Béthune carried were innocent enough. The ambassador was to excuse the non-renewal of the alliance on the grounds that James was included by name in the treaty of Vervins, where express mention was made of the ancient treaties between France and Scotland. He was to point out that when the old Franco-Scottish alliance had

<sup>7</sup> Laffleur de Kermaingant, *Boissize*, II, 22–24. This agent may have been James Colville of Easter Wemyss (*Reg. P. C. Scot.*, V, 431), but it was more likely William Bellenden, Glasgow's assistant, who was described in the Archbishop's will as "conseiller et maistre des requetes ordinaires de l'hostel du Roy d'Escoce" (*Miscellaneous Papers, Principally Illustrative of Events in the Reigns of Queen Mary and King James VI*, Maitland Club, Glasgow, 1834, p. 77; *Edmondes Papers*, pp. 383–385; *Dict. Nat. Biog.*).

<sup>8</sup> Laffleur de Kermaingant, *Boissize*, II, 22–24; Teulet, IV, 211–213.

<sup>9</sup> P. R. O., Fr. Trans., Bdl. 30, Henry to Boissize, Feb. 23, 1599, printed in Laffleur de Kermaingant, *Boissize*, II, 37–40, and in Teulet, IV, 213–214; Moncrieff, "Memoirs concerning the Ancient Alliance . . ." *Miscellanea Scotica*, IV, 24–25, 36–41, 53–57; S. P. Scotland, LXIV, Nos. 52, 54, 55, copies of the confirmation of privileges.

<sup>10</sup> Teulet, IV, 214–215, 217–222.

been made both countries hated England, but that now England was their friend. Any new confirmation of the alliance in order to avoid Elizabeth's jealousy would have to be based on new reasons. It was better to maintain the spirit of the old alliance and to avoid the whys and wherefores that invariably went into diplomatic documents. Both Kings would do well to retain the English Queen's good will. James could count on Henry to remain his friend and to defend him as far as possible from unjust enterprises.<sup>11</sup>

Béthune was welcomed cordially in Scotland and was entertained so lavishly that the English ambassador in Edinburgh was mortified by what seemed the comparatively cool treatment of himself. It was the summer of 1599, when Ashfield's abduction caused bitter feeling against Elizabeth. James was undoubtedly in touch with Essex during these months both in Ireland and in England. The rumors of an Anglo-Spanish peace and of a marriage to be arranged between a Hapsburg archduke and Arbella Stewart made a *rapprochement* with France all the more desirable. While, therefore, Béthune accomplished little of a definite nature in Scotland, his visit cemented the good will between France and Scotland at a time when James was drifting into violent quarrels with Elizabeth.<sup>12</sup>

This state of affairs continued. In July, 1600, Boissize, the French ambassador in London, advised his master not to send any ambassador to Scotland that he might not offend the Queen.<sup>13</sup> Henry replied angrily. Why should he not send one to James? Elizabeth was not hostile to Scotland nor would she be likely to conclude peace with Spain to counter such a friendly gesture. It might rather engender

<sup>11</sup> Add. MSS., 5456, ff. 418-432, copy, Henry's instructions for Béthune, May 23, 1599; Dumont, V, Pt. I, pp. 563-564, the treaty of Vervins.

<sup>12</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXIV, No. 65, [Nicolson to Cecil] [after Apr. 17, 1599]; *ibid.*, LXV, Nos. 8, 10, 11, 85, and LXVI, No. 3, Nicolson to Cecil, July 28, Aug. 2, 12, Dec. 24, 1599, Jan. 12, 1600; *ibid.*, LXV, Nos. 1, 3, Sir Wm. Bowes to Cecil, July 3, 9, 1599; *ibid.*, LXV, No. 21, [Hudson] to Cecil, Aug. 26, 1599; *ibid.*, LXV, No. 81, Aston to Cecil, Dec. 16, 1599.

<sup>13</sup> Teulet, IV, 227-228.

in her fear lest she lose Henry as an ally. Former Kings of France had found Scotland useful to bridle England.<sup>14</sup> At the moment Henry may have been somewhat concerned about the prospect of a general peace, since the Bologne conferences, although fruitless, were actually taking place.<sup>15</sup> He did not, however, carry out his plan of maintaining a resident ambassador in Edinburgh until July, 1602.<sup>16</sup> In the meantime, Scottish ambassadors in London always found excuses for calling on the French ambassador there<sup>17</sup> and James showered Henry with gifts<sup>18</sup> and special embassies. Lennox went to France in the autumn of 1601 to excuse the long delay in sending an envoy and to request renewal of the ancient league between France and Scotland. Henry replied with his customary charm and vagueness.<sup>19</sup> After the shock of the Biron conspiracy in 1602, Lord Hume was dispatched to congratulate the French King on his fortunate escape and to offer James's services.<sup>20</sup> Henry accepted such advances but cautiously avoided anything that might embroil him with either England or Spain.

Both Kings were guarded in their seemingly friendly entente. Henry cherished his neutrality and was not to be beguiled by any offers of leagues, whether advanced by James or, as he suspected, surreptitiously by Elizabeth.<sup>21</sup> He had no desire to see Scotland and England united; he approved of James's claim to the English throne merely be-

<sup>14</sup> P. R. O., Fr. Trans., Bdl. 31, Henry to Boissize, Aug. 2, 1600.

<sup>15</sup> Black, *Elizabeth and Henry IV*, pp. 158-166.

<sup>16</sup> Teulet, IV, 264-269; S. P. Scotland, LXVIII, No. 89, Nicolson to Cecil, July 29, 1602.

<sup>17</sup> E. g., P. R. O., Fr. Trans., Bdl. 31, 32, Boissize to Henry, Mar. 15, 1600, Apr. 11, 1601.

<sup>18</sup> Teulet, IV, 239.

<sup>19</sup> Cotton MSS., Caligula B iv, f. 251, copy of Lennox's instructions; Teulet, IV, 250.

<sup>20</sup> Add. MSS., 18738, f. 48, James to Henry, July 16, 1602; S. P. Scotland, LXVIII, No. 78, and LXIX, No. 24, Thos. Douglas to Cecil, July 4, Oct. 27, 1602; Teulet, IV, 263.

<sup>21</sup> Teulet, IV, 270-277.



cause James had the best chance and was preferable to the Infanta. On the other hand, the Scottish King, especially after Essex's fall, decided that his best hope lay in the good will of Elizabeth and her Council. He made a virtue of disclosing to the Queen his negotiations with Henry.<sup>22</sup> This lack of enthusiasm for the alliance forecast the next reign, when England under James promptly made peace with Spain, regardless of French policy.

The most important influence Henry exerted on the question of the English succession was in Rome. Pope Clement VIII found the problem more baffling as time passed and no promising Catholic candidate appeared. His ideal was a Catholic prince governing England, one who should be independent of both France and Spain. One man whom he had in mind for the position was the Cardinal Archduke Albert, who by an arrangement made at the time of the peace of Vervins had married the Infanta, thus sacrificing his ecclesiastical dignity. Albert and his wife were exercising joint sovereignty over the Low Countries.<sup>23</sup> Though nominally free from Spanish suzerainty, the Archduke, because of his position and marriage, was too closely identified with Spanish interests to please Henry and a large section of English Catholics. Moreover, Albert was more of a realist than were his advocates. He was frank about his indifference, even his opposition to the idea of claiming England for his wife and himself. The troubles in the Low Countries alone were enough for one ruler to handle with any fair hope of success.<sup>24</sup>

For a time this dream of an impartial Catholic King for

<sup>22</sup> Beltreis was to reveal Béthune's errands in 1599 (S. P. Scotland, LXV, No. 41, Hudson to Cecil, Sept. 14, 1599). In 1601 he was likewise directed to inform Elizabeth of Lennox's errands in France (*ibid.*, LXVII, No. 85, Thos. Douglas to [Cecil], no date). Both Lennox and Hume returned from France through England (Teulet, IV, 250; S. P. Scotland, LXIX, No. 13, Cecil to Nicolson, Oct. 2, 1602; *ibid.*, LXVIII, No. 74, copy, Elizabeth to James, July 4, 1602).

<sup>23</sup> Dumont, V, Pt. I, pp. 573-576. Albert was made governor of the Low Countries in 1596.

<sup>24</sup> Cardinal Aldobrandino, the Pope's confidant, writing to the Legate in France on May 31, 1597 (P. R. O., Rom. Trans., Bdl. 111), seemed to

England disappeared, only to be revived as Elizabeth advanced in years. In 1601 Clement hinted to Henry IV's agent in Rome, Cardinal D'Ossat, that Cardinal Farnese, brother of the Duke of Parma, was a possibility. The Farnese were Catholic; their house had a grudge against Spain because of the annexation of Portugal and stood under great obligations to France; they were allied to the Pope himself; they had some claim to the English throne from John of Gaunt; and a marriage between Cardinal Farnese and Arbella Stewart might be arranged.<sup>25</sup> Clement made the Cardinal Protector of English Affairs after Cajetan's death and did what he could to put him in touch with the English situation. A member of the Pole family, Arthur, was in Farnese's service, and for a time there was talk of making him a cardinal and sending him to England with a commission from the Pope and Cardinal Farnese. Clement's scheme, however, was received coldly by both France and Spain. Henry's ambassadors in Rome skilfully avoided any discussion of it and the Spanish Council was inclined to ignore it.<sup>26</sup>

James, therefore, had no serious Catholic rival who could command the support of Rome, Spain, and France, or of any two of them. Henry politely heard Clement's expressed desire for an "indifferent" prince, but he quickly pointed out what the Pope knew only too well, that no such prince existed and, even if there were one, it would be practically impossible to establish him to the exclusion of James.<sup>27</sup> Clement was forced to a less ambitious program and enter-

indicate Albert when he spoke of the next King of England as "che non saria se non chi governasse la Fiandra." The Archduke was not married to the Infanta until 1599. For his rejection of the idea that he and his wife claim England, see *Cal. Spanish*, 1587-1603, pp. 721, 723; Meyer, *Eng. and the Cath. Church*, p. 374, and App. XXII, pp. 526-527.

<sup>25</sup> *Letres du Cardinal D'Ossat*, M. Amelot de la Houssaie, ed. (I and II, Paris, 1698), II, 501-508.

<sup>26</sup> *Cal. Spanish*, 1587-1603, pp. 663-665, 670-671, 719-729; D'Ossat, *Lettres*, II, 524-525.

<sup>27</sup> Couzard, p. 97; Laffleur de Kermaingant, *Beaumont*, I, 95.

tained hopes of the Scottish King's conversion or at least of his toleration of Catholics.

James's partisans among the exiles had continued their propaganda in his favor. More could be won, they insisted, for the glory of the Catholic Church by negotiating directly with the King and showing a spirit willing to meet him halfway, than by dallying with Spanish pretensions or vainly expecting a miracle to produce an unimpeachable candidate. Let the Pope gain the King's confidence now when he was poor and needy! If he were to win England with the support of Protestant allies, such as Denmark and Holland, there could be little expectation of his conversion.<sup>28</sup> In view of the divisions among the Catholics, the hatred of the "spaniolized Jesuits" which was drawing the Archpriest controversy to a head, and the absence of any practical alternative, Clement could not ignore the suggestion. Consequently, one of the most interesting stories of these last years is that of secret advances made by both Clement and James.

The journey of Henry Constable to Scotland in 1599 may have some bearing on the matter. Constable was an exiled English Catholic, an ardent anti-Spanish man, who had been living for some time in France. He was reputed to be "very well exercised" in knowledge of religious controversies. Henry IV may have had something to do with sending him to Scotland, but the English ambassador in Paris seemed to think that the plan was hatched between the papal agent there and the English Catholics.<sup>29</sup> An untrustworthy rumor said that he carried to James from the Pope offers of money and diplomatic support in return for toler-

<sup>28</sup> E. g., P. R. O., Rom. Trans., Bdl. 86a, Bishop of Vaison to Aldobrandino, Jan. 23, 1599. Cf. Tierney-Dodd, III, App., pp. lxxvii-lxx, a paper by an anonymous English Catholic addressed to a Spanish minister, 1597, arguing the certainty of James's accession.

<sup>29</sup> P. R. O., Rom. Trans., Bdl. 86, letter from the Legate in France to Rome, June 15, 1597; S. P. France, XLII, Edmondes to Cecil, Sept. 12, 1598; *Hat. Cal.*, VII, 86.

ation and war against England.<sup>30</sup> More probably his mission was to argue with James and to persuade him to adopt the Roman faith. Aston, through whom Constable tried to obtain an audience, said that he confessed that his errand was "to offer his service to the King . . . not only himself but in the name of all the Catholics both at home and abroad except some that were traffickers and practised the course of Spain. . . ." <sup>31</sup> He accomplished little and returned to France, apparently journeying thence to Rome in 1600 to continue his task of reconciling James to the Catholic powers, excluding Spain.<sup>32</sup> He was probably the author of a book which James received in 1600, described as "a counterfeit discourse between counterfeit travelers, etc., said to be written and sent by Henry Constable." It was a sharp answer to Doleman's *Conference*.<sup>33</sup>

There were several other "suspect" persons traveling back and forth between Rome, Brussels, Paris, Madrid, London, and Edinburgh: about 1598 Sir Walter Lindsay was said to have brought letters from Cardinal Cajetan to James; <sup>34</sup> Patrick Stewart, brother of the Earl of Atholl, and

<sup>30</sup> Colville, *Letters*, pp. 202-204; Winwood, I, 37. Clement apparently refused to give Constable authority to treat with James but gave him leave to go to Scotland on his own errands. It is not clear whether this refers to the 1599 journey or to a later proposed visit (*Cal. Spanish*, 1587-1603, pp. 681-683).

<sup>31</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXIV, No. 37, Aston to Cecil, Mar. [2?], 1599.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, LXIV, No. 44, Nicolson to Cecil, Mar. 24, 1599; P. R. O., Rom. Trans., Bdl. 112, letter of recommendation from the Legate in France, Mar. 14, 1600; *Cal. Spanish*, 1587-1603, pp. 681-683.

<sup>33</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVI, No. 44, Nicolson to Cecil, July 22, 1600. There is in the British Museum a book called *A Discoverye of a covnterfecte conference helde at a counterfecte place, by counterfecte travellers, for thadvancement of a counterfecte tytyle, and invented, printed, and published by one (PERSON) that dare not avovve his name* (Collen, 1600). Parsons in his pamphlet, *A Manifestation of the Great Folly and Bad Spirit of certayne in England calling themselves secular priestes* . . . (1602), f. 64, spoke of this book which was attributed to Paget, yet he questioned the authorship. ". . . we would rather thinke it to be of a certaine neighbour of his, of greater title in learning, but of lesse discretion and capacity in wit or reason. . . ."

<sup>34</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXIII, No. 37, Nicolson to Cecil, Oct. 24, 1598; *ibid.*, LXVI, No. 18, advices from Scotland, Apr. [1599?].



one Moryson were thought to have gone to Rome on errands for the King;<sup>35</sup> George Ker, of Spanish Blanks fame, and the Jesuit Crichton appeared again;<sup>36</sup> Robert Crichton, Lord Sanquhar, and Sir Alexander Lindsay, Lord Spyny, traveled extensively in Flanders;<sup>37</sup> the Master of Gray rather unsuccessfully tried to make his services on the continent indispensable to James and Elizabeth;<sup>38</sup> and Lord Hume's presence on the continent worried the English ambassador in Paris.<sup>39</sup> The fact that several of these men seem to have been well received by Sir Robert Cecil in England only adds mystery to their actions.<sup>40</sup> They were almost all Catholics or had strong Papist connections. Although it is impossible to estimate with any degree of exactitude their influence on papal, Spanish, or anti-Spanish Catholic policy, their ceaseless activity gave broad scope for intrigue.

The most exact knowledge we have of the communication between Clement and James lies in the story of the Elphinstone letter, full details of which came to light years later, when James was engaged in a pamphlet war with Cardinal Bellarmine on the question of the oath of allegiance. Secretary Elphinstone then confessed that at about the time of Béthune's visit to Scotland in 1599 the Archbishop of Glasgow, prompted by James's friends among

<sup>35</sup> *Cal. Spanish*, 1587-1603, pp. 667-668; S. P. Scotland, LXV, No. 46, Nicolson to Cecil, 1599; *Border Papers*, II, 630.

<sup>36</sup> *Hat. Cal.*, VIII, 45-46, 129-130; S. P. Scotland, LXVI, No. 32, Nicolson to Cecil, June 12, 1600.

<sup>37</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXIII, No. 45, Hudson to Elizabeth, Oct., 1598; *ibid.*, LXVIII, No. 43, Nicolson to Cecil, May 4, 1602.

<sup>38</sup> *Edmondes Papers*, pp. 383-388, 390-392; Winwood, I, 124, 127; Mackie, *Negotiations*, pp. 31-36; Gray, *Letters*, pp. 187, 197-200.

<sup>39</sup> Winwood, I, 36-37, 156.

<sup>40</sup> E. g., Sanquhar came through England and spoke well of his entertainment (S. P. Scotland, LXVIII, No. 43, Nicolson to Cecil, May 4, 1602). Sir Walter Lindsay was well received there and gave out information about Spanish plans to attack England (*ibid.*, LXIII, No. 58, Hudson to Cecil, Nov. 20, 1598; *ibid.*, LXIV, Nos. 4, 6, same to same, Jan., 1599; *ibid.*, LII, pp. 239-241, Cecil to Nicolson, Jan. 12, 1599). Spyny traveled through England (*ibid.*, LXIII, No. 45, Hudson to Elizabeth, Oct., 1598).

French and Italian princes, had suggested a direct correspondence between James and the Pope. Elphinstone referred the matter to the King, who did not oppose it but proved stubborn on the point of addressing the Pope as "Beatissime Pater." The royal conscience would not permit this.<sup>41</sup> At about the same time a Scottish knight, Sir Edward Drummond, arrived in Scotland to further the proposal of getting a cardinal's hat for William Chisholm, Bishop of Vaison, a Scotsman, prominent leader among the anti-Spanish Catholics. Seizing this opportunity, Elphinstone and Drummond framed a letter to the Pope containing general expressions of gratitude for past favors and a request for a cardinalate for Vaison. Elphinstone thrust this among other missives intended for the Dukes of Savoy and Florence and for several cardinals, presenting the lot to James for his signature one morning when he was in a hurry to go hunting and telling the King they were Drummond's dispatch for the Bishop of Vaison. The one intended for the Pope, dated Sept. 24, 1599, had no address. James signed all, apparently (so he said) not noticing the extra one. The address to Clement was added later by Drummond with Elphinstone's knowledge.<sup>42</sup>

Although James denied it, the chances are that he connived at the sending of the letter to the Pope. Strictly speaking, the question of his knowledge of such action is irrelevant.<sup>43</sup> He was undoubtedly writing letters on behalf of

<sup>41</sup> See his similar statement made a year before when he said he could not in conscience write to the Pope "styling him Pope, which his religion allows not, but if he should write to him it should be by the name of Bishop, which the Pope would not be pleased with." (S. P. Scotland, LXIII, No. 23, Nicolson to Cecil, Oct. 3, 1598.)

<sup>42</sup> Elphinstone's narrative and the letters are printed in Calderwood, V, 740-744; *ibid.*, VI, 789-819; John Rushworth, *Historical Collections* . . . (7 vols., London, 1721-1722), I, 161-164. S. R. Gardiner, *History of England, 1603-1642* (new impression, 10 vols., London, 1904-1909), I, 80-82 and notes, and II, 31-34 and notes, has an excellent account tending to prove James's innocence. Meyer presents the opposite thesis ("Clemens VIII und Jakob I," pp. 273-277).

<sup>43</sup> Gardiner suggested this (II, 33n.). In one account Elphinstone implied that James knew that some of the letters were to be forwarded to

Chisholm, a gesture to promote his own interests in Rome. Whether or not one was addressed to the Pope mattered little; knowledge of his attitude would eventually come to Clement's ears.

Reports of the missive to Clement were forwarded quickly to the alert English government through both the Master of Gray and Lord Sanquhar.<sup>44</sup> When Sir Henry Brounker went to Edinburgh in 1600 to congratulate the King on his escape from the Gowry conspiracy, he was ordered to question James about it. The King, of course, denied any responsibility for it; Elphinstone, when questioned, asserted that no such letter had been written; and Drummond, who had returned to Scotland, obligingly perjured himself in similar fashion.<sup>45</sup>

The letter soon elicited a reply from the Pope, who thanked James for his communication, regretted that he could not read in it any testimony of the King's conversion, and elaborated arguments for embracing the Catholic faith. Concerning Vaison's cardinalate, Clement was evasive. The papal brief was, on the whole, not very enthusiastic.<sup>46</sup>

cardinals (Calderwood, V, 741), but in a letter to the King, dated October 24, 1608, he spoke of a number of signed letters sent to the Bishop of Glasgow, who was to advise to whom they should be delivered (Calderwood, VI, 791, 799). Glasgow, he thought, had them sent to Aldobrandino, Bellarmin, and Cajetan. Sir Robert Cecil, writing in 1608 to explain the King's part in the matter, said that James was aware only of those going to the Dukes of Savoy and Florence and to the Cardinal of Lorraine, and that Elphinstone slipped in the missives to the Pope and to two cardinals under color of the others (Gray, *Letters*, p. 205). The latter account is very similar to the official indictment made against Elphinstone (Pitcairn, II, Pt. II, 571). Nowhere is it explicitly stated how many letters and papers the King signed that morning. Drummond and Elphinstone had prepared both letters and lists of instructions for Drummond.

<sup>44</sup> Gray, *Letters*, p. 200; S. P. Scotland, LIX, No. 58, Sanquhar to Cecil, no date. The latter letter is ascribed to Sanquhar on the strength of its endorsement, which is "L. of Senqwar." It is in the P. R. O. placed with correspondence for 1596 but clearly belongs to late 1599 or 1600.

<sup>45</sup> Birch, *Memoirs*, I, 420; Calderwood, VI, 799; S. P. Scotland, LXVI, Nos. 91, 99, Nicolson to Cecil, Nov. 12, 20, 1600; *ibid.*, No. 103, Elphinstone to Cecil, Nov. 27, 1600.

<sup>46</sup> P. R. O., Rom. Trans., Bdl. 86a, Clement VIII to James, Apr. 13, 1600; Meyer, "Clemens VIII und Jakob I," p. 277.

Clement followed it with letters addressed to the English Catholic clergy and laity, urging them to unite and to permit no successor to Elizabeth save a Catholic one.<sup>47</sup>

Anne of Denmark now began to play a part.<sup>48</sup> In the summer of 1601 she replied to Clement's letter addressed to her husband and sent Drummond back to Rome with instructions to assure the Pope of her fidelity to the Catholic faith and of her care to educate her children in it, adding apologies for James's failure to reply politely to the papal brief. Elizabeth, she explained, had heard of it and since the English throne was at stake, James had to be circumspect. She hinted that James might grant liberty of conscience, although nothing must be done to endanger his life. Drummond carried letters to several cardinals, one of which, addressed to Cardinal Borghese, Protector of the Scottish nation at Rome, is preserved in the British Museum. That Anne wrote these letters and instructions for Drummond with James's knowledge seems almost certain. In the missive to Borghese and in Drummond's instructions she referred carefully to the fact that James had given her authority to reply.<sup>49</sup> In July, 1602, Clement acknowledged her communication, expressed pleasure in her conversion,

<sup>47</sup> P. R. O., Rom. Trans., Bdl. 86a, letters from the Pope to the English Catholics, to the Archpriest and the English clergy, and to the papal nuncio in Flanders, July 12, 1600; M. A. Tierney's edition of Dodd's *Church History of England from the Commencement of the Sixteenth Century to the Revolution in 1688* (5 vols., London, 1839-1843), III, 30n., and App., pp. lxx-lxxi; *ibid.*, IV, App., pp. cvi-cviii; Meyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 277-279. These were probably very similar to, if not actually copies of, the papal briefs which the Jesuit Garnet burned at James's accession (Gardiner, I, 98-99).

<sup>48</sup> The story of Anne's conversion about 1600 was told by Father Robert Abercromby, a Jesuit who was in Scotland at that time (*The Month and Catholic Review*, XVI [1879], 256-265). See also Bellesheim, III, App. V, 450-454, and pp. 347-350 and n.; A. W. Ward's review of W. Plenkens, *Er Frederik II's Datter Anna, Dronning of Storbritannien, gaaet over til Katholicismen?*, *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, III (1888), 795-798; and a brief note by W. Bliss, *ibid.*, IV (1889), 110.

<sup>49</sup> *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, XX (1905), 126-127, Anne to Cardinal Borghese, July 31, 1601, printed from Add. MSS., 37021, f. 25; Meyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 301-303, instructions for Drummond. Cf. Meyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 279-281.



and urged once more the conversion of her husband.<sup>50</sup> This clandestine correspondence effected little but it shows clearly that Clement ignored no advances made from Scotland and suggests almost conclusively that James knew about the Elphinstone letter. At about this time another agent came directly from Clement. His activities are better proof of the Pope's eagerness to win the King.

Sir James Lindsay, a brother of the Earl of Crawford, reached Scotland from Rome late in the year 1602, bearing letters of August 9, 1602 from the Pope to both James and Anne. The briefs were short statements of the Pope's regard for them and earnest requests that the young Prince Henry be educated in the Roman Catholic faith.<sup>51</sup> It is not clear whether Clement gave Lindsay further instructions or whether Lindsay presumed to make further proposals without warrant. James later said that the Pope offered to champion him against any who should attempt to prevent him from obtaining the English crown. There was some hint also that Clement might give James money if he would consent to have the Prince educated a Catholic.<sup>52</sup> Again James refused to reply directly by letter, but he drew up instructions for Lindsay, who was to excuse the omission, to explain that James could not accede to the proposal about his son's religion, and to thank Clement for "his so courteous and unexpected message." The King continued:

Lastly, you shall inform him of my honest intention in all things, as ye have many times heard it out of my own mouth, and how I shall ever (with God's grace) keep inviolably two points: the first, never to dissemble what I think (especially in matters of conscience); and the other, never to reject reason when I hear it, but without any preoccupied self-opinion of my own to refuse

<sup>50</sup> Meyer, "Clemens VIII und Jakob I," pp. 281, 303-304. Clement's letter was dated July 16, 1602.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 304-305.

<sup>52</sup> Tierney-Dodd, IV, App., pp. lxvi-lxxi, James to Sir Thomas Parry, [1603 or 1604]; Gardiner, I, 97-98 and n.; Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

nothing that can be proven lawful, reasonable, and without corruption.<sup>53</sup>

In spite of the gospel of reason it proclaimed, this reply was scarcely encouraging. As fate had it, Lindsay fell ill. The message or a similar one sent later was not to reach the Pope until long after Elizabeth's death.<sup>54</sup>

There remained other means to attempt to secure, if not the King's conversion, at least toleration for Catholics. The French ambassador who went to reside in Scotland in 1602 had instructions to solicit it;<sup>55</sup> and Vaison, whose candidacy for a cardinalate had been the subject of the Elphinstone letter, was ready early in 1603 to go to James immediately upon Elizabeth's death for the same purpose.<sup>56</sup> When that long anticipated event occurred, no alternative presenting itself, Clement VIII wisely confined his efforts to soliciting James through foreign ambassadors,<sup>57</sup> to offering to withdraw turbulent priests from England,<sup>58</sup> and to supplying financial aid to exiled Catholics who wished to return to England. He gave the last-named assistance with the ex-

<sup>53</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXIX, Nos. 20, 21, 22, copies. No. 20 was endorsed by Sir Robert Cecil, "24 of October A copy of Sir James Lynsays Instructions drawn by the King's own hand in Scotland immediately before the Queen's death." Cf. Meyer, "Clemens VIII und Jakob I," p. 306.

<sup>54</sup> S. P. France, LII, Cecil to Lennox, Jan., 1605. In this letter Cecil implied that James drew up Lindsay's instructions only *after* Elizabeth's death. Cf. *ibid.*, Cecil to Sir Thomas Parry, Apr. 17, 1605, and Meyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 283, 295. Lindsay was in Rome early in 1605 (Gardiner, I, 224-225).

<sup>55</sup> P. R. O., Rom. Trans., Bdl. 87, nuncio in France to Aldobrandino, Jan. 27, 1603. Tours was to have been accompanied by one sent to effect, if possible, James's conversion (*ibid.*, Bdl. 86a, letters from the nuncio in Paris of date Dec. 28, 30, 1601). James was said to have promised to the French ambassador some favor to Catholics (S. P. Scotland, LXIX, No. 24, Thos. Douglas to Cecil, Oct. 27, 1602).

<sup>56</sup> P. R. O., Rom. Trans., Bdl. 87, letter from Rome to the nuncio in France, Apr. 3, 1603.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, Bdl. 87, letter from Rome to the nuncio in France, Apr. 20, 1603; Meyer, "Clemens VIII und Jakob I," pp. 285-286.

<sup>58</sup> Tierney-Dodd, IV, 9, and App., pp. lx-lxi.

press stipulation that they in no way use it to create a disturbance.<sup>59</sup> Even Parsons was convinced that persuasive gentleness was the only course to adopt and so advised the Pope.<sup>60</sup>

Despite these circumstances which were playing into James's hands and assuring the succession to him, the King was not satisfied that all would go well. Spain, the principal opponent, he still feared. Bothwell was roaming the continent, trying to plan an attack on Scotland, and he seemed to be countenanced by the Archduke Albert and the Spanish king.<sup>61</sup> A rumor of an Anglo-Spanish peace and of a project to marry Arbella Stewart to one of the Austrian archdukes was annoying.<sup>62</sup> James decided, therefore, to take the initiative by broaching matters directly to the Spanish king, using as agents Colonel William Sempill, a Scotsman long resident in Spain, and his cousin Lord Robert Sempill. After all, Scotland was nominally at peace with Spain; James had at times favored Dunkirk pirates; and Scottish merchants who engaged in a flourishing trade with Spain were annoyed at the allies' efforts to prohibit it.<sup>63</sup>

There was some talk of sending Lord Sempill to Spain in 1598 and he may have been there in that year. He was certainly there in 1599, dispatched by James to find out what he could about the Spanish king's intentions with respect to the English succession. Upon his first arrival in Madrid,

<sup>59</sup> P. R. O., Rom. Trans., Bdl. 87, letter from the nuncio in France, May 4, 1603, with marginal note in Pope's hand.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, Bdl. 112, Parsons to Aldobrandino, May 24, 1603; *ibid.*, same to the Pope, May 30, 1603.

<sup>61</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXII, No. 14, and LXIV, No. 14, anonymous intelligences, [1598, 1599]; *ibid.*, LII, pp. 235-236, copy, Cecil to Nicolson, Jan. 25, 1599.

<sup>62</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXV, No. 81, Aston to Cecil, Dec. 16, 1599; *ibid.*, LXV, No. 85, and LXVI, Nos. 3, 10, 11, 21, Nicolson to Cecil, Dec., 1599-Apr., 1600.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, LXIV, No. 80, Scottish intelligences, June 8, 1599; *ibid.*, LXV, No. 64, Nicolson to Cecil, Nov. 12, 1599. Cf. Fynes Moryson, *Itinerary* (4 vols., Glasgow, 1907-1908), IV, 182.

Lord Robert conferred with his cousin, Colonel William Sempill, and discovered that he could do little without an authentic commission from the King. He, therefore, sent to Scotland for such a commission.<sup>64</sup> Philip II was dead by this time and James combined messages of condolence and congratulations to the new king with proffers of friendship and requests for trading privileges.<sup>65</sup> He sent some sort of commission to Lord Sempill<sup>66</sup> but the Spanish Council found it inadequate.<sup>67</sup> Nothing came of the negotiation. On his return through France Sempill gave out optimistic hints of a general alliance between Scotland and Spain and intimated that a Spanish ambassador would shortly be sent to reside in Scotland.<sup>68</sup> It was a fiction. There was nothing approaching a friendly understanding between the two kings. James must have been convinced of the futility of attempting it further. He was already deeply interested in the Essex affair, suspected that some in England favored the Infanta, and appeared to concentrate on the more promising methods of winning the good will of Englishmen as well as of Italian, French, and Danish rulers. When Spain openly dispatched troops under Don Juan d'Aquila to Ireland to aid Elizabeth's rebels, James was ready to coöperate

<sup>64</sup> Nat. Lib. Scot., Denmilne MSS., 33. 1. 10, nos. 7, 13, letters from Madrid from Colonel Sempill and Lord Sempill to James, Oct. 12, [1598?]; Mackie, "Secret Diplomacy . . .," *Scot. Hist. Rev.*, XXI (1923-1924), p. 274; *Cal. Domestic*, 1598-1601, pp. 208-209. Probably Sempill was in Spain in 1598 when his cousin advised him to obtain a commission from the King. He may have retired to France and journeyed to Spain again in 1599 with a commission and more adequate instructions. Lock, writing to Cecil from Bayonne in the summer of 1599, said that Lord Sempill was then on his way to Spain (*S. P. Spain*, Bdl. 6, letters of July 27, Aug. 8, Sept. 7, 1599). Cf. *Cal. Venetian*, 1592-1603, pp. 386, 396, 413, 414; *Cal. Spanish*, 1587-1603, pp. 650-653.

<sup>65</sup> Nat. Lib. Scot., Denmilne MSS., 33. 1. 10, nos. 6, 9, instructions for Sempill, one copy endorsed "Feb. 1598," probably old style of dating. It obviously belongs to 1599, since it speaks of the death of Philip II, which occurred in Sept., 1598.

<sup>66</sup> Probably Nat. Lib. Scot., Denmilne MSS., 33. 1. 10, nos. 1, 10, Mar. 12, [1599].

<sup>67</sup> Nat. Lib. Scot., Denmilne MSS., 33. 1. 10, no. 8, Lord Sempill to James, c. Jan. 15, 1600.

<sup>68</sup> Winwood, I, 295-296.



with the Queen to forestall them.<sup>69</sup> He realized that Spanish ambitions were to be frustrated not by direct overtures to Philip but by the strength of Philip's enemies.

Meanwhile, the Spanish government was distracted between wishing to keep James out of England and feeling itself helpless to do so. The Council of State spent hours in idle discussion of the problem. Shortly after Sempill left they deliberated upon requests received from English Catholics urging Philip III to decide on some course. For a time they had sanguine hopes for the Infanta, yet were incapable of any action. 1588, 1596, and 1597 had demonstrated the futility of direct invasion; the plan to have money ready in the Low Countries on the day of Elizabeth's death failed for lack of ready cash. Some zealous English Catholics, later implicated in the Gunpowder Plot, sent an envoy to Madrid in 1602 to urge a Spanish invasion; they received courteous words but no substantial encouragement.<sup>70</sup> Early in 1603 the Council seriously considered a plan to refer to the English Catholics the choice of Elizabeth's successor from their number, whom Spain might then aid. Even then one Councillor was realist enough to suggest that Spain attempt nothing she could not accomplish.<sup>71</sup> Elizabeth died while the Council was still talking. About 1602 or 1603 Philip III appears to have ordered Spinola to effect a landing on British shores, but the command was obviously worthless and served only to anger the Archdukes, who at the time were trying to bring about peace.<sup>72</sup> Thus, Spanish enervation and inertia contributed largely to James's easy accession.

<sup>69</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVII, No. 123, Nicolson to Cecil, Nov. 6, 1601; Steele, *Proclamations*, II, 270.

<sup>70</sup> Gardiner, I, 98-99; Tierney-Dodd, IV, App., pp. lii-lvii, depositions connected with the Gunpowder Plot.

<sup>71</sup> *Cal Spanish*, 1587-1603, pp. 660-665, 669-670, 674-676, 708-709, 717-737.

<sup>72</sup> J. Cuvelier, "Les Preliminaires du traité de Londres (29 août 1604)," *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*, II (1923), 288; Antonio Rodriguez-Villa, *Ambrosio Spinola* (Madrid, 1904), pp. 59-62.

When Elizabeth died, the Archduke Albert had an agent in Edinburgh for the purpose, it was rumored, of letting James understand "that if *King* do use *Archduke* well *Infanta* shall quit *her title* to *England* to *King*." <sup>73</sup> Albert was really trying to prepare for amicable relations when James should be King of England. His instructions to Scorza, the agent employed, were for the most part that he should complain about the Scots levied to serve the Dutch but, if any overtures for peace were made, Scorza was to give assurance of Albert's good will. When news of the Queen's death arrived, Scorza on his own authority undertook to assure James that Albert could be expected to aid him with men and money if he had to fight for the English throne. After James's peaceful accession it was the Archduke who first pushed the peace negotiations which resulted in the 1604 treaty. <sup>74</sup>

True to his character, James saw dangers everywhere and never relinquished his efforts to escape them. His dealings with the anti-Spanish states in northern Italy form one of his most interesting diplomatic experiments. Venice received some attention. His agents in Paris and London kept in touch with the ambassadors of the seignory, while the vivacious Anthony Sherley in Venice made the King's name well known and, if one may credit Sherley's account, favored there. <sup>75</sup> It was, however, Ferdinand I, Grand Duke of Tuscany, whom James exerted himself most to gain as an ally.

<sup>73</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXIX, No. 65, [Nicolson to Cecil], March, 1603, words in italics in cipher, deciphered. Cf. Teulet, IV, 365-369.

<sup>74</sup> *Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne sur Les Affaires des Pays-Bas au XVII<sup>e</sup> Siècle*, Tome I, *Précis de la Correspondance de Philippe III (1598-1621)*, H. Lonchay and J. Cuvelier, eds. (Commission Royale d'Histoire, Brussels, 1923), 132-133, instructions dated Feb. 12, 1603; *ibid.*, pp. 141-142, Scorza's report; J. Cuvelier, "Les Preliminaires du traité . . .," *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*, II (1923), 279-304, 485-508.

<sup>75</sup> *Cal. Venetian*, 1592-1603, pp. 479, 559-561; Nat. Lib. Scot., Denmilne MSS., 31. 1. 13, nos. 2, 7, 8, 9, 11, 18, 19, 21, letters and instructions of Sherley and one Craig to King James, Sir James Lindsay, and Kinloss, Sept., 1602.

To Florence he sent Sir Michael Balfour of Burley, an old follower of Bothwell, a reckless, lawless swaggerer, suspected of being a harbinger of Jesuits.<sup>76</sup> Balfour's first visit to the Italian city was apparently in 1598 as part of a grand tour of the continent. He then carried a letter of recommendation to Ferdinand from James and must have discussed the succession question at length with the Grand Duke. He returned to Scotland with Ferdinand's advice in the matter, namely, that James should seek alliances on all sides, dealing secretly especially with Spain, so that Elizabeth's suspicions might not be aroused. Ferdinand offered his services as mediator with the Pope.<sup>77</sup> The Essex crisis, the project for buying armor, and other affairs prevented James from making an immediate reply; not until late in the spring of 1601 did Burley set out again with more definite instructions to suggest a league and to propose the marriage of Prince Henry with a daughter of Ferdinand. James also suggested that part of the dowry of the princess be advanced to him with the assurance that if the marriage never took place it should be repaid.<sup>78</sup> Ferdinand's reception of this suggestion is not recorded and, of course, nothing came of it. Burley, like so many of the King's mysterious agents, wrote home for some official commission, but James refused to send one under the great seal, excusing himself on the plea of the necessity for secrecy. He sent only a general letter of credit.<sup>79</sup> Burley set out on another journey to Florence the next year to continue the marriage negotiations but his efforts were fruitless.<sup>80</sup>

The Florentine marriage project had a rival in the scheme to wed the Scottish prince to a daughter of the Duke of Savoy. The Duke of Savoy had married a Spanish princess,

<sup>76</sup> Mackie, *Negotiations*, Intro., pp. iii-xiv.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, Intro., p. xv, pp. 4, 7-11.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, Intro., p. xvi, pp. 21-31.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 31-43.

<sup>80</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVIII, No. 66, Thos. Douglas to [Cecil], June 12, 1602; *ibid.*, No. 69, Nicolson to Cecil, June 20, 1602; Mackie, *Negotiations*, Intro., pp. xvii-xviii, and pp. 49-50.

sister of Philip III and the Infanta Isabella, and was bound to Spain by common antagonism to France. The suggestion for a marriage alliance between Scotland and Savoy was submitted to the Spanish Council by Bothwell and Colonel Sempill, who scarcely expected James's approval and therefore looked to Spain to accomplish it.<sup>81</sup> What was of more significance was Queen Anne's approval of the idea.<sup>82</sup> The English agent in Edinburgh identified her with the Spanish party in Scotland in these last years. With her trusted Catholic adviser, the Lord President Seton, she was renewing her old intrigues against Mar and was attempting to get the custody of her son away from him.<sup>83</sup> Her correspondence with the Pope indicates her sincerity in the Papist cause. The Savoy marriage scheme was, of course, fantastic; the principals were young; Spain had neither the energy nor will to accomplish it; James had never favored an openly pro-Spanish move; and by this time the King was relying mostly on his secret understanding with Secretary Cecil and Lord Henry Howard in England. Anne's actions, like those of his numerous continental agents, he found useful, since he could ignore them officially and yet reap from them the friendship of Catholics.

Elizabeth had fairly accurate knowledge of almost all these foreign intrigues. She knew of the Elphinstone letter, of Lord Sempill's sojourn in Spain, of Burley's dealings in Florence, and seems to have made an attempt to block the last by her influence with the Grand Duke.<sup>84</sup> She constantly upbraided James for his underhand dealings with her ene-

<sup>81</sup> *Cal. Spanish*, 1587-1603, pp. 677-680, 691.

<sup>82</sup> Teulet, IV, 340-341, 351.

<sup>83</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVII, Nos. 27, 28, 30, and LXVIII, Nos. 69, 77, 87, Nicolson to Cecil, Mar. 8, 14, 21, 1601, June 20, July 4, July 21, 1602; *ibid.*, LXVII, No. 92, Hudson to [Cecil], Aug. 6, 1601; *ibid.*, No. 95, incl., advertisements from Scotland, [Aug., 1601]; *ibid.*, LXVIII, Nos. 79, 90, Cecil to Nicolson, July 6, Aug. 5, 1602.

<sup>84</sup> Mackie, *Negotiations*, pp. 35-36, 39-40; S. P. Scotland, LXVIII, No. 15, Nicolson to Cecil, [Feb., 1602].



mies and the foes of the true religion, but James invariably excused himself or denied giving his agents any commission.<sup>85</sup> These intrigues caused many quarrels between the two, especially in the years before Essex's death, when James was particularly nervous about the situation in England. From 1601 to 1603, however, there was more harmony. True, James encouraged the Pope's friendship, he flirted pleasantly with France and Florence, and he bought armor. He was too worried to do nothing. Nevertheless, he clearly recognized that English sentiment was the dominant factor and governed himself accordingly.

Undoubtedly the motives for James's tortuous policy were selfish. His half-promises of toleration through Anne, his approach to Catholic princes through his wife and through unauthorized agents, his ambiguous policy in Scotland, and his boast that no man suffered for his conscience in Scotland<sup>86</sup> were shrewd methods of attracting Papist support. Yet it has been suggested that he was not totally insincere in his efforts to establish an understanding with Rome. Professor Mackie describes his plan for a compromise with Rome as an idea, grand in concept if utterly impossible to execute.<sup>87</sup> After James's accession to the English throne he suggested a general council to advance peace and union among all Christian churches.<sup>88</sup> In his instructions for Lindsay he protested his fidelity to the Protestant faith "until he might see more sufficient warrant than ever yet he could read or hear of to the contrary."

<sup>85</sup> E. g., S. P. Scotland, LXIV, No. 76, James's answers to Sir William Bowes's propositions, [c. May, 1599].

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, LXVII, Nos. 42, 58, Nicolson to Cecil, Apr. 26, June 2, 1601. The laird of Bonytoun, a notorious Papist, was executed in 1601, but James took pains to prove that it was for his crimes as a thief.

<sup>87</sup> Mackie, *Negotiations*, Intro., pp. xxi-xxv; Mackie, "Secret Diplomacy . . .," *Scot. Hist. Rev.*, XXI (1923-1924), 267-282.

<sup>88</sup> Tierney-Dodd, IV, 10-12n., James's speech to the 1604 Parliament; *ibid.*, App., pp. lxx-lxxi, James to Parry, [1603 or 1604]. Cf. *Hat. Cal.*, XV, 299-302.

Nevertheless, because he was loath to be "preudged" that this proceeded from obduration of heart, this was his resolution and so he had often made public profession, that he would never refuse any conference in any general council which should be lawfully called by the consent of all the princes of Europe for the pacification of those contentions, which make them all less able to resist the common enemy of the same.<sup>89</sup>

The passage recalls the King's early idea of a general peace. Some time after his accession to the English throne it was proposed to him that he lay aside the pen and take up the sword to assail Anti-Christ. To this he replied in positive terms that he could find no authority in the Gospels or in the primitive church which encouraged violence to win converts.<sup>90</sup> Such words came easily from the pen of any monarch who wished to avoid war. They are not absolute proof of a detached and tolerant mind. In the last analysis James was a *politique*. His Protestantism rested not so much on early training and conviction as on political expediency. His passion for thinking of everything in terms of his own power gave him the ability to view the Catholic faith with equanimity. Papists, he felt, had it in their power to deprive him of his absolute rule in Scotland and of the English throne; therefore, he must propitiate them. The reasoning led him to toleration, a happy outcome. While the

<sup>89</sup> S. P. France, LII, Cecil to Lennox, Jan., 1605. See above, pp. 239-240.

<sup>90</sup> Nat. Lib. Scot., Denmilne MSS., 33. 1. 13, no. 10, copy, James to M. du Plessia, no place, no date [some time after 1603]. I quote a passage in the old French. "Scachez, Monsieur, que tout ce que nous avons escrit en defence de la [verité] de notre Religion ne nous fauldra iamais le courage a le maintenir avecq les armes, et aux [despens] de notre sang de iustifier la profession de notre foy. Mais quant a nous mettre en armes pour ce seul subiect, et propagner par violence [et] l'Evangile de Christ, Il y a en cela premierement question de licite a scavoir si par autorite fondee en l'Ecriture sainte en le doit attenter car ou il ny revelation epeciale pour servir de commission Il ne nous souvient ou d'aucun texte de l'Evangile ou d'aucun exemple de l'Eglise primitive qui donne pouvoir a planter par voye d'armes la religion de Christ. . . ."

tiresome driveling, lying, and equivocation he indulged in were characteristic of the sixteenth century, it is to James's honor that no man suffered death for his religion in Scotland during the years from 1587 to 1603.

## CHAPTER IX

### WAITING

When Mar and Kinloss came to London in March, 1601, immediately after the excitement connected with the Essex rising, their errands numbered three. They had specific topics to discuss with the Queen, such as Valentine Thomas, the imprisonment of Eure, and the rumors of James's intrigues with Catholic Europe, especially with Rome, which they were to deny. They were to revive the King's claim to the Lennox lands and to endeavor to get a further admission of his claim to the throne, or at least a renewal of old promises not to prejudice it. The second and most important part of their mission was to build up a party for James among the principal councillors, officers, and influential noblemen. Shortly before they set out, James was expecting to rely upon Essex's party. The tragedy of February changed completely the situation in the English government. With Essex gone, there was no focus for opposition to Cecil. James recognized the Secretary as "king thair in effect" and ordered Mar to approach him with threats of future disaster if he failed to enlist in the ranks of the King's partisans. In the third place, the ambassadors were to act as press agents for their master, currying favor in general in the country, advertising him in pleasing colors, and making all things as secure as possible for him in London, the ports, and the provinces.<sup>1</sup>

In their business with Elizabeth the ambassadors did not at first prosper. Their pleas on behalf of Eure and their re-

<sup>1</sup> Birch, *Memoirs*, II, 509-513; *Letters of Elizabeth and James*, pp. 134-138.



quests for further satisfaction in connection with the Valentine Thomas affair met with no success. They had come at a most awkward time for asking favors and had not chosen methods calculated to suit the Queen's mood. Cecil wrote to the Master of Gray:

In these particular things her Majesty and they my Lords afterward have interchanged many words, they thinking by argument to persuade her whose nature you know to be more unapt to yield even in trifles when she conceiveth they are challenged as duties than in greater matters wherein she conceiveth that the world doth believe whatsoever she granteth is *ex mero motu*.<sup>2</sup>

At the end of April the two ambassadors complained to Cecil of the Queen's "cauldnes." They begged a speedy dispatch and spoke rather sadly, "leaving the conclusion [to] that deep wisdom of your worthy sovereign which we can not but admire and reverence: only as counsellors affected to the conjunction, the quiet, and prosperity of both the states we wish it had been otherways, and . . . we can not but repent that we were deceived in [presuming that] this state which has so long [stood happ]ily by preventing all occasions [for common] enemies to work upon, is now be[come so] careless of those courses which heretofore have been thought most sound and worthy due consideration."<sup>3</sup>

Elizabeth wrote to James in April, answering the representations of his ambassadors point by point. The appeal for the Lennox lands was dismissed curtly. ". . . your selfe cannot be ignorant that some consequences wich depende therupon hath made us forbare to dispose of it one way or other." She refused to budge from the position taken be-

<sup>2</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVII, No. 45, draft, Cecil to Gray, April, 1601.

<sup>3</sup> Cotton MSS., Caligula D ii, ff. 419-420, collated with transcript in Harl. MSS., 4648, f. 212v, Mar and Bruce to [Cecil], Apr. 29, 1601. Parts of the original are destroyed.

fore concerning Valentine Thomas and was annoyed at having to speak of an affair which she considered long since concluded. Eure was her subject and she broadly hinted that James should not concern himself with her affairs. With regard to Ashfield she wrote:

. . . so doe wee think it strange that you do not better dycern of the merytt of persons who . . . going beyond the duty of subjects, seeke to shelter themselves against the danger of their owne crimes by making you a cause, and so a party to their disgraces; wich, for example sake, though for no other respect, all prynces-soveraigne ought to be wary to take uppou them, least in favouring the undutyfull doings of others subjects they open evyll wayes to their owne.

Was the Queen here writing of Ashfield but thinking of Essex? Apart from a graceful acceptance of congratulations on the suppression of his rebellion, she refrained in her letters from any direct mention of the Earl. She inserted, however, a few obscure words which could leave the King little doubt as to her knowledge of his intrigues.

. . . I marvayle much to haue suche a subject [Essex or Ashfield?] that wolde impart so great a cause to yow afore ever making me pryvy thereof, so doth my affectionat amytye to you clayme at your hands that my ignorance of subjects boldness be not augmented by your silence; by whom you may be sure you shall never obtaine so muche good as my good dealing can aford you.

. . . Remember, that a byrd of the ayre, if no other instrument, to an honest king shall stand in stead of many fayned practyses, to utter aught may any wyse touche hym. And so I leave my scrybles, with my best wyshe that you skane what works becometh best a king, and what in end will best avayle him.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> *Letters of Elizabeth and James*, pp. 134-138.

Mar and Kinloss had their last audience, receiving "nothing but negative answers, the matters being of so sour nature to the Queen, who loves neither importunity nor expostulation."<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, Elizabeth changed her mind and added to her letter addressed to James a paragraph augmenting the pension from three thousand pounds to five thousand pounds yearly as long as it should be "thankfully accepted and sincerely requited and deserved." She prefaced this grant with another warning, doubtless referring to the King's part in the Essex affair.

And now although we have plainly delivered to your ambassadors some particularities in which we might take it unkindly to have found them so reserved, yet as an argument of our opinion that you will be more careful hereafter to prevent not only the effect but the suspicions of all unkindness toward us than hitherto you have been, . . . we are contented to add 2000<sup>11</sup> yearly as of our gratuity. . . .<sup>6</sup>

She had done her best to extract from the ambassadors more exact information about the connection between James and Essex without success.<sup>7</sup> Her forbearance in letting the matter drop and her liberal gift illustrated her policy in these years, namely, that while she would not

<sup>5</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVII, No. 54, minute, Cecil to Nicolson, May 23, 1601. Cf. *Hat. Cal.*, X, 155-156, where the letter is misdated one year.

<sup>6</sup> Cotton MSS., Titus C vii, ff. 126-127, copy, Elizabeth to James, May 11, 1601. It is similar to the letter in *Letters of Elizabeth and James*, pp. 135-138, although the latter omits the final section about the pension.

<sup>7</sup> Cecil wrote to the Master of Gray on May 14, 1601 (*Hat. Cal.*, XIV, 176) that "her Majesty was infinitely distasted because they [Mar and Kinloss] were reserved in confessing the traffic between him [James] and Essex, whom it seemed the King did either believe to be his friend, or thought it wisdom to seem so. For her Majesty, knowing all particulars, took it unkindly, and yet so far is her heart . . . from malice, though it will be never free from jealousy, as she was contented to lap up all things, and to profess once more a good satisfaction and mutual correspondence. . . ."

openly designate her successor, she saw the wisdom in uniting the kingdoms, steadfastly refused to permit anything to injure seriously James's claim, and thus silently acquiesced in it.

Acting as publicity agents for James, Mar and Kinloss carried themselves well. The French resident in London said that they showed themselves often in public and attended sermons diligently to cultivate the favor of the ministers. He noticed that Mar was well received by the people and secretly visited various English gentlemen.<sup>8</sup> James received from his ambassadors glowing accounts of their popularity. Nicolson reported from Edinburgh:

. . . they have advertised that the people so applaud them and the King's cause as they can not go abroad without following of people and shew of their good wills, and her Majesty so observing it, as their greatest doubt is how to guide themselves to keep both the Queen and the people in this case. And where none dare come at them, they say it is like the blood of martyrs and engenders more desire to see and like them. . . .<sup>9</sup>

The most important result of Mar's embassy, viewed in the light of the history of the previous two years and in the light of the coming reign, was the understanding he succeeded in establishing with Sir Robert Cecil. The former estrangement, as well as the rather cold and calculating natures of the principals involved in the "Secret Correspondence," made this achievement of great significance for the last two years of Elizabeth's reign.

Shortly after the return of Mar and Kinloss to Scotland at the end of May, 1601, there began an exchange of letters between the English Secretary and James, sometimes directly, sometimes through the medium of Lord Henry

<sup>8</sup> Teulet, IV, 235, 237-238, 242-246.

<sup>9</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVII, No. 37, Nicolson to Cecil, Apr. 11, 1601.



Howard and the two recent ambassadors. Most of those written from England are printed, either in the volume edited by David Dalrymple, Lord Hailes, in 1766, *The Secret Correspondence of Sir Robert Cecil with James VI. King of Scotland*<sup>10</sup> (which, oddly enough, contains not one letter written by Cecil, but chiefly those of Howard), or in a volume edited by John Bruce and published by the Camden Society in 1861, *Correspondence of King James VI. of Scotland with Sir Robert Cecil and Others in England, During the Reign of Queen Elizabeth*.<sup>11</sup> Several other letters, not yet printed, are in the British Museum and in the National Library of Scotland.<sup>12</sup> Although there are some gaps, the absence of letters written by Mar and Kinloss being the most serious, those preserved afford a fairly complete outline of the correspondence.

Great precautions were taken to keep the exchange of letters as secret as possible. Cecil had to keep knowledge of it from Elizabeth and from his enemies in England who might have made capital of it by disclosing it to the Queen, while Mar, to insure his position and prestige in Scotland, had to safeguard it from his rivals who were anxious to supplant him. It would seem that few other than the five who actually corresponded were admitted to the secret or stumbled upon it.<sup>13</sup>

There has been a tradition that the letters were transmitted by way of Ireland, possibly through the hands of

<sup>10</sup> Hereafter cited as Hailes, *Secret Correspondence*.

<sup>11</sup> Hereafter cited as Bruce, *Correspondence*.

<sup>12</sup> Cotton MSS., Titus C vi, ff. 64–65, draft, Howard to [Bruce], written shortly after Mar's return to Scotland; Nat. Lib. Scot., Denmilne MSS., 33. 1. 7, no. 1, fragment, James to Cecil, no date. There are one or two other obscure letters, probably not of the Cecil-Howard correspondence, but possibly connected with Raleigh and Cobham. See S. P. Scotland, LXVII, No. 73, dated July 9, 1601, and Nat. Lib. Scot., Denmilne MSS., 33. 1. 7, no. 4, ——— to King James, no date.

<sup>13</sup> Bruce, *Correspondence*, Intro., pp. xxxviii–xli. Sir Thomas Erskine, David Foulis, and possibly the Lord Admiral Charles Howard, Earl of Nottingham, were admitted to the secret. The "40" of the cipher used, which Bruce failed to identify, was probably Nottingham. Cf. Bruce, *Correspondence*, pp. 15–16; Hailes, *Secret Correspondence*, p. 139.

Mr. James Hamilton and Mr. James Fullerton.<sup>14</sup> A close study of the State Papers, Scotland, in conjunction with the volumes mentioned above destroys the legend and shows that a very simple method was used. In the autumn of 1600 and the following winter the Duke of Rohan, a young French nobleman who was making a "grand tour" on the continent and in Britain, visited Scotland. He spent some time in London both before and after his journey to Edinburgh and returned to France just when the Essex rebellion came to a head.<sup>15</sup> He was very favorably impressed by the Scottish monarch and later wrote in extravagant terms of his virtues.<sup>16</sup> Here was an excellent blind. The "secret" letters were transmitted in the ordinary way between Cecil and Nicolson, the English agent in Edinburgh, but they went as packets from Rohan to Mar and vice versa, as if by courtesy of the English government. In August, 1601, Nicolson apparently received the first of such packets with Cecil's instructions to offer Mar convoy for his reply in case the Earl chose to answer.<sup>17</sup> Needless to say, Mar accepted the courtesy and thereafter frequent notices occurred in Nicolson's letters of this transmission of packets connected with Rohan's name.<sup>18</sup> The evidence which makes the proof practically conclusive occurs in a letter from Howard to King James. Urging the King to be guarded in his speeches to Nicolson, Howard wrote:

<sup>14</sup> Bruce, *Correspondence*, Intro., pp. xli-xliv. Cf. Harl. MSS., 7000, f. 308, extract, Mr. Pory to [Sir Thomas Puckering], Jan. 13, 1631, in which the writer says Fullerton and Hamilton laid the foundations of their fortunes at the end of Elizabeth's reign "by conveying the letters of some great lords of England (who worshipped the sun rising) to King James, and his letters back to them, this way of obliquity being chosen, as more safe than the direct northern road."

<sup>15</sup> P. R. O., Fr. Trans., Bdl. 32, [Boissize to Henry], Feb. 7, 13, 1601.

<sup>16</sup> *Voyage du Duc de Rohan Faict en l'an 1600, En Italie, Allemagne, Pays-bas Uni, Angleterre, & Escosse* (Amsterdam, 1646), pp. 206-218.

<sup>17</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVII, No. 103, Nicolson to Cecil, Aug. 25, 1601.

<sup>18</sup> E. g., *ibid.*, LXVII, Nos. 110, 113, 121; *ibid.*, LXVIII, Nos. 10, 40, 64; *Hat. Cal.*, XII, 109-110.

. . . for hereof you may assure yourself, that so soon as he [Nicolson] may find the least advantage whereupon to conclude a confidence in your mind toward Cecil, he will grow to conclude, that matter of more moment passeth by the packet, than Bouillon or Rohan is acquainted with.<sup>19</sup>

Nicolson noticed that Rohan's letters always drew James, Mar, and Kinloss to secret council<sup>20</sup> and later seemed to suspect an understanding between Cecil and the King.<sup>21</sup> Cecil, however, took precautions to throw him off the scent and apparently the precious secret was kept.<sup>22</sup>

That Cecil was extremely concerned about the secrecy of the intercourse was obvious. Kinloss in a note once intimated that he thought one packet had miscarried. As luck would have it, Howard, and not Cecil, read this grave news and Lord Henry took care to keep it from his colleague.

. . . if Cecil had seen [the clause about the supposedly lost packet], I protest to God all the course of convey and intelligence had been ruined for ever [wrote Lord Henry to Bruce]. . . upon the multiplicity of doubts his mind would never have been at rest, nor he would have eaten or slept quietly; for nothing makes him confident, but experience of secret trust, and security of intelligence.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Hailes, *Secret Correspondence*, p. 191. Packets seem to have been sent under Bouillon's name, too (S. P. Scotland, LXIX, No. 40, Nicolson to Cecil, Nov. 28, 1602).

<sup>20</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVII, No. 136, Nicolson to Cecil, Dec. 4, 1601.

<sup>21</sup> Hailes, *Secret Correspondence*, pp. 191-199.

<sup>22</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVIII, Nos. 79, 92, copies, Cecil to Nicolson, July 6, Aug. 24, 1602. It is possible that some letters were carried directly by minor agents of James, such as Foulis or Aston. G. Goodman's statement in his *Court of King James the First* (2 vols., London, 1839), I, 32, that the letters were "ever sent by the French post and not by Berwick" is not accurate.

<sup>23</sup> Hailes, *Secret Correspondence*, pp. 202-203.

Howard thought that no letter had miscarried since no word of such a thing had been brought to light and he made a plausible conjecture to explain away Bruce's fear.

Although Cecil and his future sovereign found this *rap-prochement* relatively easy to begin, each considered it necessary to explain and excuse his attitude toward the dead Essex. In the first letter of the clandestine correspondence James took pains to assure the Secretary that the latter's mistrust of the "aspyring mynde of essex" was a sure sign that he would never "allow that a subiect shoulde climbe to so hie a rounge." The King protested that Essex had never any dealing with him that was not most honorable and avowable, but added, "As for his misbehauioure thaire, it belongis not 30 [K. James] to iudge of it, for althoch 30 [K. James] loued him for his uertues, he uas no uayes obleished to embrace his querrellis, but to accepte of euerie man according to his owin desairtis."<sup>24</sup> Cecil, in reply, alleged his ready disposition to have been friendly to the Earl, had it been possible.<sup>25</sup> With these remarks the finale of Essex's political influence on James was written.

The correspondence, particularly at the beginning, was carried on in general terms. It served to convince James that Cecil and Howard could and would manage easily to bring about his accession after Elizabeth, thus calming the nervous excitement that had brought him so close to collaboration with Essex. It had also the effect of building up the King's confidence in Cecil and Howard, which augured much for the coming reign, and of advancing in Scotland the party of Mar and his associates. From the point of view of all the principals involved, its efficacy depended on confining it to as few as possible and on the absolute confidence each could have in the others. Consequently, after the first introductory phase of generalities, a large part of

<sup>24</sup> Bruce, *Correspondence*, p. 2.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.



the letters was devoted to establishing and maintaining this confidence to the exclusion of all intruders.

In Scotland the chief rival of Mar was the Duke of Lennox. The latter had always been a great favorite of James and had usually coöperated with Mar in the political entanglements of the kingdom. After the death of Maitland, their old enemy, and after the political eclipse of Glamis and others, the bond between them became less firm. As the years passed and men's eyes turned south, Mar obviously had the advantage over all other nobles in Scotland in the management of English affairs. He was, therefore, the object of much jealousy and in the autumn and winter of 1601-1602 it was Lennox who headed the opposition.<sup>26</sup>

Lennox had been sent on an embassy to France late in the summer of 1601. Much to Elizabeth's annoyance, he returned to Scotland through London at the time when Parliament was sitting. He, however, had only messages of compliment to her and made no effort to meddle in parliamentary affairs in support of his master's claim to the throne.<sup>27</sup> Cecil warned him not to concern himself with any serious matters,<sup>28</sup> but he apparently tried to establish a party for James in England. He negotiated with Raleigh and with Cobham while he was in London, wherefore the Secretary hastened to destroy any good opinion James may have conceived of the London visit.<sup>29</sup> Cecil intimated to James that his ambassador's experience "in distinguishing between ventosity and verity" was poor and that his conduct made the Queen very difficult to handle when it came to granting any reasonable desires. In Cecil's opinion, the contrast with Mar's wise management in circumstances much more difficult reflected little to the Duke's credit.

<sup>26</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVII, No. 128, and LXVIII, No. 5, Nicolson to Cecil, Nov. 11, 1601, Jan. 9, 1602.

<sup>27</sup> Spottiswood, III, 100-101; *Letters of Elizabeth and James*, pp. 139-141; Hailes, *Secret Correspondence*, p. 16.

<sup>28</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVIII, No. 36, draft, Cecil to [Master of Gray], no date; *Hat. Cal.*, XIV, 208-209.

<sup>29</sup> Bruce, *Correspondence*, pp. 18-20.

Once home, Lennox quarreled with Mar over the question of the Scots Elizabeth proposed using in Ireland against the Spanish, who had been sent there under d'Aquila late in 1601. James was very eager to be of use and had no sympathy with those of his Council, particularly Seton of Urquhart, who suggested that he seize this opportunity to exact good terms from Elizabeth. Mar and Argyll insisted that highlanders should be employed, while the Duke preferred lowlanders.<sup>30</sup> As luck would have it, Mountjoy's brilliant success in Ireland removed the necessity for employing Scots, and the issue vanished.<sup>31</sup>

The Duke's next move was to send Mr. James Hamilton to London to attempt to get another increase in the pension and to urge that the Garter be formally bestowed on the King. He tried to get a commission and some official errands from James, but the King, well coached by Cecil, Howard, Mar, and others, refused to give him any, alleging that

he [James] had no errand, and . . . that his friends *in England* had given him a warning that he should not send up any now that were agents before till a new matter of good evidency should fall out; for otherwise *her Majesty* would be jealous of him.<sup>32</sup>

To further Hamilton's success, Lennox enlisted the support of Sir James Sempill of Beltreis,<sup>33</sup> who was certainly receiving money from Secretary Cecil at the time.<sup>34</sup> Apart from

<sup>30</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVII, Nos. 123, 138, and LXVIII, Nos. 2, 5, Nicolson to Cecil, Nov. 6, Dec. 26, 1601, Jan. 3, 9, 1602; *ibid.*, LXVII, No. 130, James to Elizabeth, Nov. 21, 1601.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, LXVIII, No. 15, Nicolson to Cecil, Feb. 6, 1602.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, LXVIII, No. 40, Nicolson to Cecil, Apr. 25, 1602, words in italics in cipher, deciphered; Hailes, *Secret Correspondence*, pp. 91-92.

<sup>33</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVIII, No. 42, Sempill to Cecil, [April, 1602].

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, LXVIII, No. 52, [Nicolson to Cecil], no date; *ibid.*, No. 61, draft, Cecil to Nicolson, no date; "99" is the cipher figure for Beltreis. Cf. S. P. Scotland, LXVII, No. 98.

formal and empty words of courtesy, naturally, Hamilton obtained nothing.<sup>35</sup>

The figure of the Master of Gray emerged from obscurity during these last years of Elizabeth's reign. After a long journey on the continent he returned to Scotland through England in 1601. Uncertain at first of the King's favor, he engaged the Duke's support and obtained some countenance in the spring of 1602.<sup>36</sup> The reason for James's reluctance to show him any kindness may have been his meddling activity on the continent in recent years. In Paris, in 1598, he had offered his services to Elizabeth with rosy accounts of his abilities, but made no progress in the matter.<sup>37</sup> He had appeared in Florence in 1600 and tried to assume responsibility for negotiating between the Grand Duke and James, probably using a letter of recommendation dated some years before.<sup>38</sup> He was one among several who transmitted to the English government knowledge of the Elphinstone letter and for that reason may have been particularly distasteful to James.<sup>39</sup> Obviously Patrick, Master of Gray, was a man seeking employment. It was unlikely that he would let slip such a golden opportunity as the English situation afforded.

Gray found himself in bad repute with Mar and Kinloss when they were in London, early in 1601. They charged him with false practices for James in Rome and elsewhere on the continent and with unwarranted presumption in

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, LXVIII, No. 56, Sempill to Cecil, May 26, 1602; *ibid.*, LXIX, No. 26, Cecil to Nicolson, Oct., 1602; Bruce, *Correspondence*, p. 43.

<sup>36</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVII, No. 38, Ralph Gray to Cecil, Apr. 11, 1601; *ibid.*, No. 82, Master of Gray to Ralph Gray, July 29, 1601; *ibid.*, No. 87, incl., Master of Gray to Cecil, July 29, 1601; *ibid.*, LXVIII, No. 35, Ralph Gray to Cecil, [Spring, 1602]; *ibid.*, No. 45, proclamation relieving Gray from pursuit for debts for eight months, May 4, 1602; *Hat. Cal.*, XII, 124.

<sup>37</sup> *Edmondson Papers*, pp. 383-392.

<sup>38</sup> Mackie, *Negotiations*, Intro., p. xvi, pp. 14-15, 31-36.

<sup>39</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVII, No. 45, draft, Cecil to Gray, April, 1601; S. P. France, XLIV, Gray to Neville, [1600]; *ibid.*, Gray to Cecil, [Sept. 22, 1600].

undertaking to accomplish great things for the King with Elizabeth.<sup>40</sup> Cecil, who was also accused by them of using Gray to traffic with the Infanta, defended himself and the Master at that time, but seems not to have removed Mar's grudge against Gray. In the summer of 1601 the Master tried to retaliate against Mar. He turned to the Duke of Lennox and exerted all the influence he could on the Duke's behalf in England.<sup>41</sup> Strangely enough, he received some slight encouragement from Cecil, who kept up a desultory correspondence with him and arranged to pay his son a small sum yearly in France.<sup>42</sup>

The Secretary's motive in not breaking abruptly with Gray was probably his deep-rooted fear that such action would immediately arouse suspicions of his understanding with Mar. He even let fall to the Master words that hinted broadly at his expectation of James's accession.<sup>43</sup> To the King, Cecil excused his relations with Gray and received James's assurance that he thought no evil thereon.<sup>44</sup> The Secretary coolly assured the Master that he cared to hold friendship only with Gray, Nicolson, and one or two others and posed as a martyr, enduring "those hard exceptions"

<sup>40</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVII, No. 45, draft, Cecil to the Master of Gray, Apr., 1601.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, LXVII, Nos. 98, 103, Nicolson to Cecil, Aug. 17, 25, 1601; Gray, *Letters*, pp. 192-195; Hailes, *Secret Correspondence*, pp. 16-17.

<sup>42</sup> Gray, *Letters*, pp. 190-192.

<sup>43</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVII, No. 45, April, 1601. Cecil wrote to Gray, ". . . you must thus resort to your own judgment that if it be not enough for Scotland to see more and more how every accident makes their paths smooth if they tread not awry and that before their time, or that it be not sufficient for the King to think the Queen is just and her ministers honest unless she can be drawn to give account of all her actions or won to affirm his title, which no man that liveth about her dare propound unto her, then I do not see how your foundation will be established by any great matter you shall have from hence. . . ." Or again, Cecil to Gray, in Gray, *Letters*, pp. 190-192, "But to God I leaue yow, for yow haue a strange Court, and strang particularitys (me think) possess yow, so as for mine owne part I will resolue neuer to pass the riuer of Twede, thogh if yow come hyther in his naturall tyme I will hope that we southern men shall rectify yow with our mild medecins, and temper the violence and inconstancy of your humours."

<sup>44</sup> Bruce, *Correspondence*, pp. 20-25.



which James was said to have against him.<sup>45</sup> Yet to the King he used far different phrases.

. . . althogh I have ben oft constrained, (for prevention of suspicion in his [Gray's] multiplying braine) to couer my affection, (sometyme with the vaile of dispaire, sometyme with the mislike of open carriadge of all addresses,) . . . God hath neuer so farr forsaken me, as to suffer me to leaue it in the power of swch a vyper to tax me by woord or writt of malicious practise, intention of preiudice, or so much as a desire to procure the good of this state *in substantivo* by an euill adverb.<sup>46</sup>

Whatever appearances were kept up, the Master of Gray exerted little political influence at this time. His attempts to bring Cecil and the party of Sir George Hume, then Treasurer of Scotland, to an understanding and to win the King's favor for the former were coldly received.<sup>47</sup> A suggestion from Gray that Cecil write to James to explain his actions brought a speedy reproof.

. . . I do directly deny [wrote Sir Robert] that the King either (out of his election) will, or (out of his judgment) could, be one jot the better satisfied in his opinion of her Majesty's disposition by any formality or apologies of mine; for if those seals which he hath had (from her) of her Majesty's infinite care and favor be not sufficient, my writing boteth not; if sufficient, my writing needeth not. . . . But that ever I would of myself (upon such a ground) crave leave to insinuate favor or to clear suspicion, it is far from my resolution. . . .<sup>48</sup>

<sup>45</sup> Gray, *Letters*, pp. 190-195; S. P. Scotland, LXVIII, No. 36, draft, Cecil to [Gray], [Spring, 1602].

<sup>46</sup> Bruce, *Correspondence*, p. 28.

<sup>47</sup> Cotton MSS., Titus C vi, ff. 193-194, 196-197, copies of Gray's letters in Lord Henry Howard's commonplace book, [1601]; Add. MSS., 6177, ff. 103-104, copy, Gray to James, [Dec. 9, 1601].

<sup>48</sup> Add. MSS., 35125, ff. 29-30, Sir Robert Cecil to the Master of Gray, Apr. 30, 1602.

Thereafter there is little trace of correspondence between the two. Cecil occasionally transmitted foreign news to the Master,<sup>49</sup> but Gray's efforts to magnify his relations with the Secretary met with no success. Before the new reign Gray seems never to have recovered completely the King's favor for any long period.<sup>50</sup>

Great precautions had to be taken to keep knowledge of the "Secret Correspondence" from Queen Anne, whose appetite for intrigue seldom abated. About the time of Gray's return to Scotland in 1601 she was evidently trying to get in touch with Cecil. She was simultaneously agitating to get the Prince removed from Mar's keeping. Gray, who was the Duke's ally in opposition to Mar, concerned himself with Anne's attempts to play a part in affairs with England.<sup>51</sup> Sempill of Beltreis was also to some extent in her confidence and was used by her to convey gracious messages to the English Secretary.<sup>52</sup> Her advances received no encouragement. Through Gray, Cecil let her know that he had no intention of entering upon any secret course with her. The Master faithfully delivered this message. He wrote to Cecil:

As touching our Queen, before your letter came to my hand I made her the same answer in effect you have written to me. I showed her that you could take no dealing but by the Queen your sovereign's knowledge and allowance for, seeing you ever had refused the same to the King, much less could you yield it to her now. Since your letter she had [written] me to know if I had received word from you. I "shawe" her that I had and that you took it very kindly her honest meaning towards the amity, for the which you would endeavor yourself to do all the good

<sup>49</sup> E. g., *Hat. Cal.*, XII, 493-494.

<sup>50</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXIX, No. 48, Hudson to Cecil, Dec., 1602; *ibid.*, No. 52, Nicolson to Cecil, Jan. 1, 1603; *ibid.*, No. 59, Aston to Cecil, Feb. 1, 1603.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, LXVII, No. 87, incl., Gray to Cecil, July 29, 1601.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, LXVIII, No. 42, Sempill to Cecil, [1602].

offices you could, but to have a particular correspondency with her you thought it should rather do her harm than profit her, considering his Majesty's hard opinion of you.<sup>53</sup>

Cecil feared that Anne would stumble upon his secret or would compromise his position in Scotland in some way. In one letter, possibly the only one he sent to the Scottish Queen, he emphasized the fact that he wrote only by Elizabeth's warrant; and the letter, conveying from the Queen a refusal of some request of Anne's, was very curt.<sup>54</sup> Anne's hint by Beltreis of her eager desire to intercept the King's packets for England probably made the Secretary uncomfortable.<sup>55</sup> Through Lord Henry Howard he begged James "that Queen Anne may never hear the names of Cecil and Lord Henry Howard so much as sounded with any kind affection or inclination from the mouths of King James, or any of his elect."<sup>56</sup>

Howard devoted much space in his lengthy and obscure letters to warning the King against Anne. Not daring to accuse her of malicious plotting against her husband, he always built his warnings on the grounds that she was a weak woman, a tool in the hands of more clever and unscrupulous persons.<sup>57</sup> Nevertheless, Anne's obvious efforts to get the prince from Mar, linked with intelligence from the continent "of great mysteries and miracles to be wrought, in case the prince could once be put in the hands of a catholic," were significant.<sup>58</sup> Anne was in touch with Rome at this time, professing her belief in the Catholic faith and telling the Pope of her efforts to educate her children in that religion.<sup>59</sup> There were hints that she belonged to the "Span-

<sup>53</sup> Cotton MSS., Titus C vi, f. 196, copy, Gray to Cecil, Sept., [1601?].

<sup>54</sup> *Hat. Cal.*, XII, 367-368, Sept. 11, 1602.

<sup>55</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVIII, No. 42, Sempill to Cecil, [1602].

<sup>56</sup> Hailes, *Secret Correspondence*, pp. 216-217.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 143-168, 168-180, 201-202, 216-220.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 157.

<sup>59</sup> See above, p. 238.

ish party" in Scotland and encouraged the sending thither of diplomatic representatives from Rome and Spain.<sup>60</sup> When the Archduke finally sent an agent in 1603, his instructions contained a phrase that suggests the suspicions with which Anne was viewed. Scorza, the agent, had no letter to her or message of compliment, Albert explained, "afin que son ambassade ne fit aucun bruit et qu'on n'en devinât pas la cause."<sup>61</sup> James probably encouraged these intrigues of hers abroad but in domestic affairs he remained faithful to Mar.

For one phase of Anne's activity the King could have felt little sympathy. His dislike of the Ruthven family ever since the Gowry mystery of August, 1600, was known to all. At that time John Ruthven, Earl of Gowry, and his brother Alexander had been killed in the confusion attendant upon what James alleged was their attempt to assassinate him. At the end of 1602 the Scottish Queen was engaged in a serious attempt to restore the surviving members of the family to her husband's grace. The dead Earl's sister was brought secretly to court and it was thought that some plot was on foot on behalf of the two younger brothers who had taken refuge in England.<sup>62</sup> James was careful to take all precautions against any violent attempts that might be made on his person. Anne's share in these restless intrigues probably did much to destroy her chances of gaining influence with her husband. Nevertheless, her activity was enough to wrinkle the brows of the self-possessed Secretary in England and of his less restrained colleague, Howard.

While Lennox, the Master of Gray, and Anne were the chief persons in Scotland whose influence the secret cor-

<sup>60</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVIII, No. 77, Nicolson to Cecil, July 4, 1602.

<sup>61</sup> Lonchay and Cuvelier, I, 132-133, Albert's instructions for Scorza, Feb. 12, 1603.

<sup>62</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXIX, Nos. 8, 52, Nicolson to Cecil, Sept. 22, 1602, Jan. 1, 1603; *ibid.*, No. 48, Hudson to Cecil, Dec., 1602; *ibid.*, No. 59, Aston to Cecil, Feb. 1, 1603; Hailes, *Secret Correspondence*, pp. 161-166 and n.



respondents tried to frustrate, in England the figures to be contended with were mainly Sir Walter Raleigh and Henry Brooke, Lord Cobham. One of the most obscure problems of the years immediately preceding James's accession is this question of Raleigh and his friend Cobham.<sup>63</sup> The tenor of the secret correspondence was without doubt to plant mistrust of them in the King's mind. Lord Henry Howard seemed to be the chief evil genius in the affair, although Cecil must bear some share of the responsibility. What grounds there were for this hatred, what truth in the assertions of Cecil and Howard that Raleigh and Cobham opposed James, are unsolved questions. Practically the only evidence available lies in the letters of Howard and Cecil. The testimony is thus one-sided. Since most of it is in the correspondence of Lord Henry Howard, whose style James once described as "ample Asiatic and endless,"<sup>64</sup> the hope of attaining a fair solution is slight. Howard was capable of befogging any topic on which he wrote. Given Cobham and Raleigh to discuss, men whom he hated, he used no restraint. His letter to Bruce, dated December 4, (1601), is an extreme example of his obscure style.<sup>65</sup>

In his letter Howard recapitulated the contents of a former communication about Cobham and proceeded to describe the latter's further intrigues with Raleigh and with the Earl of Northumberland. According to this account, Lord Cobham had tried to poison Elizabeth's mind against Cecil by insinuating that the Secretary was veering to the side of King James. Elizabeth refused to take up the matter, whereupon Cobham resorted to another plan. This "diabolical triplicity, that is, Cobham, Raleigh, and Northumberland, that met every day at Durham-house,"<sup>66</sup>

<sup>63</sup> For a lengthy account of the story, see Edward Edwards, *The Life of Sir Walter Raleigh . . . Together with His Letters* ( 2 vols., London, 1868), I, 303-315, 324-330.

<sup>64</sup> Hailes, *Secret Correspondence*, p. 116.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 27-53.

<sup>66</sup> Durham House was Raleigh's London residence.

planned that Northumberland, "a sworn enemy to King James" (according to Howard), should offer his services to Cecil for communicating with the Scottish King. Cecil, however, handled him dexterously and gave the Earl the impression that he would oppose James's candidacy. The next suggested move from the Durham House "triplicity" was to inform Elizabeth of the attempts of Essex's old partisans to free their friend, Southampton, from imprisonment<sup>67</sup> and to hint at their further intrigues. The "triplicity" meant to link Cecil's name with these plots so that the Secretary might be disgraced. Northumberland, who was to reveal this, lost courage, and Cobham betrayed to the Secretary the schemes they had been planning. Balked so far in every attempt to ruin the Secretary and to embarrass James, Cobham now seized on the opportunity of the Duke of Lennox's visit to London in November, 1601, to profess deep devotion to James. Cobham informed Cecil of his dealings with Lennox, alleging his motives to have been the ordinary ones of preparing for the future and of participating in the general movement in James's favor, although this would not prevent him from changing sides if the occasion presented itself. Cecil consulted Howard and they agreed that Cobham's real motives were to ensnare the Secretary and to learn James's secrets, probably with the purpose of revealing all to Elizabeth and thus raising his credit with her at their expense. Cecil met Cobham's confession of his communication with Lennox with the customary impassive formula, "That it was not possible for any man to be a loyal subject to his gracious mistress, that respected King James in any degree, either present or future." Raleigh also told Cecil that Lennox had made some advances to him but that he had made a cold response.

The Cobham intrigue is an example of the complicated

<sup>67</sup> The Earls of Southampton and Essex were tried and condemned simultaneously. Southampton's life was spared but he was kept in prison for the remainder of Elizabeth's reign (Birch, *Memoirs*, II, 473-474, 493-494).

situations Howard described to James. If true, the vacillation of the Durham House plotters must have convinced the King of their little worth. Although Howard's language about them was extravagant, he actually had little of moment with which to charge them. There is only one vague suggestion in his letters from which it might be inferred that they thought seriously of Arbella's claim to the throne—the statement that there was a strong “league” between Raleigh and his wife and Lady Shrewsbury.<sup>68</sup> For the most part Lord Henry's thesis was their busy efforts to break the credit of himself and Cecil and to establish their own supremacy and favor with Elizabeth.<sup>69</sup> Howard talked much of their willingness to befriend James only so long as it served their turn, of their furthering of an Anglo-Spanish peace, which James opposed, and of their efforts to make Elizabeth jealous of James.<sup>70</sup> His pages are full of bombastic and empty phrases, contrasting their futile behavior with his own and Cecil's great capacities for serving the King.

Full responsibility for this drastic campaign to poison James's mind against the Durham House group must be shared between Cecil and Howard, although it seems clear that the latter had more to do with it. The Secretary, in one of his letters to the King, warned James that little confidence could be placed in Raleigh. He utterly repudiated anything Raleigh might presume to say for him and referred the King to Howard's relation for more complete

<sup>68</sup> Hailes, *Secret Correspondence*, p. 68.

<sup>69</sup> Edwards, *Raleigh*, II, 436–444. Cotton MSS., Titus C vi, ff. 382–387, has some passages of this paper, written by Howard, which Edwards omitted; e. g., f. 385v, “. . . therefore, the best course were in all respects to be rid of them. [Fortune allures] men and instruments of giddiness in a ‘tickell’ time must be undertaken before they come perfectly to know their own strength like colts. . . . If I should speak my conscience, the only cause that maketh them so slack in closing with the next pretender is desire by intermediate endeavors to advance themselves and value their own credits more by some [budge?] of glory for the stirring of the Scottish appetite to apprehend their vows. . . .”

<sup>70</sup> Hailes, *Secret Correspondence*, pp. 42, 45, 59–62, 75–76, 125–126; Bruce, *Correspondence*, pp. 30–31.

details.<sup>71</sup> Sir Robert undoubtedly saw some of the letters Howard sent to Edinburgh and approved of at least one, written to reveal the duplicity of the three conspirators.<sup>72</sup> His name was frequently used by Lord Henry in the course of his verbose expositions. Yet it seems likely that Howard went beyond Cecil's instructions. For instance, in his letter to Bruce, dated December 4, (1601), in which he outlined the machinations of Raleigh and his associates and their relations with Lennox, he transmitted from Cecil a request for the particulars of Lennox's reports of these same negotiations, but added, "You must not touch one word in your letter of the consultations and canons of Durham-house [i. e., the moves and counter-moves prior to the dealings with the Duke of Lennox], because I had not warrant to advertise them. . . ." <sup>73</sup> At another time Howard wrote to Mar, "I must tell your Lordship in secret, between you and me, in the wonted manner, without commission to advertise, that Cecil . . . could not guess at any other ground than some chimeras tendered from Cobham, Raleigh, and Northumberland, upon their offer to comply. . . ." <sup>74</sup> However far Howard trespassed beyond Cecil's instructions, it is clear that the Secretary employed him in the more distasteful parts of the correspondence. In one instance, when Northumberland had entrusted a secret letter and messages from James to Cecil's keeping, Howard was used to write devastating comments thereon to Bruce, "because exceptions might seem more strange out of the mouth of him, in whose hand the letter was left in trust, than from me [Howard], whom duty and care of the service might move to speak plainly without particular respects." <sup>75</sup>

<sup>71</sup> Bruce, *Correspondence*, pp. 18-19.

<sup>72</sup> Hailes, *Secret Correspondence*, p. 123.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 123.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 106.



The success of this harsh method of breaking Raleigh's credit with James may be tested both by Howard's tone of satisfaction in speaking of it and by the turn of events in 1603. Howard once drafted for Cecil a lengthy and obscure outline of ways to ruin Cobham and Raleigh. One suggestion was to let them enter into communication with James and his advisers, to draw them on, and thus obtain from their own hands enough to damn them. Rather complacently Lord Henry pointed out that this method had little chance of success; Cobham and Raleigh were too shrewd to venture far with Scotland without some sure sign from James of his trust in them and such assurance James would never grant.

That out of Scotland littell good is to be don, we gather by their [Cobham's and Raleigh's] daintiness to write; by the littell good they gotte, or their sollicitor, at the last embazy; by their diffidence in that untrustie nation; by their uncertainty of the Kinge's acceptance; and in respect of the danger that may yet growe to them, in the case they should not accept . . . by causing their knight first to sownde the passage, befor they put in their foot; by guiltiness of their own opposition to persons, that in favor have the start; by danger of discouerie. . . . Without their adventur, we can derive no grownd of operation. Of their adventuringe, against so many palissados of pike, there is no probabilitie in such craftie fellowes. Therfor the life of operation, in this degree, may be reputed desperat. . . .

If it wear possible to drawe "30" [King James the Sixth] to consent that advantage might be taken of their traffick with his ministers,—or by interception of meanes and instruments that concurr *in termino*, by making his own satisfaction their rendezvous,—it wear not possible to make shorter nor surer work, then by this overtur. But as they will not write, without some stronge motive of confidenc; and after such a warrant is awarded by the King he will not willingly permitt the cancellinge or defacer of

his owne workemanshpype, therfor no good is to be brought to pass in that circumferenc.<sup>76</sup>

The second method Lord Henry proposed was to embroil Cobham and Raleigh in difficulties with Spain in connection with the proposed peace so that they could never clear themselves of the imputation of treason. Oddly enough, it was in this way that their ruin was accomplished in 1603 after James's accession. The King's mind was certainly poisoned against Cobham and Raleigh before he came to London. In the first weeks of the new reign Raleigh was dismissed from the captainship of the guard and was shown other marks of disfavor. Cobham, too, realized his waning fortunes. When, in the summer of 1603, the unraveling of the Priests' Treason or Bye Plot, a mad proposal of discontented Catholics to seize the King's person, brought to light evidence suggesting that these two were involved in treasonable designs against the King, the opportunity was seized and both brought to trial.

The evidence in the case is very unreliable. Cobham, the star witness for the state, confessed to dealings with Arenberg, the Archduke's ambassador then in England, to get money from Albert and from the Spanish King to be distributed in England. Whether the purpose was to concert an attack on England, to advance Arbella to the throne, or to bring about peace with Spain, is uncertain. Cobham vacillated in giving testimony and the whole trial presented an unedifying spectacle of friend betraying friend, both Cobham and Raleigh seeking to gain advantage at the other's expense. Both were known to be discontented with the government; Cobham had dealt previously with Arenberg with Elizabeth's consent; and it seems likely that

<sup>76</sup> Edwards, *Raleigh*, II, 442-444. Cf. the original, written by Howard in his commonplace book, Cotton MSS., Titus C vi, ff. 382-387. There are a few inconsequential variations from the original text in the above quotation. In earlier pages Edwards has omitted important passages.

they considered accepting pensions to promote an Anglo-Spanish peace. That the matter went further and that they seriously planned any project to remove James and his "cubs" and to place Arbella on the throne seems very unlikely. Cobham said that when he had seen Arbella, he resolved never to hazard his estate for her, and Raleigh expressed similar views.<sup>77</sup> Regardless of weak evidence, both were condemned at Winchester in the autumn of 1603 and, although sentenced to death, were kept in prison for years, Raleigh until the disastrous Guiana voyage in 1616, Cobham until 1617.<sup>78</sup>

It is unfair to lay full blame for Raleigh's and Cobham's fate in 1603 on Howard and Cecil. The evidence certainly showed that there was something for the government to investigate, even if it reduced to a matter of Spanish bribes for peace, a thing from which Cecil himself cannot be absolutely exonerated at a later date, although it seems likely that he acted then with James's knowledge and consent.<sup>79</sup> Nevertheless, the invidious propaganda carried on before James's accession and Howard's cunning proposals to implicate them in intrigues with Spain appear to have had a more than casual significance in the light of their ultimate ruin.

<sup>77</sup> *Hat. Cal.*, XV, 208; Edwards, *Raleigh*, I, 301, and II, 449-450.

<sup>78</sup> The story of this Main Plot, as contrasted with the Priests' or Bye Plot, is told and evidence printed in Gardiner, I, 108-140; John Lingard, *History of England from the First Invasion by the Romans to the Accession of William and Mary in 1688* (10 vols., VI and VII covering 1558-1642, Dublin, 1874), VII, 10-14 and notes; D. Jardine, *Criminal Trials*, I (London, 1832), pp. 400-452; Howell, *State Trials*, II, 1-51; Tierney-Dodd, IV, App., pp. xxviii, xxxiii-xlix, Watson's testimony; *Hat. Cal.*, XV, *ad indices*; *Cal. Domestic*, 1603-1607, *ad indices*; Cotton MSS., Caligula E x, ff. 146-150, letters of Cecil to Sir Thomas Parry, Sept. 27, Dec. 1, 1603; Edwards, *Raleigh*, I, chaps. xvii-xix. Joseph Cuvelier in "Les Preliminaires du traité . . .," *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*, II (1923), 492-501, exonerates Arenberg from the charge of conspiring with Cobham on Arbella's behalf. Albert wanted peace, he said, and Arenberg himself opposed violent measures. Cuvelier argues in part from the absence in Arenberg's letters of any reference to dealings with Cobham for Arbella. Probably Arenberg's negotiations concerned only the peace.

<sup>79</sup> Gardiner, I, 215-217.

Unfortunately, much of the secret correspondence emanating from James, Mar, and Bruce seems not to have been preserved. From the aftermath one might conclude that the impression Howard and Cecil succeeded in creating in the King's mind was wholly to Howard's liking. But James was too cautious to turn his back squarely on any party offering him service. That may explain the slight success which Northumberland achieved in his effort to establish an understanding with James. Howard and Cecil insisted that Northumberland was acting on behalf of Raleigh; <sup>80</sup> certainly he did his best to assure James of Sir Walter's fidelity.<sup>81</sup>

Henry Percy, Earl of Northumberland, sent a lengthy letter to James, apparently some time in the year 1602, painting in rosy colors the conditions in England upon which the King's accession depended and outlining arguments to dissuade James from any attempt to enter prematurely by conquest.<sup>82</sup> The King made a very affable reply, but added, "Yea, forder wauld I wise you to be ware wyth sending of any message to me at all, except sume great occasionne sall require it, least if any misfortonne fele out, it myght breed hearme to ws both. . . ." <sup>83</sup> In spite of this admonition, the Earl wrote again to show the King "particular mens affections." In this letter he gave the dead Essex a most uncomplimentary character, commended Raleigh's "allowance" of the Scottish title, although confessing him to be a man who "will neuer be able to do yow muche good nor hearme," and suggested that Cecil was unreservedly a supporter of James, although he would probably never "open hem selfe unto your maiestie, wpone any condition, so long as her maiestie liueth." <sup>84</sup> This drew

<sup>80</sup> Hailes, *Secret Correspondence*, pp. 29-39, 64-67, 224-225.

<sup>81</sup> Bruce, *Correspondence*, p. 67.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 53-61.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 61-63.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 64-70.



from the King a like courteous letter with the repeated warning, "send no mo messingers except some great and wrgent occation of sending be accompainged wyth some suir and safe means of conuoy." <sup>85</sup>

Cecil and Howard were informed of this correspondence by Northumberland.<sup>86</sup> Howard wrote to James, expressing approval of the King's wise handling of the matter but intimating that "some" wished no handwriting of the King's to have been entrusted in an uncertain hand. He suggested that Northumberland may have presumed to magnify the King's answer or may have received messages from James which seemed to "set a greater price upon the man than he deserves, or Cecil, out of the knowledge of his falsehood, would wish that he should hold." Consequently, he warned James to use Northumberland well but never to disclose to him any hint of James's favor to the Secretary, never to hear his advice, and to "cut off all ordinary traffic of intelligence." James probably acted completely in accord with Cecil's wishes, keeping all offers of service "in hand" with vague replies, but Howard and his colleague were obviously troubled by the situation and perhaps did not have complete confidence in the King.

Other incidents occurred at times to disturb the normal state of calmness in these last years. One was the case of Francis Mowbray and his cousin Philip, Scotsmen who were apparently once employed by Cecil to capture Tyrone dead or alive.<sup>87</sup> Philip talked too much and got into trouble in Scotland.<sup>88</sup> It was with Francis, however, that a real difficulty developed. In July, 1601, he was imprisoned in Scotland on the suspicion, it was rumored, that Cecil had

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 70-72.

<sup>86</sup> Hailes, *Secret Correspondence*, pp. 64-67, 105-111.

<sup>87</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVII, No. 54, minute, Cecil to Nicolson, May 23, 1601; *ibid.*, No. 57, [Francis Mowbray] to Cecil, June 1, 1601; *Hat. Cal.*, XIV, 186.

<sup>88</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVII, No. 58, Nicolson to Cecil, June 2, 1601; *ibid.*, No. 64, Philip Mowbray to Cecil, June 24, 1601.

hired him to kill James.<sup>89</sup> The King had received various warnings of an attempt to be made on his life and was consequently nervous. Nicolson, the English agent in Edinburgh, exerted all the influence he could to get Mowbray released, showing that he was employed to go to Spain as Cecil's intelligencer. After much to-do, Mowbray was freed, apparently under guarantee to depart from the country.<sup>90</sup> The incident, occurring as it did in the summer immediately after the return of Mar and Kinloss from England, may have been magnified out of all proportion by Mar's enemies to inflame the King against the English government, or the intense excitement over it may have been a ruse planned by Mar to conceal James's new understanding with Cecil. The latter hypothesis, however, is not very probable since insufficient time had elapsed for either James or Cecil to have gained complete confidence in the other.

Mowbray returned to London after this escapade and was hired by Cecil to go as a spy to Flanders and to Spain. While in Flanders he heard that one Daniel Archdeacon, an Italian fencing-master in London, was spreading false tales to the effect that he had attempted to kill James and had said that Cecil had sold England to the Spaniard. Mowbray returned to London, denied the stories, and it was arranged that he should go to Scotland to fight a duel there with Archdeacon. James consented to the combat, on condition that Mowbray, were he victor, should leave Scotland immediately. The King, however, soon decided that the affair was too serious to be handled so lightly. He had both combatants examined and delayed the duel until further witnesses could come from London. He openly showed his mistrust of Mowbray, who, in despair, tried to escape from Edinburgh castle where he was imprisoned and killed him-

<sup>89</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVII, No. 82, Master of Gray to Ralph Gray, July 29, 1601; *ibid.*, No. 87, incl., Master of Gray to Cecil, July 29, 1601.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, LXVII, Nos. 83, 93, 94, 97, 98, 103, Nicolson to Cecil, July 29, 31, Aug. 1, 7, 10, 16, 17, 25, 1601; *ibid.*, No. 114, Cecil to the Master of Gray, Oct. 10, 1601; *ibid.*, No. 125, Aston to Lock, Nov. 7, 1601.

self in the attempt about February 1, 1603. Some people suspected foul play. James's anger against him was so great that even after his death sentence was pronounced against him and his body was hanged and quartered.<sup>91</sup>

Granted that Mowbray was a "practiser" of infamy, one of the large group whose daily business was treachery and assassination, responsibility for his fate rests partly on the shoulders of James, whose vindictive hatred of him was openly shown, and partly on the shoulders of Cecil. In a letter of Lord Henry Howard to Bruce, probably written in the summer of 1602, there occurs a brief passage about the fellow. "Cecil will observe the King's direction, as well in mining by invention and subornation into his ends, as by continuing the pension, though he have very ill deserved it. He doth concur with the judgement of King James touching the peril that may grow by driving him into despair for want of provender, before the close decks be discovered. You may in like sort assure King James, that Cecil will take no extraordinary course with him about King James's particular, till he take him with more meat in his mouth, and the matter be so pregnant, as negatives would be found both ridiculous and impudent."<sup>92</sup> Mowbray's chances of survival were small in view of James's loathing and Cecil's willingness to lead him on to destruction in conformity with the King's desires.

It would be interesting to know just how much Elizabeth's principal minister permitted himself to be influenced by James in these years. There was, first of all, the question of peace. Lord Burghley's name had been traditionally associated with the peace party in contrast to the energetic militarism of Walsingham, Leicester, and later Essex. Sir Robert Cecil was in general heir to his father's policy. And

<sup>91</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXIX, No. 13, Cecil to Nicolson, Oct. 2, 1602; *ibid.*, No. 35, Nicolson to Cecil, Nov. 13, 1602; *ibid.*, Nos. 24, 37, 38, 58, Thos. Douglas to Cecil, Oct. 27, Nov. 16, 24, 1602, Feb. 4, 1603; *ibid.*, Nos. 31, 33, 34, depositions of Francis Mowbray, Walter Mowbray, and John Anderson; Pitcairn, II, Pt. II, 405-409.

<sup>92</sup> Hailes, *Secret Correspondence*, pp. 223-224.

yet, the spirited Essex once removed and a firm understanding with Scotland established, the Secretary appears to have delayed the movements for an Anglo-Spanish peace which were on foot.<sup>93</sup> This may have been partly out of consideration for James, although the gravity of the situation, with Albert threatening Ostend and with Spanish reinforcements sent to Ireland, raised doubts as to the sincerity of the enemy's peace moves. When a new overture for cessation of hostilities was made, Cecil consulted James as to how he wished the matter handled. He received from the Scottish King a plain intimation of his disapproval of a peace. Were England at peace with Spain in the present state of affairs, the King wrote, it would prejudice religion, the state, and "my iust claime in particulaire." Free commerce between the nations would soon erase old prejudices and ample opportunity would be given for Spanish agents, Jesuits, and others to corrupt men's minds.<sup>94</sup> Cecil replied, assuring the King that he would oppose a peace. He added that the "scandall which followed the late Erl of Essex for his greedynes of warr, because he wold be euer sure of an army, is most transferred to me, as being an enemy for some other corrupt ends to the cours of pacification."<sup>95</sup> Some of the opprobrium he endured arose because Elizabeth was very much worried over the drain of money from the Exchequer. She was, also, keenly aware of discontentment in England at the continuance of the costly war. The peace party laid these arguments before her, but Cecil in a stormy interview skilfully overcame them. Nevertheless, the encounter with his mistress had been a "sharp" one.<sup>96</sup>

The policy toward recusants in England at the end of the reign may also have been influenced to some extent by

<sup>93</sup> Cotton MSS., Titus C vi, ff. 64-65, draft, Howard to [Bruce] [Summer, 1601].

<sup>94</sup> Bruce, *Correspondence*, pp. 30-31.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35. The French ambassador in London reported that Elizabeth's councillors opposed peace for fear of offending James (P. R. O., Fr. Trans., Bdl. 35, Beaumont to Henry, Jan. 13, 1603).

<sup>96</sup> Hailes, *Secret Correspondence*, pp. 75-76.



the King's fears. At the time when he argued so earnestly against peace, he complained of the resort of Jesuits and priests to England and of the growth of popery there. The Catholics vaunted, he said, that none should be king there but by their leave.<sup>97</sup> He longed to hear of the enforcement of the recent proclamation against them. Probably he referred to Elizabeth's proclamation of November 5, 1602, in which she declared that Jesuits and priests who had plotted an invasion of England must depart or run the risk of the penal laws, which really meant death. A chance was given to the moderates of the secular clergy who opposed such treason to acknowledge their allegiance to the Queen by February first; if they neglected this oath, they, too, would have to leave the country.<sup>98</sup> Sir Robert Cecil assured the King that the proclamation was in no way modified and that there was "a lyberty now of their apprehension and execution," although such as had "voluntarily come in," i. e., pledged allegiance to Elizabeth, before the last day of the proclamation would receive some "charitable relief" either in prison or beyond seas. He agreed with the King's opinion that even the moderates opened a way for papal influence which might be prejudicial to the state.<sup>99</sup>

The increase in the pension which Elizabeth granted to James at the time of Mar's embassy in England was advocated as much as possible by Cecil, who suffered bitter words from his mistress afterwards because of it.<sup>100</sup> He apparently stayed the delivery of James's first effusive letter of thanks, not wishing the Queen to have "more thanks than she deserves for so poor a reckoning." Howard, who transmitted this message, argued that any great show of appreciation for the largeness of her bounty might make her

<sup>97</sup> Bruce, *Correspondence*, pp. 31-32.

<sup>98</sup> Meyer, *Eng. and the Cath. Church*, pp. 451-459; Steele, *Proclamations*, I, 106.

<sup>99</sup> Bruce, *Correspondence*, pp. 33-35, 36-37.

<sup>100</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVII, No. 54, draft, Cecil to Nicolson, May 23, 1601; Hailes, *Secret Correspondence*, pp. 78, 92.

tighten the purse strings henceforth, or revile those who urged her to make the grant, or make her despise the King for making a mountain out of such a poor gift!<sup>101</sup>

Not only was Cecil generous with state funds, but he seems to have made an offer of money to the King shortly before Elizabeth's death for the purpose of maintaining a guard about his person. Tytler, referring to a document in the Hatfield collection,<sup>102</sup> said the sum was ten thousand pounds, advanced from Cecil's own pocket and never repaid. This was a sum large enough to strain any private income, although ample reward in the next reign may have been guaranteed. The tone of the letters about this matter certainly imply that it was to be a gift from Cecil himself and not from the national treasury. Had he presumed to offer public funds, the difficulties in keeping it secret—and secrecy was a point on which he insisted—would have been almost insuperable. In any case the complications of exchange and transportation must have been great. Probably the gift was never made, since the letters referring to arrangements about it can be dated from internal evidence as after February 1, 1603, a date too close to the Queen's death to allow much time for its transaction.<sup>103</sup> The money was offered by Cecil at about the time when there was fear of an attempt to surprise the King, a fear aroused by the unrest of Anne and certain noblemen thought to be sympathetic with Gowry's brothers. It was most welcome to James, who not only needed money at all times, but who also seemed to enjoy the solicitude for his safety. Cecil tactfully emphasized the King's kindness in pardoning so presumptuous an offer. It was a master stroke in securing royal favor for the Secretary.

In the matter of Gowry's brothers, who had fled to Eng-

<sup>101</sup> Hailes, *Secret Correspondence*, pp. 78-79.

<sup>102</sup> I have not been able to trace this document.

<sup>103</sup> Tytler, VII, 455; Bruce, *Correspondence*, pp. 35, 36-38, 44-45, 50. The letters must be early in 1603, since one at least refers to the proclamation about Catholic priests as effective now (i. e., after Feb. 1).

land in August, 1600, Cecil seems to have humored James. They had apparently received some aid from Sir John Carey at their first arrival in England and he had arranged for their conveyance into regions more remote from the borders.<sup>104</sup> Elizabeth, however, could not openly countenance them and seems to have urged them to leave England. It is doubtful whether they did. In 1602 and 1603, when fresh alarm was aroused in James by efforts on their behalf, proclamation was made at the King's request on the English borders that none should receive them or assist them in any way.<sup>105</sup>

From one point of view this clandestine correspondence of Cecil with his future sovereign can scarcely be looked upon as resulting from any motives other than the most flagrant self-interest. Something, nevertheless, can be said in justification of it and Cecil is not necessarily the selfish statesman he may seem at first glance. Howard, in drawing up a paper apparently for Cecil's eyes, once wrote:

Again suppose that you should take that liberty that many worthy councillors have done in holding better correspondency with neighbor states than princes in their passions admit and, respecting more your oath to serve with fidelity than the custom of the court or of the time, should ever keep a vent open whereby malice might evaporate by clearing doubts and jealousies that might cause wars, dissensions, and practises. . . . Suppose . . . that you should take away the cause upon which public [envy?] would ground a quarrel to her hurt, during the time of league deserve a better credit by respective dutiful and beneficial services than others either will or can attain by reason of obstructions in their own particulars, to the end only that they may conserve that league which, breaking out, would hazard his own prince. Suppose that you should compass such a kind of credit

<sup>104</sup> Hailes, *Secret Correspondence*, footnotes, pp. 161-166, where various letters of Sir John Carey, now in the *Border Papers*, are quoted.

<sup>105</sup> *Border Papers*, II, 790, 819; S. P. Scotland, LXIX, No. 52, Nicolson to Cecil, Jan. 1, 1603; *ibid.*, No. 59, Aston to Cecil, Feb. 1, 1603.

with the Queen of England's neighbor and ally against her express will . . . tending to the Queen's security . . . what quarrel could a just or worthy prince pretend against a minister thus diligent in preventing dangers that might *remuer le menage* or what cause hath not a worthy queen in such a case to value one that in despite of passion will [secure pertinacity?].<sup>106</sup>

Cecil used much the same argument to explain his motives to James. The imputation made against him, he said, of being Spanishly affected might lead the King to believe that the Queen, who placed so great confidence in her Secretary, was prone to advance another to the throne than James. It might force the King to make a false move, thus creating great opposition to him among "honest men." Therefore, to protect the interests of both sovereigns, Cecil had felt it necessary to act.<sup>107</sup> Above all he insisted that allegiance to Elizabeth was his first care and took pleasure in the fact that "whatsoever hath passed in this correspondence hath wholly tended to her owne repose and safety."<sup>108</sup>

The course of events supports this argument. Cecil persisted in the advice that James was master of his own fortune, that his best course was "by . . . cleare and temperate courses, to secure the heart of the Highest, to whose sex and qualitie nothing is soe improper as ether needles expostulations, or over much curiositye in her owne actions."<sup>109</sup> He drove the point home so well that these years show remarkable quiet and good feeling between the two countries.

In the first place, Cecil was able to prevent James from sending many and important embassies to trouble the Queen with topics she preferred not to discuss.<sup>110</sup> Secondly,

<sup>106</sup> Cotton MSS., Titus C vi, f. 384.

<sup>107</sup> Bruce, *Correspondence*, pp. 5-6.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>110</sup> E. g., *Hat Cal.*, XIV, 236; Hailes, *Secret Correspondence*, pp. 116-117.



the old fear that James might intrigue abroad had vanished. James now felt it incumbent upon him to consult the Queen in practically every step of his foreign policy. The rebirth of the idea of a triple alliance between France, England, and Scotland at this time, the rumors of ambassadors about to come from Spain, Rome, and the Archduke, even Sir James Lindsay's arrival, were all laid before the Queen for her knowledge and advice. To be sure, James did not reveal the whole of Lindsay's errand, but in general he was frank with Elizabeth concerning his dealings abroad.<sup>111</sup> In the third place, he was eager to coöperate with the Queen in Ireland, the landing of the Spaniards there having the desired effect of throwing him whole-heartedly into the English alliance. On the whole, James clung to his policy outlined in a letter to the Queen: "For I trust God hath not so skaircely bestowid his graces upon me, as that I shoulde not be able to discerne betuixt the only waye that leads to my uell-doing and safetie, and the ineuitable gulfe of my shippeurakke. . . ." <sup>112</sup>

Cecil's course, then, was effective in contributing to the peace of his mistress's last days. Hers was a tragic position. It could not be but that men would look to the sun rising. While the Secretary affords the most striking example of that trend, credit must be given him for accomplishing it with relatively little discomfort to the Queen and a decided increase in the harmony of her relations with Scotland.

The old question of religion never lost its importance as James's prospects of succeeding to the English throne brightened. Not only were the Pope's eyes upon him; much closer were the eyes of thousands of English Catholics, who looked to the coming change in sovereigns as the most hopeful opportunity for bettering their somewhat anomalous position in England. The King was constantly importuned for some assurance of his kindness toward Pa-

<sup>111</sup> *Letters of Elizabeth and James*, pp. 143-147, 149-154.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 144.

pists. Apprehensive of their power and unwilling to see them increase in number and influence, he was put in a most awkward position.

Perhaps the most important person who approached him on the subject was Henry Percy, Earl of Northumberland, whose correspondence with the King has just been mentioned.<sup>113</sup> In his first letter to James he pointed out the strength of the Catholic faction and their daily increase in number and, while not presuming to give advice, hinted rather broadly, "it weare pittie to losse so good a kingdome for the not tollerating a messe in a cornere."<sup>114</sup> The carrier of these letters to the King, evidently one Thomas Percy, may have received some verbal message in response to this hint, but the King chose to ignore it entirely in his written reply.<sup>115</sup> In any case, just before Elizabeth's death Northumberland assured the King that from various Catholics, some his relatives, some his friends, he had never heard anything but that they wished James success and hoped for toleration; if, however, they could not get freedom of conscience by petition, they would endure their hardships. Northumberland took it upon himself to give them hopes of obtaining this liberty of conscience, telling James that he might act in this case as his judgment should direct.<sup>116</sup>

Other representations were made to James on the same subject. William Watson, the secular priest who was later involved so deeply in the "Bye Plot," went to the King in Scotland and apparently received a "gracious and comfortable" answer on behalf of Catholics known to be the King's loyal subjects. Watson later admitted that he sometimes affirmed "by insinuation" more than James had said to

<sup>113</sup> See above, pp. 274-275.

<sup>114</sup> Bruce, *Correspondence*, p. 56.

<sup>115</sup> *Border Papers*, II, 812; Bruce, *Correspondence*, p. 63; Hailes, *Secret Correspondence*, pp. 105-106.

<sup>116</sup> Bruce, *Correspondence*, p. 74.

him.<sup>117</sup> And yet, the King must have offered some encouragement. Anne's correspondence with Rome spoke of a possible toleration for Catholics.<sup>118</sup> James was said to have promised Scorza, the Archduke's representative in Scotland, that he would not oppress the Catholics in England,<sup>119</sup> and Beaumont, the French ambassador in London, was optimistic for the future. Beaumont wrote to Henry IV, ". . . mais vostre Maiesté se peut bien asseurer que son [Elizabeth's] successeur sera nécessairement obligé de s'en relascher comme i'ay bien descouuert que desia le Roy d'Escosse en faict donner des espérances soubz main, ce qui m'a aussy esté confirmé par le sieur Cecil. . . ." <sup>120</sup> In view of the fact that instances can be cited of fervent Catholics agitating in his favor at the time of his accession,<sup>121</sup> that the Jesuit Garnet burned the papal letters urging Catholics to support only a Catholic candidate,<sup>122</sup> and that many Catholics were said to condemn the hare-brained impetuosity of one Sir Edward Baynham who made brave speeches about the great numbers of Papists who would oppose James,<sup>123</sup> it seems clear that the recusants, either from hope or inertia, gave justification to the King's policy of never declaring himself outright against Catholicism.

James achieved this miracle of fostering hopes in all camps at the price of inconsistency. At times he posed as the most tolerant of monarchs, taking pride in his record that no man had lost his life in Scotland for religion during

<sup>117</sup> Tierney-Dodd, IV, App., pp. xix-xx, Watson to the Lords of the Council, [Aug. 9], 1603.

<sup>118</sup> See above, p. 238.

<sup>119</sup> Lonchay and Cuvelier, I, 158n., referring to a letter from Frangipani to Aldobrandino, Nov. 7, 1603.

<sup>120</sup> P. R. O., Fr. Trans., Bdl. 34, Beaumont to Henry, Oct. 2, 1602; Teulet, IV, 265.

<sup>121</sup> Hist. MSS. Comm., *Report on Manuscripts in Various Collections*, III (London, 1904), 117-123, Sir Thomas Tresham's account of his efforts to proclaim James in Northampton.

<sup>122</sup> Gardiner, I, 98-99.

<sup>123</sup> Bruce, *Correspondence*, pp. 73-74.

his reign. The execution of the laird of Bonytoun in 1601 was somewhat ostentatiously advertised as for his crimes of theft and violent breaking into his father's house, rather than for his known adherence to the Catholic faith.<sup>124</sup> To Cecil the King wrote, "I uill neuer allowe in my conscience that the bloode of any man shall be shedde for diuersitie of opinions in religion. . . . I will neuer agree that any shoulde dye for erreure in faith. . . . I ame so farre from any intention of persecution, as I proteste to God I reuerence thaire church as oure mother church, althoch clogged with many infirmities and corruptions, besydes that I did euer holde persecution as one of the infallible notes of a false church." <sup>125</sup> Yet he saw in Catholics the most real danger to his succession to the English throne and a challenge to royal authority. Hence his policies designed to prevent them from increasing in number. Like the root of the struggle with Presbyterian ministers, the question was one of divided sovereignty, temporal and spiritual. Academically, James had no objection to freedom of conscience, but the fear that it might carry over into the temporal realm qualified his application of that ideal. ". . . allready [they have] suche a setled monarchie amongst thaim, as thaire archipreiste with his tuelf apostles keeping thaire termis in Londone, and iudging all questions as uell ciuill as spirituall amongst all catholikes." With the shadow of Spain behind that of Rome, there was too much suggestion of interference, of hindrance in his "just rights."

Whatever his policy in Scotland, his past career of vacillation and favor to the Catholics, his hatred of "proud puritans," James was the avowed Protestant King of an officially Protestant country. In that lay his principal strength for the English throne. Although he felt it necessary to temporize and to hold out a stealthy hand to Catholics, it was

<sup>124</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVII, No. 58, Nicolson to Cecil, June 2, 1601.

<sup>125</sup> Bruce, *Correspondence*, pp. 36-37.



with the Protestants that his positive hopes lay. Hence the letter to Mr. James Hamilton, while he was in London in 1600. “. . . ye shall in my name assure all the honest men ye can meet with that are affected that way [Protestant Englishmen]—and that in the princely word of a Christian King—that as I have ever without swerving professed and maintained the same religion within all the bounds of my kingdom, so may they assure themselves that how soon it shall please God lawfully to possess me with the crown of that kingdom wherein they are subjects, I shall not only maintain and continue the profession of the Gospel there, but withall not suffer or permit any other religion to be professed and avowed within the bounds of that kingdom.”<sup>126</sup>

And so, even at the end of the period as at the beginning, James followed a double policy. His position in Scotland made him the hope of the Protestants, his actions lent themselves to a favorable interpretation by Catholics. He himself encouraged both. The object was a crown—and James was determined to leave nothing undone that could contribute to his success in attaining it.

Had he been capable of taking a detached view of the situation, James might have been less troubled about his prospects. On all sides people looked upon him as the next King of England. Abroad, Henry of France made no secret of his opinion. The Pope was hesitant, reluctant to approve, but in the absence of any likely alternative, willing to wait quietly and hope for an understanding. The Spanish government was helpless. The Archduke Albert, eager to arrange a peace with England, offered no opposition. With dogged realism he was turning his attention to the problem immediately before him, the conquest and reorganization of the Low Countries. Denmark and the German princes

<sup>126</sup> Harl. MSS., 787, f. lv, copy; printed in J. Strype, *Annals of the Reformation and Establishment of Religion and other various occurrences in the Church of England, during Queen Elizabeth's Happy Reign . . .* (4 vols., Oxford, 1824), IV, 498–499; calendared in *Hat. Cal.*, XIV, 264.

were benevolently friendly to James. In short, the European situation was in a state of equilibrium. There was little prospect of a violent international upheaval when Elizabeth should die.

In England the same air of expectancy was discernible. Even Cecil dropped the mask of secrecy and hinted rather broadly to the French ambassador that he favored James's claim.<sup>127</sup> A Scottish gentleman traveling through England to the continent in the winter of 1602-1603 reported to his monarch "that wherever I passed and lodged they think your Majesty their young lord, which within few years no man durst speak."<sup>128</sup> The Venetian ambassadors in London and Paris noted the trend<sup>129</sup> and another observer wrote that the majority favored James.<sup>130</sup> The reports of Beaumont, who had been predicting it for a long time, were reinforced by information he received from Northumberland.<sup>131</sup>

One cloud appeared to trouble the first months of 1603. Arbella Stewart, now a lady of about twenty-eight years, who still lived under the ægis of her grandmother, "Bess of Hardwick," sprang into the limelight and caused some harassed moments to Elizabeth and her Council. Arbella, about Christmastime, 1602, sent secretly to the Earl of Hertford to revive a proposal of marriage between herself and one of Hertford's grandsons, a son of Lord Beauchamp, which proposal, she said, had been suggested several years previously by Hertford. If the Earl had actually made such a proposal several years before—and there is some slight evidence to show that a suggestion of the kind had been

<sup>127</sup> P. R. O., Fr. Trans., Bdl. 34, Beaumont to Henry, Oct. 2, 1602.

<sup>128</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXIX, No. 56, incl., copy, Indernyty to James, Feb. 9, 1603.

<sup>129</sup> *Cal. Venetian*, 1592-1603, pp. 539-542, 561.

<sup>130</sup> *Cal. Domestic*, 1601-1603, pp. 298-300, Anthony Rivers to Giacomo Creleto, Mar. 9, 1603.

<sup>131</sup> P. R. O., Fr. Trans., Bdl. 33, Beaumont to Henry, May 1, 1602; *ibid.*, Bdl. 35, same to same and to Villeroy, Mar. 28, 1603.

made, though not necessarily inspired by Hertford<sup>132</sup>—it had been immediately dropped. Hertford was now properly disturbed at the idea. The marriage would have united the two best rival claims to the succession after the Scottish one. It was a grave offence for any one of the royal blood to marry without the sovereign's consent. Hertford, duly apprehensive, sent Arbella's messenger to the Council and there ensued a long and tiresome affair. The Privy Council, anxious to fathom the matter, sent Sir Henry Brounker to examine the lady. He found her baffling; her answers to his questions were confusing, and when he obtained a written statement from her, the result was no less obscure.<sup>133</sup>

Brounker was forced to make several journeys to Hardwick and was bombarded with long and distracted letters from Arbella. She hated her grandmother's tutelage and was doing her best to escape from it. Apparently she wanted to get to court or at least to command some attention.<sup>134</sup> In her muddled letters she referred to a nameless lover, spoke of her devotion to King James, and succeeded in convincing those around her that she was temporarily mentally unbalanced. It is practically impossible to untangle from her writings any connected story. Her ravings suggest dissatisfaction with the fate that kept her unmarried and far from the center of glamour and a desire to escape rather than any serious plan to challenge the succession. The names of one or two of her uncles and aunts (Cavendishes and Talbots) are connected with the incident in some slight way, but the government wisely refused to pursue the matter. The agitation had begun before Elizabeth's last illness; in fact, it was thought to have contributed to this since the Queen appeared worried by it. As the more im-

<sup>132</sup> *Hat. Cal.*, XII, 605, examination of David Owen Tudir, Jan. 15, 1603.

<sup>133</sup> *Hat. Cal.*, XII, 583-587, 627-630, testimony of witnesses; *ibid.*, pp. 593-597, Brounker to the Queen and to Cecil, c. Jan. 10, 1603.

<sup>134</sup> E. T. Bradley, *Life of the Lady Arabella Stuart* (2 vols., London, 1889), II, 100-103, 120-121, 131-135.

portant crisis appeared in March, Arbella's case dropped into the background. She was kept in careful custody, but nothing more was done.<sup>135</sup>

March, 1603. The day for which James had been hoping, planning, and intriguing so many years was seen to be close at hand. At last the King was to change from the "wylde unreulie coalte" that Scotland was to Saint George's "touardlie rydding horse."<sup>136</sup> Many were the messages and messengers traveling north to inform the King of Her Majesty's illness.<sup>137</sup> Apparently Elizabeth was not "to endure as long als the sunne and the moone," as James had once petulantly written,<sup>138</sup> and due preparations were made to see that he should succeed her as quietly as possible. When Elizabeth lay dying, Cecil had opened the succession matter to several responsible officers and great nobles, who joined in a letter to the King, advising him to send an agent to London as quickly as possible with commission for such as he pleased to carry on the government.<sup>139</sup> A draft of the proposed proclamation of his accession was forwarded for his approval.<sup>140</sup> Precautions were taken to ship restless "rogues" to the Low Countries, London was commanded to keep strong watch, recusants of note were committed, and all things made as safe and quiet as could be.<sup>141</sup>

<sup>135</sup> For the complete story, see Bradley's *Arabella Stuart*, I, 100-162; documents printed in II, 92-137. Cf. *Hat. Cal.*, XII and XIV, *ad indices*. The Spanish Council received coldly the suggestion of some English Catholics that the Duke of Savoy should marry Arbella and rule England. There were conflicting reports as to Arbella's religion. (*Cal. Spanish*, 1587-1603, pp. 664, 675, 720-722.) In 1610 Arbella secretly married William Seymour, son of Lord Beauchamp, contrary to the wishes of King James. For this crime she and her husband were placed in custody. After one unsuccessful effort to escape, she remained in prison until her death in 1615 (*Dict. Nat. Biog.*).

<sup>136</sup> Bruce, *Correspondence*, pp. 31-32. The words are James's.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 45-51.

<sup>138</sup> Birch, *Memoirs*, II, 512.

<sup>139</sup> *National MSS. of Scotland*, III, No. LXXXI, facsimile, Mar. 10, 1603. The "three other" joined with the Councillors were probably Northumberland, Cobham, and Lord Thomas Howard. See Bruce, *Correspondence*, p. 73.

<sup>140</sup> Bruce, *Correspondence*, p. 47.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 73.



At last, early on the morning of March twenty-fourth, the great Queen died. She did not fail to nominate her successor, although the story of her mute motion when the Councillors in attendance at her death-bed put the question to her may be apocryphal.<sup>142</sup> Her policy for the last years of her reign had been silently directed to that end. Deeds, she had often told James, speak louder than words; the aphorism applied with the same weight to herself as it did to the Scottish King.

For the sixteen years under discussion Elizabeth had steadfastly refused to name James her heir. From her own point of view, her policy was justified. Until the end she was Queen with no rival to her power in England. She did not, however, permit her personal desire to ignore a "sun rising" to interfere with the obvious need of the state to have the succession question settled. She had promised to do nothing to prejudice James's claim "as long as he shall give us no just cause of exception."<sup>143</sup> Not one of the many incidents for quarreling with the King had she chosen to interpret as a "just cause of exception." The most serious, the understanding with Essex, she had reluctantly ignored. Her policy of friendship with Scotland as evidenced in the pension and her care to prevent Arbella Stewart and the Seymour family from becoming too important were silent indications of her intention. She must have seen, as her grandfather Henry VII is credited with having seen, the advantages of uniting England and Scotland into one realm. And her pride in her Tudor blood could have made her desire no one but the nearest Tudor to succeed her.

Some disappointment Elizabeth may have felt in the character of this nearest Tudor relative. His tactless anxiety to have her out of the way, his efforts to force a "decla-

<sup>142</sup> See J. E. Neale, "The Sayings of Queen Elizabeth," *History*, X (1925), pp. 228-229.

<sup>143</sup> See above, pp. 10, 197.

ration" from her, his shifts and compromises at home and abroad, she found very annoying. But viewed in the light of the handicaps facing him from birth, James had had so far a remarkably successful career. He had reestablished royal power in Scotland in kirk and in government by playing faction against faction. He had reduced the power of his feudal nobles and since Bothwell's departure had maintained a semblance of order in the kingdom. That it had been accomplished with inadequate financial resources makes it all the more remarkable. In foreign affairs he had maintained peace and had prevented any serious opposition from Spain to his accession to the English throne, although both achievements were due more to the general equilibrium in Europe and to Elizabeth's defence of her realm against Spain than to his own efforts. Since 1587 he had steadily recognized Spain as the greatest danger to his country and to himself and his ambition for the English throne. He saw clearly the division of the Catholic world into pro-Spanish and anti-Spanish parties and utilized the division to his own advantage. By favor to his own "Spanishly affected" nobility, by his war on the kirk's pretensions to political power, and by his tortuous diplomacy, he encouraged the hopes of Catholics at home, in England, and abroad. Although, in the final analysis, his peaceful accession to the English throne may be attributed to factors beyond his control, his achievements in Scotland between 1587 and 1603 and his cautious handling of his relations with England and with Catholic Europe contributed somewhat to the realization of his dream.

# ELIZABETH'S PENSION TO JAMES

DATE <sup>1</sup>	AMOUNT	REFERENCE
1586, May	£ 4000	P. 9, n. 12
1588, July	2000	P. 24, n. 62
1588, August	3000	P. 25, n. 66
1589, April	3000	P. 45, n. 17
1589, c. December	3000	P. 50, n. 33
1590, c. July	3000 <sup>2</sup>	P. 72, n. 106
1591, May	3000	P. 72, n. 106
1592, July	2000	P. 72, n. 106
1593, July	4000	P. 83, n. 25; p. 84, n. 26
1594, June	4000	P. 109, n. 95
1594, November	2000	P. 113, n. 109
1595, August	3000	P. 158, n. 2
1596, September	3000	P. 171, n. 34
1598, April	3000	P. 186, n. 38
1598, December	3000	P. R. O., E 404/134; S. P. Scotland, LXVI, No. 12
1600, February	3000	S. P. Scotland, LXVI, No. 12
1601, October	2000	S. P. Scotland, LXVII, No. 120
1601, December	3000	S. P. Scotland, LXVIII, No. 65
1602, June	2500	Thorpe, <i>Scottish Calendar</i> , p. 814; cf. S. P. Scotland, LXVIII, No. 65
1603, Jan.	2500	P. R. O., Issue Rolls, E 408/875; <i>ibid.</i> , E 404/134

<sup>1</sup> The months indicate only approximate time of payment. Days and weeks, of necessity, passed between the date when Elizabeth's warrant to the Exchequer was issued and the date when the money was received in Scotland.

<sup>2</sup> An additional £ 500 financed Stewart and Skene on their embassy to Denmark and Germany.





## ABBREVIATIONS

<i>Acts P. C. Eng.</i> . . . . .	<i>Acts of the Privy Council of England.</i>
<i>Acts Parl. Scot.</i> . . . . .	<i>The Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland.</i>
B. M. . . . .	British Museum, London.
Bellesheim . . . . .	D. O. Hunter Blair's translation of A. Bellesheim's <i>History of the Catholic Church of Scotland.</i>
Birch, <i>Historical View</i> . . .	Thomas Birch, <i>An Historical View of the Negotiations Between the Courts of England, France, and Brussels, From the Year 1592 to 1617.</i> . . .
Birch, <i>Memoirs</i> . . . . .	Thomas Birch, <i>Memoirs of the Reign of Queen Elizabeth From the Year 1581 till her Death.</i>
Bruce, <i>Correspondence</i> . .	John Bruce, ed., <i>Correspondence of King James VI. of Scotland with Sir Robert Cecil and Others in England during the Reign of Queen Elizabeth.</i>
<i>Cal. Domestic</i> . . . . .	<i>Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, Elizabeth.</i>
<i>Cal. Foreign</i> . . . . .	<i>Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series.</i>
<i>Cal. Ireland</i> . . . . .	<i>Calendar of State Papers, Relating to Ireland.</i>
<i>Cal. Scottish</i> . . . . .	<i>Calendar of the State Papers Relating to Scotland and Mary, Queen of Scots, 1547-1603.</i>
<i>Cal. Spanish</i> . . . . .	<i>Calendar of Letters and State Papers, Relating to English Affairs</i>

- Preserved in, or originally belonging to, the Archives of Simancas.*
- Cal. Venetian* ..... *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, Relating to English Affairs, existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice, and in other Libraries of Northern Italy.*
- Calderwood* ..... *David Calderwood, History of the Kirk of Scotland.*
- Cam. Mod. Hist.* ..... *Cambridge Modern History.*
- Camden* ..... *Wm. Camden, The History of the Most Renowned and Victorious Princess Elizabeth. . . .*
- Carey, Memoirs* ..... *Memoirs of Robert Cary, Earl of Monmouth.*
- Cheyney* ..... *E. P. Cheyney, A History of England from the Defeat of the Armada to the Death of Elizabeth.*
- Colville, Letters* ..... *Original Letters of Mr John Colville, 1582-1603.*
- Courcelles, Despatches* .. *Extracts from the Despatches of M. Courcelles, French Ambassador at the Court of Scotland, MDLXXXVI-MDLXXXVII.*
- Couzard* ..... *R. Couzard, Une Ambassade à Rome sous Henri IV, Septembre 1601-Juin 1605.*
- Dict. Nat. Biog.* ..... *Dictionary of National Biography.*
- Doleman, Conference* ... *R. Doleman (R. Parsons?), A conference about the next Succession to the crowne of ingland. . . .*
- D'Ossat, Lettres* ..... *Letres du Cardinal D'Ossat.*
- Dumont* ..... *J. Dumont, Corps Universel Diplomatique du Droit des Gens.*
- Edwards, Raleigh* ..... *Edward Edwards, The Life of Sir Walter Raleigh . . . Together with His Letters.*

- Ellis, *Letters* ..... Henry Ellis, ed., *Original Letters, Illustrative of English History*.
- Eng. Hist. Rev. .... *English Historical Review*.
- Forbes-Leith ..... Wm. Forbes-Leith, *The Scots Men-at-arms and Life-Guards in France from their Formation until their Final Dissolution* A. D. MCCCCXVIII-MDCCCXXX.
- Fr. Trans. .... French Transcripts, Public Record Office, London.
- Gardiner ..... S. R. Gardiner, *History of England, 1603-1642*.
- Gray, *Letters* ..... *Letters and Papers Relating to Patrick Master of Gray, Afterwards Seventh Lord Gray*.
- Hailes, *Secret Correspondence* ..... David Dalrymple, Lord Hailes, ed., *The Secret Correspondence of Sir Robert Cecil with James VI. King of Scotland*.
- Hat. Cal. .... Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Most Hon. The Marquis of Salisbury . . . Preserved at Hatfield House, Hertfordshire*.
- Hist. MSS. Comm. .... Historical Manuscripts Commission.
- Historie and Life* ..... *The Historie and Life of King James the Sext. . . .*
- Howell, *State Trials* .... T. B. Howell, ed., *A Complete Collection of State Trials and Proceedings for High Treason and Other Crimes and Misdemeanors. . . .*
- James VI, *Works* ..... *The Workes Of The Most High And Mighty Prince, Iames By The Grace Of God, King of Great Britaine, France And Ireland, Defender of the Faith, &c.*

- Laffleur de Kermaingant,  
*Beaumont* ..... P. Laffleur de Kermaingant, *L'Ambassade de France en Angleterre sous Henri IV; Mission de Christophe de Harlay Comte de Beaumont (1602-1605)*.
- Laffleur de Kermaingant,  
*Boissize* ..... P. Laffleur de Kermaingant, *L'Ambassade de France en Angleterre sous Henri IV; Mission de Jean de Thumery Sieur de Boissize (1598-1602)*.
- Letters of Elizabeth and James* ..... *Letters of Queen Elizabeth and King James VI. of Scotland*.
- Lettres Missives* ..... *Recueil des Lettres Missives de Henri IV*.
- Lonchay and Cuvelier ... Henri Lonchay and Joseph Cuvelier, eds., *Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne sur Les Affaires des Pays-Bas au XVII<sup>e</sup> Siècle, Tome I, Précis de la Correspondance de Philippe III (1598-1621)*.
- Mackie, *Negotiations* .... J. D. Mackie, ed., *Negotiations between King James VI. and I. and Ferdinand I. Grand Duke of Tuscany*.
- Mackie, "Secret Diplomacy . . ." ..... J. D. Mackie, "The Secret Diplomacy of King James VI. in Italy prior to his Accession to the English Throne," *Scottish Historical Review*, XXI (1923-1924), 267-282.
- Maidment, *Letters and State Papers* ..... James Maidment, ed., *Letters and State Papers during the Reign of King James the Sixth*.



- Melville, *Autobiography* . *The Autobiography and Diary of Mr James Melvill.*
- Melville, *Memoirs* . . . . . *The Memoires of Sir James Melvil of Halhill.*
- Meyer, "Clemens VIII und Jakob I" . . . . . Arnold Oscar Meyer, "Clemens VIII und Jakob I von England," printed in *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken*, VII (1904), 268 ff.
- Meyer, *Eng. and the Cath. Church* . . . . . J. R. McKee's translation of Arnold Oscar Meyer's *England and the Catholic Church under Queen Elizabeth.*
- Michel . . . . . F. Michel, *Les Écossais en France: Les Français en Écosse.*
- Moysie . . . . . David Moysie, *Memoirs of the Affairs of Scotland.*
- Nat. Lib. Scot. . . . . National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh.
- P. R. O. . . . . Public Record Office, London.
- Pitcairn . . . . . Robert Pitcairn, ed., *Ancient Criminal Trials in Scotland.*
- Read, *Walsingham* . . . . . Conyers Read, *Mr Secretary Walsingham and the Policy of Queen Elizabeth.*
- Reg. P. C. Scot.* . . . . . *The Register of the Privy Council of Scotland.*
- Rom. Trans. . . . . Roman Transcripts, Public Record Office, London.
- S. P. . . . . State Papers, Public Record Office, London.
- Scot. Hist. Rev.* . . . . . *Scottish Historical Review.*

- Scot. Hist. Soc. Misc.* . . . . *Miscellany of the Scottish History Society.*
- Scots Brigade* . . . . . *The Scots Brigade in Holland.*
- Spedding* . . . . . James Spedding, *The Letters and the Life of Francis Bacon.* . . .
- Spottiswood* . . . . . John Spottiswood, *The History of the Church of Scotland.*
- Steele, Proclamations* . . . Robert Steele, ed., *Tudor and Stuart Proclamations, 1485-1714.*
- Teulet* . . . . . A. Teulet, *Relations Politiques de la France et de l'Espagne avec l'Écosse au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle.*
- Tierney-Dodd* . . . . . M. A. Tierney, ed., *Dodd's Church History of England from the Commencement of the Sixteenth Century to the Revolution in 1688.*
- Tytler* . . . . . P. F. Tytler, *History of Scotland.*
- Warr. Papers* . . . . . *The Warrender Papers.*
- Winwood* . . . . . Ralph Winwood, *Memorials of Affairs of State in the Reigns of Q. Elizabeth and K. James I.* . . .

## BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

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  - C. Arbella Stewart
- VII. Contemporary Literature on the Succession Question

## BIBLIOGRAPHIES

The *Bibliography of British History, Tudor Period, 1485–1603*, prepared by Professor Conyers Read (Oxford, 1933), has been of invaluable assistance in finding material for this study. The corresponding volume, *Bibliography of British History, Stuart Period, 1603–1714*, edited by Godfrey Davies (Oxford, 1928), is important, although for this study it contains little that can not be found in the *Tudor Bibliography*. The latter has a better arrangement of material. These two supersede such bibliographical aids as E. R. Adair's *Sources for the History of the Council in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (London, 1924), in the *Helps for Students of History Series*, published by the Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge, and J. H. Pollen's briefer pamphlet in the same series, *Sources for the History of Roman Catholics in England, Ireland, and Scotland* (London, 1921). For various aspects of the Catholic and foreign situations, the extensive bibliographical lists in Ludwig Pastor's *History of the Popes from the Close of the Middle Ages*, English edition by R. F. Kerr, XXIII and XXIV (London, 1933), are useful.

## GENERAL HISTORIES

*England and the Continent*

The sections on Scottish problems in Professor Conyers Read's *Mr Secretary Walsingham and the Policy of Queen Elizabeth* (3 vols., Oxford, 1925) form the best point of departure for a study of Anglo-Scottish relations during the last years of the sixteenth century. Professor E. P. Cheyney's work, *A History of England from the Defeat of the Armada to the Death of Elizabeth* (2 vols., New York, 1914–1926), is an invaluable survey of Elizabeth's last years, although Scotland and the Puritan and Roman Catholic questions receive little attention. *The History of England from the Accession of Edward VI. to the Death of Elizabeth* (London, 1910), written by Professor A. F. Pollard for the twelve-volume *Political History of England*, edited by William Hunt and Reginald Lane



Poole, is a concise outline, very convenient for general reference. S. R. Gardiner's *History of England, 1603-1642* (new impression, 10 vols., London, 1904-1909) is excellent for the state of affairs at the beginning of the new reign, and has valuable discussions of the Catholic situation and its effect on the succession. The standard books of reference should be mentioned, such as the *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. II, *The Reformation* (1903); Vol. III, *The Wars of Religion* (1907); and Vol. XIII, *Genealogical Tables and Lists and General Index* (1911); E. Lavisse's *Histoire de France*, Tome VI, Parts I and II by J. H. Mariéjol (Paris, 1911); and Vol. III of J. L. Motley's *United Netherlands* (4 vols., London, 1904).

### Scotland

Five general histories of Scotland are useful for a preliminary survey of the period. The oldest is William Robertson's *History of Scotland during the Reigns of Queen Mary and of King James VI. . . .* (2 vols., London, 1787, the last edition corrected by the author). Robertson had access to material in the National Library of Scotland (then the Advocates' Library) and to the Cotton manuscripts, now in the British Museum. His work, although now supplanted by the work of later historians, still commands attention for its admirable organization, clear presentation, and careful research. In the appendix are printed documents from the Warrender collections and from the Advocates' Library, including a secret letter to James from an English nobleman or councillor, probably of the year 1602, which parallels the correspondence of Cecil and Howard with James, although it appears not to have been written by them. The best of the older histories is Vol. VII of Patrick Fraser Tytler's *History of Scotland* (3rd ed. in 7 vols., Edinburgh, 1845). Tytler used material in the Public Record Office and British Museum, quoted at great length from original documents, printed interesting letters and papers in an appendix, and on the whole presents the best, most accurate, and readable account for the years 1587-1603. The annotation is sometimes inadequate. John Hill Burton's *History of Scotland . . . to the Revolution of 1688* (7 vols., Edinburgh and London, 1867-1870) has been a standard work. The chapters covering the years 1587-1603 are

very brief, except for the section on the Gowry conspiracy, and suffer from poor arrangement. The chapters in Andrew Lang's *History of Scotland from the Roman Occupation* (4 vols., Edinburgh and London, 1900-1907) which concern this study are useful but rather confusing and inaccurate at times in small details. Volume II of P. Hume Brown's *History of Scotland* (3 vols., Cambridge, 1899-1909) contains an excellent, concise survey of the period.

#### SIXTEENTH CENTURY SCOTLAND—DESCRIPTIVE

##### *Constitutional, Administrative, Social, and Economic*

There is no one book which supplies an adequate description of the state of Scotland at the end of the sixteenth century. In his Introductions to the volumes of the *Register of the Privy Council of Scotland*, David Masson has partly filled this need. James MacKinnon's *Constitutional History of Scotland* (London, 1924) is a good account of Church and State organization in its historical setting, but not enough attention is paid to local government. MacKinnon's work should be supplemented by Sir Robert Rait's *Parliaments of Scotland* (Glasgow, 1924), and by various articles on constitutional organization, written by Professor R. K. Hannay and published in the *Scottish Historical Review*. A doctoral thesis in manuscript form in the University of Edinburgh, "The Finances of James VI, 1567-1603," by R. S. Brydon, is a useful but inadequate account of the poverty of the crown and its effect on state policies. Miss I. F. Grant's valuable study, *Social and Economic Development of Scotland before 1603* (Edinburgh, 1930), is particularly interesting on trade and finance. J. D. Marwick's edition of the *Records of the Convention of the Royal Burghs of Scotland* (Vols. I and II, Edinburgh, 1870) reveals an energetic municipal life, although Scotland's interests at the time were largely agricultural.

##### *Highlands and Borders*

The highlands and the borders presented two major problems of government during the period. For the former, Donald Gregory's *History of the Western Highlands and Isles of*

*Scotland . . . 1493-1625* (Edinburgh, 1836) is an old but extremely valuable account of the feuds and troubles that kept the West in anarchy much of the time. Miss Audrey Cunningham's *Loyal Clans* (Cambridge, 1932) is an analysis of the clan problem over a period of several hundred years. Its chief value for the present study lies in its explanation of the land tenure, which was at the root of clan disorders, and in its account of particular feuds and rivalries. For the borders *The Last Years of a Frontier* (Oxford, 1928) by D. L. W. Tough is inadequate. Much briefer but superior in merit is Thomas Hodgkin's *Wardens of the Northern Marches* (London, 1908). See also Howard Pease, *The Lord Wardens of the Marches of England and Scotland* (London, 1913), and Charles A. Coulomb, *The Administration of the English Borders during the Reign of Elizabeth* (University of Pennsylvania publication, 1911).

### *Religion*

The works of the three great Protestant writers who were nearly contemporary with the period 1587-1603—John Knox, David Calderwood, and John Spottiswood—are discussed below. Of modern books, W. L. Mathieson's *Politics and Religion—A Study in Scottish History from the Reformation to the Revolution* (2 vols., Glasgow, 1902) is a thoughtful investigation of the relations between the crown and the kirk. A. F. Mitchell's *Scottish Reformation*, edited by D. H. Fleming (Edinburgh and London, 1900); Vol. II of A. R. MacEwen's *History of the Church in Scotland* (London, 1918), reaching to 1560; and D. H. Fleming's *Reformation in Scotland* (London, 1910) are useful accounts from the Protestant point of view. In an article in the *Scottish Historical Review*, XIV (1916-1917), pp. 200-203, "Thoughts on the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland under the Constitution of 1690 (1690-1707)," A. V. Dicey printed a brilliantly concise outline of kirk organization, which on the whole is applicable to the end of the sixteenth century. F. W. Maitland's essay, "The Anglican Settlement and the Scottish Reformation," in the *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. II, Chapter xvi, is admirable. For the Catholic side of the story, see below, pp. 317-322.

*Genealogical Aids*

One of the serious difficulties confronting a student of Scottish history is the complicated family connections of the nobles. *The Scots Peerage*, edited by Sir James Balfour Paul (9 vols., Edinburgh, 1904-1914), is indispensable. Useful contemporary and nearly contemporary lists of the Scots nobility and gentry are published by Charles Rogers in the *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, New Series, II (1873), 222-296; by David Laing in *Original Letters of Mr John Colville, 1582-1603* (Bannatyne Club, Edinburgh, 1858), pp. 311-320; in *Excerpta Scotica*, edited by J. Maidment (Edinburgh, 1825); and in the *English Historical Review*, XLI (1926), 579-583, edited by David and Anthony Mathew. *The Staggering State of Scottish Statesmen from 1550 to 1650* by Sir John Scot of Scotstarvet, edited by Charles Rogers (Edinburgh, 1872), is a curiously inaccurate compilation. Other lists are to be found in the State Papers, Domestic, and State Papers, Scotland, in the Public Record Office, and in collections in the British Museum, most of which are or will soon be printed in the official *Calendars*, e. g., State Papers, Domestic, Elizabeth, Vol. ccviii, No. 2, inclosures V, VI, VII. In the *Calendar Spanish, 1580-1586*, pp. 688-689, there is a similar list, apparently drawn up by Colonel Stewart at Mendoza's request. An M.A. thesis written by Miss Helen M. Wallace, "Foreign Influences on Scottish Politics, 1578-1582," deposited at the Institute of Historical Research, Malet Street, London, has a useful outline of family connections and political alliances (pp. 13-20).

## ANGLO-SCOTTISH RELATIONS

*Manuscript Collections*

*Public Record Office:* The most important single source for this study is the collection of State Papers, Scotland, in the Public Record Office in London. These are mostly letters from English agents or ambassadors in Edinburgh to Lord Burghley or to Sir Robert Cecil, giving detailed accounts of all events of importance in Scotland. They are filed chronologically and bound in volumes. Some errors are noticeable in the chronological arrangement, but for the most part the collection is in good



order. It includes also letters from various "intelligencers" in Scotland, notes of payments to James and others, a few royal letters, and occasionally drafts of instructions and letters from England to the ambassador or agent in Edinburgh. Volume lii is a minute-book in which copies of Sir Robert Cecil's letters were entered by his secretary. Many of these documents and others from the British Museum are calendared in publications by His Majesty's Stationery Office and the General Register House.<sup>1</sup> The State Papers, Domestic, calendared with varying degrees of completeness in the *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, Elizabeth*, 1581-1590, edited by R. Lemon, 1591-1594, 1595-1597, 1598-1601, 1601-1603 with Addenda, 1547-1565, and Addenda, 1580-1625, edited by Mary Anne Everett Green (London, 1865-1872), have relatively little value for Scottish affairs.

*British Museum:* Supplementary to the material in the Public Record Office are the valuable papers of the Cotton manuscripts in the British Museum. Caligula D i and D ii contain many original dispatches of Ashby, Bowes, and others. Their logical place is in the public archives among the State Papers, Scotland, but public archives were neglected for many years and pilfering was not unknown. It was, moreover, difficult to distinguish between the private and public papers of men like Lord Burghley. Caligula D i and D ii were partly destroyed by fire, but transcripts of many of the letters were made before that accident and are preserved in the Harleian manuscripts, Vols. 4647 and 4648. Caligula B v and E x, Titus C vii, and Vespasian F iii are other volumes of the Cotton collection valuable for Scottish affairs. Titus C vi, the commonplace book of Lord Henry Howard, contains new material in copies of some letters from the Master of Gray in Howard's writing, and in what is apparently a draft of the first letter Howard wrote in the secret correspondence to Kinloss. The latter is not included in Lord Hailes's or Bruce's printed volumes of that correspondence.

The Harleian manuscripts in the British Museum contain valuable material. In addition to Vols. 4109-4124 inclusive, which are Birch's transcripts of the Bacon manuscripts at Lam-

<sup>1</sup> See below, p. 309.

beth Palace, and Vols. 4647 and 4648, which so often supply the gaps in Caligula D i and D ii, Vol. 292 is of special interest for Scottish affairs. The Egerton manuscripts and the Additional Manuscripts contain pertinent matter. Additional Manuscripts 19401 and 23109 include drafts and copies of royal letters and of the correspondence of Cecil, Gray, Maitland, and others. Elsewhere there are occasionally letters of Elizabeth and James, either not printed in the Camden Society edition of their correspondence or differing somewhat from the documents printed there. Additional Manuscript 31022 contains a copy of Essex's letter to James, dated Christmas Day, 1600. So far as I know it has never before been printed, although Cuffe's confession with full details about it is well known. The Lansdowne collection in the British Museum has relatively few items of interest.

*Hatfield House:* Many papers, collected by Lord Burghley and by Sir Robert Cecil in the course of their public duties, are now in the possession of the Marquis of Salisbury at Hatfield House, Hertfordshire. Practically all for the period under consideration have been calendared by the Historical Manuscripts Commission in their *Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Most Hon. The Marquis of Salisbury . . . Preserved at Hatfield House, Hertfordshire* (Vols. III–XV, London, Dublin, and Hereford, 1889–1930). In this *Calendar* there are some errors in dating. The transcript of the long document quoted above on pp. 118–121 has some slight mistakes, but on the whole the *Calendar* is adequate and accurate.

*National Library of Scotland:* Another great repository of manuscripts is the National Library of Scotland, formerly the Advocates' Library, in Edinburgh. The papers of particular value there are the collection of Sir James Balfour of Denmilne and the Balcarres collection. Most in the Denmilne collection which have domestic importance for the years 1587–1603 have been printed in *Letters and State Papers during the Reign of King James the Sixth*, edited by James Maidment (Abbotsford Club, Edinburgh, 1838). Several interesting documents, a long memorandum concerning Mar's embassy in 1601, instructions for an earlier embassy of Bruce, and apparently a fragment of

the secret correspondence, are preserved in Denmilne 33. 1. 7. J. D. Mackie has published many of the Balcarres papers which concern foreign affairs in *Negotiations between King James VI. and I. and Ferdinand I. Grand Duke of Tuscany* (St. Andrews University publication, 1927). Little of importance for this period remains which has not been printed or discussed in some published work.

The incompleteness of all these sources is apparent. Material emanating from Scottish agents and statesmen is very meager and the absence during most of the period of foreign agents and ambassadors from the court at Edinburgh is unfortunate. The letters from the English diplomatic agent there form a fairly continuous series. Relatively few documents from the English government, especially from Lord Burghley and Sir Robert Cecil, seem to have been preserved.

### *Printed Sources*

*Official Documents:* A brief *Calendar of the State Papers Relating to Scotland* . . . was edited by M. J. Thorpe (2 vols., London, 1858). This serves as a rough guide to the State Papers, Scotland, in the Public Record Office. It is being supplanted by the more elaborate *Calendar of the State Papers Relating to Scotland and Mary, Queen of Scots, 1547-1603*, of which eleven volumes, covering the period to August, 1595, have appeared. The new *Calendar* includes both the Scottish correspondence in the Record Office and pertinent material in the British Museum. The title-pages of Vol. VIII for 1585-1586 (H.M. Stationery Office, Edinburgh, 1914) and Vol. IX for 1586-1588 (H.M. Stationery Office, Glasgow, 1915), edited by W. K. Boyd, say that other collections in England were used but there is little evidence of this. Boyd's work has called forth the censures of historians for its omissions, repetitions, and inaccuracies. Volume X for 1589-1593 (H.M. General Register House, Edinburgh, 1936) was left by him in page-proof and was given to Dr. Henry W. Meikle of the National Library of Scotland to complete. Miss Annie I. Cameron of the General Register House in Edinburgh edited Vol. XI for 1593-1595 (H.M. General Register House, Edinburgh, 1936).

Supplementary material of an official character is contained in *The Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland*, edited by T. Thomson and C. Innes, Vols. III and IV (1814–1816), and in *The Register of the Privy Council of Scotland*, Vols. IV–VI (H.M. General Register House, Edinburgh, 1881–1884), ably edited with brilliant introductions by David Masson. These are paralleled to some extent in the English *Statutes of the Realm*, Vol. IV, Part I (1819), and in the *Acts of the Privy Council of England*, New Series, Vols. XIV–XXXII, edited by Sir J. R. Dasent (H.M. Stationery Office, London, 1897–1907). The business of the Scottish Council seems to be recorded more fully than that of the corresponding body in England. The two-volume calendar of *Border Papers*, edited by Joseph Bain (Edinburgh, 1894–1896), has valuable material on many points other than petty border disputes; and Vol. II of *The Hamilton Papers*, edited by Joseph Bain (H.M. General Register House, Edinburgh, 1892) is useful for the first years of the period. Volume VI, Part IV of Thomas Rymer's and Robert Sanderson's *Foedera, Conventiones, Litterae . . .* (The Hague, 1741) is useful for treaties and some correspondence, printed mostly from manuscripts in the British Museum and Public Record Office, while both English and Scottish proclamations are listed in Robert Steele's *Tudor and Stuart Proclamations, 1485–1714* (2 vols., Oxford, 1910). *The Exchequer Rolls of Scotland*, Vol. XXIII, edited by G. P. McNeill (Edinburgh, 1908), and *Records of the Convention of the Royal Burghs of Scotland*, Vols. I and II, edited by J. D. Marwick (Edinburgh, 1870), should be mentioned, although they have contributed little to the material for this study. Robert Pitcairn's *Ancient Criminal Trials in Scotland* (3 vols., Bannatyne Club, Edinburgh, 1833) prints records of the court of High Justiciary (criminal) supplemented by accounts from other sources. Unfortunately, there are gaps in the official records of the court for long and interesting periods.

*Other Contemporary Letters, Papers, Chronicles, and Narrative Accounts:* The *Letters of Queen Elizabeth and King James VI. of Scotland*, edited by John Bruce (Camden Society, London, 1849), are of prime importance for the relations between the two kingdoms. This volume omits some royal letters printed



in Tytler's *History* or existing in manuscript form in the British Museum and the Public Record Office. Occasionally, a manuscript draft or copy differs from that printed by Bruce. The *Original Letters of Mr John Colville, 1582-1603*, David Laing, ed. (Bannatyne Club, Edinburgh, 1858), is one of the few collections from the pen of a Scotsman active in the politics of his time. The *Letters and Papers Relating to Patrick Master of Gray, Afterwards Seventh Lord Gray*, Thomas Thomson, ed. (Bannatyne Club, Edinburgh, 1835), are valuable for the early part of the period. Other letters written by him or to him occur in various collections in the British Museum. I have not been able to investigate the manuscripts of the Earl of Moray at Darnaway Castle, which contain some correspondence of Gray and of others, described in the *Sixth Report* of the Historical Manuscripts Commission (1877), pp. 658-669. Of miscellaneous printed collections, Maidment's edition of *Letters and State Papers during the Reign of King James the Sixth* (Abbotsford Club, Edinburgh, 1838) and *Analecta Scotica* (2 vols., Edinburgh, 1834-1837) deserve mention. *The Warrender Papers*, Vols. I and II, edited by Dr. Annie I. Cameron for the Scottish History Society (Edinburgh, 1931-1932), have new material for both insular and continental affairs. Miss Cameron has written able introductions pointing out their importance. Those papers of the Warrender collection dealing with the execution of Mary Queen of Scots have been printed by Sir Robert S. Rait and Miss Cameron in *King James's Secret* (London, 1927). The *Reports* of the Historical Manuscripts Commission, apart from the *Calendar of Salisbury Manuscripts*, have furnished little material for this study. Those on the muniments of the Earl of Moray, on the papers of the Earl of Mar and Kellie at Alloa House, Clackmannanshire (London, 1904, 1930), on the manuscripts of the Earl of Ancaster preserved at Grimsthorpe (Dublin, 1907), on the Laing manuscripts in the University of Edinburgh (London, 1914), and on Various Collections (Vol. iii, London, 1904) have contributed something.

On the English side there are a few letters of interest in Edmund Lodge's *Illustrations of British History* (3 vols., London, 1791) and in Henry Ellis' *Original Letters, Illustrative of Eng-*

*lish History* (first series, 3 vols., London, 1824; second series, 4 vols., London, 1827; third series, 4 vols., London, 1846). Thomas Birch's *Memoirs of the Reign of Queen Elizabeth, From the Year 1581 till her Death* (2 vols., London, 1754) contain much of the correspondence of Essex and Anthony Bacon with Mar, Foulis, and other persons connected with Scotland. The communication between Sir Robert Cecil and James, as evidenced by *The Secret Correspondence of Sir Robert Cecil with James VI. King of Scotland . . .*, edited by David Dalrymple, Lord Hailes (Edinburgh, 1766), and the *Correspondence of King James VI. of Scotland with Sir Robert Cecil and Others . . .*, edited by John Bruce (Camden Society, London, 1861), is discussed at length in the text. There were undoubtedly more letters than those printed. I have found traces of several.<sup>2</sup>

The Scottish History Society has published *Highland Papers*, Vol. I, edited by J. R. N. Macphail (Edinburgh, 1914), which contains documents printed from transcripts concerning Calder's murder, evidence which complicates the tangled circumstances of Moray's murder.

There are relatively few chronicles and narrative sources on the English side. William Camden's *History of the Most Renowned and Victorious Princess Elizabeth . . .* (London, 1688) has interesting passages on Scottish affairs and occasionally quotes documents. Camden wrote partly for James's eye, which may explain his charges against Gray in connection with Mary's death. John Stow's *Annales* (London, 1631) have very little concerning Scotland. The *Memoirs of Robert Cary, Earl of Monmouth . . .* (Edinburgh, 1808) are a first-hand but all too brief biography by the son of Lord Hunsdon, who was familiar with court life, held responsible posts on the borders, and enjoyed the friendship of King James.

Scotland affords rather more in the way of chronicles, memoirs, and narrative accounts than does England. *The Memoires of Sir James Melvil of Halhill*, edited by George Scott (London, 1683), were written by a member of a prominent Scottish family in whom James placed great trust. Melville, rather anti-English in sentiment, wrote graphic accounts of the Danish marriage

<sup>2</sup> See above, p. 255.

negotiations as impeded by England. His tale goes only to the year 1594 and is very brief for the last years. David Moysie, sometime clerk of the Council and employed under the Secretary, wrote vivid *Memoirs of the Affairs of Scotland* (Bannatyne Club, Edinburgh, 1830) which, although brief, are valuable comments on affairs during the period under consideration. *The Historie and Life of King James the Sext . . .* (Bannatyne Club, Edinburgh, 1825) is the work of an anonymous author<sup>3</sup> who was in touch with events and who occasionally wrote caustic comments on the lack of order in Scotland. His detailed history stops at 1596, although there is a continuation which brings the story into the next century.<sup>4</sup>

A number of very short accounts deserve mention, not for any fresh material that they contain, but because they illustrate a typical form of Scots literature. "The Diarey of Robert Birrel, Burges of Edinburghe . . . 1532-1605," printed in *Fragments of Scottish History* (Edinburgh, 1798), George Mariorey-banks' *Annals of Scotland, From the Yeir 1514 To the Yeir 1591* (actually to 1595), edited by J. G. Dalyell (Edinburgh, 1814), and the *Chronicle of the Kings of Scotland, From Fergus the First, To James the Sixth, in the Year M.DC.XI* (Maitland Club, Edinburgh, 1830) are brief chronological notes. The *Annales of Scotland* in *The Historical Works of Sir James Balfour* (4 vols., London, 1825, Vol. I ending at 1603), although not strictly contemporary, are of the same type.

For church history there is much of interest and importance. John Knox's *History of the Reformation of Religion in Scotland*, edited by William M. M'Gavin (Glasgow, 1832), is too early to be of immediate use for the period 1587-1603, but it is almost impossible to understand the Presbyterian point of view without some glance at the great Reformer's

<sup>3</sup> David Laing, in his Introduction to Colville, *Letters*, considered Colville the author.

<sup>4</sup> A manuscript chronicle in the National Library of Scotland, No. 35. 5. 3., "Manuscript of the History of Scotland," is attributed to Dr. Anderson, probably Patrick Anderson, physician to Charles I. Laing MSS., 203, in the University of Edinburgh is a copy of this chronicle, which covers the period from Fergus I to 1597. It was probably written by a person living in the late sixteenth century for the description of the "December 17th Tumult" is the account of an eye-witness. It is interesting but has little that is new for the period 1587-1603.

work. His *First Blast of the Trumpet against the Monstrous Regimen of Women* is, perhaps, his best-known work. The best authority for the kirk is David Calderwood, who wrote his *History of the Kirk of Scotland*, edited by Thomas Thomson for the Wodrow Society (Vols. IV–VI, Edinburgh, 1843–1845), early in the seventeenth century. Calderwood made free use of William Scot's *Apologetical Narration of the State and Government of the Kirk of Scotland Since the Reformation* (Wodrow Society, Edinburgh, 1846) and of *The Autobiography and Diary of Mr James Melvill*, edited by Robert Pitcairn for the Wodrow Society (Edinburgh, 1842), a vigorous first-hand account from the pen of an earnest Presbyterian minister who was in the thick of the struggle between king and kirk. Calderwood's is a strongly prejudiced Presbyterian point of view, in marked contrast to John Spottiswood's *History of the Church of Scotland*, edited by M. Russell (3 vols., Edinburgh, 1847–1851), also written early in the seventeenth century, giving the Episcopalian version of church politics. Spottiswood's style is more polished but less vigorous than Calderwood's. Both print many documents.

#### FOREIGN AFFAIRS

##### *France*

The foreign correspondence in the Public Record Office furnishes another source for Anglo-Scottish affairs, particularly in their relation to other European nations. The State Papers are classified under geographical headings and are arranged chronologically. They are mostly letters from news agents or "intelligencers" in the designated country and, if the English government maintained an ambassador there, his dispatches and the orders issued to him. Since formal diplomatic relations were maintained by England with France and Holland, these collections are of greatest value.

From 1595 on, many of the papers of Thomas Edmondes, English resident agent in Paris, have been edited by G. G. Butler for the Roxburghe Club (*The Edmondes Papers*, London, 1913) from the State Papers, France, in the Public Record Office, and from the Stowe collection in the British Mu-



seum. Thomas Birch's *Historical View of the Negotiations Between the Courts of England, France, and Brussels, From the Year 1592 to 1617* . . . (London, 1749) includes many of the same letters. The Public Record Office collection has much of the correspondence of Sir Henry Neville, Sir Thomas Parry, the Master of Gray, and Ralph Winwood for the last years of Elizabeth's reign. See also Winwood's *Memorials of Affairs of State in the Reigns of Q. Elizabeth and K. James I* . . . (3 vols., London, 1725).

For material emanating from French agents, the most important source in English archives is the series of French transcripts in the Public Record Office. These are copies of the correspondence, preserved in French archives, between Henry IV, Villeroy, and Henry's ambassadors in London and Edinburgh. Extracts from many have been printed in Vol. IV of A. Teulet's *Relations Politiques de la France et de l'Espagne avec l'Écosse au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle* (5 vols., Paris, 1862), but Teulet includes only passages bearing directly on Scotland. It is worth while going through the transcripts for matters which, although of more general interest, have a bearing on the Anglo-Scottish situation. Volumes II to VI inclusive of the *Recueil des Lettres Missives de Henri IV*, Berger de Xivrey and J. Guadet, editors (9 vols., Paris, 1843-1876), have disappointingly little about Scottish affairs. Volume III of the *Memoires d'Estat* of Villeroy (4 vols., Sedan and Paris, 1622-1623) and the *Memoires de Maximilien de Béthune Duc de Sully, Principal Ministre de Henry Le Grand*, Vol. II (London, 1747), contain a few items of interest for this study. The truth of Sully's story about his embassy to Elizabeth in 1601, when, according to Sully, she openly acknowledged James as her successor, is destroyed by P. Laffleur de Kermaingant in *L'Ambassade de France en Angleterre sous Henri IV; Mission de Jean de Thumery Sieur de Boissize (1598-1602)*, I, 553-557. This book, printed in Paris in 1886, and its successor, the *Mission de Christophe de Harlay Comte de Beaumont (1602-1605)* (Paris, 1895), are careful studies of Anglo-French relations. Volume I in each case is the author's critical essay on his subject, and Vol. II *pièces justificatives*, mostly letters from Henry to his representatives, many of which are among

the French transcripts in the Public Record Office and are printed in part in Teulet's Volume IV. For French influence at Rome and its effect on the English succession, see the *Letres du Cardinal D'Ossat*, edited by M. Amelot de la Houssaie (Vols. I and II, Paris, 1698), and R. Couzard, *Une Ambassade à Rome sous Henri IV, Septembre 1601-Juin 1605* (Paris, [1902]). Couzard's brilliant essay is based mostly on letters of Philippe de Béthune, brother of Sully, who had gone to Scotland in 1599 and was Henry's ambassador at Rome early in the next century.

T. Moncrieff printed the formal grants of privileges accorded to Scots in France in his "Memoirs concerning the Ancient Alliance between the French and Scots, and the Privileges of the Scots in France . . ." in *Miscellanea Scotica* (Vol. IV, Glasgow, 1819).

Of secondary works, William Forbes-Leith's *Scots Men-at-arms and Life-Guards in France . . .* (2 vols., Edinburgh, 1882) and F. Michel's *Les Écossais en France; Les Français en Écosse* (2 vols., London, 1862) provide miscellaneous information. J. B. Black's *Elizabeth and Henry IV* (Oxford, 1914) is a short but useful account of the growing estrangement between France and England in the last years of Elizabeth.

### *Holland*

Holland was of less importance than France in the story of Anglo-Scottish relations. About it there is some material in the State Papers, Holland, in the Public Record Office, of which I have made a hasty survey. There are a few letters of minor importance in the National Library of Scotland, Balcarras collection, Vol. VI. Volume I of *The Scots Brigade in Holland*, edited by James Ferguson for the Scottish History Society (Edinburgh, 1899), has valuable material from the archives at The Hague, including the Dutch ambassadors' report of their journey to Scotland in 1594 to attend the baptism of Prince Henry. James usually maintained in Camphvere a diplomatic representative to the Estates in the person of the Conservator of the Scots' privileges, really the agent of the Convention of the Royal Burghs, and the Estates at times

had an agent, probably for commercial purposes, in Edinburgh. I have found no correspondence of these agents.

### *Rome and Spain*

A vast amount of material exists about the complications arising from Spanish ambitions, papal zeal to reclaim England and Scotland, and the intrigues of exiled English and Scottish Catholics. Perhaps the most important source is the series of Roman transcripts in the Public Record Office, copies from papal registers and other archives in Rome. They consist chiefly of communications between the papal secretary and the various legates and nuncios abroad, together with some letters from Creswell, Parsons, and others, and formal briefs from Clement VIII touching on English affairs. Arnold Oscar Meyer, in his excellent book, *England and the Catholic Church under Queen Elizabeth* (English translation by J. R. McKee, London, 1916, the translation approved by the author), and in his monograph, "Clemens VIII und Jakob I von England," printed in *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken*, VII (1904), 268 ff., has made extensive use of Roman archives. Father J. H. Pollen found valuable material in the Roman transcripts in the Public Record Office and in various Roman Catholic archives which he used in his articles in *The Month*: "The Politics of the English Catholics during the Reign of Queen Elizabeth," Part VI, C (1902), 176-188; "The Question of Queen Elizabeth's Successor," CI (1903), 517-533; and "The Accession of King James I.," CI (1903), 572-585. These two men have garnered the best from the Catholic sources but it is worth while going through the transcripts for a general view of the Pope's policy with respect to France and Spain and the English question. The State Papers, Spain, in the Public Record Office have some interesting notes from "intelligencers" abroad, but little of great value for this study. The State Papers, Flanders, contain items of continental gossip, rumor, and fact, much of which has been calendared in the *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic*, although some notes concerning Scottish affairs have been omitted there. A hasty survey of the State Papers, Flanders, convinced me that they had little of importance for

my theme. The Denmilne collection in the National Library of Scotland has valuable papers about James's attempted *rap-prochement* with Spain through Lord Sempill. Other manuscript sources noted above, such as the State Papers, France, Scotland, and the British Museum collections contribute scattered material.

Much source material is printed. The *Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series*, for the reign of Elizabeth has been published only to 1588 and is devoted largely to material from the Low Countries found in the Public Record Office. Volume XXI for 1586-1588 in four parts, edited by Mrs. Sophie Crawford Lomas and A. B. Hinds (H.M. Stationery Office, London, 1927-1931), and Vol. XXII for July-December, 1588, edited by R. B. Wernham (H.M. Stationery Office, London, 1936), contribute little to this study. The *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, Relating to English Affairs, Existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice, and in other Libraries of Northern Italy*, Vols. VIII and IX, edited by H. F. Brown (H.M. Stationery Office, London, 1894-1897), has the comments of Venetian ambassadors stationed in France, Spain, and elsewhere. M. A. S. Hume's *Calendar of Letters and State Papers Relating to English Affairs Preserved in, or originally belonging to, the Archives of Simancas* (Vols. III and IV, H.M. Stationery Office, London, 1896-1899) prints abstracts from archives in Simancas, Paris, and London, but the collection is meager for certain years. The numerous volumes in the *Colección de Documentos Inéditos para la Historia de España* contain nothing of value for Scottish affairs for this period. The publication of the *Correspondance d'Ottavio Mirto Frangipani (1596-1606)* now in progress (two volumes have appeared, Rome, Brussels, Paris, 1924-1932) makes available interesting notes and observations from the papal nuncio in Flanders. See the reviews by J. D. Mackie in the *English Historical Review*, XLIII (1928), 126-127, and XLIX (1934), 130-132. Some valuable material is contained in the *Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne sur Les Affaires des Pays-Bas au XVII<sup>e</sup> Siècle*, Tome I, *Précis de la Correspondance de Philippe III (1598-1621)*, edited by Henri Lonchay and Joseph Cuvelier (Commission Royale d'Histoire, Brussels, 1923).



T. F. Knox's edition of *The Letters and Memorials of William, Cardinal Allen (1532-1594)* (London, 1882) is important for showing the activities and quarrels of Allen, Parsons, Crichton, and others.

For more general controversial literature, especially concerning the Jesuits and their enemies, see the *Catholic Record Society Miscellanea* (Vol. II, London, 1906), where Father Pollen has edited Parsons' briefer works, his "Autobiography," "Domesticall Difficulties," and "Certayne Aparent Iudgments." His *Manifestation of the Great Folly and Bad Spirit of certayne in England calling themselves secular priestes . . .* (1602) was a violent attack on his enemies. Curious papers concerning the priest, John Cecil, and his controversy with Father Crichton about James are printed by T. G. Law in "Documents Illustrating Catholic Policy in the Reign of James VI" in the *Miscellany of the Scottish History Society* (Vol. I, Edinburgh, 1893), and in J. R. Elder's *Spanish Influences in Scottish History* (Glasgow, 1920), where Cecil's *A Discoverye of the Errors Committed and Inivryes don to his Ma: off Scotlande . . .* is reprinted. G. Con's *De Duplici Statu Religioni apud Scotos* (1628) and the *Narratives of Scottish Catholics under Mary Stuart and James VI*, edited by W. Forbes-Leith (Edinburgh, 1885), are extremely untrustworthy contemporary statements.

Secondary works vary greatly. Ludwig Pastor's *History of the Popes from the Close of the Middle Ages*, English edition by R. F. Kerr, Vols. XXIII and XXIV (London, 1933), has an excellent general account of Clement VIII, although the sections on Scotland are not particularly good. The bibliography is very useful. Gardiner's *History* has already been noted.<sup>5</sup> Meyer's and Pollen's works are invaluable, based on sound scholarship.<sup>6</sup> Meyer prints documents from papal archives illustrating James's relations with the Pope from 1598 to 1603 in his "Clemens VIII und Jakob I. . . ." Volume III of A. Bellesheim's *History of the Catholic Church of Scotland*, translated by D. O. Hunter Blair (Edinburgh, 1889) has an interesting note and documents relative to Anne's conversion.

<sup>5</sup> See above, pp. 302-303.

<sup>6</sup> See above, p. 317.

John Lingard's *History of England from the First Invasion by the Romans to the Accession of William and Mary in 1688*, Vols. VI and VII covering 1558–1642 (10 vols., Dublin, 1874), is written from the Catholic point of view. The section on James VI before 1603 is slight and inaccurate. M. A. Tierney's edition of Dodd's *Church History of England from the Commencement of the Sixteenth Century to the Revolution in 1688* (5 vols., London, 1839–1843) is invaluable for its lengthy footnotes and appendices, containing documents relative to the Catholic question. The text is almost worthless. Peter Guilday's *English Catholic Refugees on the Continent, 1558–1795*, I (London, 1914), 85–115, contains a good account of the dissensions among exiled Catholics, written from a Catholic point of view. Robert Lechat, in *Les Réfugiés Anglais dans les Pays-Bas espagnols durant le règne d'Elisabeth, 1558–1603* (Louvain, 1914), has collected facts from printed sources concerning the troubles of those Catholics abroad who were trying to avoid the sacrifice of either religion or patriotism. By far the best study of these dissensions is the work of T. G. Law, whose *Collected Essays and Reviews*, edited by P. Hume Brown (Edinburgh, 1904), and *Historical Sketch of the Conflicts between Jesuits and Seculars in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth* (London, 1889) are careful, scholarly contributions to the subject. His Introduction to "Documents Illustrating Catholic Policy in the Reign of James VI"<sup>7</sup> throws much light on the negotiations of Poury Ogilvy.

J. Martin's articles in the *Revue d'histoire diplomatique* (1911), pp. 279–307, 359–378, on "Clement VIII et Jacques Stuart" are based almost exclusively on the *Calendars of State Papers, Venice, and Spain*. They are confused, slight, and poorly annotated. M. A. S. Hume's *Treason and Plot* (London, 1901) is a readable account of Spanish intrigues in Scotland, but suffers from poor annotation. *Spanish Influences in Scottish History* by J. R. Elder (Glasgow, 1920) is a useful summary of printed materials.

Professor J. D. Mackie of the University of Glasgow has devoted much time to the study of James's foreign policy. His contributions to the *Scottish Historical Review* are thoughtful

<sup>7</sup> See above, p. 319.

essays on various aspects of James's career. They are: "A Secret Agent of James VI," IX (1911-1912), 376-386; "The Will of Mary Stuart," XI (1913-1914), 338-344; "Scotland and the Spanish Armada," XII (1914-1915), 1-23; "The Secret Diplomacy of King James VI. in Italy prior to his Accession to the English Throne," XXI (1923-1924), 267-282; "James VI. and I. and the Peace with Spain, 1604," XXIII (1925-1926), 241-249; "The Elizabethan Intelligence Department," XXV (1927-1928), 385-386. Professor Mackie is thoroughly familiar with the contents of the Denmilne and Balcarres papers in the National Library of Scotland and has drawn most of his new material from them. He is a defender of the idea that James may have been sincere in his effort to effect a compromise with Rome and to bring peace to a troubled world.

For the policy of the Archduke Albert in Flanders, Joseph Cuvelier's "Les Préliminaires du traité de Londres (29 août, 1604)" in the *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*, II (1923), 279-304, 485-508, should be mentioned, along with Antonio Rodriguez-Villa's *Ambrosio Spinola* (Madrid, 1905).

### *Florence and Venice*

Professor Mackie has printed in *Negotiations between King James VI. and I. and Ferdinand I. Grand Duke of Tuscany* (St. Andrews University publication, 1927) letters from the Balcarres and Denmilne collections about James's relations with Florence. The Denmilne papers include a few letters about Anthony Sherley's activities in Venice and William Keith's journey there. For Keith's mission, see *Letters and State Papers during the Reign of King James the Sixth*, edited by James Maidment for the Abbotsford Club (Edinburgh, 1838).

### MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS

#### *Anne of Denmark*

*Papers Relative to the Marriage of King James the Sixth of Scotland with the Princess Anna of Denmark* (Bannatyne Club, Edinburgh, 1828) has nothing of importance for the political aspects of the marriage with Anne. L. Laursen,

*Traité du Danemark et de la Norwège*, III (1905), 14-21, prints the marriage treaty. There are a few miscellaneous letters concerning Danish affairs among the Denmilne papers, but nothing of importance for this period.

In addition to Bellesheim's and Meyer's contributions concerning Anne of Denmark's religion, the letter from Anne to Cardinal Borghese, published by G. F. Warner in the *English Historical Review*, XX (1905), 126-127, and Abercromby's narrative, published by Joseph Stevenson in *The Month and Catholic Review*, XVI (1879), 256-265, are useful. See also *English Historical Review*, III (1888), 795-798, and IV (1889), 110, for notes on the question.

### *Essex and Raleigh*

For the Essex story and its sequel in the form of Raleigh's troubles, James Spedding's edition of *The Letters and the Life of Francis Bacon* . . . (Vol. II, London, 1890), T. B. Howell's *Complete Collection of State Trials and Proceedings for High Treason* . . . (Vol. I, London, 1816), David Jardine's *Lives and Criminal Trials of Celebrated Men* (Philadelphia, 1835) and his *Criminal Trials* (Vol. I, London, 1832) have been useful. Much material concerning Essex is printed in the appendix to the Camden Society volume, *Correspondence of King James VI. of Scotland with Sir Robert Cecil and Others* . . . (1861). Edward Edwards' *The Life of Sir Walter Raleigh* . . . *Together with His Letters* (2 vols., London, 1868) is important for the last years of Elizabeth's reign.

### *Arbella Stewart*

Arbella Stewart has two biographers—Elizabeth Cooper, who published *The Life and Letters of Lady Arabella Stuart* (2 vols., London, 1866), and Miss E. T. Bradley, whose *Life of the Lady Arabella Stuart* (2 vols., London, 1889) has superseded the other. Documents are printed at length in Miss Bradley's work, but the editors of the *Calendar of Salisbury MSS.*, Vol. XII, have called attention to some slight errors. An article in the *Edinburgh Review*, Vol. CCCLXXVIII (October, 1896), collects from dispatches of Venetian ambassadors pertinent material concerning Arbella.



## CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE ON THE SUCCESSION QUESTION

There are many contemporary pamphlets, both printed and in manuscript form, discussing the possible successor to Elizabeth. A *conference about the next Succession to the crowne of ingland . . .* (1594), attributed to Robert Parsons, although the name on the title-page is R. Doleman, is the most important one on the Catholic side. It called forth many answers, among which are *A Discoverye of a counterfecte conference helde at a counterfecte place, by counterfecte travellers, for thadvancement of a counterfecte tytyle, and invented, printed, and published by one (PERSON) that dare not avowve his name* (Collen, 1600), perhaps the work of Henry Constable;<sup>8</sup> Sir John Hayward's *Answer To the First Part of a Certaine Conference Concerning Succession . . .* (London, 1603); and Sir Thomas Craig's *Right of Succession to the Kingdom of England . . .* (written in 1603, published in London, 1703). Peter Wentworth's *Pithie Exhortation To Her Maiestie For Establishing Her Sccessor To the crowne . . .* and its sequel, *A Discovrse containing the Authors opinion of the true and lavvfull successor to her Maiestie* (1598), are the best known Puritan statements in favor of the Scottish King. In 1602 Sir John Harrington, Elizabeth's godson, wrote *A Tract on the Succession to the Crown*, an entertaining essay directed at Puritans, Papists, and "Protestants" on James's behalf, but it was not published until 1880 (Roxburghe Club, London). James P. R. Lyell, in the *English Historical Review*, LI (April, 1936), 300-301, described a book printed by Robert Waldegrave in Edinburgh in 1599, *A Treatise Declaring, And confirming against all obiections the just title and right of the most excellent and worthie Prince, Iames the sixt, King of Scotland, to the succession of the croun of England*. Colville's *Palinode*, first printed in Edinburgh in 1600, was reprinted by the Bannatyne Club in their publication of his letters (Edinburgh, 1858). A manuscript, entitled "An apologie of the Scottische king," number 245 of the Laing collection in the University of Edinburgh Library, is an eloquent vindication of James, written by an anonymous Englishman about

<sup>8</sup> S. P. Scotland, LXVI, No. 44, Nicolson to Cecil, July 22, 1600.

1600, and an earnest request for a public declaration of him as Elizabeth's rightful heir. In his paper, "Of succession to the Crowne of England" (British Museum, Regius 17 B XI), Henry Hooke argued for James but defended Elizabeth for refusing to nominate him explicitly. Cotton MSS., Julius F vi, f. 248, is a brief Latin discourse defending the Queen's silence. Among the State Papers, Scotland, is a brief Latin writing proving the validity of James's title (Vol. lix, No. 56), probably the work of the Frenchman, M. Jessé.<sup>9</sup> Thomas Wilson's short outline of the rival candidates is preserved in the Public Record Office, State Papers, Domestic, Elizabeth, cclxxx.

In the British Museum, Lansdowne MSS., number 512, ff. 12-33, there is a copy of a Catholic plan to restore England to the Roman faith at Elizabeth's death by judicious grants of ecclesiastical lands, by abolition of debts and of the court of wards, and by grant of privileges to those who would aid the Papist cause. Compare Cotton MSS., Julius F vi, ff. 139-141, "Sir Edmund Ashfeild to the King of Scottes." These documents have a Protestant parallel in the suggestions sent to James as measures necessary to win the hearts of the English (National Library of Scotland, Denmilne MSS., 33. 1. 7, no. 4, printed in the appendix of Robertson's *History*).

No bibliographical discussion of contemporary literature bearing on the succession should omit the products of the pen of James himself which were calculated to make him admired for his wisdom. A collection of his works was first made in London in 1616—*The Workes Of The Most High And Mightie Prince, Iames By The Grace Of God, King of Great Britaine, France And Ireland, Defender of the Faith, &c.* This is the basis of C. H. McIlwain's *Political Works of James I* (Cambridge, Mass., 1918). The *Basilicon Doron* and *The Trewe Law of Free Monarchies* are the most revealing as to the King's ideas on government.

<sup>9</sup> S. P. Scotland, LIX, No. 57, Bowes to Burghley, Oct. 12, 1596.

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